With the introduction of static/trusted nodes, the peer count
can go above MaxPeers. Update the capacity check to handle this.
While here, decouple the trusted nodes check from the handshake
by passing a function instead.
The previous metric was pubkey1^pubkey2, as specified in the Kademlia
paper. We missed that EC public keys are not uniformly distributed.
Using the hash of the public keys addresses that. It also makes it
a bit harder to generate node IDs that are close to a particular node.
This commit changes the discovery protocol to use the new "v4" endpoint
format, which allows for separate UDP and TCP ports and makes it
possible to discover the UDP address after NAT.
Peer.readLoop will only terminate if the connection is closed. Fix the
hang by closing the connection before waiting for readLoop to terminate.
This also removes the british disconnect procedure where we're waiting
for the remote end to close the connection. I have confirmed with
@subtly that cpp-ethereum doesn't adhere to it either.
This is supposed to apply some back pressure so Server is not accepting
more connections than it can actually handle. The current limit is 50.
This doesn't really need to be configurable, but we'll see how it
behaves in our test nodes and adjust accordingly.
As of this commit, p2p will disconnect nodes directly after the
encryption handshake if too many peer connections are active.
Errors in the protocol handshake packet are now handled more politely
by sending a disconnect packet before closing the connection.
There were multiple synchronization issues in the disconnect handling,
all caused by the odd special-casing of Peer.readLoop errors. Remove the
special handling of read errors and make readLoop part of the Peer
WaitGroup.
Thanks to @Gustav-Simonsson for pointing at arrows in a diagram
and playing rubber-duck.
This a fix for an attack vector where the discovery protocol could be
used to amplify traffic in a DDOS attack. A malicious actor would send a
findnode request with the IP address and UDP port of the target as the
source address. The recipient of the findnode packet would then send a
neighbors packet (which is 16x the size of findnode) to the victim.
Our solution is to require a 'bond' with the sender of findnode. If no
bond exists, the findnode packet is not processed. A bond between nodes
α and β is created when α replies to a ping from β.
This (initial) version of the bonding implementation might still be
vulnerable against replay attacks during the expiration time window.
We will add stricter source address validation later.
This is better because protocols might not actually read the payload for
some errors (msg too big, etc.) which can be a pain to test with the old
behaviour.
Message encoding functions have been renamed to catch any uses.
The switch to the new encoder can cause subtle incompatibilities.
If there are any users outside of our tree, they will at least be
alerted that there was a change.
NewMsg no longer exists. The replacements for EncodeMsg are called
Send and SendItems.
With RLPx frames, the message code is contained in the
frame and is no longer part of the encoded data.
EncodeMsg, Msg.Decode have been updated to match.
Code that decodes RLP directly from Msg.Payload will need
to change.
This mostly changes how information is passed around.
Instead of using many function parameters and return values,
put the entire state in a struct and pass that.
This also adds back derivation of ecdhe-shared-secret. I deleted
it by accident in a previous refactoring.
The diff is a bit bigger than expected because the protocol handshake
logic has moved out of Peer. This is necessary because the protocol
handshake will have custom framing in the final protocol.
Range expressions capture the length of the slice once before the first
iteration. A range expression cannot be used here since the loop
modifies the slice variable (including length changes).
