## Issue Addressed
Addresses #2557
## Proposed Changes
Adds the `lighthouse validator-manager` command, which provides:
- `lighthouse validator-manager create`
- Creates a `validators.json` file and a `deposits.json` (same format as https://github.com/ethereum/staking-deposit-cli)
- `lighthouse validator-manager import`
- Imports validators from a `validators.json` file to the VC via the HTTP API.
- `lighthouse validator-manager move`
- Moves validators from one VC to the other, utilizing only the VC API.
## Additional Info
In 98bcb947c I've reduced some VC `ERRO` and `CRIT` warnings to `WARN` or `DEBG` for the case where a pubkey is missing from the validator store. These were being triggered when we removed a validator but still had it in caches. It seems to me that `UnknownPubkey` will only happen in the case where we've removed a validator, so downgrading the logs is prudent. All the logs are `DEBG` apart from attestations and blocks which are `WARN`. I thought having *some* logging about this condition might help us down the track.
In 856cd7e37d I've made the VC delete the corresponding password file when it's deleting a keystore. This seemed like nice hygiene. Notably, it'll only delete that password file after it scans the validator definitions and finds that no other validator is also using that password file.
## Issue Addressed
NA
## Proposed Changes
We've been seeing a lot of [CI failures](https://github.com/sigp/lighthouse/actions/runs/5781296217/job/15666209142) with errors like this:
```
---- extra_interchange_tests::export_same_key_twice stdout ----
thread 'extra_interchange_tests::export_same_key_twice' panicked at 'called `Result::unwrap()` on an `Err` value: SQLError("Unable to open database: Error(None)")', validator_client/slashing_protection/src/extra_interchange_tests.rs:48:67
```
I'm assuming they're timeouts. I noticed that tests have a 0.1s timeout. Perhaps this just doesn't cut it when our new runners are overloaded.
## Additional Info
NA
## Issue Addressed
#4386
## Proposed Changes
The original proposal described in the issue adds a new endpoint to support updating validator graffiti, but I realized we already have an endpoint that we use for updating various validator fields in memory and in the validator definitions file, so I think that would be the best place to add this to.
### API endpoint
`PATCH lighthouse/validators/{validator_pubkey}`
This endpoint updates the graffiti in both the [ validator definition file](https://lighthouse-book.sigmaprime.io/graffiti.html#2-setting-the-graffiti-in-the-validator_definitionsyml) and the in memory `InitializedValidators`. In the next block proposal, the new graffiti will be used.
Note that the [`--graffiti-file`](https://lighthouse-book.sigmaprime.io/graffiti.html#1-using-the---graffiti-file-flag-on-the-validator-client) flag has a priority over the validator definitions file, so if the caller attempts to update the graffiti while the `--graffiti-file` flag is present, the endpoint will return an error (Bad request 400).
## Tasks
- [x] Add graffiti update support to `PATCH lighthouse/validators/{validator_pubkey}`
- [x] Return error if user tries to update graffiti while the `--graffiti-flag` is set
- [x] Update Lighthouse book
## Issue Addressed
NA
## Proposed Changes
Adds the `--validator-registration-batch-size` flag to the VC to allow runtime configuration of the number of validators POSTed to the [`validator/register_validator`](https://ethereum.github.io/beacon-APIs/?urls.primaryName=dev#/Validator/registerValidator) endpoint.
There are builders (Agnostic and Eden) that are timing out with `regsiterValidator` requests with ~400 validators, even with a 9 second timeout. Exposing the batch size will help tune batch sizes to (hopefully) avoid this.
This PR should not change the behavior of Lighthouse when the new flag is not provided (i.e., the same default value is used).
## Additional Info
NA
## Issue Addressed
NA
## Proposed Changes
Downgrade a `CRIT` to an `ERRO` when there's an `Irrecoverable` error whilst publishing a blinded block.
It's quite common for builders successfully broadcast a block to the network whilst failing to respond to the BN when it publishes a signed, blinded block. The VC is currently raising a `CRIT` when this happens and I think that's excessive.
These changes have the same intent as #4073. In that PR I only managed to remove the `CRIT`s in the BN but missed this one in the VC.
I've also tidied the log messages to:
- Give them all the same title (*"Error whilst producing block"*) to help with grepping.
- Include the `block_slot` so it's easy to look up the slot in an explorer and see if it was actually skipped.
## Additional Info
This PR should not change any logic beyond logging.
This PR adds the ability to read the Lighthouse logs from the HTTP API for both the BN and the VC.
This is done in such a way to as minimize any kind of performance hit by adding this feature.
The current design creates a tokio broadcast channel and mixes is into a form of slog drain that combines with our main global logger drain, only if the http api is enabled.
The drain gets the logs, checks the log level and drops them if they are below INFO. If they are INFO or higher, it sends them via a broadcast channel only if there are users subscribed to the HTTP API channel. If not, it drops the logs.
If there are more than one subscriber, the channel clones the log records and converts them to json in their independent HTTP API tasks.
Co-authored-by: Michael Sproul <micsproul@gmail.com>
## Issue Addressed
https://github.com/sigp/lighthouse/pull/4309#issuecomment-1556052261
## Proposed Changes
Log the `Connected to beacon node` message only if the node was previously offline. This avoids a regression in logging after #4295, whereby the `Connected to beacon node` message would be logged every slot.
The new reduced logging is _slightly different_ from what we had prior to my changes in #4295. The main difference is that we used to log the `Connected` message whenever a node was online and subject to a health check (for being unhealthy in some other way). I think the new behaviour is reasonable, as the `Connected` message isn't particularly helpful if the BN is unhealthy, and the specific reason for unhealthiness will be logged by the warnings for `is_compatible`/`is_synced`.
## Issue Addressed
Closes https://github.com/sigp/lighthouse/issues/4291, part of #3613.
## Proposed Changes
- Implement the `el_offline` field on `/eth/v1/node/syncing`. We set `el_offline=true` if:
- The EL's internal status is `Offline` or `AuthFailed`, _or_
- The most recent call to `newPayload` resulted in an error (more on this in a moment).
- Use the `el_offline` field in the VC to mark nodes with offline ELs as _unsynced_. These nodes will still be used, but only after synced nodes.
- Overhaul the usage of `RequireSynced` so that `::No` is used almost everywhere. The `--allow-unsynced` flag was broken and had the opposite effect to intended, so it has been deprecated.
- Add tests for the EL being offline on the upcheck call, and being offline due to the newPayload check.
## Why track `newPayload` errors?
Tracking the EL's online/offline status is too coarse-grained to be useful in practice, because:
- If the EL is timing out to some calls, it's unlikely to timeout on the `upcheck` call, which is _just_ `eth_syncing`. Every failed call is followed by an upcheck [here](693886b941/beacon_node/execution_layer/src/engines.rs (L372-L380)), which would have the effect of masking the failure and keeping the status _online_.
- The `newPayload` call is the most likely to time out. It's the call in which ELs tend to do most of their work (often 1-2 seconds), with `forkchoiceUpdated` usually returning much faster (<50ms).
- If `newPayload` is failing consistently (e.g. timing out) then this is a good indication that either the node's EL is in trouble, or the network as a whole is. In the first case validator clients _should_ prefer other BNs if they have one available. In the second case, all of their BNs will likely report `el_offline` and they'll just have to proceed with trying to use them.
## Additional Changes
- Add utility method `ForkName::latest` which is quite convenient for test writing, but probably other things too.
- Delete some stale comments from when we used to support multiple execution nodes.
It is a well-known fact that IP addresses for beacon nodes used by specific validators can be de-anonymized. There is an assumed risk that a malicious user may attempt to DOS validators when producing blocks to prevent chain growth/liveness.
Although there are a number of ideas put forward to address this, there a few simple approaches we can take to mitigate this risk.
Currently, a Lighthouse user is able to set a number of beacon-nodes that their validator client can connect to. If one beacon node is taken offline, it can fallback to another. Different beacon nodes can use VPNs or rotate IPs in order to mask their IPs.
This PR provides an additional setup option which further mitigates attacks of this kind.
This PR introduces a CLI flag --proposer-only to the beacon node. Setting this flag will configure the beacon node to run with minimal peers and crucially will not subscribe to subnets or sync committees. Therefore nodes of this kind should not be identified as nodes connected to validators of any kind.
It also introduces a CLI flag --proposer-nodes to the validator client. Users can then provide a number of beacon nodes (which may or may not run the --proposer-only flag) that the Validator client will use for block production and propagation only. If these nodes fail, the validator client will fallback to the default list of beacon nodes.
Users are then able to set up a number of beacon nodes dedicated to block proposals (which are unlikely to be identified as validator nodes) and point their validator clients to produce blocks on these nodes and attest on other beacon nodes. An attack attempting to prevent liveness on the eth2 network would then need to preemptively find and attack the proposer nodes which is significantly more difficult than the default setup.
This is a follow on from: #3328
Co-authored-by: Michael Sproul <michael@sigmaprime.io>
Co-authored-by: Paul Hauner <paul@paulhauner.com>
## Issue Addressed
Addresses #4117
## Proposed Changes
See https://github.com/ethereum/keymanager-APIs/pull/58 for proposed API specification.
## TODO
- [x] ~~Add submission to BN~~
- removed, see discussion in [keymanager API](https://github.com/ethereum/keymanager-APIs/pull/58)
- [x] ~~Add flag to allow voluntary exit via the API~~
- no longer needed now the VC doesn't submit exit directly
- [x] ~~Additional verification / checks, e.g. if validator on same network as BN~~
- to be done on client side
- [x] ~~Potentially wait for the message to propagate and return some exit information in the response~~
- not required
- [x] Update http tests
- [x] ~~Update lighthouse book~~
- not required if this endpoint makes it to the standard keymanager API
Co-authored-by: Paul Hauner <paul@paulhauner.com>
Co-authored-by: Jimmy Chen <jimmy@sigmaprime.io>
## Title
Optimise `update_validators` by decrypting key cache only when necessary
## Issue Addressed
Resolves [#3968: Slow performance of validator client PATCH API with hundreds of keys](https://github.com/sigp/lighthouse/issues/3968)
## Proposed Changes
1. Add a check to determine if there is at least one local definition before decrypting the key cache.
2. Assign an empty `KeyCache` when all definitions are of the `Web3Signer` type.
3. Perform cache-related operations (e.g., saving the modified key cache) only if there are local definitions.
## Additional Info
This PR addresses the excessive CPU usage and slow performance experienced when using the `PATCH lighthouse/validators/{pubkey}` request with a large number of keys. The issue was caused by the key cache using cryptography to decipher and cipher the cache entities every time the request was made. This operation called `scrypt`, which was very slow and required a lot of memory when there were many concurrent requests.
These changes have no impact on the overall functionality but can lead to significant performance improvements when working with remote signers. Importantly, the key cache is never used when there are only `Web3Signer` definitions, avoiding the expensive operation of decrypting the key cache in such cases.
Co-authored-by: Maksim Shcherbo <max.shcherbo@consensys.net>
* rename 4844 to deneb
* rename 4844 to deneb
* move excess data gas field
* get EF tests working
* fix ef tests lint
* fix the blob identifier ef test
* fix accessed files ef test script
* get beacon chain tests passing
## Issue Addressed
NA
## Proposed Changes
In #4024 we added metrics to expose the latency measurements from a VC to each BN. Whilst playing with these new metrics on our infra I realised it would be great to have a single metric to make sure that the primary BN for each VC has a reasonable latency. With the current "metrics for all BNs" it's hard to tell which is the primary.
## Additional Info
NA
## Issue Addressed
NA
## Proposed Changes
- Adds a `WARN` statement for Capella, just like the previous forks.
- Adds a hint message to all those WARNs to suggest the user update the BN or VC.
## Additional Info
NA
## Issue Addressed
Closes#3963 (hopefully)
## Proposed Changes
Compute attestation selection proofs gradually each slot rather than in a single `join_all` at the start of each epoch. On a machine with 5k validators this replaces 5k tasks signing 5k proofs with 1 task that signs 5k/32 ~= 160 proofs each slot.
Based on testing with Goerli validators this seems to reduce the average time to produce a signature by preventing Tokio and the OS from falling over each other trying to run hundreds of threads. My testing so far has been with local keystores, which run on a dynamic pool of up to 512 OS threads because they use [`spawn_blocking`](https://docs.rs/tokio/1.11.0/tokio/task/fn.spawn_blocking.html) (and we haven't changed the default).
An earlier version of this PR hyper-optimised the time-per-signature metric to the detriment of the entire system's performance (see the reverted commits). The current PR is conservative in that it avoids touching the attestation service at all. I think there's more optimising to do here, but we can come back for that in a future PR rather than expanding the scope of this one.
The new algorithm for attestation selection proofs is:
- We sign a small batch of selection proofs each slot, for slots up to 8 slots in the future. On average we'll sign one slot's worth of proofs per slot, with an 8 slot lookahead.
- The batch is signed halfway through the slot when there is unlikely to be contention for signature production (blocks are <4s, attestations are ~4-6 seconds, aggregates are 8s+).
## Performance Data
_See first comment for updated graphs_.
Graph of median signing times before this PR:
Graph of update attesters metric (includes selection proof signing) before this PR:
Median signing time after this PR (prototype from 12:00, updated version from 13:30):
99th percentile on signing times (bounded attestation signing from 16:55, now removed):
Attester map update timing after this PR:
Selection proof signings per second change:
## Link to late blocks
I believe this is related to the slow block signings because logs from Stakely in #3963 show these two logs almost 5 seconds apart:
> Feb 23 18:56:23.978 INFO Received unsigned block, slot: 5862880, service: block, module: validator_client::block_service:393
> Feb 23 18:56:28.552 INFO Publishing signed block, slot: 5862880, service: block, module: validator_client::block_service:416
The only thing that happens between those two logs is the signing of the block:
0fb58a680d/validator_client/src/block_service.rs (L410-L414)
Helpfully, Stakely noticed this issue without any Lighthouse BNs in the mix, which pointed to a clear issue in the VC.
## TODO
- [x] Further testing on testnet infrastructure.
- [x] Make the attestation signing parallelism configurable.
## Issue Addressed
NA
## Proposed Changes
Adds a service which periodically polls (11s into each mainnet slot) the `node/version` endpoint on each BN and roughly measures the round-trip latency. The latency is exposed as a `DEBG` log and a Prometheus metric.
The `--latency-measurement-service` has been added to the VC, with the following options:
- `--latency-measurement-service true`: enable the service (default).
- `--latency-measurement-service`: (without a value) has the same effect.
- `--latency-measurement-service false`: disable the service.
## Additional Info
Whilst looking at our staking setup, I think the BN+VC latency is contributing to late blocks. Now that we have to wait for the builders to respond it's nice to try and do everything we can to reduce that latency. Having visibility is the first step.
## Issue Addressed
Cleans up all the remnants of 4844 in capella. This makes sure when 4844 is reviewed there is nothing we are missing because it got included here
## Proposed Changes
drop a bomb on every 4844 thing
## Additional Info
Merge process I did (locally) is as follows:
- squash merge to produce one commit
- in new branch off unstable with the squashed commit create a `git revert HEAD` commit
- merge that new branch onto 4844 with `--strategy ours`
- compare local 4844 to remote 4844 and make sure the diff is empty
- enjoy
Co-authored-by: Paul Hauner <paul@paulhauner.com>
This fixes issues with certain metrics scrapers, which might error if the content-type is not correctly set.
## Issue Addressed
Fixes https://github.com/sigp/lighthouse/issues/3437
## Proposed Changes
Simply set header: `Content-Type: text/plain` on metrics server response. Seems like the errored branch does this correctly already.
## Additional Info
This is needed also to enable influx-db metric scraping which work very nicely with Geth.
## Issue Addressed
Resolves#2521
## Proposed Changes
Add a metric that indicates the next attestation duty slot for all managed validators in the validator client.
## Issue Addressed
#3853
## Proposed Changes
Added `INFO` level logs for requesting and receiving the unsigned block.
## Additional Info
Logging for successfully publishing the signed block is already there. And seemingly there is a log for when "We realize we are going to produce a block" in the `start_update_service`: `info!(log, "Block production service started");
`. Is there anywhere else you'd like to see logging around this event?
Co-authored-by: GeemoCandama <104614073+GeemoCandama@users.noreply.github.com>
## Issue Addressed
#3780
## Proposed Changes
Add error reporting that notifies the node operator that the `voting_keystore_path` in their `validator_definitions.yml` file may be incorrect.
## Additional Info
There is more info in issue #3780
Co-authored-by: Paul Hauner <paul@paulhauner.com>
## Proposed Changes
With proposer boosting implemented (#2822) we have an opportunity to re-org out late blocks.
This PR adds three flags to the BN to control this behaviour:
* `--disable-proposer-reorgs`: turn aggressive re-orging off (it's on by default).
* `--proposer-reorg-threshold N`: attempt to orphan blocks with less than N% of the committee vote. If this parameter isn't set then N defaults to 20% when the feature is enabled.
* `--proposer-reorg-epochs-since-finalization N`: only attempt to re-org late blocks when the number of epochs since finalization is less than or equal to N. The default is 2 epochs, meaning re-orgs will only be attempted when the chain is finalizing optimally.
For safety Lighthouse will only attempt a re-org under very specific conditions:
1. The block being proposed is 1 slot after the canonical head, and the canonical head is 1 slot after its parent. i.e. at slot `n + 1` rather than building on the block from slot `n` we build on the block from slot `n - 1`.
2. The current canonical head received less than N% of the committee vote. N should be set depending on the proposer boost fraction itself, the fraction of the network that is believed to be applying it, and the size of the largest entity that could be hoarding votes.
3. The current canonical head arrived after the attestation deadline from our perspective. This condition was only added to support suppression of forkchoiceUpdated messages, but makes intuitive sense.
4. The block is being proposed in the first 2 seconds of the slot. This gives it time to propagate and receive the proposer boost.
## Additional Info
For the initial idea and background, see: https://github.com/ethereum/consensus-specs/pull/2353#issuecomment-950238004
There is also a specification for this feature here: https://github.com/ethereum/consensus-specs/pull/3034
Co-authored-by: Michael Sproul <micsproul@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: pawan <pawandhananjay@gmail.com>
## Issue Addressed
#3766
## Proposed Changes
Adds an endpoint to get the graffiti that will be used for the next block proposal for each validator.
## Usage
```bash
curl -H "Authorization: Bearer api-token" http://localhost:9095/lighthouse/ui/graffiti | jq
```
```json
{
"data": {
"0x81283b7a20e1ca460ebd9bbd77005d557370cabb1f9a44f530c4c4c66230f675f8df8b4c2818851aa7d77a80ca5a4a5e": "mr f was here",
"0xa3a32b0f8b4ddb83f1a0a853d81dd725dfe577d4f4c3db8ece52ce2b026eca84815c1a7e8e92a4de3d755733bf7e4a9b": "mr v was here",
"0x872c61b4a7f8510ec809e5b023f5fdda2105d024c470ddbbeca4bc74e8280af0d178d749853e8f6a841083ac1b4db98f": null
}
}
```
## Additional Info
This will only return graffiti that the validator client knows about.
That is from these 3 sources:
1. Graffiti File
2. validator_definitions.yml
3. The `--graffiti` flag on the VC
If the graffiti is set on the BN, it will not be returned. This may warrant an additional endpoint on the BN side which can be used in the event the endpoint returns `null`.
This PR adds some health endpoints for the beacon node and the validator client.
Specifically it adds the endpoint:
`/lighthouse/ui/health`
These are not entirely stable yet. But provide a base for modification for our UI.
These also may have issues with various platforms and may need modification.
## Issue Addressed
Closes#3612
## Proposed Changes
- Iterates through BNs until it finds a non-optimistic head.
A slight change in error behavior:
- Previously: `spawn_contribution_tasks` did not return an error for a non-optimistic block head. It returned `Ok(())` logged a warning.
- Now: `spawn_contribution_tasks` returns an error if it cannot find a non-optimistic block head. The caller of `spawn_contribution_tasks` then logs the error as a critical error.
Co-authored-by: Michael Sproul <micsproul@gmail.com>
## Issue Addressed
New lints for rust 1.65
## Proposed Changes
Notable change is the identification or parameters that are only used in recursion
## Additional Info
na
## Summary
The deposit cache now has the ability to finalize deposits. This will cause it to drop unneeded deposit logs and hashes in the deposit Merkle tree that are no longer required to construct deposit proofs. The cache is finalized whenever the latest finalized checkpoint has a new `Eth1Data` with all deposits imported.
This has three benefits:
1. Improves the speed of constructing Merkle proofs for deposits as we can just replay deposits since the last finalized checkpoint instead of all historical deposits when re-constructing the Merkle tree.
2. Significantly faster weak subjectivity sync as the deposit cache can be transferred to the newly syncing node in compressed form. The Merkle tree that stores `N` finalized deposits requires a maximum of `log2(N)` hashes. The newly syncing node then only needs to download deposits since the last finalized checkpoint to have a full tree.
3. Future proofing in preparation for [EIP-4444](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-4444) as execution nodes will no longer be required to store logs permanently so we won't always have all historical logs available to us.
## More Details
Image to illustrate how the deposit contract merkle tree evolves and finalizes along with the resulting `DepositTreeSnapshot`
## Other Considerations
I've changed the structure of the `SszDepositCache` so once you load & save your database from this version of lighthouse, you will no longer be able to load it from older versions.
Co-authored-by: ethDreamer <37123614+ethDreamer@users.noreply.github.com>
* add capella gossip boiler plate
* get everything compiling
Co-authored-by: realbigsean <sean@sigmaprime.io
Co-authored-by: Mark Mackey <mark@sigmaprime.io>
* small cleanup
* small cleanup
* cargo fix + some test cleanup
* improve block production
* add fixme for potential panic
Co-authored-by: Mark Mackey <mark@sigmaprime.io>
## Issue Addressed
Resolves#3516
## Proposed Changes
Adds a beacon fallback function for running a beacon node http query on all available fallbacks instead of returning on a first successful result. Uses the new `run_on_all` method for attestation and sync committee subscriptions.
## Additional Info
Please provide any additional information. For example, future considerations
or information useful for reviewers.
## Issue Addressed
fixes lints from the last rust release
## Proposed Changes
Fix the lints, most of the lints by `clippy::question-mark` are false positives in the form of https://github.com/rust-lang/rust-clippy/issues/9518 so it's allowed for now
## Additional Info
## Issue Addressed
Resolves: #3550
Remove the `--strict-fee-recipient` flag. It will cause missed proposals prior to the bellatrix transition.
Co-authored-by: realbigsean <sean@sigmaprime.io>
## Issue Addressed
Closes#3514
## Proposed Changes
- Change default monitoring endpoint frequency to 120 seconds to fit with 30k requests/month limit.
- Allow configuration of the monitoring endpoint frequency using `--monitoring-endpoint-frequency N` where `N` is a value in seconds.
## Issue Addressed
[Have --checkpoint-sync-url timeout](https://github.com/sigp/lighthouse/issues/3478)
## Proposed Changes
I added a parameter for `get_bytes_opt_accept_header<U: IntoUrl>` which accept a timeout duration, and modified the body of `get_beacon_blocks_ssz` and `get_debug_beacon_states_ssz` to pass corresponding timeout durations.
## Issue Addressed
Resolves#3524
## Proposed Changes
Log fee recipient in the `Validator exists in beacon chain` log. Logging in the BN already happens here 18c61a5e8b/beacon_node/beacon_chain/src/beacon_chain.rs (L3858-L3865)
I also think it's good practice to encourage users to set the fee recipient in the VC rather than the BN because of issues mentioned here https://github.com/sigp/lighthouse/issues/3432
Some example logs from prater:
```
Aug 30 03:47:09.922 INFO Validator exists in beacon chain fee_recipient: 0xab97_ad88, validator_index: 213615, pubkey: 0xb542b69ba14ddbaf717ca1762ece63a4804c08d38a1aadf156ae718d1545942e86763a1604f5065d4faa550b7259d651, service: duties
Aug 30 03:48:05.505 INFO Validator exists in beacon chain fee_recipient: Fee recipient for validator not set in validator_definitions.yml or provided with the `--suggested-fee-recipient flag`, validator_index: 210710, pubkey: 0xad5d67cc7f990590c7b3fa41d593c4cf12d9ead894be2311fbb3e5c733d8c1b909e9d47af60ea3480fb6b37946c35390, service: duties
```
Co-authored-by: Paul Hauner <paul@paulhauner.com>
## Issue Addressed
Relates to https://github.com/sigp/lighthouse/issues/3416
## Proposed Changes
- Add an `OfflineOnFailure` enum to the `first_success` method for querying beacon nodes so that a val registration request failure from the BN -> builder does not result in the BN being marked offline. This seems important because these failures could be coming directly from a connected relay and actually have no bearing on BN health. Other messages that are sent to a relay have a local fallback so shouldn't result in errors
- Downgrade the following log to a `WARN`
```
ERRO Unable to publish validator registrations to the builder network, error: All endpoints failed https://BN_B => RequestFailed(ServerMessage(ErrorMessage { code: 500, message: "UNHANDLED_ERROR: BuilderMissing", stacktraces: [] })), https://XXXX/ => Unavailable(Offline), [omitted]
```
## Additional Info
I think this change at least improves the UX of having a VC connected to some builder and some non-builder beacon nodes. I think we need to balance potentially alerting users that there is a BN <> VC misconfiguration and also allowing this type of fallback to work.
If we want to fully support this type of configuration we may want to consider adding a flag `--builder-beacon-nodes` and track whether a VC should be making builder queries on a per-beacon node basis. But I think the changes in this PR are independent of that type of extension.
PS: Sorry for the big diff here, it's mostly formatting changes after I added a new arg to a bunch of methods calls.
Co-authored-by: realbigsean <sean@sigmaprime.io>
## Issue Addressed
NA
## Proposed Changes
Indicate that local keystores are `readonly: Some(false)` rather than `None` via the `/eth/v1/keystores` method on the VC API.
I'll mark this as backwards-incompat so we remember to mention it in the release notes. There aren't any type-level incompatibilities here, just a change in how Lighthouse responds to responses.
## Additional Info
- Blocked on #3464
## Proposed Changes
Update the merge migration docs to encourage updating mainnet configs _now_!
The docs are also updated to recommend _against_ `--suggested-fee-recipient` on the beacon node (https://github.com/sigp/lighthouse/issues/3432).
Additionally the `--help` for the CLI is updated to match with a few small semantic changes:
- `--execution-jwt` is no longer allowed without `--execution-endpoint`. We've ended up without a default for `--execution-endpoint`, so I think that's fine.
- The flags related to the JWT are only allowed if `--execution-jwt` is provided.
## Issue Addressed
Resolves#3388Resolves#2638
## Proposed Changes
- Return the `BellatrixPreset` on `/eth/v1/config/spec` by default.
- Allow users to opt out of this by providing `--http-spec-fork=altair` (unless there's a Bellatrix fork epoch set).
- Add the Altair constants from #2638 and make serving the constants non-optional (the `http-disable-legacy-spec` flag is deprecated).
- Modify the VC to only read the `Config` and not to log extra fields. This prevents it from having to muck around parsing the `ConfigAndPreset` fields it doesn't need.
## Additional Info
This change is backwards-compatible for the VC and the BN, but is marked as a breaking change for the removal of `--http-disable-legacy-spec`.
I tried making `Config` a `superstruct` too, but getting the automatic decoding to work was a huge pain and was going to require a lot of hacks, so I gave up in favour of keeping the default-based approach we have now.
## Issue Addressed
Fixes#2967
## Proposed Changes
Collect validator indices alongside attestations when creating signed
attestations (and aggregates) for inclusion in the logs.
## Additional Info
This is my first time looking at Lighthouse source code and using Rust, so newbie feedback appreciated!
## Issue Addressed
https://github.com/sigp/lighthouse/issues/3091
Extends https://github.com/sigp/lighthouse/pull/3062, adding pre-bellatrix block support on blinded endpoints and allowing the normal proposal flow (local payload construction) on blinded endpoints. This resulted in better fallback logic because the VC will not have to switch endpoints on failure in the BN <> Builder API, the BN can just fallback immediately and without repeating block processing that it shouldn't need to. We can also keep VC fallback from the VC<>BN API's blinded endpoint to full endpoint.
## Proposed Changes
- Pre-bellatrix blocks on blinded endpoints
- Add a new `PayloadCache` to the execution layer
- Better fallback-from-builder logic
## Todos
- [x] Remove VC transition logic
- [x] Add logic to only enable builder flow after Merge transition finalization
- [x] Tests
- [x] Fix metrics
- [x] Rustdocs
Co-authored-by: Mac L <mjladson@pm.me>
Co-authored-by: realbigsean <sean@sigmaprime.io>
## Issue Addressed
Resolves#3151
## Proposed Changes
When fetching duties for sync committee contributions, check the value of `execution_optimistic` of the head block from the BN and refuse to sign any sync committee messages `if execution_optimistic == true`.
## Additional Info
- Is backwards compatible with older BNs
- Finding a way to add test coverage for this would be prudent. Open to suggestions.
## Issue Addressed
Resolves#3267Resolves#3156
## Proposed Changes
- Move the log for fee recipient checks from proposer cache insertion into block proposal so we are directly checking what we get from the EE
- Only log when there is a discrepancy with the local EE, not when using the builder API. In the `builder-api` branch there is an `info` log when there is a discrepancy, I think it is more likely there will be a difference in fee recipient with the builder api because proposer payments might be made via a transaction in the block. Not really sure what patterns will become commong.
- Upgrade the log from a `warn` to an `error` - not actually sure which we want, but I think this is worth an error because the local EE with default transaction ordering I think should pretty much always use the provided fee recipient
- add a `strict-fee-recipient` flag to the VC so we only sign blocks with matching fee recipients. Falls back from the builder API to the local API if there is a discrepancy .
Co-authored-by: realbigsean <sean@sigmaprime.io>
## Issue Addressed
#3302
## Proposed Changes
Move the `reqwest::Client` from being initialized per-validator, to being initialized per distinct Web3Signer.
This is done by placing the `Client` into a `HashMap` keyed by the definition of the Web3Signer as specified by the `ValidatorDefintion`. This will allow multiple Web3Signers to be used with a single VC and also maintains backwards compatibility.
## Additional Info
This was done to reduce the memory used by the VC when connecting to a Web3Signer.
I set up a local testnet using [a custom script](https://github.com/macladson/lighthouse/tree/web3signer-local-test/scripts/local_testnet_web3signer) and ran a VC with 200 validator keys:
VC with Web3Signer:
- `unstable`: ~200MB
- With fix: ~50MB
VC with Local Signer:
- `unstable`: ~35MB
- With fix: ~35MB
> I'm seeing some fragmentation with the VC using the Web3Signer, but not when using a local signer (this is most likely due to making lots of http requests and dealing with lots of JSON objects). I tested the above using `MALLOC_ARENA_MAX=1` to try to reduce the fragmentation. Without it, the values are around +50MB for both `unstable` and the fix.
## Issue Addressed
Web3signer validators can't produce post-Bellatrix blocks.
## Proposed Changes
Add support for Bellatrix to web3signer validators.
## Additional Info
I am running validators with this code on Ropsten, but it may be a while for them to get a proposal.
## Issue Addressed
Resolves#3276.
## Proposed Changes
Add a timeout for the sync committee contributions at 1/4 the slot length such that we may be able to try backup beacon nodes in the case of contribution post failure.
## Additional Info
1/4 slot length seemed standard for the timeouts, but may want to decrease this to 1/2.
I did not find any timeout related / sync committee related tests, so there are no tests. Happy to write some with a bit of guidance.
## Issue Addressed
* #3173
## Proposed Changes
Moved all `fee_recipient_file` related logic inside the `ValidatorStore` as it makes more sense to have this all together there. I tested this with the validators I have on `mainnet-shadow-fork-5` and everything appeared to work well. Only technicality is that I can't get the method to return `401` when the authorization header is not specified (it returns `400` instead). Fixing this is probably quite difficult given that none of `warp`'s rejections have code `401`.. I don't really think this matters too much though as long as it fails.
## Issue Addressed
Lays the groundwork for builder API changes by implementing the beacon-API's new `register_validator` endpoint
## Proposed Changes
- Add a routine in the VC that runs on startup (re-try until success), once per epoch or whenever `suggested_fee_recipient` is updated, signing `ValidatorRegistrationData` and sending it to the BN.
- TODO: `gas_limit` config options https://github.com/ethereum/builder-specs/issues/17
- BN only sends VC registration data to builders on demand, but VC registration data *does update* the BN's prepare proposer cache and send an updated fcU to a local EE. This is necessary for fee recipient consistency between the blinded and full block flow in the event of fallback. Having the BN only send registration data to builders on demand gives feedback directly to the VC about relay status. Also, since the BN has no ability to sign these messages anyways (so couldn't refresh them if it wanted), and validator registration is independent of the BN head, I think this approach makes sense.
- Adds upcoming consensus spec changes for this PR https://github.com/ethereum/consensus-specs/pull/2884
- I initially applied the bit mask based on a configured application domain.. but I ended up just hard coding it here instead because that's how it's spec'd in the builder repo.
- Should application mask appear in the api?
Co-authored-by: realbigsean <sean@sigmaprime.io>
## Issue Addressed
Following up from https://github.com/sigp/lighthouse/pull/3223#issuecomment-1158718102, it has been observed that the validator client uses vastly more memory in some compilation configurations than others. Compiling with Cross and then putting the binary into an Ubuntu 22.04 image seems to use 3x more memory than compiling with Cargo directly on Debian bullseye.
## Proposed Changes
Enable malloc metrics for the validator client. This will hopefully allow us to see the difference between the two compilation configs and compare heap fragmentation. This PR doesn't enable malloc tuning for the VC because it was found to perform significantly worse. The `--disable-malloc-tuning` flag is repurposed to just disable the metrics.
## Issue Addressed
#3154
## Proposed Changes
Add three new metrics for the VC:
1. `vc_beacon_nodes_synced_count`
2. `vc_beacon_nodes_available_count`
3. `vc_beacon_nodes_total_count`
Their values mirror the values present in the following log line:
```
Apr 08 17:25:17.000 INFO Connected to beacon node(s) synced: 4, available: 4, total: 4, service: notifier
```
## Issue Addressed
This fixes the low-hanging Clippy lints introduced in Rust 1.61 (due any hour now). It _ignores_ one lint, because fixing it requires a structural refactor of the validator client that needs to be done delicately. I've started on that refactor and will create another PR that can be reviewed in more depth in the coming days. I think we should merge this PR in the meantime to unblock CI.
## Issue Addressed
Web3Signer validators do not support client authentication. This means the `--tls-known-clients-file` option on Web3Signer can't be used with Lighthouse.
## Proposed Changes
Add two new fields to Web3Signer validators, `client_identity_path` and `client_identity_password`, which specify the path and password for a PKCS12 file containing a certificate and private key. If `client_identity_path` is present, use the certificate for SSL client authentication.
## Additional Info
I am successfully validating on Prater using client authentication with Web3Signer and client authentication.
