## Issue Addressed
NA
## Proposed Changes
Addresses an interesting DoS vector raised by @protolambda by verifying that the head and target are consistent when processing aggregate attestations. This check prevents us from loading very old target blocks and doing lots of work to skip them to the current slot.
## Additional Info
NA
Adding UPnP support will help grow the DHT by allowing NAT traversal for peers with UPnP supported routers.
## Issue Addressed
#927
## Proposed Changes
Using IGD library: https://docs.rs/igd/0.10.0/igd/
Adding the the libp2p tcp port and discovery udp port. If this fails it simply logs the attempt and moves on
## Additional Info
Co-authored-by: Age Manning <Age@AgeManning.com>
## Issue Addressed
Solution 2 proposed here: https://github.com/sigp/lighthouse/issues/1435#issuecomment-692317639
## Proposed Changes
- Adds an optional `--wss-checkpoint` flag that takes a string `root:epoch`
- Verify that the given checkpoint exists in the chain, or that the the chain syncs through this checkpoint. If not, shutdown and prompt the user to purge state before restarting.
## Additional Info
Co-authored-by: Paul Hauner <paul@paulhauner.com>
## Issue Addressed
Closes#1680
## Proposed Changes
This PR fixes a race condition in beacon node start-up whereby the pubkey cache could be created by the beacon chain builder before the `PersistedBeaconChain` was stored to disk. When the node restarted, it would find the persisted chain missing, and attempt to start from scratch, creating a new pubkey cache in the process. This call to `ValidatorPubkeyCache::new` would fail if the file already existed (which it did). I changed the behaviour so that pubkey cache initialization now doesn't care whether there's a file already in existence (it's only a cache after all). Instead it will truncate and recreate the file in the race scenario described.
## Issue Addressed
NA
## Proposed Changes
There are four new conditions introduced in v0.12.3:
1. _[REJECT]_ The attestation's epoch matches its target -- i.e. `attestation.data.target.epoch ==
compute_epoch_at_slot(attestation.data.slot)`
1. _[REJECT]_ The attestation's target block is an ancestor of the block named in the LMD vote -- i.e.
`get_ancestor(store, attestation.data.beacon_block_root, compute_start_slot_at_epoch(attestation.data.target.epoch)) == attestation.data.target.root`
1. _[REJECT]_ The committee index is within the expected range -- i.e. `data.index < get_committee_count_per_slot(state, data.target.epoch)`.
1. _[REJECT]_ The number of aggregation bits matches the committee size -- i.e.
`len(attestation.aggregation_bits) == len(get_beacon_committee(state, data.slot, data.index))`.
This PR implements new logic to suit (1) and (2). Tests are added for (3) and (4), although they were already implicitly enforced.
## Additional Info
- There's a bit of edge-case with target root verification that I raised here: https://github.com/ethereum/eth2.0-specs/pull/2001#issuecomment-699246659
- I've had to add an `--ignore` to `cargo audit` to get CI to pass. See https://github.com/sigp/lighthouse/issues/1669
## Issue Addressed
#629
## Proposed Changes
This removes banned peers from the DHT and informs discovery to block the node_id and the known source IP's associated with this node. It has the capabilities of un banning this peer after a period of time.
This also corrects the logic about banning specific IP addresses. We now use seen_ip addresses from libp2p rather than those sent to us via identify (which also include local addresses).
## Issue Addressed
In principle.. closes#1551 but in general are improvements for performance, maintainability and readability. The logic for the optimistic sync in actually simple
## Proposed Changes
There are miscellaneous things here:
- Remove unnecessary `BatchProcessResult::Partial` to simplify the batch validation logic
- Make batches a state machine. This is done to ensure batch state transitions respect our logic (this was previously done by moving batches between `Vec`s) and to ease the cognitive load of the `SyncingChain` struct
- Move most batch-related logic to the batch
- Remove `PendingBatches` in favor of a map of peers to their batches. This is to avoid duplicating peers inside the chain (peer_pool and pending_batches)
- Add `must_use` decoration to the `ProcessingResult` so that chains that request to be removed are handled accordingly. This also means that chains are now removed in more places than before to account for unhandled cases
- Store batches in a sorted map (`BTreeMap`) access is not O(1) but since the number of _active_ batches is bounded this should be fast, and saves performing hashing ops. Batches are indexed by the epoch they start. Sorted, to easily handle chain advancements (range logic)
- Produce the chain Id from the identifying fields: target root and target slot. This, to guarantee there can't be duplicated chains and be able to consistently search chains by either Id or checkpoint
- Fix chain_id not being present in all chain loggers
- Handle mega-edge case where the processor's work queue is full and the batch can't be sent. In this case the chain would lose the blocks, remain in a "syncing" state and waiting for a result that won't arrive, effectively stalling sync.
- When a batch imports blocks or the chain starts syncing with a local finalized epoch greater that the chain's start epoch, the chain is advanced instead of reset. This is to avoid losing download progress and validate batches faster. This also means that the old `start_epoch` now means "current first unvalidated batch", so it represents more accurately the progress of the chain.
- Batch status peers from the same chain to reduce Arc access.
- Handle a couple of cases where the retry counters for a batch were not updated/checked are now handled via the batch state machine. Basically now if we forget to do it, we will know.
- Do not send back the blocks from the processor to the batch. Instead register the attempt before sending the blocks (does not count as failed)
- When re-requesting a batch, try to avoid not only the last failed peer, but all previous failed peers.
- Optimize requesting batches ahead in the buffer by shuffling idle peers just once (this is just addressing a couple of old TODOs in the code)
- In chain_collection, store chains by their id in a map
- Include a mapping from request_ids to (chain, batch) that requested the batch to avoid the double O(n) search on block responses
- Other stuff:
- impl `slog::KV` for batches
- impl `slog::KV` for syncing chains
- PSA: when logging, we can use `%thing` if `thing` implements `Display`. Same for `?` and `Debug`
### Optimistic syncing:
Try first the batch that contains the current head, if the batch imports any block, advance the chain. If not, if this optimistic batch is inside the current processing window leave it there for future use, if not drop it. The tolerance for this block is the same for downloading, but just once for processing
Co-authored-by: Age Manning <Age@AgeManning.com>
## Issue Addressed
N/A
## Proposed Changes
Prevent subscribing to core gossipsub topics until after we have achieved a full sync. This prevents us censoring gossipsub channels, getting penalised in gossipsub 1.1 scoring and saves us computation time in attempting to validate gossipsub messages which we will be unable to do with a non-sync'd chain.
## Issue Addressed
Closes#1472
## Proposed Changes
Add `--staking` ~~and`staking-with-eth1-endpoint`~~ flag to improve UX for stakers.
Co-authored-by: Paul Hauner <paul@paulhauner.com>
## Issue Addressed
- Resolves#1080
## Proposed Changes
- Call `update_pubkey_cache` only in the `build_all_caches` method and `get_validator_index` method.
## Additional Info
This does reduce the number of places the cache is updated, making it simpler. But the `get_validator_index` method is used a couple times when we are iterating through the entire validator registry (or set of active validators). Before, we would only call `update_pubkey_cache` once before iterating through all validators. So I'm not _totally_ sure this change is worth it.
## Issue Addressed
- Resolves#1616
## Proposed Changes
If we look at the function which persists fork choice and the canonical head to disk:
1db8daae0c/beacon_node/beacon_chain/src/beacon_chain.rs (L234-L280)
There is a race-condition which might cause the canonical head and fork choice values to be out-of-sync.
I believe this is the cause of #1616. I managed to recreate the issue and produce a database that was unable to sync under the `master` branch but able to sync with this branch.
These new changes solve the issue by ignoring the persisted `canonical_head_block_root` value and instead getting fork choice to generate it. This ensures that the canonical head is in-sync with fork choice.
## Additional Info
This is hotfix method that leaves some crusty code hanging around. Once this PR is merged (to satisfy the v0.2.x users) we should later update and merge #1638 so we can have a clean fix for the v0.3.x versions.
## Issue Addressed
N/A
## Proposed Changes
Shifts the local `metadata` to `network_globals` making it accessible to the HTTP API and other areas of lighthouse.
## Additional Info
N/A
## Issue Addressed
N/A
## Proposed Changes
Adds the following check from the spec
> A reader SHOULD NOT read more than max_encoded_len(n) bytes after reading the SSZ length-prefix n from the header.
## Issue Addressed
- Resolves#1616
## Proposed Changes
Fixes a bug where we are unable to read the finalized block from fork choice.
## Detail
I had made an assumption that the finalized block always has a parent root of `None`:
e5fc6bab48/consensus/fork_choice/src/fork_choice.rs (L749-L752)
This was a faulty assumption, we don't set parent *roots* to `None`. Instead we *sometimes* set parent *indices* to `None`, depending if this pruning condition is satisfied:
e5fc6bab48/consensus/proto_array/src/proto_array.rs (L229-L232)
The bug manifested itself like this:
1. We attempt to get the finalized block from fork choice
1. We try to check that the block is descendant of the finalized block (note: they're the same block).
1. We expect the parent root to be `None`, but it's actually the parent root of the finalized root.
1. We therefore end up checking if the parent of the finalized root is a descendant of itself. (note: it's an *ancestor* not a *descendant*).
1. We therefore declare that the finalized block is not a descendant of (or eq to) the finalized block. Bad.
## Additional Info
In reflection, I made a poor assumption in the quest to obtain a probably negligible performance gain. The performance gain wasn't worth the risk and we got burnt.
## Issue Addressed
N/A
## Proposed Changes
This will consider all gossipsub messages that have either the `from`, `seqno` or `signature` field as invalid.
## Additional Info
We should not merge this until all other clients have been sending empty fields for a while.
See https://github.com/ethereum/eth2.0-specs/issues/1981 for reference
## Issue Addressed
https://github.com/ethereum/eth2.0-specs/pull/2044
## Proposed Changes
Shifts the gossipsub message id to use the first 8 bytes of the SHA256 hash of the gossipsub message data field.
## Additional Info
We should merge this in once the spec has been decided on. It will cause issues with gossipsub scoring and gossipsub propagation rates (as we won't receive IWANT) messages from clients that also haven't made this update.
## Issue Addressed
#1590
## Proposed Changes
This is a temporary workaround that prevents finalized chain sync from swapping chains. I'm merging this in now until the full solution is ready.
## Issue Addressed
Malicious users could request very large block ranges, more than we expect. Although technically legal, we are now quadraticaly weighting large step sizes in the filter. Therefore users may request large skips, but not a large number of blocks, to prevent requests forcing us to do long chain lookups.
## Proposed Changes
Weight the step parameter in the RPC filter and prevent any overflows that effect us in the step parameter.
## Additional Info
## Issue Addressed
Closes#1365
## Proposed Changes
Dial peers in the `cached_enrs` who aren't connected, aren't banned and satisfy the subnet predicate before making a subnet discovery query.
## Issue Addressed
Partly addresses #1547
## Proposed Changes
This fix addresses the missing attestations at slot 0 of an epoch (also sometimes slot 1 when slot 0 was skipped).
There are 2 cases:
1. BN receives the block for the attestation slot after 4 seconds (1/3rd of the slot).
2. No block is proposed for this slot.
In both cases, when we produce the attestation, we pass the head state to the
`produce_unaggregated_attestation_for_block` function here
9833eca024/beacon_node/beacon_chain/src/beacon_chain.rs (L845-L850)
Since we don't advance the state in this function, we set `attestation.data.source = state.current_justified_checkpoint` which is atleast 2 epochs lower than current_epoch(wall clock epoch).
This attestation is invalid and cannot be included in a block because of this assert from the spec:
```python
if data.target.epoch == get_current_epoch(state):
assert data.source == state.current_justified_checkpoint
state.current_epoch_attestations.append(pending_attestation)
```
https://github.com/ethereum/eth2.0-specs/blob/dev/specs/phase0/beacon-chain.md#attestations
This PR changes the `produce_unaggregated_attestation_for_block` function to ensure that it advances the state before producing the attestation at the new epoch.
Running this on my node, have missed 0 attestations across all 8 of my validators in a 100 epoch period 🎉
To compare, I was missing ~14 attestations across all 8 validators in the same 100 epoch period before the fix.
Will report missed attestations if any after running for another 100 epochs tomorrow.
## Issue Addressed
#1421
## Proposed Changes
Bounding the error_message that can be returned for RPC domain errors
Co-authored-by: Age Manning <Age@AgeManning.com>
Converts the graffiti binary data to string before printing to logs.
## Issue Addressed
#1566
## Proposed Changes
Rather than converting graffiti to a vector the binary data less the last character is passed to String::from_utf_lossy(). This then allows us to call the to_string() function directly to give us the string
## Additional Info
Rust skills are fairly weak
## Issue Addressed
N/A
## Proposed Changes
Adds extended metrics to get a better idea of what is happening at the gossipsub layer of lighthouse. This provides information about mesh statistics per topics, subscriptions and peer scores.
## Additional Info
## Issue Addressed
Fixes#1509
## Proposed Changes
Exit the beacon node if the eth1 endpoint points to an invalid eth1 network. Check the network id before every eth1 cache update and display an error log if the network id has changed to an invalid one.
## Issue Addressed
#1172
## Proposed Changes
* updates the libp2p dependency
* small adaptions based on changes in libp2p
* report not just valid messages but also invalid and distinguish between `IGNORE`d messages and `REJECT`ed messages
Co-authored-by: Age Manning <Age@AgeManning.com>
The PR:
* Adds the ability to generate a crucial test scenario that isn't possible with `BeaconChainHarness` (i.e. two blocks occupying the same slot; previously forks necessitated skipping slots):
* New testing API: Instead of repeatedly calling add_block(), you generate a sorted `Vec<Slot>` and leave it up to the framework to generate blocks at those slots.
* Jumping backwards to an earlier epoch is a hard error, so that tests necessarily generate blocks in a epoch-by-epoch manner.
* Configures the test logger so that output is printed on the console in case a test fails. The logger also plays well with `--nocapture`, contrary to the existing testing framework
* Rewrites existing fork pruning tests to use the new API
* Adds a tests that triggers finalization at a non epoch boundary slot
* Renamed `BeaconChainYoke` to `BeaconChainTestingRig` because the former has been too confusing
* Fixed multiple tests (e.g. `block_production_different_shuffling_long`, `delete_blocks_and_states`, `shuffling_compatible_simple_fork`) that relied on a weird (and accidental) feature of the old `BeaconChainHarness` that attestations aren't produced for epochs earlier than the current one, thus masking potential bugs in test cases.
Co-authored-by: Michael Sproul <michael@sigmaprime.io>
## Issue Addressed
Closes#1488
## Proposed Changes
* Prevent the pruning algorithm from over-eagerly deleting states at skipped slots when they are shared with the canonical chain.
* Add `debug` logging to the pruning algorithm so we have so better chance of debugging future issues from logs.
* Modify the handling of the "finalized state" in the beacon chain, so that it's always the state at the first slot of the finalized epoch (previously it was the state at the finalized block). This gives database pruning a clearer and cleaner view of things, and will marginally impact the pruning of the op pool, observed proposers, etc (in ways that are safe as far as I can tell).
* Remove duplicated `RevertedFinalizedEpoch` check from `after_finalization`
* Delete useless and unused `max_finality_distance`
* Add tests that exercise pruning with shared states at skip slots
* Delete unnecessary `block_strategy` argument from `add_blocks` and friends in the test harness (will likely conflict with #1380 slightly, sorry @adaszko -- but we can fix that)
* Bonus: add a `BeaconChain::with_head` method. I didn't end up needing it, but it turned out quite nice, so I figured we could keep it?
## Additional Info
Any users who have experienced pruning errors on Medalla will need to resync after upgrading to a release including this change. This should end unbounded `chain_db` growth! 🎉
## Issue Addressed
NA
## Proposed Changes
Shift practically all HTTP endpoint handlers to the blocking executor (some very light tasks are left on the core executor).
## Additional Info
This PR covers the `rest_api` which will soon be refactored to suit the standard API. As such, I've cut a few corners and left some existing issues open in this patch. What I have done here should leave the API in state that is not necessary *exactly* the same, but good enough for us to run validators with. Specifically, the number of blocking workers that can be spawned is unbounded and I have not implemented a queue; this will need to be fixed when we implement the standard API.
## Issue Addressed
#1378
## Proposed Changes
Boot node reuses code from beacon_node to initialize network config. This also enables using the network directory to store/load the enr and the private key.
## Additional Info
Note that before this PR the port cli arguments were off (the argument was named `enr-port` but used as `boot-node-enr-port`).
Therefore as port always the cli port argument was used (for both enr and listening). Now the enr-port argument can be used to overwrite the listening port as the public port others should connect to.
Last but not least note, that this restructuring reuses `ethlibp2p::NetworkConfig` that has many more options than the ones used in the boot node. For example the network config has an own `discv5_config` field that gets never used in the boot node and instead another `Discv5Config` gets created later in the boot node process.
Co-authored-by: Age Manning <Age@AgeManning.com>
## Issue Addressed
#1283
## Proposed Changes
All peers with the same IP will be considered banned as long as there are more than 5 (constant) peers with this IP that have a score below the ban threshold. As soon as some of those 5 peers get unbanned (through decay) and if there are then less than 5 peers with a score below the threshold the IP will be considered not banned anymore.
## Issue Addressed
N/A
## Proposed Changes
Refactor attestation service to send out requests to find peers for subnets as soon as we get attestation duties.
Earlier, we had much more involved logic to send the discovery requests to the discovery service only 6 slots before the attestation slot. Now that discovery is much smarter with grouped queries, the complexity in attestation service can be reduced considerably.
Co-authored-by: Age Manning <Age@AgeManning.com>
