forked from cerc-io/plugeth
p2p: EIP-8 changes
This commit is contained in:
parent
ee1debda53
commit
7d8155714b
@ -143,7 +143,8 @@ func TestEOFSignal(t *testing.T) {
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}
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func unhex(str string) []byte {
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b, err := hex.DecodeString(strings.Replace(str, "\n", "", -1))
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r := strings.NewReplacer("\t", "", " ", "", "\n", "")
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b, err := hex.DecodeString(r.Replace(str))
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if err != nil {
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panic(fmt.Sprintf("invalid hex string: %q", str))
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}
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@ -56,6 +56,9 @@ type protoHandshake struct {
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Caps []Cap
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ListenPort uint64
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ID discover.NodeID
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// Ignore additional fields (for forward compatibility).
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Rest []rlp.RawValue `rlp:"tail"`
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}
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// Peer represents a connected remote node.
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363
p2p/rlpx.go
363
p2p/rlpx.go
@ -24,11 +24,14 @@ import (
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"crypto/elliptic"
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"crypto/hmac"
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"crypto/rand"
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"encoding/binary"
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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"hash"
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"io"
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mrand "math/rand"
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"net"
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"os"
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"sync"
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"time"
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@ -51,9 +54,10 @@ const (
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authMsgLen = sigLen + shaLen + pubLen + shaLen + 1
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authRespLen = pubLen + shaLen + 1
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eciesBytes = 65 + 16 + 32
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encAuthMsgLen = authMsgLen + eciesBytes // size of the final ECIES payload sent as initiator's handshake
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encAuthRespLen = authRespLen + eciesBytes // size of the final ECIES payload sent as receiver's handshake
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eciesOverhead = 65 /* pubkey */ + 16 /* IV */ + 32 /* MAC */
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encAuthMsgLen = authMsgLen + eciesOverhead // size of encrypted pre-EIP-8 initiator handshake
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encAuthRespLen = authRespLen + eciesOverhead // size of encrypted pre-EIP-8 handshake reply
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// total timeout for encryption handshake and protocol
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// handshake in both directions.
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@ -151,10 +155,6 @@ func readProtocolHandshake(rw MsgReader, our *protoHandshake) (*protoHandshake,
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if err := msg.Decode(&hs); err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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// validate handshake info
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if hs.Version != our.Version {
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return nil, DiscIncompatibleVersion
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}
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if (hs.ID == discover.NodeID{}) {
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return nil, DiscInvalidIdentity
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}
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@ -200,6 +200,29 @@ type secrets struct {
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Token []byte
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}
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// RLPx v4 handshake auth (defined in EIP-8).
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type authMsgV4 struct {
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gotPlain bool // whether read packet had plain format.
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Signature [sigLen]byte
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InitiatorPubkey [pubLen]byte
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Nonce [shaLen]byte
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Version uint
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// Ignore additional fields (forward-compatibility)
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Rest []rlp.RawValue `rlp:"tail"`
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}
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// RLPx v4 handshake response (defined in EIP-8).
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type authRespV4 struct {
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RandomPubkey [pubLen]byte
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Nonce [shaLen]byte
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Version uint
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// Ignore additional fields (forward-compatibility)
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Rest []rlp.RawValue `rlp:"tail"`
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}
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// secrets is called after the handshake is completed.
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// It extracts the connection secrets from the handshake values.
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func (h *encHandshake) secrets(auth, authResp []byte) (secrets, error) {
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@ -215,7 +238,6 @@ func (h *encHandshake) secrets(auth, authResp []byte) (secrets, error) {
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RemoteID: h.remoteID,
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AES: aesSecret,
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MAC: crypto.Sha3(ecdheSecret, aesSecret),
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Token: crypto.Sha3(sharedSecret),
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}
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// setup sha3 instances for the MACs
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@ -234,114 +256,89 @@ func (h *encHandshake) secrets(auth, authResp []byte) (secrets, error) {
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return s, nil
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}
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func (h *encHandshake) ecdhShared(prv *ecdsa.PrivateKey) ([]byte, error) {
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// staticSharedSecret returns the static shared secret, the result
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// of key agreement between the local and remote static node key.
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func (h *encHandshake) staticSharedSecret(prv *ecdsa.PrivateKey) ([]byte, error) {
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return ecies.ImportECDSA(prv).GenerateShared(h.remotePub, sskLen, sskLen)
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}
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var configSendEIP = os.Getenv("RLPX_EIP8") != ""
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// initiatorEncHandshake negotiates a session token on conn.
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// it should be called on the dialing side of the connection.
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//
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// prv is the local client's private key.
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// token is the token from a previous session with this node.
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func initiatorEncHandshake(conn io.ReadWriter, prv *ecdsa.PrivateKey, remoteID discover.NodeID, token []byte) (s secrets, err error) {
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h, err := newInitiatorHandshake(remoteID)
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h := &encHandshake{initiator: true, remoteID: remoteID}
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authMsg, err := h.makeAuthMsg(prv, token)
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if err != nil {
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return s, err
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}
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auth, err := h.authMsg(prv, token)
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var authPacket []byte
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if configSendEIP {
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authPacket, err = sealEIP8(authMsg, h)
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} else {
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authPacket, err = authMsg.sealPlain(h)
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}
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if err != nil {
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return s, err
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}
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if _, err = conn.Write(auth); err != nil {
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if _, err = conn.Write(authPacket); err != nil {
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return s, err
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}
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response := make([]byte, encAuthRespLen)
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if _, err = io.ReadFull(conn, response); err != nil {
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authRespMsg := new(authRespV4)
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authRespPacket, err := readHandshakeMsg(authRespMsg, encAuthRespLen, prv, conn)
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if err != nil {
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return s, err
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}
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if err := h.decodeAuthResp(response, prv); err != nil {
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if err := h.handleAuthResp(authRespMsg); err != nil {
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return s, err
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}
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return h.secrets(auth, response)
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return h.secrets(authPacket, authRespPacket)
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}
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func newInitiatorHandshake(remoteID discover.NodeID) (*encHandshake, error) {
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rpub, err := remoteID.Pubkey()
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// makeAuthMsg creates the initiator handshake message.
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func (h *encHandshake) makeAuthMsg(prv *ecdsa.PrivateKey, token []byte) (*authMsgV4, error) {
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rpub, err := h.remoteID.Pubkey()
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("bad remoteID: %v", err)
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}
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// generate random initiator nonce
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n := make([]byte, shaLen)
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if _, err := rand.Read(n); err != nil {
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h.remotePub = ecies.ImportECDSAPublic(rpub)
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// Generate random initiator nonce.
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h.initNonce = make([]byte, shaLen)
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if _, err := rand.Read(h.initNonce); err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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// generate random keypair to use for signing
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randpriv, err := ecies.GenerateKey(rand.Reader, secp256k1.S256(), nil)
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// Generate random keypair to for ECDH.
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h.randomPrivKey, err = ecies.GenerateKey(rand.Reader, secp256k1.S256(), nil)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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h := &encHandshake{
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initiator: true,
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remoteID: remoteID,
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remotePub: ecies.ImportECDSAPublic(rpub),
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initNonce: n,
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randomPrivKey: randpriv,
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}
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return h, nil
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}
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// authMsg creates an encrypted initiator handshake message.
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func (h *encHandshake) authMsg(prv *ecdsa.PrivateKey, token []byte) ([]byte, error) {
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var tokenFlag byte
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if token == nil {
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// no session token found means we need to generate shared secret.
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// ecies shared secret is used as initial session token for new peers
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// generate shared key from prv and remote pubkey
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var err error
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if token, err = h.ecdhShared(prv); err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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} else {
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// for known peers, we use stored token from the previous session
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tokenFlag = 0x01
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// Sign known message: static-shared-secret ^ nonce
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token, err = h.staticSharedSecret(prv)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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// sign known message:
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// ecdh-shared-secret^nonce for new peers
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// token^nonce for old peers
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signed := xor(token, h.initNonce)
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signature, err := crypto.Sign(signed, h.randomPrivKey.ExportECDSA())
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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// encode auth message
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// signature || sha3(ecdhe-random-pubk) || pubk || nonce || token-flag
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msg := make([]byte, authMsgLen)
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n := copy(msg, signature)
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n += copy(msg[n:], crypto.Sha3(exportPubkey(&h.randomPrivKey.PublicKey)))
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n += copy(msg[n:], crypto.FromECDSAPub(&prv.PublicKey)[1:])
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n += copy(msg[n:], h.initNonce)
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msg[n] = tokenFlag
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// encrypt auth message using remote-pubk
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return ecies.Encrypt(rand.Reader, h.remotePub, msg, nil, nil)
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msg := new(authMsgV4)
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copy(msg.Signature[:], signature)
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copy(msg.InitiatorPubkey[:], crypto.FromECDSAPub(&prv.PublicKey)[1:])
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copy(msg.Nonce[:], h.initNonce)
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msg.Version = 4
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return msg, nil
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}
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// decodeAuthResp decode an encrypted authentication response message.
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func (h *encHandshake) decodeAuthResp(auth []byte, prv *ecdsa.PrivateKey) error {
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msg, err := crypto.Decrypt(prv, auth)
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if err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("could not decrypt auth response (%v)", err)
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}
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h.respNonce = msg[pubLen : pubLen+shaLen]
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h.remoteRandomPub, err = importPublicKey(msg[:pubLen])
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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// ignore token flag for now
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return nil
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func (h *encHandshake) handleAuthResp(msg *authRespV4) (err error) {
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h.respNonce = msg.Nonce[:]
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h.remoteRandomPub, err = importPublicKey(msg.RandomPubkey[:])
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return err
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}
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// receiverEncHandshake negotiates a session token on conn.
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@ -350,99 +347,165 @@ func (h *encHandshake) decodeAuthResp(auth []byte, prv *ecdsa.PrivateKey) error
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// prv is the local client's private key.
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// token is the token from a previous session with this node.
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func receiverEncHandshake(conn io.ReadWriter, prv *ecdsa.PrivateKey, token []byte) (s secrets, err error) {
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// read remote auth sent by initiator.
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auth := make([]byte, encAuthMsgLen)
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if _, err := io.ReadFull(conn, auth); err != nil {
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return s, err
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}
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h, err := decodeAuthMsg(prv, token, auth)
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authMsg := new(authMsgV4)
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authPacket, err := readHandshakeMsg(authMsg, encAuthMsgLen, prv, conn)
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if err != nil {
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return s, err
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}
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h := new(encHandshake)
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if err := h.handleAuthMsg(authMsg, prv); err != nil {
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return s, err
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}
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// send auth response
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resp, err := h.authResp(prv, token)
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authRespMsg, err := h.makeAuthResp()
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if err != nil {
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return s, err
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}
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if _, err = conn.Write(resp); err != nil {
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var authRespPacket []byte
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if authMsg.gotPlain {
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authRespPacket, err = authRespMsg.sealPlain(h)
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} else {
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authRespPacket, err = sealEIP8(authRespMsg, h)
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}
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if err != nil {
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return s, err
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}
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return h.secrets(auth, resp)
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if _, err = conn.Write(authRespPacket); err != nil {
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return s, err
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}
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return h.secrets(authPacket, authRespPacket)
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}
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func decodeAuthMsg(prv *ecdsa.PrivateKey, token []byte, auth []byte) (*encHandshake, error) {
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var err error
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h := new(encHandshake)
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// generate random keypair for session
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h.randomPrivKey, err = ecies.GenerateKey(rand.Reader, secp256k1.S256(), nil)
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func (h *encHandshake) handleAuthMsg(msg *authMsgV4, prv *ecdsa.PrivateKey) error {
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// Import the remote identity.
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h.initNonce = msg.Nonce[:]
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h.remoteID = msg.InitiatorPubkey
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rpub, err := h.remoteID.Pubkey()
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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return fmt.Errorf("bad remoteID: %#v", err)
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}
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// generate random nonce
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h.remotePub = ecies.ImportECDSAPublic(rpub)
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// Generate random keypair for ECDH.
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// If a private key is already set, use it instead of generating one (for testing).
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if h.randomPrivKey == nil {
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h.randomPrivKey, err = ecies.GenerateKey(rand.Reader, secp256k1.S256(), nil)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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}
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// Check the signature.
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token, err := h.staticSharedSecret(prv)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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signedMsg := xor(token, h.initNonce)
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remoteRandomPub, err := secp256k1.RecoverPubkey(signedMsg, msg.Signature[:])
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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h.remoteRandomPub, _ = importPublicKey(remoteRandomPub)
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return nil
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}
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func (h *encHandshake) makeAuthResp() (msg *authRespV4, err error) {
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// Generate random nonce.
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h.respNonce = make([]byte, shaLen)
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if _, err = rand.Read(h.respNonce); err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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msg, err := crypto.Decrypt(prv, auth)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("could not decrypt auth message (%v)", err)
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}
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// decode message parameters
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// signature || sha3(ecdhe-random-pubk) || pubk || nonce || token-flag
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h.initNonce = msg[authMsgLen-shaLen-1 : authMsgLen-1]
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copy(h.remoteID[:], msg[sigLen+shaLen:sigLen+shaLen+pubLen])
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rpub, err := h.remoteID.Pubkey()
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("bad remoteID: %#v", err)
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}
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h.remotePub = ecies.ImportECDSAPublic(rpub)
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// recover remote random pubkey from signed message.
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if token == nil {
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// TODO: it is an error if the initiator has a token and we don't. check that.
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// no session token means we need to generate shared secret.
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// ecies shared secret is used as initial session token for new peers.
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// generate shared key from prv and remote pubkey.
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if token, err = h.ecdhShared(prv); err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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}
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signedMsg := xor(token, h.initNonce)
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remoteRandomPub, err := secp256k1.RecoverPubkey(signedMsg, msg[:sigLen])
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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// validate the sha3 of recovered pubkey
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remoteRandomPubMAC := msg[sigLen : sigLen+shaLen]
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shaRemoteRandomPub := crypto.Sha3(remoteRandomPub[1:])
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if !bytes.Equal(remoteRandomPubMAC, shaRemoteRandomPub) {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("sha3 of recovered ephemeral pubkey does not match checksum in auth message")
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}
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h.remoteRandomPub, _ = importPublicKey(remoteRandomPub)
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return h, nil
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msg = new(authRespV4)
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copy(msg.Nonce[:], h.respNonce)
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copy(msg.RandomPubkey[:], exportPubkey(&h.randomPrivKey.PublicKey))
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msg.Version = 4
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return msg, nil
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}
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// authResp generates the encrypted authentication response message.
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func (h *encHandshake) authResp(prv *ecdsa.PrivateKey, token []byte) ([]byte, error) {
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// responder auth message
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// E(remote-pubk, ecdhe-random-pubk || nonce || 0x0)
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resp := make([]byte, authRespLen)
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n := copy(resp, exportPubkey(&h.randomPrivKey.PublicKey))
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n += copy(resp[n:], h.respNonce)
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if token == nil {
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resp[n] = 0
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} else {
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resp[n] = 1
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func (msg *authMsgV4) sealPlain(h *encHandshake) ([]byte, error) {
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buf := make([]byte, authMsgLen)
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n := copy(buf, msg.Signature[:])
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n += copy(buf[n:], crypto.Sha3(exportPubkey(&h.randomPrivKey.PublicKey)))
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n += copy(buf[n:], msg.InitiatorPubkey[:])
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n += copy(buf[n:], msg.Nonce[:])
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buf[n] = 0 // token-flag
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return ecies.Encrypt(rand.Reader, h.remotePub, buf, nil, nil)
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}
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func (msg *authMsgV4) decodePlain(input []byte) {
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n := copy(msg.Signature[:], input)
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n += shaLen // skip sha3(initiator-ephemeral-pubk)
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n += copy(msg.InitiatorPubkey[:], input[n:])
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n += copy(msg.Nonce[:], input[n:])
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msg.Version = 4
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msg.gotPlain = true
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}
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func (msg *authRespV4) sealPlain(hs *encHandshake) ([]byte, error) {
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buf := make([]byte, authRespLen)
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n := copy(buf, msg.RandomPubkey[:])
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n += copy(buf[n:], msg.Nonce[:])
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return ecies.Encrypt(rand.Reader, hs.remotePub, buf, nil, nil)
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}
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func (msg *authRespV4) decodePlain(input []byte) {
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n := copy(msg.RandomPubkey[:], input)
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n += copy(msg.Nonce[:], input[n:])
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msg.Version = 4
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}
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var padSpace = make([]byte, 300)
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func sealEIP8(msg interface{}, h *encHandshake) ([]byte, error) {
|
||||
buf := new(bytes.Buffer)
|
||||
if err := rlp.Encode(buf, msg); err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
// encrypt using remote-pubk
|
||||
return ecies.Encrypt(rand.Reader, h.remotePub, resp, nil, nil)
|
||||
// pad with random amount of data. the amount needs to be at least 100 bytes to make
|
||||
// the message distinguishable from pre-EIP-8 handshakes.
|
||||
pad := padSpace[:mrand.Intn(len(padSpace)-100)+100]
|
||||
buf.Write(pad)
|
||||
prefix := make([]byte, 2)
|
||||
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(prefix, uint16(buf.Len()+eciesOverhead))
|
||||
|
||||
enc, err := ecies.Encrypt(rand.Reader, h.remotePub, buf.Bytes(), nil, prefix)
|
||||
return append(prefix, enc...), err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
type plainDecoder interface {
|
||||
decodePlain([]byte)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func readHandshakeMsg(msg plainDecoder, plainSize int, prv *ecdsa.PrivateKey, r io.Reader) ([]byte, error) {
|
||||
buf := make([]byte, plainSize)
|
||||
if _, err := io.ReadFull(r, buf); err != nil {
|
||||
return buf, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Attempt decoding pre-EIP-8 "plain" format.
|
||||
key := ecies.ImportECDSA(prv)
|
||||
if dec, err := key.Decrypt(rand.Reader, buf, nil, nil); err == nil {
|
||||
msg.decodePlain(dec)
|
||||
return buf, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Could be EIP-8 format, try that.
|
||||
prefix := buf[:2]
|
||||
size := binary.BigEndian.Uint16(prefix)
|
||||
if size < uint16(plainSize) {
|
||||
return buf, fmt.Errorf("size underflow, need at least %d bytes", plainSize)
|
||||
}
|
||||
buf = append(buf, make([]byte, size-uint16(plainSize)+2)...)
|
||||
if _, err := io.ReadFull(r, buf[plainSize:]); err != nil {
|
||||
return buf, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
dec, err := key.Decrypt(rand.Reader, buf[2:], nil, prefix)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return buf, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Can't use rlp.DecodeBytes here because it rejects
|
||||
// trailing data (forward-compatibility).
|
||||
s := rlp.NewStream(bytes.NewReader(dec), 0)
|
||||
return buf, s.Decode(msg)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// importPublicKey unmarshals 512 bit public keys.
|
||||
@ -458,7 +521,11 @@ func importPublicKey(pubKey []byte) (*ecies.PublicKey, error) {
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid public key length %v (expect 64/65)", len(pubKey))
|
||||
}
|
||||
// TODO: fewer pointless conversions
|
||||
return ecies.ImportECDSAPublic(crypto.ToECDSAPub(pubKey65)), nil
|
||||
pub := crypto.ToECDSAPub(pubKey65)
|
||||
if pub.X == nil {
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid public key")
|
||||
}
|
||||
return ecies.ImportECDSAPublic(pub), nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func exportPubkey(pub *ecies.PublicKey) []byte {
|
||||
|
235
p2p/rlpx_test.go
235
p2p/rlpx_test.go
@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ import (
|
||||
"crypto/rand"
|
||||
"errors"
|
||||
"fmt"
|
||||
"io"
|
||||
"io/ioutil"
|
||||
"net"
|
||||
"reflect"
|
||||
@ -162,6 +163,7 @@ func TestProtocolHandshake(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
wg.Add(2)
|
||||
go func() {
|
||||
defer wg.Done()
|
||||
defer fd1.Close()
|
||||
rlpx := newRLPX(fd0)
|
||||
remid, err := rlpx.doEncHandshake(prv0, node1)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
@ -178,6 +180,7 @@ func TestProtocolHandshake(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Errorf("dial side proto handshake error: %v", err)
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
phs.Rest = nil
|
||||
if !reflect.DeepEqual(phs, hs1) {
|
||||
t.Errorf("dial side proto handshake mismatch:\ngot: %s\nwant: %s\n", spew.Sdump(phs), spew.Sdump(hs1))
|
||||
return
|
||||
@ -186,6 +189,7 @@ func TestProtocolHandshake(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
}()
|
||||
go func() {
|
||||
defer wg.Done()
|
||||
defer fd1.Close()
|
||||
rlpx := newRLPX(fd1)
|
||||
remid, err := rlpx.doEncHandshake(prv1, nil)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
@ -202,6 +206,7 @@ func TestProtocolHandshake(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Errorf("listen side proto handshake error: %v", err)
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
phs.Rest = nil
|
||||
if !reflect.DeepEqual(phs, hs0) {
|
||||
t.Errorf("listen side proto handshake mismatch:\ngot: %s\nwant: %s\n", spew.Sdump(phs), spew.Sdump(hs0))
|
||||
return
|
||||
@ -216,7 +221,6 @@ func TestProtocolHandshake(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
|
||||
func TestProtocolHandshakeErrors(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
our := &protoHandshake{Version: 3, Caps: []Cap{{"foo", 2}, {"bar", 3}}, Name: "quux"}
|
||||
id := randomID()
|
||||
tests := []struct {
|
||||
code uint64
|
||||
msg interface{}
|
||||
@ -242,11 +246,6 @@ func TestProtocolHandshakeErrors(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
msg: []byte{1, 2, 3},
|
||||
err: newPeerError(errInvalidMsg, "(code 0) (size 4) rlp: expected input list for p2p.protoHandshake"),
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
code: handshakeMsg,
|
||||
msg: &protoHandshake{Version: 9944, ID: id},
|
||||
err: DiscIncompatibleVersion,
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
code: handshakeMsg,
|
||||
msg: &protoHandshake{Version: 3},
|
||||
@ -374,3 +373,227 @@ func TestRLPXFrameRW(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
type handshakeAuthTest struct {
|
||||
input string
|
||||
isPlain bool
|
||||
wantVersion uint
|
||||
wantRest []rlp.RawValue
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
var eip8HandshakeAuthTests = []handshakeAuthTest{
|
||||
// (Auth₁) RLPx v4 plain encoding
|
||||
{
|
||||
input: `
|
||||
048ca79ad18e4b0659fab4853fe5bc58eb83992980f4c9cc147d2aa31532efd29a3d3dc6a3d89eaf
|
||||
913150cfc777ce0ce4af2758bf4810235f6e6ceccfee1acc6b22c005e9e3a49d6448610a58e98744
|
||||
ba3ac0399e82692d67c1f58849050b3024e21a52c9d3b01d871ff5f210817912773e610443a9ef14
|
||||
2e91cdba0bd77b5fdf0769b05671fc35f83d83e4d3b0b000c6b2a1b1bba89e0fc51bf4e460df3105
|
||||
c444f14be226458940d6061c296350937ffd5e3acaceeaaefd3c6f74be8e23e0f45163cc7ebd7622
|
||||
0f0128410fd05250273156d548a414444ae2f7dea4dfca2d43c057adb701a715bf59f6fb66b2d1d2
|
||||
0f2c703f851cbf5ac47396d9ca65b6260bd141ac4d53e2de585a73d1750780db4c9ee4cd4d225173
|
||||
a4592ee77e2bd94d0be3691f3b406f9bba9b591fc63facc016bfa8
|
||||
`,
|
||||
isPlain: true,
|
||||
wantVersion: 4,
|
||||
},
|
||||
// (Auth₂) EIP-8 encoding
|
||||
{
|
||||
input: `
|
||||
01b304ab7578555167be8154d5cc456f567d5ba302662433674222360f08d5f1534499d3678b513b
|
||||
0fca474f3a514b18e75683032eb63fccb16c156dc6eb2c0b1593f0d84ac74f6e475f1b8d56116b84
|
||||
9634a8c458705bf83a626ea0384d4d7341aae591fae42ce6bd5c850bfe0b999a694a49bbbaf3ef6c
|
||||
da61110601d3b4c02ab6c30437257a6e0117792631a4b47c1d52fc0f8f89caadeb7d02770bf999cc
|
||||
147d2df3b62e1ffb2c9d8c125a3984865356266bca11ce7d3a688663a51d82defaa8aad69da39ab6
|
||||
d5470e81ec5f2a7a47fb865ff7cca21516f9299a07b1bc63ba56c7a1a892112841ca44b6e0034dee
|
||||
70c9adabc15d76a54f443593fafdc3b27af8059703f88928e199cb122362a4b35f62386da7caad09
|
||||
c001edaeb5f8a06d2b26fb6cb93c52a9fca51853b68193916982358fe1e5369e249875bb8d0d0ec3
|
||||
6f917bc5e1eafd5896d46bd61ff23f1a863a8a8dcd54c7b109b771c8e61ec9c8908c733c0263440e
|
||||
2aa067241aaa433f0bb053c7b31a838504b148f570c0ad62837129e547678c5190341e4f1693956c
|
||||
3bf7678318e2d5b5340c9e488eefea198576344afbdf66db5f51204a6961a63ce072c8926c
|
||||
`,
|
||||
wantVersion: 4,
|
||||
wantRest: []rlp.RawValue{},
|
||||
},
|
||||
// (Auth₃) RLPx v4 EIP-8 encoding with version 56, additional list elements
|
||||
{
|
||||
input: `
|
||||
01b8044c6c312173685d1edd268aa95e1d495474c6959bcdd10067ba4c9013df9e40ff45f5bfd6f7
|
||||
2471f93a91b493f8e00abc4b80f682973de715d77ba3a005a242eb859f9a211d93a347fa64b597bf
|
||||
280a6b88e26299cf263b01b8dfdb712278464fd1c25840b995e84d367d743f66c0e54a586725b7bb
|
||||
f12acca27170ae3283c1073adda4b6d79f27656993aefccf16e0d0409fe07db2dc398a1b7e8ee93b
|
||||
cd181485fd332f381d6a050fba4c7641a5112ac1b0b61168d20f01b479e19adf7fdbfa0905f63352
|
||||
bfc7e23cf3357657455119d879c78d3cf8c8c06375f3f7d4861aa02a122467e069acaf513025ff19
|
||||
6641f6d2810ce493f51bee9c966b15c5043505350392b57645385a18c78f14669cc4d960446c1757
|
||||
1b7c5d725021babbcd786957f3d17089c084907bda22c2b2675b4378b114c601d858802a55345a15
|
||||
116bc61da4193996187ed70d16730e9ae6b3bb8787ebcaea1871d850997ddc08b4f4ea668fbf3740
|
||||
7ac044b55be0908ecb94d4ed172ece66fd31bfdadf2b97a8bc690163ee11f5b575a4b44e36e2bfb2
|
||||
f0fce91676fd64c7773bac6a003f481fddd0bae0a1f31aa27504e2a533af4cef3b623f4791b2cca6
|
||||
d490
|
||||
`,
|
||||
wantVersion: 56,
|
||||
wantRest: []rlp.RawValue{{0x01}, {0x02}, {0xC2, 0x04, 0x05}},
|
||||
},
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
type handshakeAckTest struct {
|
||||
input string
|
||||
wantVersion uint
|
||||
wantRest []rlp.RawValue
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
var eip8HandshakeRespTests = []handshakeAckTest{
|
||||
// (Ack₁) RLPx v4 plain encoding
|
||||
{
|
||||
input: `
|
||||
049f8abcfa9c0dc65b982e98af921bc0ba6e4243169348a236abe9df5f93aa69d99cadddaa387662
|
||||
b0ff2c08e9006d5a11a278b1b3331e5aaabf0a32f01281b6f4ede0e09a2d5f585b26513cb794d963
|
||||
5a57563921c04a9090b4f14ee42be1a5461049af4ea7a7f49bf4c97a352d39c8d02ee4acc416388c
|
||||
1c66cec761d2bc1c72da6ba143477f049c9d2dde846c252c111b904f630ac98e51609b3b1f58168d
|
||||
dca6505b7196532e5f85b259a20c45e1979491683fee108e9660edbf38f3add489ae73e3dda2c71b
|
||||
d1497113d5c755e942d1
|
||||
`,
|
||||
wantVersion: 4,
|
||||
},
|
||||
// (Ack₂) EIP-8 encoding
|
||||
{
|
||||
input: `
|
||||
01ea0451958701280a56482929d3b0757da8f7fbe5286784beead59d95089c217c9b917788989470
|
||||
b0e330cc6e4fb383c0340ed85fab836ec9fb8a49672712aeabbdfd1e837c1ff4cace34311cd7f4de
|
||||
05d59279e3524ab26ef753a0095637ac88f2b499b9914b5f64e143eae548a1066e14cd2f4bd7f814
|
||||
c4652f11b254f8a2d0191e2f5546fae6055694aed14d906df79ad3b407d94692694e259191cde171
|
||||
ad542fc588fa2b7333313d82a9f887332f1dfc36cea03f831cb9a23fea05b33deb999e85489e645f
|
||||
6aab1872475d488d7bd6c7c120caf28dbfc5d6833888155ed69d34dbdc39c1f299be1057810f34fb
|
||||
e754d021bfca14dc989753d61c413d261934e1a9c67ee060a25eefb54e81a4d14baff922180c395d
|
||||
3f998d70f46f6b58306f969627ae364497e73fc27f6d17ae45a413d322cb8814276be6ddd13b885b
|
||||
201b943213656cde498fa0e9ddc8e0b8f8a53824fbd82254f3e2c17e8eaea009c38b4aa0a3f306e8
|
||||
797db43c25d68e86f262e564086f59a2fc60511c42abfb3057c247a8a8fe4fb3ccbadde17514b7ac
|
||||
8000cdb6a912778426260c47f38919a91f25f4b5ffb455d6aaaf150f7e5529c100ce62d6d92826a7
|
||||
1778d809bdf60232ae21ce8a437eca8223f45ac37f6487452ce626f549b3b5fdee26afd2072e4bc7
|
||||
5833c2464c805246155289f4
|
||||
`,
|
||||
wantVersion: 4,
|
||||
wantRest: []rlp.RawValue{},
|
||||
},
|
||||
// (Ack₃) EIP-8 encoding with version 57, additional list elements
|
||||
{
|
||||
input: `
|
||||
01f004076e58aae772bb101ab1a8e64e01ee96e64857ce82b1113817c6cdd52c09d26f7b90981cd7
|
||||
ae835aeac72e1573b8a0225dd56d157a010846d888dac7464baf53f2ad4e3d584531fa203658fab0
|
||||
3a06c9fd5e35737e417bc28c1cbf5e5dfc666de7090f69c3b29754725f84f75382891c561040ea1d
|
||||
dc0d8f381ed1b9d0d4ad2a0ec021421d847820d6fa0ba66eaf58175f1b235e851c7e2124069fbc20
|
||||
2888ddb3ac4d56bcbd1b9b7eab59e78f2e2d400905050f4a92dec1c4bdf797b3fc9b2f8e84a482f3
|
||||
d800386186712dae00d5c386ec9387a5e9c9a1aca5a573ca91082c7d68421f388e79127a5177d4f8
|
||||
590237364fd348c9611fa39f78dcdceee3f390f07991b7b47e1daa3ebcb6ccc9607811cb17ce51f1
|
||||
c8c2c5098dbdd28fca547b3f58c01a424ac05f869f49c6a34672ea2cbbc558428aa1fe48bbfd6115
|
||||
8b1b735a65d99f21e70dbc020bfdface9f724a0d1fb5895db971cc81aa7608baa0920abb0a565c9c
|
||||
436e2fd13323428296c86385f2384e408a31e104670df0791d93e743a3a5194ee6b076fb6323ca59
|
||||
3011b7348c16cf58f66b9633906ba54a2ee803187344b394f75dd2e663a57b956cb830dd7a908d4f
|
||||
39a2336a61ef9fda549180d4ccde21514d117b6c6fd07a9102b5efe710a32af4eeacae2cb3b1dec0
|
||||
35b9593b48b9d3ca4c13d245d5f04169b0b1
|
||||
`,
|
||||
wantVersion: 57,
|
||||
wantRest: []rlp.RawValue{{0x06}, {0xC2, 0x07, 0x08}, {0x81, 0xFA}},
|
||||
},
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestHandshakeForwardCompatibility(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
var (
|
||||
keyA, _ = crypto.HexToECDSA("49a7b37aa6f6645917e7b807e9d1c00d4fa71f18343b0d4122a4d2df64dd6fee")
|
||||
keyB, _ = crypto.HexToECDSA("b71c71a67e1177ad4e901695e1b4b9ee17ae16c6668d313eac2f96dbcda3f291")
|
||||
pubA = crypto.FromECDSAPub(&keyA.PublicKey)[1:]
|
||||
pubB = crypto.FromECDSAPub(&keyB.PublicKey)[1:]
|
||||
ephA, _ = crypto.HexToECDSA("869d6ecf5211f1cc60418a13b9d870b22959d0c16f02bec714c960dd2298a32d")
|
||||
ephB, _ = crypto.HexToECDSA("e238eb8e04fee6511ab04c6dd3c89ce097b11f25d584863ac2b6d5b35b1847e4")
|
||||
ephPubA = crypto.FromECDSAPub(&ephA.PublicKey)[1:]
|
||||
ephPubB = crypto.FromECDSAPub(&ephB.PublicKey)[1:]
|
||||
nonceA = unhex("7e968bba13b6c50e2c4cd7f241cc0d64d1ac25c7f5952df231ac6a2bda8ee5d6")
|
||||
nonceB = unhex("559aead08264d5795d3909718cdd05abd49572e84fe55590eef31a88a08fdffd")
|
||||
_, _, _, _ = pubA, pubB, ephPubA, ephPubB
|
||||
authSignature = unhex("299ca6acfd35e3d72d8ba3d1e2b60b5561d5af5218eb5bc182045769eb4226910a301acae3b369fffc4a4899d6b02531e89fd4fe36a2cf0d93607ba470b50f7800")
|
||||
_ = authSignature
|
||||
)
|
||||
makeAuth := func(test handshakeAuthTest) *authMsgV4 {
|
||||
msg := &authMsgV4{Version: test.wantVersion, Rest: test.wantRest, gotPlain: test.isPlain}
|
||||
copy(msg.Signature[:], authSignature)
|
||||
copy(msg.InitiatorPubkey[:], pubA)
|
||||
copy(msg.Nonce[:], nonceA)
|
||||
return msg
|
||||
}
|
||||
makeAck := func(test handshakeAckTest) *authRespV4 {
|
||||
msg := &authRespV4{Version: test.wantVersion, Rest: test.wantRest}
|
||||
copy(msg.RandomPubkey[:], ephPubB)
|
||||
copy(msg.Nonce[:], nonceB)
|
||||
return msg
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// check auth msg parsing
|
||||
for _, test := range eip8HandshakeAuthTests {
|
||||
r := bytes.NewReader(unhex(test.input))
|
||||
msg := new(authMsgV4)
|
||||
ciphertext, err := readHandshakeMsg(msg, encAuthMsgLen, keyB, r)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Errorf("error for input %x:\n %v", unhex(test.input), err)
|
||||
continue
|
||||
}
|
||||
if !bytes.Equal(ciphertext, unhex(test.input)) {
|
||||
t.Errorf("wrong ciphertext for input %x:\n %x", unhex(test.input), ciphertext)
|
||||
}
|
||||
want := makeAuth(test)
|
||||
if !reflect.DeepEqual(msg, want) {
|
||||
t.Errorf("wrong msg for input %x:\ngot %s\nwant %s", unhex(test.input), spew.Sdump(msg), spew.Sdump(want))
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// check auth resp parsing
|
||||
for _, test := range eip8HandshakeRespTests {
|
||||
input := unhex(test.input)
|
||||
r := bytes.NewReader(input)
|
||||
msg := new(authRespV4)
|
||||
ciphertext, err := readHandshakeMsg(msg, encAuthRespLen, keyA, r)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Errorf("error for input %x:\n %v", input, err)
|
||||
continue
|
||||
}
|
||||
if !bytes.Equal(ciphertext, input) {
|
||||
t.Errorf("wrong ciphertext for input %x:\n %x", input, err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
want := makeAck(test)
|
||||
if !reflect.DeepEqual(msg, want) {
|
||||
t.Errorf("wrong msg for input %x:\ngot %s\nwant %s", input, spew.Sdump(msg), spew.Sdump(want))
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// check derivation for (Auth₂, Ack₂) on recipient side
|
||||
var (
|
||||
hs = &encHandshake{
|
||||
initiator: false,
|
||||
respNonce: nonceB,
|
||||
randomPrivKey: ecies.ImportECDSA(ephB),
|
||||
}
|
||||
authCiphertext = unhex(eip8HandshakeAuthTests[1].input)
|
||||
authRespCiphertext = unhex(eip8HandshakeRespTests[1].input)
|
||||
authMsg = makeAuth(eip8HandshakeAuthTests[1])
|
||||
wantAES = unhex("80e8632c05fed6fc2a13b0f8d31a3cf645366239170ea067065aba8e28bac487")
|
||||
wantMAC = unhex("2ea74ec5dae199227dff1af715362700e989d889d7a493cb0639691efb8e5f98")
|
||||
wantFooIngressHash = unhex("0c7ec6340062cc46f5e9f1e3cf86f8c8c403c5a0964f5df0ebd34a75ddc86db5")
|
||||
)
|
||||
if err := hs.handleAuthMsg(authMsg, keyB); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("handleAuthMsg: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
derived, err := hs.secrets(authCiphertext, authRespCiphertext)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("secrets: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if !bytes.Equal(derived.AES, wantAES) {
|
||||
t.Errorf("aes-secret mismatch:\ngot %x\nwant %x", derived.AES, wantAES)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if !bytes.Equal(derived.MAC, wantMAC) {
|
||||
t.Errorf("mac-secret mismatch:\ngot %x\nwant %x", derived.MAC, wantMAC)
|
||||
}
|
||||
io.WriteString(derived.IngressMAC, "foo")
|
||||
fooIngressHash := derived.IngressMAC.Sum(nil)
|
||||
if !bytes.Equal(fooIngressHash, wantFooIngressHash) {
|
||||
t.Errorf("ingress-mac('foo') mismatch:\ngot %x\nwant %x", fooIngressHash, wantFooIngressHash)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
Loading…
Reference in New Issue
Block a user