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Merge pull request #18390 from realdave/remove-sha3-pkg

Browse Source 
vendor, crypto, swarm: switch over to upstream sha3 package
This commit is contained in:
Péter Szilágyi 2019-01-04 09:51:12 +02:00 committed by GitHub
commit 391d4cb9b5
No known key found for this signature in database
GPG Key ID: 4AEE18F83AFDEB23
99 changed files with 4507 additions and 1019 deletions
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4
cmd/swarm/access_test.go
View File

@ -33,11 +33,11 @@ import (
"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/crypto"
"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/crypto/ecies"
"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/crypto/sha3"
"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/log"
"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/swarm/api"
swarmapi "github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/swarm/api/client"
"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/swarm/testutil"
"golang.org/x/crypto/sha3"
)
const (
@ -598,7 +598,7 @@ func TestKeypairSanity(t *testing.T) {
t.Fatal(err)
}
hasher := sha3.NewKeccak256()
hasher := sha3.NewLegacyKeccak256()
hasher.Write(salt)
shared, err := hex.DecodeString(sharedSecret)
if err != nil {

4
common/types.go
View File

@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ import (
"strings"
"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/common/hexutil"
"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/crypto/sha3"
"golang.org/x/crypto/sha3"
)
// Lengths of hashes and addresses in bytes.
@ -196,7 +196,7 @@ func (a Address) Hash() Hash { return BytesToHash(a[:]) }
// Hex returns an EIP55-compliant hex string representation of the address.
func (a Address) Hex() string {
unchecksummed := hex.EncodeToString(a[:])
sha := sha3.NewKeccak256()
sha := sha3.NewLegacyKeccak256()
sha.Write([]byte(unchecksummed))
hash := sha.Sum(nil)

4
consensus/clique/clique.go
View File

@ -33,13 +33,13 @@ import (
"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/core/state"
"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/core/types"
"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/crypto"
"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/crypto/sha3"
"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/ethdb"
"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/log"
"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/params"
"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/rlp"
"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/rpc"
lru "github.com/hashicorp/golang-lru"
"golang.org/x/crypto/sha3"
)
const (
@ -148,7 +148,7 @@ type SignerFn func(accounts.Account, []byte) ([]byte, error)
// panics. This is done to avoid accidentally using both forms (signature present
// or not), which could be abused to produce different hashes for the same header.
func sigHash(header *types.Header) (hash common.Hash) {
hasher := sha3.NewKeccak256()
hasher := sha3.NewLegacyKeccak256()
rlp.Encode(hasher, []interface{}{
header.ParentHash,

10
consensus/ethash/algorithm.go
View File

@ -30,8 +30,8 @@ import (
"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/common"
"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/common/bitutil"
"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/crypto"
"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/crypto/sha3"
"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/log"
"golang.org/x/crypto/sha3"
)
const (
@ -123,7 +123,7 @@ func seedHash(block uint64) []byte {
if block < epochLength {
return seed
}
keccak256 := makeHasher(sha3.NewKeccak256())
keccak256 := makeHasher(sha3.NewLegacyKeccak256())
for i := 0; i < int(block/epochLength); i++ {
keccak256(seed, seed)
}
@ -177,7 +177,7 @@ func generateCache(dest []uint32, epoch uint64, seed []byte) {
}
}()
// Create a hasher to reuse between invocations
keccak512 := makeHasher(sha3.NewKeccak512())
keccak512 := makeHasher(sha3.NewLegacyKeccak512())
// Sequentially produce the initial dataset
keccak512(cache, seed)
@ -301,7 +301,7 @@ func generateDataset(dest []uint32, epoch uint64, cache []uint32) {
defer pend.Done()
// Create a hasher to reuse between invocations
keccak512 := makeHasher(sha3.NewKeccak512())
keccak512 := makeHasher(sha3.NewLegacyKeccak512())
// Calculate the data segment this thread should generate
batch := uint32((size + hashBytes*uint64(threads) - 1) / (hashBytes * uint64(threads)))
@ -375,7 +375,7 @@ func hashimoto(hash []byte, nonce uint64, size uint64, lookup func(index uint32)
// in-memory cache) in order to produce our final value for a particular header
// hash and nonce.
func hashimotoLight(size uint64, cache []uint32, hash []byte, nonce uint64) ([]byte, []byte) {
keccak512 := makeHasher(sha3.NewKeccak512())
keccak512 := makeHasher(sha3.NewLegacyKeccak512())
lookup := func(index uint32) []uint32 {
rawData := generateDatasetItem(cache, index, keccak512)

4
consensus/ethash/consensus.go
View File

@ -31,9 +31,9 @@ import (
"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/consensus/misc"
"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/core/state"
"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/core/types"
"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/crypto/sha3"
"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/params"
"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/rlp"
"golang.org/x/crypto/sha3"
)
// Ethash proof-of-work protocol constants.
@ -575,7 +575,7 @@ func (ethash *Ethash) Finalize(chain consensus.ChainReader, header *types.Header
// SealHash returns the hash of a block prior to it being sealed.
func (ethash *Ethash) SealHash(header *types.Header) (hash common.Hash) {
hasher := sha3.NewKeccak256()
hasher := sha3.NewLegacyKeccak256()
rlp.Encode(hasher, []interface{}{
header.ParentHash,

8
core/rawdb/accessors_chain_test.go
View File

@ -23,9 +23,9 @@ import (
"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/common"
"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/core/types"
"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/crypto/sha3"
"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/ethdb"
"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/rlp"
"golang.org/x/crypto/sha3"
)
// Tests block header storage and retrieval operations.
@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ func TestHeaderStorage(t *testing.T) {
if entry := ReadHeaderRLP(db, header.Hash(), header.Number.Uint64()); entry == nil {
t.Fatalf("Stored header RLP not found")
} else {
hasher := sha3.NewKeccak256()
hasher := sha3.NewLegacyKeccak256()
hasher.Write(entry)
if hash := common.BytesToHash(hasher.Sum(nil)); hash != header.Hash() {
@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ func TestBodyStorage(t *testing.T) {
// Create a test body to move around the database and make sure it's really new
body := &types.Body{Uncles: []*types.Header{{Extra: []byte("test header")}}}
hasher := sha3.NewKeccak256()
hasher := sha3.NewLegacyKeccak256()
rlp.Encode(hasher, body)
hash := common.BytesToHash(hasher.Sum(nil))
@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ func TestBodyStorage(t *testing.T) {
if entry := ReadBodyRLP(db, hash, 0); entry == nil {
t.Fatalf("Stored body RLP not found")
} else {
hasher := sha3.NewKeccak256()
hasher := sha3.NewLegacyKeccak256()
hasher.Write(entry)
if calc := common.BytesToHash(hasher.Sum(nil)); calc != hash {

4
core/types/block.go
View File

@ -28,8 +28,8 @@ import (
"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/common"
"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/common/hexutil"
"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/crypto/sha3"
"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/rlp"
"golang.org/x/crypto/sha3"
)
var (
@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ func (h *Header) Size() common.StorageSize {
}
func rlpHash(x interface{}) (h common.Hash) {
hw := sha3.NewKeccak256()
hw := sha3.NewLegacyKeccak256()
rlp.Encode(hw, x)
hw.Sum(h[:0])
return h

4
core/vm/instructions.go
View File

@ -24,8 +24,8 @@ import (
"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/common"
"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/common/math"
"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/core/types"
"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/crypto/sha3"
"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/params"
"golang.org/x/crypto/sha3"
)
var (
@ -387,7 +387,7 @@ func opSha3(pc *uint64, interpreter *EVMInterpreter, contract *Contract, memory
data := memory.Get(offset.Int64(), size.Int64())
if interpreter.hasher == nil {
interpreter.hasher = sha3.NewKeccak256().(keccakState)
interpreter.hasher = sha3.NewLegacyKeccak256().(keccakState)
} else {
interpreter.hasher.Reset()
}

8
crypto/crypto.go
View File

@ -30,8 +30,8 @@ import (
"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/common"
"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/common/math"
"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/crypto/sha3"
"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/rlp"
"golang.org/x/crypto/sha3"
)
var (
@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ var errInvalidPubkey = errors.New("invalid secp256k1 public key")
// Keccak256 calculates and returns the Keccak256 hash of the input data.
func Keccak256(data ...[]byte) []byte {
d := sha3.NewKeccak256()
d := sha3.NewLegacyKeccak256()
for _, b := range data {
d.Write(b)
}
@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ func Keccak256(data ...[]byte) []byte {
// Keccak256Hash calculates and returns the Keccak256 hash of the input data,
// converting it to an internal Hash data structure.
func Keccak256Hash(data ...[]byte) (h common.Hash) {
d := sha3.NewKeccak256()
d := sha3.NewLegacyKeccak256()
for _, b := range data {
d.Write(b)
}
@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ func Keccak256Hash(data ...[]byte) (h common.Hash) {
// Keccak512 calculates and returns the Keccak512 hash of the input data.
func Keccak512(data ...[]byte) []byte {
d := sha3.NewKeccak512()
d := sha3.NewLegacyKeccak512()
for _, b := range data {
d.Write(b)
}

27
crypto/sha3/LICENSE
View File

@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
Copyright (c) 2009 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are
met:
* Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above
copyright notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer
in the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
distribution.
* Neither the name of Google Inc. nor the names of its
contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived from
this software without specific prior written permission.
THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS
"AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT
LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR
A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT
OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT
LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
(INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE
OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.

22
crypto/sha3/PATENTS
View File

@ -1,22 +0,0 @@
Additional IP Rights Grant (Patents)
"This implementation" means the copyrightable works distributed by
Google as part of the Go project.
Google hereby grants to You a perpetual, worldwide, non-exclusive,
no-charge, royalty-free, irrevocable (except as stated in this section)
patent license to make, have made, use, offer to sell, sell, import,
transfer and otherwise run, modify and propagate the contents of this
implementation of Go, where such license applies only to those patent
claims, both currently owned or controlled by Google and acquired in
the future, licensable by Google that are necessarily infringed by this
implementation of Go. This grant does not include claims that would be
infringed only as a consequence of further modification of this
implementation. If you or your agent or exclusive licensee institute or
order or agree to the institution of patent litigation against any
entity (including a cross-claim or counterclaim in a lawsuit) alleging
that this implementation of Go or any code incorporated within this
implementation of Go constitutes direct or contributory patent
infringement, or inducement of patent infringement, then any patent
rights granted to you under this License for this implementation of Go
shall terminate as of the date such litigation is filed.

297
crypto/sha3/sha3_test.go
View File

@ -1,297 +0,0 @@
// Copyright 2014 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
package sha3
// Tests include all the ShortMsgKATs provided by the Keccak team at
// https://github.com/gvanas/KeccakCodePackage
//
// They only include the zero-bit case of the bitwise testvectors
// published by NIST in the draft of FIPS-202.
import (
"bytes"
"compress/flate"
"encoding/hex"
"encoding/json"
"hash"
"os"
"strings"
"testing"
)
const (
testString = "brekeccakkeccak koax koax"
katFilename = "testdata/keccakKats.json.deflate"
)
// Internal-use instances of SHAKE used to test against KATs.
func newHashShake128() hash.Hash {
return &state{rate: 168, dsbyte: 0x1f, outputLen: 512}
}
func newHashShake256() hash.Hash {
return &state{rate: 136, dsbyte: 0x1f, outputLen: 512}
}
// testDigests contains functions returning hash.Hash instances
// with output-length equal to the KAT length for both SHA-3 and
// SHAKE instances.
var testDigests = map[string]func() hash.Hash{
"SHA3-224": New224,
"SHA3-256": New256,
"SHA3-384": New384,
"SHA3-512": New512,
"SHAKE128": newHashShake128,
"SHAKE256": newHashShake256,
}
// testShakes contains functions that return ShakeHash instances for
// testing the ShakeHash-specific interface.
var testShakes = map[string]func() ShakeHash{
"SHAKE128": NewShake128,
"SHAKE256": NewShake256,
}
// structs used to marshal JSON test-cases.
type KeccakKats struct {
Kats map[string][]struct {
Digest string `json:"digest"`
Length int64 `json:"length"`
Message string `json:"message"`
}
}
func testUnalignedAndGeneric(t *testing.T, testf func(impl string)) {
xorInOrig, copyOutOrig := xorIn, copyOut
xorIn, copyOut = xorInGeneric, copyOutGeneric
testf("generic")
if xorImplementationUnaligned != "generic" {
xorIn, copyOut = xorInUnaligned, copyOutUnaligned
testf("unaligned")
}
xorIn, copyOut = xorInOrig, copyOutOrig
}
// TestKeccakKats tests the SHA-3 and Shake implementations against all the
// ShortMsgKATs from https://github.com/gvanas/KeccakCodePackage
// (The testvectors are stored in keccakKats.json.deflate due to their length.)
func TestKeccakKats(t *testing.T) {
testUnalignedAndGeneric(t, func(impl string) {
// Read the KATs.
deflated, err := os.Open(katFilename)
if err != nil {
t.Errorf("error opening %s: %s", katFilename, err)
}
file := flate.NewReader(deflated)
dec := json.NewDecoder(file)
var katSet KeccakKats
err = dec.Decode(&katSet)
if err != nil {
t.Errorf("error decoding KATs: %s", err)
}
// Do the KATs.
for functionName, kats := range katSet.Kats {
d := testDigests[functionName]()
for _, kat := range kats {
d.Reset()
in, err := hex.DecodeString(kat.Message)
if err != nil {
t.Errorf("error decoding KAT: %s", err)
}
d.Write(in[:kat.Length/8])
got := strings.ToUpper(hex.EncodeToString(d.Sum(nil)))
if got != kat.Digest {
t.Errorf("function=%s, implementation=%s, length=%d\nmessage:\n %s\ngot:\n %s\nwanted:\n %s",
functionName, impl, kat.Length, kat.Message, got, kat.Digest)
t.Logf("wanted %+v", kat)
t.FailNow()
}
continue
}
}
})
}
// TestUnalignedWrite tests that writing data in an arbitrary pattern with
// small input buffers.
func TestUnalignedWrite(t *testing.T) {
testUnalignedAndGeneric(t, func(impl string) {
buf := sequentialBytes(0x10000)
for alg, df := range testDigests {
d := df()
d.Reset()
d.Write(buf)
want := d.Sum(nil)
d.Reset()
for i := 0; i < len(buf); {
// Cycle through offsets which make a 137 byte sequence.
// Because 137 is prime this sequence should exercise all corner cases.
offsets := [17]int{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 1}
for _, j := range offsets {
if v := len(buf) - i; v < j {
j = v
}
d.Write(buf[i : i+j])
i += j
}
}
got := d.Sum(nil)
if !bytes.Equal(got, want) {
t.Errorf("Unaligned writes, implementation=%s, alg=%s\ngot %q, want %q", impl, alg, got, want)
}
}
})
}
// TestAppend checks that appending works when reallocation is necessary.
func TestAppend(t *testing.T) {
testUnalignedAndGeneric(t, func(impl string) {
d := New224()
for capacity := 2; capacity <= 66; capacity += 64 {
// The first time around the loop, Sum will have to reallocate.
// The second time, it will not.
buf := make([]byte, 2, capacity)
d.Reset()
d.Write([]byte{0xcc})
buf = d.Sum(buf)
expected := "0000DF70ADC49B2E76EEE3A6931B93FA41841C3AF2CDF5B32A18B5478C39"
if got := strings.ToUpper(hex.EncodeToString(buf)); got != expected {
t.Errorf("got %s, want %s", got, expected)
}
}
})
}
// TestAppendNoRealloc tests that appending works when no reallocation is necessary.
func TestAppendNoRealloc(t *testing.T) {
testUnalignedAndGeneric(t, func(impl string) {
buf := make([]byte, 1, 200)
d := New224()
d.Write([]byte{0xcc})
buf = d.Sum(buf)
expected := "00DF70ADC49B2E76EEE3A6931B93FA41841C3AF2CDF5B32A18B5478C39"
if got := strings.ToUpper(hex.EncodeToString(buf)); got != expected {
t.Errorf("%s: got %s, want %s", impl, got, expected)
}
})
}
// TestSqueezing checks that squeezing the full output a single time produces
// the same output as repeatedly squeezing the instance.
func TestSqueezing(t *testing.T) {
testUnalignedAndGeneric(t, func(impl string) {
for functionName, newShakeHash := range testShakes {
d0 := newShakeHash()
d0.Write([]byte(testString))
ref := make([]byte, 32)
d0.Read(ref)
d1 := newShakeHash()
d1.Write([]byte(testString))
var multiple []byte
for range ref {
one := make([]byte, 1)
d1.Read(one)
multiple = append(multiple, one...)
}
if !bytes.Equal(ref, multiple) {
t.Errorf("%s (%s): squeezing %d bytes one at a time failed", functionName, impl, len(ref))
}
}
})
}
// sequentialBytes produces a buffer of size consecutive bytes 0x00, 0x01, ..., used for testing.
func sequentialBytes(size int) []byte {
result := make([]byte, size)
for i := range result {
result[i] = byte(i)
}
return result
}
// BenchmarkPermutationFunction measures the speed of the permutation function
// with no input data.
func BenchmarkPermutationFunction(b *testing.B) {
b.SetBytes(int64(200))
var lanes [25]uint64
for i := 0; i < b.N; i++ {
keccakF1600(&lanes)
}
}
// benchmarkHash tests the speed to hash num buffers of buflen each.
func benchmarkHash(b *testing.B, h hash.Hash, size, num int) {
b.StopTimer()
h.Reset()
data := sequentialBytes(size)
b.SetBytes(int64(size * num))
b.StartTimer()
var state []byte
for i := 0; i < b.N; i++ {
for j := 0; j < num; j++ {
h.Write(data)
}
state = h.Sum(state[:0])
}
b.StopTimer()
h.Reset()
}
// benchmarkShake is specialized to the Shake instances, which don't
// require a copy on reading output.
func benchmarkShake(b *testing.B, h ShakeHash, size, num int) {
b.StopTimer()
h.Reset()
data := sequentialBytes(size)
d := make([]byte, 32)
b.SetBytes(int64(size * num))
b.StartTimer()
for i := 0; i < b.N; i++ {
h.Reset()
for j := 0; j < num; j++ {
h.Write(data)
}
h.Read(d)
}
}
func BenchmarkSha3_512_MTU(b *testing.B) { benchmarkHash(b, New512(), 1350, 1) }
func BenchmarkSha3_384_MTU(b *testing.B) { benchmarkHash(b, New384(), 1350, 1) }
func BenchmarkSha3_256_MTU(b *testing.B) { benchmarkHash(b, New256(), 1350, 1) }
func BenchmarkSha3_224_MTU(b *testing.B) { benchmarkHash(b, New224(), 1350, 1) }
func BenchmarkShake128_MTU(b *testing.B) { benchmarkShake(b, NewShake128(), 1350, 1) }
func BenchmarkShake256_MTU(b *testing.B) { benchmarkShake(b, NewShake256(), 1350, 1) }
func BenchmarkShake256_16x(b *testing.B) { benchmarkShake(b, NewShake256(), 16, 1024) }
func BenchmarkShake256_1MiB(b *testing.B) { benchmarkShake(b, NewShake256(), 1024, 1024) }
func BenchmarkSha3_512_1MiB(b *testing.B) { benchmarkHash(b, New512(), 1024, 1024) }
func Example_sum() {
buf := []byte("some data to hash")
// A hash needs to be 64 bytes long to have 256-bit collision resistance.
h := make([]byte, 64)
// Compute a 64-byte hash of buf and put it in h.
ShakeSum256(h, buf)
}
func Example_mac() {
k := []byte("this is a secret key; you should generate a strong random key that's at least 32 bytes long")
buf := []byte("and this is some data to authenticate")
// A MAC with 32 bytes of output has 256-bit security strength -- if you use at least a 32-byte-long key.
h := make([]byte, 32)
d := NewShake256()
// Write the key into the hash.
d.Write(k)
// Now write the data.
d.Write(buf)
// Read 32 bytes of output from the hash into h.
d.Read(h)
}

BIN
crypto/sha3/testdata/keccakKats.json.deflate vendored
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Binary file not shown.

4
eth/downloader/statesync.go
View File

@ -25,10 +25,10 @@ import (
"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/common"
"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/core/rawdb"
"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/core/state"
"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/crypto/sha3"
"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/ethdb"
"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/log"
"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/trie"
"golang.org/x/crypto/sha3"
)
// stateReq represents a batch of state fetch requests grouped together into
@ -240,7 +240,7 @@ func newStateSync(d *Downloader, root common.Hash) *stateSync {
return &stateSync{
d: d,
sched: state.NewStateSync(root, d.stateDB),
keccak: sha3.NewKeccak256(),
keccak: sha3.NewLegacyKeccak256(),
tasks: make(map[common.Hash]*stateTask),
deliver: make(chan *stateReq),
cancel: make(chan struct{}),

4
p2p/discv5/net.go
View File

@ -27,10 +27,10 @@ import (
"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/common"
"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/common/mclock"
"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/crypto"
"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/crypto/sha3"
"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/log"
"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/p2p/netutil"
"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/rlp"
"golang.org/x/crypto/sha3"
)
var (
@ -1234,7 +1234,7 @@ func (net *Network) checkTopicRegister(data *topicRegister) (*pong, error) {
}
func rlpHash(x interface{}) (h common.Hash) {
hw := sha3.NewKeccak256()
hw := sha3.NewLegacyKeccak256()
rlp.Encode(hw, x)
hw.Sum(h[:0])
return h

6
p2p/enode/idscheme.go
View File

@ -23,9 +23,9 @@ import (
"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/common/math"
"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/crypto"
"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/crypto/sha3"
"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/p2p/enr"
"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/rlp"
"golang.org/x/crypto/sha3"
)
// List of known secure identity schemes.
@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ func SignV4(r *enr.Record, privkey *ecdsa.PrivateKey) error {
cpy.Set(enr.ID("v4"))
cpy.Set(Secp256k1(privkey.PublicKey))
h := sha3.NewKeccak256()
h := sha3.NewLegacyKeccak256()
rlp.Encode(h, cpy.AppendElements(nil))
sig, err := crypto.Sign(h.Sum(nil), privkey)
if err != nil {
@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ func (V4ID) Verify(r *enr.Record, sig []byte) error {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid public key")
}
h := sha3.NewKeccak256()
h := sha3.NewLegacyKeccak256()
rlp.Encode(h, r.AppendElements(nil))
if !crypto.VerifySignature(entry, h.Sum(nil), sig) {
return enr.ErrInvalidSig

6
p2p/rlpx.go
View File

@ -39,9 +39,9 @@ import (
"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/crypto"
"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/crypto/ecies"
"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/crypto/secp256k1"
"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/crypto/sha3"
"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/rlp"
"github.com/golang/snappy"
"golang.org/x/crypto/sha3"
)
const (
@ -253,10 +253,10 @@ func (h *encHandshake) secrets(auth, authResp []byte) (secrets, error) {
}
// setup sha3 instances for the MACs
mac1 := sha3.NewKeccak256()
mac1 := sha3.NewLegacyKeccak256()
mac1.Write(xor(s.MAC, h.respNonce))
mac1.Write(auth)
mac2 := sha3.NewKeccak256()
mac2 := sha3.NewLegacyKeccak256()
mac2.Write(xor(s.MAC, h.initNonce))
mac2.Write(authResp)
if h.initiator {

10
p2p/rlpx_test.go
View File

@ -34,9 +34,9 @@ import (
"github.com/davecgh/go-spew/spew"
"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/crypto"
"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/crypto/ecies"
"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/crypto/sha3"
"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/p2p/simulations/pipes"
"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/rlp"
"golang.org/x/crypto/sha3"
)
func TestSharedSecret(t *testing.T) {
@ -334,8 +334,8 @@ func TestRLPXFrameRW(t *testing.T) {
s1 := secrets{
AES: aesSecret,
MAC: macSecret,
EgressMAC: sha3.NewKeccak256(),
IngressMAC: sha3.NewKeccak256(),
EgressMAC: sha3.NewLegacyKeccak256(),
IngressMAC: sha3.NewLegacyKeccak256(),
}
s1.EgressMAC.Write(egressMACinit)
s1.IngressMAC.Write(ingressMACinit)
@ -344,8 +344,8 @@ func TestRLPXFrameRW(t *testing.T) {
s2 := secrets{
AES: aesSecret,
MAC: macSecret,
EgressMAC: sha3.NewKeccak256(),
IngressMAC: sha3.NewKeccak256(),
EgressMAC: sha3.NewLegacyKeccak256(),
IngressMAC: sha3.NewLegacyKeccak256(),
}
s2.EgressMAC.Write(ingressMACinit)
s2.IngressMAC.Write(egressMACinit)

6
p2p/server_test.go
View File

@ -26,10 +26,10 @@ import (
"time"
"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/crypto"
"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/crypto/sha3"
"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/log"
"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/p2p/enode"
"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/p2p/enr"
"golang.org/x/crypto/sha3"
)
// func init() {
@ -48,8 +48,8 @@ func newTestTransport(rpub *ecdsa.PublicKey, fd net.Conn) transport {
wrapped.rw = newRLPXFrameRW(fd, secrets{
MAC: zero16,
AES: zero16,
IngressMAC: sha3.NewKeccak256(),
EgressMAC: sha3.NewKeccak256(),
IngressMAC: sha3.NewLegacyKeccak256(),
EgressMAC: sha3.NewLegacyKeccak256(),
})
return &testTransport{rpub: rpub, rlpx: wrapped}
}

8
swarm/api/act.go
View File

@ -15,11 +15,11 @@ import (
"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/common"
"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/crypto"
"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/crypto/ecies"
"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/crypto/sha3"
"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/swarm/log"
"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/swarm/sctx"
"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/swarm/storage"
"golang.org/x/crypto/scrypt"
"golang.org/x/crypto/sha3"
cli "gopkg.in/urfave/cli.v1"
)
@ -336,7 +336,7 @@ func (a *API) doDecrypt(ctx context.Context, credentials string, pk *ecdsa.Priva
}
func (a *API) getACTDecryptionKey(ctx context.Context, actManifestAddress storage.Address, sessionKey []byte) (found bool, ciphertext, decryptionKey []byte, err error) {
hasher := sha3.NewKeccak256()
hasher := sha3.NewLegacyKeccak256()
hasher.Write(append(sessionKey, 0))
lookupKey := hasher.Sum(nil)
hasher.Reset()
@ -462,7 +462,7 @@ func DoACT(ctx *cli.Context, privateKey *ecdsa.PrivateKey, salt []byte, grantees
return nil, nil, nil, err
}
hasher := sha3.NewKeccak256()
hasher := sha3.NewLegacyKeccak256()
hasher.Write(append(sessionKey, 0))
lookupKey := hasher.Sum(nil)
@ -484,7 +484,7 @@ func DoACT(ctx *cli.Context, privateKey *ecdsa.PrivateKey, salt []byte, grantees
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, nil, err
}
hasher := sha3.NewKeccak256()
hasher := sha3.NewLegacyKeccak256()
hasher.Write(append(sessionKey, 0))
lookupKey := hasher.Sum(nil)

10
swarm/api/encrypt.go
View File

@ -20,8 +20,8 @@ import (
"encoding/binary"
"errors"
"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/crypto/sha3"
"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/swarm/storage/encryption"
"golang.org/x/crypto/sha3"
)
type RefEncryption struct {
@ -39,12 +39,12 @@ func NewRefEncryption(refSize int) *RefEncryption {
}
func (re *RefEncryption) Encrypt(ref []byte, key []byte) ([]byte, error) {
spanEncryption := encryption.New(key, 0, uint32(re.refSize/32), sha3.NewKeccak256)
spanEncryption := encryption.New(key, 0, uint32(re.refSize/32), sha3.NewLegacyKeccak256)
encryptedSpan, err := spanEncryption.Encrypt(re.span)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
dataEncryption := encryption.New(key, re.refSize, 0, sha3.NewKeccak256)
dataEncryption := encryption.New(key, re.refSize, 0, sha3.NewLegacyKeccak256)
encryptedData, err := dataEncryption.Encrypt(ref)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ func (re *RefEncryption) Encrypt(ref []byte, key []byte) ([]byte, error) {
}
func (re *RefEncryption) Decrypt(ref []byte, key []byte) ([]byte, error) {
spanEncryption := encryption.New(key, 0, uint32(re.refSize/32), sha3.NewKeccak256)
spanEncryption := encryption.New(key, 0, uint32(re.refSize/32), sha3.NewLegacyKeccak256)
decryptedSpan, err := spanEncryption.Decrypt(ref[:8])
if err != nil {
return nil, err
@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ func (re *RefEncryption) Decrypt(ref []byte, key []byte) ([]byte, error) {
return nil, errors.New("invalid span in encrypted reference")
}
dataEncryption := encryption.New(key, re.refSize, 0, sha3.NewKeccak256)
dataEncryption := encryption.New(key, re.refSize, 0, sha3.NewLegacyKeccak256)
decryptedRef, err := dataEncryption.Decrypt(ref[8:])
if err != nil {
return nil, err

2
swarm/bmt/bmt.go
View File

@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ const (
)
// BaseHasherFunc is a hash.Hash constructor function used for the base hash of the BMT.
// implemented by Keccak256 SHA3 sha3.NewKeccak256
// implemented by Keccak256 SHA3 sha3.NewLegacyKeccak256
type BaseHasherFunc func() hash.Hash
// Hasher a reusable hasher for fixed maximum size chunks representing a BMT

30
swarm/bmt/bmt_test.go
View File

@ -26,8 +26,8 @@ import (
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/crypto/sha3"
"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/swarm/testutil"
"golang.org/x/crypto/sha3"
)
// the actual data length generated (could be longer than max datalength of the BMT)
@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ var counts = []int{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 9, 15, 16, 17, 32, 37, 42, 53, 63, 64, 65,
// calculates the Keccak256 SHA3 hash of the data
func sha3hash(data ...[]byte) []byte {
h := sha3.NewKeccak256()
h := sha3.NewLegacyKeccak256()
return doSum(h, nil, data...)
}
@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ func TestRefHasher(t *testing.T) {
t.Run(fmt.Sprintf("%d_segments_%d_bytes", segmentCount, length), func(t *testing.T) {
data := testutil.RandomBytes(i, length)
expected := x.expected(data)
actual := NewRefHasher(sha3.NewKeccak256, segmentCount).Hash(data)
actual := NewRefHasher(sha3.NewLegacyKeccak256, segmentCount).Hash(data)
if !bytes.Equal(actual, expected) {
t.Fatalf("expected %x, got %x", expected, actual)
}
@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ func TestRefHasher(t *testing.T) {
// tests if hasher responds with correct hash comparing the reference implementation return value
func TestHasherEmptyData(t *testing.T) {
hasher := sha3.NewKeccak256
hasher := sha3.NewLegacyKeccak256
var data []byte
for _, count := range counts {
t.Run(fmt.Sprintf("%d_segments", count), func(t *testing.T) {
@ -153,7 +153,7 @@ func TestHasherEmptyData(t *testing.T) {
// tests sequential write with entire max size written in one go
func TestSyncHasherCorrectness(t *testing.T) {
data := testutil.RandomBytes(1, BufferSize)
hasher := sha3.NewKeccak256
hasher := sha3.NewLegacyKeccak256
size := hasher().Size()
var err error
@ -179,7 +179,7 @@ func TestSyncHasherCorrectness(t *testing.T) {
// tests order-neutral concurrent writes with entire max size written in one go
func TestAsyncCorrectness(t *testing.T) {
data := testutil.RandomBytes(1, BufferSize)
hasher := sha3.NewKeccak256
hasher := sha3.NewLegacyKeccak256
size := hasher().Size()
whs := []whenHash{first, last, random}
@ -226,7 +226,7 @@ func TestHasherReuse(t *testing.T) {
// tests if bmt reuse is not corrupting result
func testHasherReuse(poolsize int, t *testing.T) {
hasher := sha3.NewKeccak256
hasher := sha3.NewLegacyKeccak256
pool := NewTreePool(hasher, segmentCount, poolsize)
defer pool.Drain(0)
bmt := New(pool)
@ -243,7 +243,7 @@ func testHasherReuse(poolsize int, t *testing.T) {
// Tests if pool can be cleanly reused even in concurrent use by several hasher
func TestBMTConcurrentUse(t *testing.T) {
hasher := sha3.NewKeccak256
hasher := sha3.NewLegacyKeccak256
pool := NewTreePool(hasher, segmentCount, PoolSize)
defer pool.Drain(0)
cycles := 100
@ -277,7 +277,7 @@ LOOP:
// Tests BMT Hasher io.Writer interface is working correctly
// even multiple short random write buffers
func TestBMTWriterBuffers(t *testing.T) {
hasher := sha3.NewKeccak256
hasher := sha3.NewLegacyKeccak256
for _, count := range counts {
t.Run(fmt.Sprintf("%d_segments", count), func(t *testing.T) {
@ -410,7 +410,7 @@ func BenchmarkPool(t *testing.B) {
// benchmarks simple sha3 hash on chunks
func benchmarkSHA3(t *testing.B, n int) {
data := testutil.RandomBytes(1, n)
hasher := sha3.NewKeccak256
hasher := sha3.NewLegacyKeccak256
h := hasher()
t.ReportAllocs()
@ -426,7 +426,7 @@ func benchmarkSHA3(t *testing.B, n int) {
// the premise is that this is the minimum computation needed for a BMT
// therefore this serves as a theoretical optimum for concurrent implementations
func benchmarkBMTBaseline(t *testing.B, n int) {
hasher := sha3.NewKeccak256
hasher := sha3.NewLegacyKeccak256
hashSize := hasher().Size()
data := testutil.RandomBytes(1, hashSize)
@ -453,7 +453,7 @@ func benchmarkBMTBaseline(t *testing.B, n int) {
// benchmarks BMT Hasher
func benchmarkBMT(t *testing.B, n int) {
data := testutil.RandomBytes(1, n)
hasher := sha3.NewKeccak256
hasher := sha3.NewLegacyKeccak256
pool := NewTreePool(hasher, segmentCount, PoolSize)
bmt := New(pool)
@ -467,7 +467,7 @@ func benchmarkBMT(t *testing.B, n int) {
// benchmarks BMT hasher with asynchronous concurrent segment/section writes
func benchmarkBMTAsync(t *testing.B, n int, wh whenHash, double bool) {
data := testutil.RandomBytes(1, n)
hasher := sha3.NewKeccak256
hasher := sha3.NewLegacyKeccak256
pool := NewTreePool(hasher, segmentCount, PoolSize)
bmt := New(pool).NewAsyncWriter(double)
idxs, segments := splitAndShuffle(bmt.SectionSize(), data)
@ -485,7 +485,7 @@ func benchmarkBMTAsync(t *testing.B, n int, wh whenHash, double bool) {
// benchmarks 100 concurrent bmt hashes with pool capacity
func benchmarkPool(t *testing.B, poolsize, n int) {
data := testutil.RandomBytes(1, n)
hasher := sha3.NewKeccak256
hasher := sha3.NewLegacyKeccak256
pool := NewTreePool(hasher, segmentCount, poolsize)
cycles := 100
@ -508,7 +508,7 @@ func benchmarkPool(t *testing.B, poolsize, n int) {
// benchmarks the reference hasher
func benchmarkRefHasher(t *testing.B, n int) {
data := testutil.RandomBytes(1, n)
hasher := sha3.NewKeccak256
hasher := sha3.NewLegacyKeccak256
rbmt := NewRefHasher(hasher, 128)
t.ReportAllocs()

2
swarm/network/stream/streamer_test.go
View File

@ -24,8 +24,8 @@ import (
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/crypto/sha3"
p2ptest "github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/p2p/testing"
"golang.org/x/crypto/sha3"
)
func TestStreamerSubscribe(t *testing.T) {

4
swarm/pss/pss.go
View File

@ -29,7 +29,6 @@ import (
"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/common"
"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/crypto"
"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/crypto/sha3"
"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/metrics"
"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/p2p"
"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/p2p/enode"
@ -40,6 +39,7 @@ import (
"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/swarm/pot"
"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/swarm/storage"
whisper "github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/whisper/whisperv5"
"golang.org/x/crypto/sha3"
)
const (
@ -187,7 +187,7 @@ func NewPss(k *network.Kademlia, params *PssParams) (*Pss, error) {
hashPool: sync.Pool{
New: func() interface{} {
return sha3.NewKeccak256()
return sha3.NewLegacyKeccak256()
},
},
}

4
swarm/storage/chunker_test.go
View File

@ -24,8 +24,8 @@ import (
"io"
"testing"
"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/crypto/sha3"
"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/swarm/testutil"
"golang.org/x/crypto/sha3"
)
/*
@ -142,7 +142,7 @@ func TestSha3ForCorrectness(t *testing.T) {
io.LimitReader(bytes.NewReader(input[8:]), int64(size))
rawSha3 := sha3.NewKeccak256()
rawSha3 := sha3.NewLegacyKeccak256()
rawSha3.Reset()
rawSha3.Write(input)
rawSha3Output := rawSha3.Sum(nil)

4
swarm/storage/encryption/encryption_test.go
View File

File diff suppressed because one or more lines are too long

6
swarm/storage/hasherstore.go
View File

@ -21,9 +21,9 @@ import (
"fmt"
"sync/atomic"
"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/crypto/sha3"
ch "github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/swarm/chunk"
"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/swarm/storage/encryption"
"golang.org/x/crypto/sha3"
)
type hasherStore struct {
@ -232,11 +232,11 @@ func (h *hasherStore) decrypt(chunkData ChunkData, key encryption.Key) ([]byte,
}
func (h *hasherStore) newSpanEncryption(key encryption.Key) encryption.Encryption {
return encryption.New(key, 0, uint32(ch.DefaultSize/h.refSize), sha3.NewKeccak256)
return encryption.New(key, 0, uint32(ch.DefaultSize/h.refSize), sha3.NewLegacyKeccak256)
}
func (h *hasherStore) newDataEncryption(key encryption.Key) encryption.Encryption {
return encryption.New(key, int(ch.DefaultSize), 0, sha3.NewKeccak256)
return encryption.New(key, int(ch.DefaultSize), 0, sha3.NewLegacyKeccak256)
}
func (h *hasherStore) storeChunk(ctx context.Context, chunk *chunk) {

6
swarm/storage/types.go
View File

@ -26,9 +26,9 @@ import (
"io"
"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/common"
"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/crypto/sha3"
"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/swarm/bmt"
ch "github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/swarm/chunk"
"golang.org/x/crypto/sha3"
)
const MaxPO = 16
@ -75,10 +75,10 @@ func MakeHashFunc(hash string) SwarmHasher {
case "SHA256":
return func() SwarmHash { return &HashWithLength{crypto.SHA256.New()} }
case "SHA3":
return func() SwarmHash { return &HashWithLength{sha3.NewKeccak256()} }
return func() SwarmHash { return &HashWithLength{sha3.NewLegacyKeccak256()} }
case "BMT":
return func() SwarmHash {
hasher := sha3.NewKeccak256
hasher := sha3.NewLegacyKeccak256
hasherSize := hasher().Size()
segmentCount := ch.DefaultSize / hasherSize
pool := bmt.NewTreePool(hasher, segmentCount, bmt.PoolSize)

4
tests/state_test_util.go
View File

@ -31,10 +31,10 @@ import (
"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/core/types"
"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/core/vm"
"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/crypto"
"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/crypto/sha3"
"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/ethdb"
"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/params"
"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/rlp"
"golang.org/x/crypto/sha3"
)
// StateTest checks transaction processing without block context.
@ -248,7 +248,7 @@ func (tx *stTransaction) toMessage(ps stPostState) (core.Message, error) {
}
func rlpHash(x interface{}) (h common.Hash) {
hw := sha3.NewKeccak256()
hw := sha3.NewLegacyKeccak256()
rlp.Encode(hw, x)
hw.Sum(h[:0])
return h

4
trie/hasher.go
View File

@ -21,8 +21,8 @@ import (
"sync"
"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/common"
"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/crypto/sha3"
"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/rlp"
"golang.org/x/crypto/sha3"
)
type hasher struct {
@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ var hasherPool = sync.Pool{
New: func() interface{} {
return &hasher{
tmp: make(sliceBuffer, 0, 550), // cap is as large as a full fullNode.
sha: sha3.NewKeccak256().(keccakState),
sha: sha3.NewLegacyKeccak256().(keccakState),
}
},
}

60
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ed25519/ed25519.go generated vendored
View File

@ -6,7 +6,10 @@
// https://ed25519.cr.yp.to/.
//
// These functions are also compatible with the “Ed25519” function defined in
// RFC 8032.
// RFC 8032. However, unlike RFC 8032's formulation, this package's private key
// representation includes a public key suffix to make multiple signing
// operations with the same key more efficient. This package refers to the RFC
// 8032 private key as the “seed”.
package ed25519
// This code is a port of the public domain, “ref10” implementation of ed25519
@ -31,6 +34,8 @@ const (
PrivateKeySize = 64
// SignatureSize is the size, in bytes, of signatures generated and verified by this package.
SignatureSize = 64
// SeedSize is the size, in bytes, of private key seeds. These are the private key representations used by RFC 8032.
SeedSize = 32
)
// PublicKey is the type of Ed25519 public keys.
@ -46,6 +51,15 @@ func (priv PrivateKey) Public() crypto.PublicKey {
return PublicKey(publicKey)
}
// Seed returns the private key seed corresponding to priv. It is provided for
// interoperability with RFC 8032. RFC 8032's private keys correspond to seeds
// in this package.
func (priv PrivateKey) Seed() []byte {
seed := make([]byte, SeedSize)
copy(seed, priv[:32])
return seed
}
// Sign signs the given message with priv.
// Ed25519 performs two passes over messages to be signed and therefore cannot
// handle pre-hashed messages. Thus opts.HashFunc() must return zero to
@ -61,19 +75,33 @@ func (priv PrivateKey) Sign(rand io.Reader, message []byte, opts crypto.SignerOp
// GenerateKey generates a public/private key pair using entropy from rand.
// If rand is nil, crypto/rand.Reader will be used.
func GenerateKey(rand io.Reader) (publicKey PublicKey, privateKey PrivateKey, err error) {
func GenerateKey(rand io.Reader) (PublicKey, PrivateKey, error) {
if rand == nil {
rand = cryptorand.Reader
}
privateKey = make([]byte, PrivateKeySize)
publicKey = make([]byte, PublicKeySize)
_, err = io.ReadFull(rand, privateKey[:32])
if err != nil {
seed := make([]byte, SeedSize)
if _, err := io.ReadFull(rand, seed); err != nil {
return nil, nil, err
}
digest := sha512.Sum512(privateKey[:32])
privateKey := NewKeyFromSeed(seed)
publicKey := make([]byte, PublicKeySize)
copy(publicKey, privateKey[32:])
return publicKey, privateKey, nil
}
// NewKeyFromSeed calculates a private key from a seed. It will panic if
// len(seed) is not SeedSize. This function is provided for interoperability
// with RFC 8032. RFC 8032's private keys correspond to seeds in this
// package.
func NewKeyFromSeed(seed []byte) PrivateKey {
if l := len(seed); l != SeedSize {
panic("ed25519: bad seed length: " + strconv.Itoa(l))
}
digest := sha512.Sum512(seed)
digest[0] &= 248
digest[31] &= 127
digest[31] |= 64
@ -85,10 +113,11 @@ func GenerateKey(rand io.Reader) (publicKey PublicKey, privateKey PrivateKey, er
var publicKeyBytes [32]byte
A.ToBytes(&publicKeyBytes)
privateKey := make([]byte, PrivateKeySize)
copy(privateKey, seed)
copy(privateKey[32:], publicKeyBytes[:])
copy(publicKey, publicKeyBytes[:])
return publicKey, privateKey, nil
return privateKey
}
// Sign signs the message with privateKey and returns a signature. It will
@ -171,9 +200,16 @@ func Verify(publicKey PublicKey, message, sig []byte) bool {
edwards25519.ScReduce(&hReduced, &digest)
var R edwards25519.ProjectiveGroupElement
var b [32]byte
copy(b[:], sig[32:])
edwards25519.GeDoubleScalarMultVartime(&R, &hReduced, &A, &b)
var s [32]byte
copy(s[:], sig[32:])
// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8032#section-5.1.7 requires that s be in
// the range [0, order) in order to prevent signature malleability.
if !edwards25519.ScMinimal(&s) {
return false
}
edwards25519.GeDoubleScalarMultVartime(&R, &hReduced, &A, &s)
var checkR [32]byte
R.ToBytes(&checkR)

22
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ed25519/internal/edwards25519/edwards25519.go generated vendored
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@ -4,6 +4,8 @@
package edwards25519
import "encoding/binary"
// This code is a port of the public domain, “ref10” implementation of ed25519
// from SUPERCOP.
@ -1769,3 +1771,23 @@ func ScReduce(out *[32]byte, s *[64]byte) {
out[30] = byte(s11 >> 9)
out[31] = byte(s11 >> 17)
}
// order is the order of Curve25519 in little-endian form.
var order = [4]uint64{0x5812631a5cf5d3ed, 0x14def9dea2f79cd6, 0, 0x1000000000000000}
// ScMinimal returns true if the given scalar is less than the order of the
// curve.
func ScMinimal(scalar *[32]byte) bool {
for i := 3; ; i-- {
v := binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(scalar[i*8:])
if v > order[i] {
return false
} else if v < order[i] {
break
} else if i == 0 {
return false
}
}
return true
}

264
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/chacha20/chacha_generic.go generated vendored Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,264 @@
// Copyright 2016 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
// Package ChaCha20 implements the core ChaCha20 function as specified
// in https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7539#section-2.3.
package chacha20
import (
"crypto/cipher"
"encoding/binary"
"golang.org/x/crypto/internal/subtle"
)
// assert that *Cipher implements cipher.Stream
var _ cipher.Stream = (*Cipher)(nil)
// Cipher is a stateful instance of ChaCha20 using a particular key
// and nonce. A *Cipher implements the cipher.Stream interface.
type Cipher struct {
key [8]uint32
counter uint32 // incremented after each block
nonce [3]uint32
buf [bufSize]byte // buffer for unused keystream bytes
len int // number of unused keystream bytes at end of buf
}
// New creates a new ChaCha20 stream cipher with the given key and nonce.
// The initial counter value is set to 0.
func New(key [8]uint32, nonce [3]uint32) *Cipher {
return &Cipher{key: key, nonce: nonce}
}
// ChaCha20 constants spelling "expand 32-byte k"
const (
j0 uint32 = 0x61707865
j1 uint32 = 0x3320646e
j2 uint32 = 0x79622d32
j3 uint32 = 0x6b206574
)
func quarterRound(a, b, c, d uint32) (uint32, uint32, uint32, uint32) {
a += b
d ^= a
d = (d << 16) | (d >> 16)
c += d
b ^= c
b = (b << 12) | (b >> 20)
a += b
d ^= a
d = (d << 8) | (d >> 24)
c += d
b ^= c
b = (b << 7) | (b >> 25)
return a, b, c, d
}
// XORKeyStream XORs each byte in the given slice with a byte from the
// cipher's key stream. Dst and src must overlap entirely or not at all.
//
// If len(dst) < len(src), XORKeyStream will panic. It is acceptable
// to pass a dst bigger than src, and in that case, XORKeyStream will
// only update dst[:len(src)] and will not touch the rest of dst.
//
// Multiple calls to XORKeyStream behave as if the concatenation of
// the src buffers was passed in a single run. That is, Cipher
// maintains state and does not reset at each XORKeyStream call.
func (s *Cipher) XORKeyStream(dst, src []byte) {
if len(dst) < len(src) {
panic("chacha20: output smaller than input")
}
if subtle.InexactOverlap(dst[:len(src)], src) {
panic("chacha20: invalid buffer overlap")
}
// xor src with buffered keystream first
if s.len != 0 {
buf := s.buf[len(s.buf)-s.len:]
if len(src) < len(buf) {
buf = buf[:len(src)]
}
td, ts := dst[:len(buf)], src[:len(buf)] // BCE hint
for i, b := range buf {
td[i] = ts[i] ^ b
}
s.len -= len(buf)
if s.len != 0 {
return
}
s.buf = [len(s.buf)]byte{} // zero the empty buffer
src = src[len(buf):]
dst = dst[len(buf):]
}
if len(src) == 0 {
return
}
if haveAsm {
if uint64(len(src))+uint64(s.counter)*64 > (1<<38)-64 {
panic("chacha20: counter overflow")
}
s.xorKeyStreamAsm(dst, src)
return
}
// set up a 64-byte buffer to pad out the final block if needed
// (hoisted out of the main loop to avoid spills)
rem := len(src) % 64 // length of final block
fin := len(src) - rem // index of final block
if rem > 0 {
copy(s.buf[len(s.buf)-64:], src[fin:])
}
// pre-calculate most of the first round
s1, s5, s9, s13 := quarterRound(j1, s.key[1], s.key[5], s.nonce[0])
s2, s6, s10, s14 := quarterRound(j2, s.key[2], s.key[6], s.nonce[1])
s3, s7, s11, s15 := quarterRound(j3, s.key[3], s.key[7], s.nonce[2])
n := len(src)
src, dst = src[:n:n], dst[:n:n] // BCE hint
for i := 0; i < n; i += 64 {
// calculate the remainder of the first round
s0, s4, s8, s12 := quarterRound(j0, s.key[0], s.key[4], s.counter)
// execute the second round
x0, x5, x10, x15 := quarterRound(s0, s5, s10, s15)
x1, x6, x11, x12 := quarterRound(s1, s6, s11, s12)
x2, x7, x8, x13 := quarterRound(s2, s7, s8, s13)
x3, x4, x9, x14 := quarterRound(s3, s4, s9, s14)
// execute the remaining 18 rounds
for i := 0; i < 9; i++ {
x0, x4, x8, x12 = quarterRound(x0, x4, x8, x12)
x1, x5, x9, x13 = quarterRound(x1, x5, x9, x13)
x2, x6, x10, x14 = quarterRound(x2, x6, x10, x14)
x3, x7, x11, x15 = quarterRound(x3, x7, x11, x15)
x0, x5, x10, x15 = quarterRound(x0, x5, x10, x15)
x1, x6, x11, x12 = quarterRound(x1, x6, x11, x12)
x2, x7, x8, x13 = quarterRound(x2, x7, x8, x13)
x3, x4, x9, x14 = quarterRound(x3, x4, x9, x14)
}
x0 += j0
x1 += j1
x2 += j2
x3 += j3
x4 += s.key[0]
x5 += s.key[1]
x6 += s.key[2]
x7 += s.key[3]
x8 += s.key[4]
x9 += s.key[5]
x10 += s.key[6]
x11 += s.key[7]
x12 += s.counter
x13 += s.nonce[0]
x14 += s.nonce[1]
x15 += s.nonce[2]
// increment the counter
s.counter += 1
if s.counter == 0 {
panic("chacha20: counter overflow")
}
// pad to 64 bytes if needed
in, out := src[i:], dst[i:]
if i == fin {
// src[fin:] has already been copied into s.buf before
// the main loop
in, out = s.buf[len(s.buf)-64:], s.buf[len(s.buf)-64:]
}
in, out = in[:64], out[:64] // BCE hint
// XOR the key stream with the source and write out the result
xor(out[0:], in[0:], x0)
xor(out[4:], in[4:], x1)
xor(out[8:], in[8:], x2)
xor(out[12:], in[12:], x3)
xor(out[16:], in[16:], x4)
xor(out[20:], in[20:], x5)
xor(out[24:], in[24:], x6)
xor(out[28:], in[28:], x7)
xor(out[32:], in[32:], x8)
xor(out[36:], in[36:], x9)
xor(out[40:], in[40:], x10)
xor(out[44:], in[44:], x11)
xor(out[48:], in[48:], x12)
xor(out[52:], in[52:], x13)
xor(out[56:], in[56:], x14)
xor(out[60:], in[60:], x15)
}
// copy any trailing bytes out of the buffer and into dst
if rem != 0 {
s.len = 64 - rem
copy(dst[fin:], s.buf[len(s.buf)-64:])
}
}
// Advance discards bytes in the key stream until the next 64 byte block
// boundary is reached and updates the counter accordingly. If the key
// stream is already at a block boundary no bytes will be discarded and
// the counter will be unchanged.
func (s *Cipher) Advance() {
s.len -= s.len % 64
if s.len == 0 {
s.buf = [len(s.buf)]byte{}
}
}
// XORKeyStream crypts bytes from in to out using the given key and counters.
// In and out must overlap entirely or not at all. Counter contains the raw
// ChaCha20 counter bytes (i.e. block counter followed by nonce).
func XORKeyStream(out, in []byte, counter *[16]byte, key *[32]byte) {
s := Cipher{
key: [8]uint32{
binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[0:4]),
binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[4:8]),
binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[8:12]),
binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[12:16]),
binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[16:20]),
binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[20:24]),
binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[24:28]),
binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[28:32]),
},
nonce: [3]uint32{
binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(counter[4:8]),
binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(counter[8:12]),
binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(counter[12:16]),
},
counter: binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(counter[0:4]),
}
s.XORKeyStream(out, in)
}
// HChaCha20 uses the ChaCha20 core to generate a derived key from a key and a
// nonce. It should only be used as part of the XChaCha20 construction.
func HChaCha20(key *[8]uint32, nonce *[4]uint32) [8]uint32 {
x0, x1, x2, x3 := j0, j1, j2, j3
x4, x5, x6, x7 := key[0], key[1], key[2], key[3]
x8, x9, x10, x11 := key[4], key[5], key[6], key[7]
x12, x13, x14, x15 := nonce[0], nonce[1], nonce[2], nonce[3]
for i := 0; i < 10; i++ {
x0, x4, x8, x12 = quarterRound(x0, x4, x8, x12)
x1, x5, x9, x13 = quarterRound(x1, x5, x9, x13)
x2, x6, x10, x14 = quarterRound(x2, x6, x10, x14)
x3, x7, x11, x15 = quarterRound(x3, x7, x11, x15)
x0, x5, x10, x15 = quarterRound(x0, x5, x10, x15)
x1, x6, x11, x12 = quarterRound(x1, x6, x11, x12)
x2, x7, x8, x13 = quarterRound(x2, x7, x8, x13)
x3, x4, x9, x14 = quarterRound(x3, x4, x9, x14)
}
var out [8]uint32
out[0], out[1], out[2], out[3] = x0, x1, x2, x3
out[4], out[5], out[6], out[7] = x12, x13, x14, x15
return out
}

16
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/chacha20/chacha_noasm.go generated vendored Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
// +build !s390x gccgo appengine
package chacha20
const (
bufSize = 64
haveAsm = false
)
func (*Cipher) xorKeyStreamAsm(dst, src []byte) {
panic("not implemented")
}

30
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/chacha20/chacha_s390x.go generated vendored Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
// +build s390x,!gccgo,!appengine
package chacha20
var haveAsm = hasVectorFacility()
const bufSize = 256
// hasVectorFacility reports whether the machine supports the vector
// facility (vx).
// Implementation in asm_s390x.s.
func hasVectorFacility() bool
// xorKeyStreamVX is an assembly implementation of XORKeyStream. It must only
// be called when the vector facility is available.
// Implementation in asm_s390x.s.
//go:noescape
func xorKeyStreamVX(dst, src []byte, key *[8]uint32, nonce *[3]uint32, counter *uint32, buf *[256]byte, len *int)
func (c *Cipher) xorKeyStreamAsm(dst, src []byte) {
xorKeyStreamVX(dst, src, &c.key, &c.nonce, &c.counter, &c.buf, &c.len)
}
// EXRL targets, DO NOT CALL!
func mvcSrcToBuf()
func mvcBufToDst()

283
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/chacha20/chacha_s390x.s generated vendored Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,283 @@
// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
// +build s390x,!gccgo,!appengine
#include "go_asm.h"
#include "textflag.h"
// This is an implementation of the ChaCha20 encryption algorithm as
// specified in RFC 7539. It uses vector instructions to compute
// 4 keystream blocks in parallel (256 bytes) which are then XORed
// with the bytes in the input slice.
GLOBL ·constants<>(SB), RODATA|NOPTR, $32
// BSWAP: swap bytes in each 4-byte element
DATA ·constants<>+0x00(SB)/4, $0x03020100
DATA ·constants<>+0x04(SB)/4, $0x07060504
DATA ·constants<>+0x08(SB)/4, $0x0b0a0908
DATA ·constants<>+0x0c(SB)/4, $0x0f0e0d0c
// J0: [j0, j1, j2, j3]
DATA ·constants<>+0x10(SB)/4, $0x61707865
DATA ·constants<>+0x14(SB)/4, $0x3320646e
DATA ·constants<>+0x18(SB)/4, $0x79622d32
DATA ·constants<>+0x1c(SB)/4, $0x6b206574
// EXRL targets:
TEXT ·mvcSrcToBuf(SB), NOFRAME|NOSPLIT, $0
MVC $1, (R1), (R8)
RET
TEXT ·mvcBufToDst(SB), NOFRAME|NOSPLIT, $0
MVC $1, (R8), (R9)
RET
#define BSWAP V5
#define J0 V6
#define KEY0 V7
#define KEY1 V8
#define NONCE V9
#define CTR V10
#define M0 V11
#define M1 V12
#define M2 V13
#define M3 V14
#define INC V15
#define X0 V16
#define X1 V17
#define X2 V18
#define X3 V19
#define X4 V20
#define X5 V21
#define X6 V22
#define X7 V23
#define X8 V24
#define X9 V25
#define X10 V26
#define X11 V27
#define X12 V28
#define X13 V29
#define X14 V30
#define X15 V31
#define NUM_ROUNDS 20
#define ROUND4(a0, a1, a2, a3, b0, b1, b2, b3, c0, c1, c2, c3, d0, d1, d2, d3) \
VAF a1, a0, a0 \
VAF b1, b0, b0 \
VAF c1, c0, c0 \
VAF d1, d0, d0 \
VX a0, a2, a2 \
VX b0, b2, b2 \
VX c0, c2, c2 \
VX d0, d2, d2 \
VERLLF $16, a2, a2 \
VERLLF $16, b2, b2 \
VERLLF $16, c2, c2 \
VERLLF $16, d2, d2 \
VAF a2, a3, a3 \
VAF b2, b3, b3 \
VAF c2, c3, c3 \
VAF d2, d3, d3 \
VX a3, a1, a1 \
VX b3, b1, b1 \
VX c3, c1, c1 \
VX d3, d1, d1 \
VERLLF $12, a1, a1 \
VERLLF $12, b1, b1 \
VERLLF $12, c1, c1 \
VERLLF $12, d1, d1 \
VAF a1, a0, a0 \
VAF b1, b0, b0 \
VAF c1, c0, c0 \
VAF d1, d0, d0 \
VX a0, a2, a2 \
VX b0, b2, b2 \
VX c0, c2, c2 \
VX d0, d2, d2 \
VERLLF $8, a2, a2 \
VERLLF $8, b2, b2 \
VERLLF $8, c2, c2 \
VERLLF $8, d2, d2 \
VAF a2, a3, a3 \
VAF b2, b3, b3 \
VAF c2, c3, c3 \
VAF d2, d3, d3 \
VX a3, a1, a1 \
VX b3, b1, b1 \
VX c3, c1, c1 \
VX d3, d1, d1 \
VERLLF $7, a1, a1 \
VERLLF $7, b1, b1 \
VERLLF $7, c1, c1 \
VERLLF $7, d1, d1
#define PERMUTE(mask, v0, v1, v2, v3) \
VPERM v0, v0, mask, v0 \
VPERM v1, v1, mask, v1 \
VPERM v2, v2, mask, v2 \
VPERM v3, v3, mask, v3
#define ADDV(x, v0, v1, v2, v3) \
VAF x, v0, v0 \
VAF x, v1, v1 \
VAF x, v2, v2 \
VAF x, v3, v3
#define XORV(off, dst, src, v0, v1, v2, v3) \
VLM off(src), M0, M3 \
PERMUTE(BSWAP, v0, v1, v2, v3) \
VX v0, M0, M0 \
VX v1, M1, M1 \
VX v2, M2, M2 \
VX v3, M3, M3 \
VSTM M0, M3, off(dst)
#define SHUFFLE(a, b, c, d, t, u, v, w) \
VMRHF a, c, t \ // t = {a[0], c[0], a[1], c[1]}
VMRHF b, d, u \ // u = {b[0], d[0], b[1], d[1]}
VMRLF a, c, v \ // v = {a[2], c[2], a[3], c[3]}
VMRLF b, d, w \ // w = {b[2], d[2], b[3], d[3]}
VMRHF t, u, a \ // a = {a[0], b[0], c[0], d[0]}
VMRLF t, u, b \ // b = {a[1], b[1], c[1], d[1]}
VMRHF v, w, c \ // c = {a[2], b[2], c[2], d[2]}
VMRLF v, w, d // d = {a[3], b[3], c[3], d[3]}
// func xorKeyStreamVX(dst, src []byte, key *[8]uint32, nonce *[3]uint32, counter *uint32, buf *[256]byte, len *int)
TEXT ·xorKeyStreamVX(SB), NOSPLIT, $0
MOVD $·constants<>(SB), R1
MOVD dst+0(FP), R2 // R2=&dst[0]
LMG src+24(FP), R3, R4 // R3=&src[0] R4=len(src)
MOVD key+48(FP), R5 // R5=key
MOVD nonce+56(FP), R6 // R6=nonce
MOVD counter+64(FP), R7 // R7=counter
MOVD buf+72(FP), R8 // R8=buf
MOVD len+80(FP), R9 // R9=len
// load BSWAP and J0
VLM (R1), BSWAP, J0
// set up tail buffer
ADD $-1, R4, R12
MOVBZ R12, R12
CMPUBEQ R12, $255, aligned
MOVD R4, R1
AND $~255, R1
MOVD $(R3)(R1*1), R1
EXRL $·mvcSrcToBuf(SB), R12
MOVD $255, R0
SUB R12, R0
MOVD R0, (R9) // update len
aligned:
// setup
MOVD $95, R0
VLM (R5), KEY0, KEY1
VLL R0, (R6), NONCE
VZERO M0
VLEIB $7, $32, M0
VSRLB M0, NONCE, NONCE
// initialize counter values
VLREPF (R7), CTR
VZERO INC
VLEIF $1, $1, INC
VLEIF $2, $2, INC
VLEIF $3, $3, INC
VAF INC, CTR, CTR
VREPIF $4, INC
chacha:
VREPF $0, J0, X0
VREPF $1, J0, X1
VREPF $2, J0, X2
VREPF $3, J0, X3
VREPF $0, KEY0, X4
VREPF $1, KEY0, X5
VREPF $2, KEY0, X6
VREPF $3, KEY0, X7
VREPF $0, KEY1, X8
VREPF $1, KEY1, X9
VREPF $2, KEY1, X10
VREPF $3, KEY1, X11
VLR CTR, X12
VREPF $1, NONCE, X13
VREPF $2, NONCE, X14
VREPF $3, NONCE, X15
MOVD $(NUM_ROUNDS/2), R1
loop:
ROUND4(X0, X4, X12, X8, X1, X5, X13, X9, X2, X6, X14, X10, X3, X7, X15, X11)
ROUND4(X0, X5, X15, X10, X1, X6, X12, X11, X2, X7, X13, X8, X3, X4, X14, X9)
ADD $-1, R1
BNE loop
// decrement length
ADD $-256, R4
BLT tail
continue:
// rearrange vectors
SHUFFLE(X0, X1, X2, X3, M0, M1, M2, M3)
ADDV(J0, X0, X1, X2, X3)
SHUFFLE(X4, X5, X6, X7, M0, M1, M2, M3)
ADDV(KEY0, X4, X5, X6, X7)
SHUFFLE(X8, X9, X10, X11, M0, M1, M2, M3)
ADDV(KEY1, X8, X9, X10, X11)
VAF CTR, X12, X12
SHUFFLE(X12, X13, X14, X15, M0, M1, M2, M3)
ADDV(NONCE, X12, X13, X14, X15)
// increment counters
VAF INC, CTR, CTR
// xor keystream with plaintext
XORV(0*64, R2, R3, X0, X4, X8, X12)
XORV(1*64, R2, R3, X1, X5, X9, X13)
XORV(2*64, R2, R3, X2, X6, X10, X14)
XORV(3*64, R2, R3, X3, X7, X11, X15)
// increment pointers
MOVD $256(R2), R2
MOVD $256(R3), R3
CMPBNE R4, $0, chacha
CMPUBEQ R12, $255, return
EXRL $·mvcBufToDst(SB), R12 // len was updated during setup
return:
VSTEF $0, CTR, (R7)
RET
tail:
MOVD R2, R9
MOVD R8, R2
MOVD R8, R3
MOVD $0, R4
JMP continue
// func hasVectorFacility() bool
TEXT ·hasVectorFacility(SB), NOSPLIT, $24-1
MOVD $x-24(SP), R1
XC $24, 0(R1), 0(R1) // clear the storage
MOVD $2, R0 // R0 is the number of double words stored -1
WORD $0xB2B01000 // STFLE 0(R1)
XOR R0, R0 // reset the value of R0
MOVBZ z-8(SP), R1
AND $0x40, R1
BEQ novector
vectorinstalled:
// check if the vector instruction has been enabled
VLEIB $0, $0xF, V16
VLGVB $0, V16, R1
CMPBNE R1, $0xF, novector
MOVB $1, ret+0(FP) // have vx
RET
novector:
MOVB $0, ret+0(FP) // no vx
RET

43
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/chacha20/xor.go generated vendored Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found src the LICENSE file.
package chacha20
import (
"runtime"
)
// Platforms that have fast unaligned 32-bit little endian accesses.
const unaligned = runtime.GOARCH == "386" ||
runtime.GOARCH == "amd64" ||
runtime.GOARCH == "arm64" ||
runtime.GOARCH == "ppc64le" ||
runtime.GOARCH == "s390x"
// xor reads a little endian uint32 from src, XORs it with u and
// places the result in little endian byte order in dst.
func xor(dst, src []byte, u uint32) {
_, _ = src[3], dst[3] // eliminate bounds checks
if unaligned {
// The compiler should optimize this code into
// 32-bit unaligned little endian loads and stores.
// TODO: delete once the compiler does a reliably
// good job with the generic code below.
// See issue #25111 for more details.
v := uint32(src[0])
v |= uint32(src[1]) << 8
v |= uint32(src[2]) << 16
v |= uint32(src[3]) << 24
v ^= u
dst[0] = byte(v)
dst[1] = byte(v >> 8)
dst[2] = byte(v >> 16)
dst[3] = byte(v >> 24)
} else {
dst[0] = src[0] ^ byte(u)
dst[1] = src[1] ^ byte(u>>8)
dst[2] = src[2] ^ byte(u>>16)
dst[3] = src[3] ^ byte(u>>24)
}
}

32
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/subtle/aliasing.go generated vendored Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
// +build !appengine
// Package subtle implements functions that are often useful in cryptographic
// code but require careful thought to use correctly.
package subtle // import "golang.org/x/crypto/internal/subtle"
import "unsafe"
// AnyOverlap reports whether x and y share memory at any (not necessarily
// corresponding) index. The memory beyond the slice length is ignored.
func AnyOverlap(x, y []byte) bool {
return len(x) > 0 && len(y) > 0 &&
uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&x[0])) <= uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&y[len(y)-1])) &&
uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&y[0])) <= uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&x[len(x)-1]))
}
// InexactOverlap reports whether x and y share memory at any non-corresponding
// index. The memory beyond the slice length is ignored. Note that x and y can
// have different lengths and still not have any inexact overlap.
//
// InexactOverlap can be used to implement the requirements of the crypto/cipher
// AEAD, Block, BlockMode and Stream interfaces.
func InexactOverlap(x, y []byte) bool {
if len(x) == 0 || len(y) == 0 || &x[0] == &y[0] {
return false
}
return AnyOverlap(x, y)
}

35
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/subtle/aliasing_appengine.go generated vendored Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
// +build appengine
// Package subtle implements functions that are often useful in cryptographic
// code but require careful thought to use correctly.
package subtle // import "golang.org/x/crypto/internal/subtle"
// This is the Google App Engine standard variant based on reflect
// because the unsafe package and cgo are disallowed.
import "reflect"
// AnyOverlap reports whether x and y share memory at any (not necessarily
// corresponding) index. The memory beyond the slice length is ignored.
func AnyOverlap(x, y []byte) bool {
return len(x) > 0 && len(y) > 0 &&
reflect.ValueOf(&x[0]).Pointer() <= reflect.ValueOf(&y[len(y)-1]).Pointer() &&
reflect.ValueOf(&y[0]).Pointer() <= reflect.ValueOf(&x[len(x)-1]).Pointer()
}
// InexactOverlap reports whether x and y share memory at any non-corresponding
// index. The memory beyond the slice length is ignored. Note that x and y can
// have different lengths and still not have any inexact overlap.
//
// InexactOverlap can be used to implement the requirements of the crypto/cipher
// AEAD, Block, BlockMode and Stream interfaces.
func InexactOverlap(x, y []byte) bool {
if len(x) == 0 || len(y) == 0 || &x[0] == &y[0] {
return false
}
return AnyOverlap(x, y)
}

168
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp/keys.go generated vendored
View File

@ -325,16 +325,14 @@ func ReadEntity(packets *packet.Reader) (*Entity, error) {
if e.PrivateKey, ok = p.(*packet.PrivateKey); !ok {
packets.Unread(p)
return nil, errors.StructuralError("first packet was not a public/private key")
} else {
e.PrimaryKey = &e.PrivateKey.PublicKey
}
e.PrimaryKey = &e.PrivateKey.PublicKey
}
if !e.PrimaryKey.PubKeyAlgo.CanSign() {
return nil, errors.StructuralError("primary key cannot be used for signatures")
}
var current *Identity
var revocations []*packet.Signature
EachPacket:
for {
@ -347,32 +345,8 @@ EachPacket:
switch pkt := p.(type) {
case *packet.UserId:
current = new(Identity)
current.Name = pkt.Id
current.UserId = pkt
e.Identities[pkt.Id] = current
for {
p, err = packets.Next()
if err == io.EOF {
return nil, io.ErrUnexpectedEOF
} else if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
sig, ok := p.(*packet.Signature)
if !ok {
return nil, errors.StructuralError("user ID packet not followed by self-signature")
}
if (sig.SigType == packet.SigTypePositiveCert || sig.SigType == packet.SigTypeGenericCert) && sig.IssuerKeyId != nil && *sig.IssuerKeyId == e.PrimaryKey.KeyId {
if err = e.PrimaryKey.VerifyUserIdSignature(pkt.Id, e.PrimaryKey, sig); err != nil {
return nil, errors.StructuralError("user ID self-signature invalid: " + err.Error())
}
current.SelfSignature = sig
break
}
current.Signatures = append(current.Signatures, sig)
if err := addUserID(e, packets, pkt); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
case *packet.Signature:
if pkt.SigType == packet.SigTypeKeyRevocation {
@ -381,11 +355,9 @@ EachPacket:
// TODO: RFC4880 5.2.1 permits signatures
// directly on keys (eg. to bind additional
// revocation keys).
} else if current == nil {
return nil, errors.StructuralError("signature packet found before user id packet")
} else {
current.Signatures = append(current.Signatures, pkt)
}
// Else, ignoring the signature as it does not follow anything
// we would know to attach it to.
case *packet.PrivateKey:
if pkt.IsSubkey == false {
packets.Unread(p)
@ -426,33 +398,105 @@ EachPacket:
return e, nil
}
func addUserID(e *Entity, packets *packet.Reader, pkt *packet.UserId) error {
// Make a new Identity object, that we might wind up throwing away.
// We'll only add it if we get a valid self-signature over this
// userID.
identity := new(Identity)
identity.Name = pkt.Id
identity.UserId = pkt
for {
p, err := packets.Next()
if err == io.EOF {
break
} else if err != nil {
return err
}
sig, ok := p.(*packet.Signature)
if !ok {
packets.Unread(p)
break
}
if (sig.SigType == packet.SigTypePositiveCert || sig.SigType == packet.SigTypeGenericCert) && sig.IssuerKeyId != nil && *sig.IssuerKeyId == e.PrimaryKey.KeyId {
if err = e.PrimaryKey.VerifyUserIdSignature(pkt.Id, e.PrimaryKey, sig); err != nil {
return errors.StructuralError("user ID self-signature invalid: " + err.Error())
}
identity.SelfSignature = sig
e.Identities[pkt.Id] = identity
} else {
identity.Signatures = append(identity.Signatures, sig)
}
}
return nil
}
func addSubkey(e *Entity, packets *packet.Reader, pub *packet.PublicKey, priv *packet.PrivateKey) error {
var subKey Subkey
subKey.PublicKey = pub
subKey.PrivateKey = priv
p, err := packets.Next()
if err == io.EOF {
return io.ErrUnexpectedEOF
for {
p, err := packets.Next()
if err == io.EOF {
break
} else if err != nil {
return errors.StructuralError("subkey signature invalid: " + err.Error())
}
sig, ok := p.(*packet.Signature)
if !ok {
packets.Unread(p)
break
}
if sig.SigType != packet.SigTypeSubkeyBinding && sig.SigType != packet.SigTypeSubkeyRevocation {
return errors.StructuralError("subkey signature with wrong type")
}
if err := e.PrimaryKey.VerifyKeySignature(subKey.PublicKey, sig); err != nil {
return errors.StructuralError("subkey signature invalid: " + err.Error())
}
switch sig.SigType {
case packet.SigTypeSubkeyRevocation:
subKey.Sig = sig
case packet.SigTypeSubkeyBinding:
if shouldReplaceSubkeySig(subKey.Sig, sig) {
subKey.Sig = sig
}
}
}
if err != nil {
return errors.StructuralError("subkey signature invalid: " + err.Error())
}
var ok bool
subKey.Sig, ok = p.(*packet.Signature)
if !ok {
if subKey.Sig == nil {
return errors.StructuralError("subkey packet not followed by signature")
}
if subKey.Sig.SigType != packet.SigTypeSubkeyBinding && subKey.Sig.SigType != packet.SigTypeSubkeyRevocation {
return errors.StructuralError("subkey signature with wrong type")
}
err = e.PrimaryKey.VerifyKeySignature(subKey.PublicKey, subKey.Sig)
if err != nil {
return errors.StructuralError("subkey signature invalid: " + err.Error())
}
e.Subkeys = append(e.Subkeys, subKey)
return nil
}
func shouldReplaceSubkeySig(existingSig, potentialNewSig *packet.Signature) bool {
if potentialNewSig == nil {
return false
}
if existingSig == nil {
return true
}
if existingSig.SigType == packet.SigTypeSubkeyRevocation {
return false // never override a revocation signature
}
return potentialNewSig.CreationTime.After(existingSig.CreationTime)
}
const defaultRSAKeyBits = 2048
// NewEntity returns an Entity that contains a fresh RSA/RSA keypair with a
@ -487,7 +531,7 @@ func NewEntity(name, comment, email string, config *packet.Config) (*Entity, err
}
isPrimaryId := true
e.Identities[uid.Id] = &Identity{
Name: uid.Name,
Name: uid.Id,
UserId: uid,
SelfSignature: &packet.Signature{
CreationTime: currentTime,
@ -501,6 +545,10 @@ func NewEntity(name, comment, email string, config *packet.Config) (*Entity, err
IssuerKeyId: &e.PrimaryKey.KeyId,
},
}
err = e.Identities[uid.Id].SelfSignature.SignUserId(uid.Id, e.PrimaryKey, e.PrivateKey, config)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
// If the user passes in a DefaultHash via packet.Config,
// set the PreferredHash for the SelfSignature.
@ -508,6 +556,11 @@ func NewEntity(name, comment, email string, config *packet.Config) (*Entity, err
e.Identities[uid.Id].SelfSignature.PreferredHash = []uint8{hashToHashId(config.DefaultHash)}
}
// Likewise for DefaultCipher.
if config != nil && config.DefaultCipher != 0 {
e.Identities[uid.Id].SelfSignature.PreferredSymmetric = []uint8{uint8(config.DefaultCipher)}
}
e.Subkeys = make([]Subkey, 1)
e.Subkeys[0] = Subkey{
PublicKey: packet.NewRSAPublicKey(currentTime, &encryptingPriv.PublicKey),
@ -525,13 +578,16 @@ func NewEntity(name, comment, email string, config *packet.Config) (*Entity, err
}
e.Subkeys[0].PublicKey.IsSubkey = true
e.Subkeys[0].PrivateKey.IsSubkey = true
err = e.Subkeys[0].Sig.SignKey(e.Subkeys[0].PublicKey, e.PrivateKey, config)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return e, nil
}
// SerializePrivate serializes an Entity, including private key material, to
// the given Writer. For now, it must only be used on an Entity returned from
// NewEntity.
// SerializePrivate serializes an Entity, including private key material, but
// excluding signatures from other entities, to the given Writer.
// Identities and subkeys are re-signed in case they changed since NewEntry.
// If config is nil, sensible defaults will be used.
func (e *Entity) SerializePrivate(w io.Writer, config *packet.Config) (err error) {
err = e.PrivateKey.Serialize(w)
@ -569,8 +625,8 @@ func (e *Entity) SerializePrivate(w io.Writer, config *packet.Config) (err error
return nil
}
// Serialize writes the public part of the given Entity to w. (No private
// key material will be output).
// Serialize writes the public part of the given Entity to w, including
// signatures from other entities. No private key material will be output.
func (e *Entity) Serialize(w io.Writer) error {
err := e.PrimaryKey.Serialize(w)
if err != nil {

9
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp/packet/encrypted_key.go generated vendored
View File

@ -42,12 +42,18 @@ func (e *EncryptedKey) parse(r io.Reader) (err error) {
switch e.Algo {
case PubKeyAlgoRSA, PubKeyAlgoRSAEncryptOnly:
e.encryptedMPI1.bytes, e.encryptedMPI1.bitLength, err = readMPI(r)
if err != nil {
return
}
case PubKeyAlgoElGamal:
e.encryptedMPI1.bytes, e.encryptedMPI1.bitLength, err = readMPI(r)
if err != nil {
return
}
e.encryptedMPI2.bytes, e.encryptedMPI2.bitLength, err = readMPI(r)
if err != nil {
return
}
}
_, err = consumeAll(r)
return
@ -72,7 +78,8 @@ func (e *EncryptedKey) Decrypt(priv *PrivateKey, config *Config) error {
// padding oracle attacks.
switch priv.PubKeyAlgo {
case PubKeyAlgoRSA, PubKeyAlgoRSAEncryptOnly:
b, err = rsa.DecryptPKCS1v15(config.Random(), priv.PrivateKey.(*rsa.PrivateKey), e.encryptedMPI1.bytes)
k := priv.PrivateKey.(*rsa.PrivateKey)
b, err = rsa.DecryptPKCS1v15(config.Random(), k, padToKeySize(&k.PublicKey, e.encryptedMPI1.bytes))
case PubKeyAlgoElGamal:
c1 := new(big.Int).SetBytes(e.encryptedMPI1.bytes)
c2 := new(big.Int).SetBytes(e.encryptedMPI2.bytes)

44
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp/packet/packet.go generated vendored
View File

@ -11,10 +11,12 @@ import (
"crypto/aes"
"crypto/cipher"
"crypto/des"
"golang.org/x/crypto/cast5"
"golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp/errors"
"crypto/rsa"
"io"
"math/big"
"golang.org/x/crypto/cast5"
"golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp/errors"
)
// readFull is the same as io.ReadFull except that reading zero bytes returns
@ -402,14 +404,16 @@ const (
type PublicKeyAlgorithm uint8
const (
PubKeyAlgoRSA PublicKeyAlgorithm = 1
PubKeyAlgoRSAEncryptOnly PublicKeyAlgorithm = 2
PubKeyAlgoRSASignOnly PublicKeyAlgorithm = 3
PubKeyAlgoElGamal PublicKeyAlgorithm = 16
PubKeyAlgoDSA PublicKeyAlgorithm = 17
PubKeyAlgoRSA PublicKeyAlgorithm = 1
PubKeyAlgoElGamal PublicKeyAlgorithm = 16
PubKeyAlgoDSA PublicKeyAlgorithm = 17
// RFC 6637, Section 5.
PubKeyAlgoECDH PublicKeyAlgorithm = 18
PubKeyAlgoECDSA PublicKeyAlgorithm = 19
// Deprecated in RFC 4880, Section 13.5. Use key flags instead.
PubKeyAlgoRSAEncryptOnly PublicKeyAlgorithm = 2
PubKeyAlgoRSASignOnly PublicKeyAlgorithm = 3
)
// CanEncrypt returns true if it's possible to encrypt a message to a public
@ -500,19 +504,17 @@ func readMPI(r io.Reader) (mpi []byte, bitLength uint16, err error) {
numBytes := (int(bitLength) + 7) / 8
mpi = make([]byte, numBytes)
_, err = readFull(r, mpi)
return
}
// mpiLength returns the length of the given *big.Int when serialized as an
// MPI.
func mpiLength(n *big.Int) (mpiLengthInBytes int) {
mpiLengthInBytes = 2 /* MPI length */
mpiLengthInBytes += (n.BitLen() + 7) / 8
// According to RFC 4880 3.2. we should check that the MPI has no leading
// zeroes (at least when not an encrypted MPI?), but this implementation
// does generate leading zeroes, so we keep accepting them.
return
}
// writeMPI serializes a big integer to w.
func writeMPI(w io.Writer, bitLength uint16, mpiBytes []byte) (err error) {
// Note that we can produce leading zeroes, in violation of RFC 4880 3.2.
// Implementations seem to be tolerant of them, and stripping them would
// make it complex to guarantee matching re-serialization.
_, err = w.Write([]byte{byte(bitLength >> 8), byte(bitLength)})
if err == nil {
_, err = w.Write(mpiBytes)
@ -525,6 +527,18 @@ func writeBig(w io.Writer, i *big.Int) error {
return writeMPI(w, uint16(i.BitLen()), i.Bytes())
}
// padToKeySize left-pads a MPI with zeroes to match the length of the
// specified RSA public.
func padToKeySize(pub *rsa.PublicKey, b []byte) []byte {
k := (pub.N.BitLen() + 7) / 8
if len(b) >= k {
return b
}
bb := make([]byte, k)
copy(bb[len(bb)-len(b):], b)
return bb
}
// CompressionAlgo Represents the different compression algorithms
// supported by OpenPGP (except for BZIP2, which is not currently
// supported). See Section 9.3 of RFC 4880.

9
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp/packet/private_key.go generated vendored
View File

@ -64,14 +64,19 @@ func NewECDSAPrivateKey(currentTime time.Time, priv *ecdsa.PrivateKey) *PrivateK
return pk
}
// NewSignerPrivateKey creates a sign-only PrivateKey from a crypto.Signer that
// NewSignerPrivateKey creates a PrivateKey from a crypto.Signer that
// implements RSA or ECDSA.
func NewSignerPrivateKey(currentTime time.Time, signer crypto.Signer) *PrivateKey {
pk := new(PrivateKey)
// In general, the public Keys should be used as pointers. We still
// type-switch on the values, for backwards-compatibility.
switch pubkey := signer.Public().(type) {
case *rsa.PublicKey:
pk.PublicKey = *NewRSAPublicKey(currentTime, pubkey)
case rsa.PublicKey:
pk.PublicKey = *NewRSAPublicKey(currentTime, &pubkey)
pk.PubKeyAlgo = PubKeyAlgoRSASignOnly
case *ecdsa.PublicKey:
pk.PublicKey = *NewECDSAPublicKey(currentTime, pubkey)
case ecdsa.PublicKey:
pk.PublicKey = *NewECDSAPublicKey(currentTime, &pubkey)
default:

11
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp/packet/public_key.go generated vendored
View File

@ -244,7 +244,12 @@ func NewECDSAPublicKey(creationTime time.Time, pub *ecdsa.PublicKey) *PublicKey
}
pk.ec.p.bytes = elliptic.Marshal(pub.Curve, pub.X, pub.Y)
pk.ec.p.bitLength = uint16(8 * len(pk.ec.p.bytes))
// The bit length is 3 (for the 0x04 specifying an uncompressed key)
// plus two field elements (for x and y), which are rounded up to the
// nearest byte. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6637#section-6
fieldBytes := (pub.Curve.Params().BitSize + 7) & ^7
pk.ec.p.bitLength = uint16(3 + fieldBytes + fieldBytes)
pk.setFingerPrintAndKeyId()
return pk
@ -515,7 +520,7 @@ func (pk *PublicKey) VerifySignature(signed hash.Hash, sig *Signature) (err erro
switch pk.PubKeyAlgo {
case PubKeyAlgoRSA, PubKeyAlgoRSASignOnly:
rsaPublicKey, _ := pk.PublicKey.(*rsa.PublicKey)
err = rsa.VerifyPKCS1v15(rsaPublicKey, sig.Hash, hashBytes, sig.RSASignature.bytes)
err = rsa.VerifyPKCS1v15(rsaPublicKey, sig.Hash, hashBytes, padToKeySize(rsaPublicKey, sig.RSASignature.bytes))
if err != nil {
return errors.SignatureError("RSA verification failure")
}
@ -566,7 +571,7 @@ func (pk *PublicKey) VerifySignatureV3(signed hash.Hash, sig *SignatureV3) (err
switch pk.PubKeyAlgo {
case PubKeyAlgoRSA, PubKeyAlgoRSASignOnly:
rsaPublicKey := pk.PublicKey.(*rsa.PublicKey)
if err = rsa.VerifyPKCS1v15(rsaPublicKey, sig.Hash, hashBytes, sig.RSASignature.bytes); err != nil {
if err = rsa.VerifyPKCS1v15(rsaPublicKey, sig.Hash, hashBytes, padToKeySize(rsaPublicKey, sig.RSASignature.bytes)); err != nil {
return errors.SignatureError("RSA verification failure")
}
return

2
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp/packet/signature.go generated vendored
View File

@ -542,7 +542,7 @@ func (sig *Signature) Sign(h hash.Hash, priv *PrivateKey, config *Config) (err e
r, s, err = ecdsa.Sign(config.Random(), pk, digest)
} else {
var b []byte
b, err = priv.PrivateKey.(crypto.Signer).Sign(config.Random(), digest, nil)
b, err = priv.PrivateKey.(crypto.Signer).Sign(config.Random(), digest, sig.Hash)
if err == nil {
r, s, err = unwrapECDSASig(b)
}

2
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp/packet/userattribute.go generated vendored
View File

@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ func (uat *UserAttribute) Serialize(w io.Writer) (err error) {
// ImageData returns zero or more byte slices, each containing
// JPEG File Interchange Format (JFIF), for each photo in the
// the user attribute packet.
// user attribute packet.
func (uat *UserAttribute) ImageData() (imageData [][]byte) {
for _, sp := range uat.Contents {
if sp.SubType == UserAttrImageSubpacket && len(sp.Contents) > 16 {

176
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp/write.go generated vendored
View File

@ -164,12 +164,12 @@ func hashToHashId(h crypto.Hash) uint8 {
return v
}
// Encrypt encrypts a message to a number of recipients and, optionally, signs
// it. hints contains optional information, that is also encrypted, that aids
// the recipients in processing the message. The resulting WriteCloser must
// be closed after the contents of the file have been written.
// If config is nil, sensible defaults will be used.
func Encrypt(ciphertext io.Writer, to []*Entity, signed *Entity, hints *FileHints, config *packet.Config) (plaintext io.WriteCloser, err error) {
// writeAndSign writes the data as a payload package and, optionally, signs
// it. hints contains optional information, that is also encrypted,
// that aids the recipients in processing the message. The resulting
// WriteCloser must be closed after the contents of the file have been
// written. If config is nil, sensible defaults will be used.
func writeAndSign(payload io.WriteCloser, candidateHashes []uint8, signed *Entity, hints *FileHints, config *packet.Config) (plaintext io.WriteCloser, err error) {
var signer *packet.PrivateKey
if signed != nil {
signKey, ok := signed.signingKey(config.Now())
@ -185,6 +185,83 @@ func Encrypt(ciphertext io.Writer, to []*Entity, signed *Entity, hints *FileHint
}
}
var hash crypto.Hash
for _, hashId := range candidateHashes {
if h, ok := s2k.HashIdToHash(hashId); ok && h.Available() {
hash = h
break
}
}
// If the hash specified by config is a candidate, we'll use that.
if configuredHash := config.Hash(); configuredHash.Available() {
for _, hashId := range candidateHashes {
if h, ok := s2k.HashIdToHash(hashId); ok && h == configuredHash {
hash = h
break
}
}
}
if hash == 0 {
hashId := candidateHashes[0]
name, ok := s2k.HashIdToString(hashId)
if !ok {
name = "#" + strconv.Itoa(int(hashId))
}
return nil, errors.InvalidArgumentError("cannot encrypt because no candidate hash functions are compiled in. (Wanted " + name + " in this case.)")
}
if signer != nil {
ops := &packet.OnePassSignature{
SigType: packet.SigTypeBinary,
Hash: hash,
PubKeyAlgo: signer.PubKeyAlgo,
KeyId: signer.KeyId,
IsLast: true,
}
if err := ops.Serialize(payload); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
}
if hints == nil {
hints = &FileHints{}
}
w := payload
if signer != nil {
// If we need to write a signature packet after the literal
// data then we need to stop literalData from closing
// encryptedData.
w = noOpCloser{w}
}
var epochSeconds uint32
if !hints.ModTime.IsZero() {
epochSeconds = uint32(hints.ModTime.Unix())
}
literalData, err := packet.SerializeLiteral(w, hints.IsBinary, hints.FileName, epochSeconds)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if signer != nil {
return signatureWriter{payload, literalData, hash, hash.New(), signer, config}, nil
}
return literalData, nil
}
// Encrypt encrypts a message to a number of recipients and, optionally, signs
// it. hints contains optional information, that is also encrypted, that aids
// the recipients in processing the message. The resulting WriteCloser must
// be closed after the contents of the file have been written.
// If config is nil, sensible defaults will be used.
func Encrypt(ciphertext io.Writer, to []*Entity, signed *Entity, hints *FileHints, config *packet.Config) (plaintext io.WriteCloser, err error) {
if len(to) == 0 {
return nil, errors.InvalidArgumentError("no encryption recipient provided")
}
// These are the possible ciphers that we'll use for the message.
candidateCiphers := []uint8{
uint8(packet.CipherAES128),
@ -194,6 +271,7 @@ func Encrypt(ciphertext io.Writer, to []*Entity, signed *Entity, hints *FileHint
// These are the possible hash functions that we'll use for the signature.
candidateHashes := []uint8{
hashToHashId(crypto.SHA256),
hashToHashId(crypto.SHA384),
hashToHashId(crypto.SHA512),
hashToHashId(crypto.SHA1),
hashToHashId(crypto.RIPEMD160),
@ -241,33 +319,6 @@ func Encrypt(ciphertext io.Writer, to []*Entity, signed *Entity, hints *FileHint
}
}
var hash crypto.Hash
for _, hashId := range candidateHashes {
if h, ok := s2k.HashIdToHash(hashId); ok && h.Available() {
hash = h
break
}
}
// If the hash specified by config is a candidate, we'll use that.
if configuredHash := config.Hash(); configuredHash.Available() {
for _, hashId := range candidateHashes {
if h, ok := s2k.HashIdToHash(hashId); ok && h == configuredHash {
hash = h
break
}
}
}
if hash == 0 {
hashId := candidateHashes[0]
name, ok := s2k.HashIdToString(hashId)
if !ok {
name = "#" + strconv.Itoa(int(hashId))
}
return nil, errors.InvalidArgumentError("cannot encrypt because no candidate hash functions are compiled in. (Wanted " + name + " in this case.)")
}
symKey := make([]byte, cipher.KeySize())
if _, err := io.ReadFull(config.Random(), symKey); err != nil {
return nil, err
@ -279,49 +330,38 @@ func Encrypt(ciphertext io.Writer, to []*Entity, signed *Entity, hints *FileHint
}
}
encryptedData, err := packet.SerializeSymmetricallyEncrypted(ciphertext, cipher, symKey, config)
payload, err := packet.SerializeSymmetricallyEncrypted(ciphertext, cipher, symKey, config)
if err != nil {
return
}
if signer != nil {
ops := &packet.OnePassSignature{
SigType: packet.SigTypeBinary,
Hash: hash,
PubKeyAlgo: signer.PubKeyAlgo,
KeyId: signer.KeyId,
IsLast: true,
}
if err := ops.Serialize(encryptedData); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return writeAndSign(payload, candidateHashes, signed, hints, config)
}
// Sign signs a message. The resulting WriteCloser must be closed after the
// contents of the file have been written. hints contains optional information
// that aids the recipients in processing the message.
// If config is nil, sensible defaults will be used.
func Sign(output io.Writer, signed *Entity, hints *FileHints, config *packet.Config) (input io.WriteCloser, err error) {
if signed == nil {
return nil, errors.InvalidArgumentError("no signer provided")
}
if hints == nil {
hints = &FileHints{}
// These are the possible hash functions that we'll use for the signature.
candidateHashes := []uint8{
hashToHashId(crypto.SHA256),
hashToHashId(crypto.SHA384),
hashToHashId(crypto.SHA512),
hashToHashId(crypto.SHA1),
hashToHashId(crypto.RIPEMD160),
}
w := encryptedData
if signer != nil {
// If we need to write a signature packet after the literal
// data then we need to stop literalData from closing
// encryptedData.
w = noOpCloser{encryptedData}
defaultHashes := candidateHashes[len(candidateHashes)-1:]
preferredHashes := signed.primaryIdentity().SelfSignature.PreferredHash
if len(preferredHashes) == 0 {
preferredHashes = defaultHashes
}
var epochSeconds uint32
if !hints.ModTime.IsZero() {
epochSeconds = uint32(hints.ModTime.Unix())
}
literalData, err := packet.SerializeLiteral(w, hints.IsBinary, hints.FileName, epochSeconds)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if signer != nil {
return signatureWriter{encryptedData, literalData, hash, hash.New(), signer, config}, nil
}
return literalData, nil
candidateHashes = intersectPreferences(candidateHashes, preferredHashes)
return writeAndSign(noOpCloser{output}, candidateHashes, signed, hints, config)
}
// signatureWriter hashes the contents of a message while passing it along to

33
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/poly1305.go generated vendored Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
// Copyright 2012 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
/*
Package poly1305 implements Poly1305 one-time message authentication code as
specified in https://cr.yp.to/mac/poly1305-20050329.pdf.
Poly1305 is a fast, one-time authentication function. It is infeasible for an
attacker to generate an authenticator for a message without the key. However, a
key must only be used for a single message. Authenticating two different
messages with the same key allows an attacker to forge authenticators for other
messages with the same key.
Poly1305 was originally coupled with AES in order to make Poly1305-AES. AES was
used with a fixed key in order to generate one-time keys from an nonce.
However, in this package AES isn't used and the one-time key is specified
directly.
*/
package poly1305 // import "golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305"
import "crypto/subtle"
// TagSize is the size, in bytes, of a poly1305 authenticator.
const TagSize = 16
// Verify returns true if mac is a valid authenticator for m with the given
// key.
func Verify(mac *[16]byte, m []byte, key *[32]byte) bool {
var tmp [16]byte
Sum(&tmp, m, key)
return subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(tmp[:], mac[:]) == 1
}

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@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
// Copyright 2012 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
// +build amd64,!gccgo,!appengine
package poly1305
// This function is implemented in sum_amd64.s
//go:noescape
func poly1305(out *[16]byte, m *byte, mlen uint64, key *[32]byte)
// Sum generates an authenticator for m using a one-time key and puts the
// 16-byte result into out. Authenticating two different messages with the same
// key allows an attacker to forge messages at will.
func Sum(out *[16]byte, m []byte, key *[32]byte) {
var mPtr *byte
if len(m) > 0 {
mPtr = &m[0]
}
poly1305(out, mPtr, uint64(len(m)), key)
}

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@ -0,0 +1,125 @@
// Copyright 2012 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
// +build amd64,!gccgo,!appengine
#include "textflag.h"
#define POLY1305_ADD(msg, h0, h1, h2) \
ADDQ 0(msg), h0; \
ADCQ 8(msg), h1; \
ADCQ $1, h2; \
LEAQ 16(msg), msg
#define POLY1305_MUL(h0, h1, h2, r0, r1, t0, t1, t2, t3) \
MOVQ r0, AX; \
MULQ h0; \
MOVQ AX, t0; \
MOVQ DX, t1; \
MOVQ r0, AX; \
MULQ h1; \
ADDQ AX, t1; \
ADCQ $0, DX; \
MOVQ r0, t2; \
IMULQ h2, t2; \
ADDQ DX, t2; \
\
MOVQ r1, AX; \
MULQ h0; \
ADDQ AX, t1; \
ADCQ $0, DX; \
MOVQ DX, h0; \
MOVQ r1, t3; \
IMULQ h2, t3; \
MOVQ r1, AX; \
MULQ h1; \
ADDQ AX, t2; \
ADCQ DX, t3; \
ADDQ h0, t2; \
ADCQ $0, t3; \
\
MOVQ t0, h0; \
MOVQ t1, h1; \
MOVQ t2, h2; \
ANDQ $3, h2; \
MOVQ t2, t0; \
ANDQ $0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFC, t0; \
ADDQ t0, h0; \
ADCQ t3, h1; \
ADCQ $0, h2; \
SHRQ $2, t3, t2; \
SHRQ $2, t3; \
ADDQ t2, h0; \
ADCQ t3, h1; \
ADCQ $0, h2
DATA ·poly1305Mask<>+0x00(SB)/8, $0x0FFFFFFC0FFFFFFF
DATA ·poly1305Mask<>+0x08(SB)/8, $0x0FFFFFFC0FFFFFFC
GLOBL ·poly1305Mask<>(SB), RODATA, $16
// func poly1305(out *[16]byte, m *byte, mlen uint64, key *[32]key)
TEXT ·poly1305(SB), $0-32
MOVQ out+0(FP), DI
MOVQ m+8(FP), SI
MOVQ mlen+16(FP), R15
MOVQ key+24(FP), AX
MOVQ 0(AX), R11
MOVQ 8(AX), R12
ANDQ ·poly1305Mask<>(SB), R11 // r0
ANDQ ·poly1305Mask<>+8(SB), R12 // r1
XORQ R8, R8 // h0
XORQ R9, R9 // h1
XORQ R10, R10 // h2
CMPQ R15, $16
JB bytes_between_0_and_15
loop:
POLY1305_ADD(SI, R8, R9, R10)
multiply:
POLY1305_MUL(R8, R9, R10, R11, R12, BX, CX, R13, R14)
SUBQ $16, R15
CMPQ R15, $16
JAE loop
bytes_between_0_and_15:
TESTQ R15, R15
JZ done
MOVQ $1, BX
XORQ CX, CX
XORQ R13, R13
ADDQ R15, SI
flush_buffer:
SHLQ $8, BX, CX
SHLQ $8, BX
MOVB -1(SI), R13
XORQ R13, BX
DECQ SI
DECQ R15
JNZ flush_buffer
ADDQ BX, R8
ADCQ CX, R9
ADCQ $0, R10
MOVQ $16, R15
JMP multiply
done:
MOVQ R8, AX
MOVQ R9, BX
SUBQ $0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFB, AX
SBBQ $0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF, BX
SBBQ $3, R10
CMOVQCS R8, AX
CMOVQCS R9, BX
MOVQ key+24(FP), R8
ADDQ 16(R8), AX
ADCQ 24(R8), BX
MOVQ AX, 0(DI)
MOVQ BX, 8(DI)
RET

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@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
// Copyright 2015 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
// +build arm,!gccgo,!appengine,!nacl
package poly1305
// This function is implemented in sum_arm.s
//go:noescape
func poly1305_auth_armv6(out *[16]byte, m *byte, mlen uint32, key *[32]byte)
// Sum generates an authenticator for m using a one-time key and puts the
// 16-byte result into out. Authenticating two different messages with the same
// key allows an attacker to forge messages at will.
func Sum(out *[16]byte, m []byte, key *[32]byte) {
var mPtr *byte
if len(m) > 0 {
mPtr = &m[0]
}
poly1305_auth_armv6(out, mPtr, uint32(len(m)), key)
}

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@ -0,0 +1,427 @@
// Copyright 2015 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
// +build arm,!gccgo,!appengine,!nacl
#include "textflag.h"
// This code was translated into a form compatible with 5a from the public
// domain source by Andrew Moon: github.com/floodyberry/poly1305-opt/blob/master/app/extensions/poly1305.
DATA ·poly1305_init_constants_armv6<>+0x00(SB)/4, $0x3ffffff
DATA ·poly1305_init_constants_armv6<>+0x04(SB)/4, $0x3ffff03
DATA ·poly1305_init_constants_armv6<>+0x08(SB)/4, $0x3ffc0ff
DATA ·poly1305_init_constants_armv6<>+0x0c(SB)/4, $0x3f03fff
DATA ·poly1305_init_constants_armv6<>+0x10(SB)/4, $0x00fffff
GLOBL ·poly1305_init_constants_armv6<>(SB), 8, $20
// Warning: the linker may use R11 to synthesize certain instructions. Please
// take care and verify that no synthetic instructions use it.
TEXT poly1305_init_ext_armv6<>(SB), NOSPLIT, $0
// Needs 16 bytes of stack and 64 bytes of space pointed to by R0. (It
// might look like it's only 60 bytes of space but the final four bytes
// will be written by another function.) We need to skip over four
// bytes of stack because that's saving the value of 'g'.
ADD $4, R13, R8
MOVM.IB [R4-R7], (R8)
MOVM.IA.W (R1), [R2-R5]
MOVW $·poly1305_init_constants_armv6<>(SB), R7
MOVW R2, R8
MOVW R2>>26, R9
MOVW R3>>20, g
MOVW R4>>14, R11
MOVW R5>>8, R12
ORR R3<<6, R9, R9
ORR R4<<12, g, g
ORR R5<<18, R11, R11
MOVM.IA (R7), [R2-R6]
AND R8, R2, R2
AND R9, R3, R3
AND g, R4, R4
AND R11, R5, R5
AND R12, R6, R6
MOVM.IA.W [R2-R6], (R0)
EOR R2, R2, R2
EOR R3, R3, R3
EOR R4, R4, R4
EOR R5, R5, R5
EOR R6, R6, R6
MOVM.IA.W [R2-R6], (R0)
MOVM.IA.W (R1), [R2-R5]
MOVM.IA [R2-R6], (R0)
ADD $20, R13, R0
MOVM.DA (R0), [R4-R7]
RET
#define MOVW_UNALIGNED(Rsrc, Rdst, Rtmp, offset) \
MOVBU (offset+0)(Rsrc), Rtmp; \
MOVBU Rtmp, (offset+0)(Rdst); \
MOVBU (offset+1)(Rsrc), Rtmp; \
MOVBU Rtmp, (offset+1)(Rdst); \
MOVBU (offset+2)(Rsrc), Rtmp; \
MOVBU Rtmp, (offset+2)(Rdst); \
MOVBU (offset+3)(Rsrc), Rtmp; \
MOVBU Rtmp, (offset+3)(Rdst)
TEXT poly1305_blocks_armv6<>(SB), NOSPLIT, $0
// Needs 24 bytes of stack for saved registers and then 88 bytes of
// scratch space after that. We assume that 24 bytes at (R13) have
// already been used: four bytes for the link register saved in the
// prelude of poly1305_auth_armv6, four bytes for saving the value of g
// in that function and 16 bytes of scratch space used around
// poly1305_finish_ext_armv6_skip1.
ADD $24, R13, R12
MOVM.IB [R4-R8, R14], (R12)
MOVW R0, 88(R13)
MOVW R1, 92(R13)
MOVW R2, 96(R13)
MOVW R1, R14
MOVW R2, R12
MOVW 56(R0), R8
WORD $0xe1180008 // TST R8, R8 not working see issue 5921
EOR R6, R6, R6
MOVW.EQ $(1<<24), R6
MOVW R6, 84(R13)
ADD $116, R13, g
MOVM.IA (R0), [R0-R9]
MOVM.IA [R0-R4], (g)
CMP $16, R12
BLO poly1305_blocks_armv6_done
poly1305_blocks_armv6_mainloop:
WORD $0xe31e0003 // TST R14, #3 not working see issue 5921
BEQ poly1305_blocks_armv6_mainloop_aligned
ADD $100, R13, g
MOVW_UNALIGNED(R14, g, R0, 0)
MOVW_UNALIGNED(R14, g, R0, 4)
MOVW_UNALIGNED(R14, g, R0, 8)
MOVW_UNALIGNED(R14, g, R0, 12)
MOVM.IA (g), [R0-R3]
ADD $16, R14
B poly1305_blocks_armv6_mainloop_loaded
poly1305_blocks_armv6_mainloop_aligned:
MOVM.IA.W (R14), [R0-R3]
poly1305_blocks_armv6_mainloop_loaded:
MOVW R0>>26, g
MOVW R1>>20, R11
MOVW R2>>14, R12
MOVW R14, 92(R13)
MOVW R3>>8, R4
ORR R1<<6, g, g
ORR R2<<12, R11, R11
ORR R3<<18, R12, R12
BIC $0xfc000000, R0, R0
BIC $0xfc000000, g, g
MOVW 84(R13), R3
BIC $0xfc000000, R11, R11
BIC $0xfc000000, R12, R12
ADD R0, R5, R5
ADD g, R6, R6
ORR R3, R4, R4
ADD R11, R7, R7
ADD $116, R13, R14
ADD R12, R8, R8
ADD R4, R9, R9
MOVM.IA (R14), [R0-R4]
MULLU R4, R5, (R11, g)
MULLU R3, R5, (R14, R12)
MULALU R3, R6, (R11, g)
MULALU R2, R6, (R14, R12)
MULALU R2, R7, (R11, g)
MULALU R1, R7, (R14, R12)
ADD R4<<2, R4, R4
ADD R3<<2, R3, R3
MULALU R1, R8, (R11, g)
MULALU R0, R8, (R14, R12)
MULALU R0, R9, (R11, g)
MULALU R4, R9, (R14, R12)
MOVW g, 76(R13)
MOVW R11, 80(R13)
MOVW R12, 68(R13)
MOVW R14, 72(R13)
MULLU R2, R5, (R11, g)
MULLU R1, R5, (R14, R12)
MULALU R1, R6, (R11, g)
MULALU R0, R6, (R14, R12)
MULALU R0, R7, (R11, g)
MULALU R4, R7, (R14, R12)
ADD R2<<2, R2, R2
ADD R1<<2, R1, R1
MULALU R4, R8, (R11, g)
MULALU R3, R8, (R14, R12)
MULALU R3, R9, (R11, g)
MULALU R2, R9, (R14, R12)
MOVW g, 60(R13)
MOVW R11, 64(R13)
MOVW R12, 52(R13)
MOVW R14, 56(R13)
MULLU R0, R5, (R11, g)
MULALU R4, R6, (R11, g)
MULALU R3, R7, (R11, g)
MULALU R2, R8, (R11, g)
MULALU R1, R9, (R11, g)
ADD $52, R13, R0
MOVM.IA (R0), [R0-R7]
MOVW g>>26, R12
MOVW R4>>26, R14
ORR R11<<6, R12, R12
ORR R5<<6, R14, R14
BIC $0xfc000000, g, g
BIC $0xfc000000, R4, R4
ADD.S R12, R0, R0
ADC $0, R1, R1
ADD.S R14, R6, R6
ADC $0, R7, R7
MOVW R0>>26, R12
MOVW R6>>26, R14
ORR R1<<6, R12, R12
ORR R7<<6, R14, R14
BIC $0xfc000000, R0, R0
BIC $0xfc000000, R6, R6
ADD R14<<2, R14, R14
ADD.S R12, R2, R2
ADC $0, R3, R3
ADD R14, g, g
MOVW R2>>26, R12
MOVW g>>26, R14
ORR R3<<6, R12, R12
BIC $0xfc000000, g, R5
BIC $0xfc000000, R2, R7
ADD R12, R4, R4
ADD R14, R0, R0
MOVW R4>>26, R12
BIC $0xfc000000, R4, R8
ADD R12, R6, R9
MOVW 96(R13), R12
MOVW 92(R13), R14
MOVW R0, R6
CMP $32, R12
SUB $16, R12, R12
MOVW R12, 96(R13)
BHS poly1305_blocks_armv6_mainloop
poly1305_blocks_armv6_done:
MOVW 88(R13), R12
MOVW R5, 20(R12)
MOVW R6, 24(R12)
MOVW R7, 28(R12)
MOVW R8, 32(R12)
MOVW R9, 36(R12)
ADD $48, R13, R0
MOVM.DA (R0), [R4-R8, R14]
RET
#define MOVHUP_UNALIGNED(Rsrc, Rdst, Rtmp) \
MOVBU.P 1(Rsrc), Rtmp; \
MOVBU.P Rtmp, 1(Rdst); \
MOVBU.P 1(Rsrc), Rtmp; \
MOVBU.P Rtmp, 1(Rdst)
#define MOVWP_UNALIGNED(Rsrc, Rdst, Rtmp) \
MOVHUP_UNALIGNED(Rsrc, Rdst, Rtmp); \
MOVHUP_UNALIGNED(Rsrc, Rdst, Rtmp)
// func poly1305_auth_armv6(out *[16]byte, m *byte, mlen uint32, key *[32]key)
TEXT ·poly1305_auth_armv6(SB), $196-16
// The value 196, just above, is the sum of 64 (the size of the context
// structure) and 132 (the amount of stack needed).
//
// At this point, the stack pointer (R13) has been moved down. It
// points to the saved link register and there's 196 bytes of free
// space above it.
//
// The stack for this function looks like:
//
// +---------------------
// |
// | 64 bytes of context structure
// |
// +---------------------
// |
// | 112 bytes for poly1305_blocks_armv6
// |
// +---------------------
// | 16 bytes of final block, constructed at
// | poly1305_finish_ext_armv6_skip8
// +---------------------
// | four bytes of saved 'g'
// +---------------------
// | lr, saved by prelude <- R13 points here
// +---------------------
MOVW g, 4(R13)
MOVW out+0(FP), R4
MOVW m+4(FP), R5
MOVW mlen+8(FP), R6
MOVW key+12(FP), R7
ADD $136, R13, R0 // 136 = 4 + 4 + 16 + 112
MOVW R7, R1
// poly1305_init_ext_armv6 will write to the stack from R13+4, but
// that's ok because none of the other values have been written yet.
BL poly1305_init_ext_armv6<>(SB)
BIC.S $15, R6, R2
BEQ poly1305_auth_armv6_noblocks
ADD $136, R13, R0
MOVW R5, R1
ADD R2, R5, R5
SUB R2, R6, R6
BL poly1305_blocks_armv6<>(SB)
poly1305_auth_armv6_noblocks:
ADD $136, R13, R0
MOVW R5, R1
MOVW R6, R2
MOVW R4, R3
MOVW R0, R5
MOVW R1, R6
MOVW R2, R7
MOVW R3, R8
AND.S R2, R2, R2
BEQ poly1305_finish_ext_armv6_noremaining
EOR R0, R0
ADD $8, R13, R9 // 8 = offset to 16 byte scratch space
MOVW R0, (R9)
MOVW R0, 4(R9)
MOVW R0, 8(R9)
MOVW R0, 12(R9)
WORD $0xe3110003 // TST R1, #3 not working see issue 5921
BEQ poly1305_finish_ext_armv6_aligned
WORD $0xe3120008 // TST R2, #8 not working see issue 5921
BEQ poly1305_finish_ext_armv6_skip8
MOVWP_UNALIGNED(R1, R9, g)
MOVWP_UNALIGNED(R1, R9, g)
poly1305_finish_ext_armv6_skip8:
WORD $0xe3120004 // TST $4, R2 not working see issue 5921
BEQ poly1305_finish_ext_armv6_skip4
MOVWP_UNALIGNED(R1, R9, g)
poly1305_finish_ext_armv6_skip4:
WORD $0xe3120002 // TST $2, R2 not working see issue 5921
BEQ poly1305_finish_ext_armv6_skip2
MOVHUP_UNALIGNED(R1, R9, g)
B poly1305_finish_ext_armv6_skip2
poly1305_finish_ext_armv6_aligned:
WORD $0xe3120008 // TST R2, #8 not working see issue 5921
BEQ poly1305_finish_ext_armv6_skip8_aligned
MOVM.IA.W (R1), [g-R11]
MOVM.IA.W [g-R11], (R9)
poly1305_finish_ext_armv6_skip8_aligned:
WORD $0xe3120004 // TST $4, R2 not working see issue 5921
BEQ poly1305_finish_ext_armv6_skip4_aligned
MOVW.P 4(R1), g
MOVW.P g, 4(R9)
poly1305_finish_ext_armv6_skip4_aligned:
WORD $0xe3120002 // TST $2, R2 not working see issue 5921
BEQ poly1305_finish_ext_armv6_skip2
MOVHU.P 2(R1), g
MOVH.P g, 2(R9)
poly1305_finish_ext_armv6_skip2:
WORD $0xe3120001 // TST $1, R2 not working see issue 5921
BEQ poly1305_finish_ext_armv6_skip1
MOVBU.P 1(R1), g
MOVBU.P g, 1(R9)
poly1305_finish_ext_armv6_skip1:
MOVW $1, R11
MOVBU R11, 0(R9)
MOVW R11, 56(R5)
MOVW R5, R0
ADD $8, R13, R1
MOVW $16, R2
BL poly1305_blocks_armv6<>(SB)
poly1305_finish_ext_armv6_noremaining:
MOVW 20(R5), R0
MOVW 24(R5), R1
MOVW 28(R5), R2
MOVW 32(R5), R3
MOVW 36(R5), R4
MOVW R4>>26, R12
BIC $0xfc000000, R4, R4
ADD R12<<2, R12, R12
ADD R12, R0, R0
MOVW R0>>26, R12
BIC $0xfc000000, R0, R0
ADD R12, R1, R1
MOVW R1>>26, R12
BIC $0xfc000000, R1, R1
ADD R12, R2, R2
MOVW R2>>26, R12
BIC $0xfc000000, R2, R2
ADD R12, R3, R3
MOVW R3>>26, R12
BIC $0xfc000000, R3, R3
ADD R12, R4, R4
ADD $5, R0, R6
MOVW R6>>26, R12
BIC $0xfc000000, R6, R6
ADD R12, R1, R7
MOVW R7>>26, R12
BIC $0xfc000000, R7, R7
ADD R12, R2, g
MOVW g>>26, R12
BIC $0xfc000000, g, g
ADD R12, R3, R11
MOVW $-(1<<26), R12
ADD R11>>26, R12, R12
BIC $0xfc000000, R11, R11
ADD R12, R4, R9
MOVW R9>>31, R12
SUB $1, R12
AND R12, R6, R6
AND R12, R7, R7
AND R12, g, g
AND R12, R11, R11
AND R12, R9, R9
MVN R12, R12
AND R12, R0, R0
AND R12, R1, R1
AND R12, R2, R2
AND R12, R3, R3
AND R12, R4, R4
ORR R6, R0, R0
ORR R7, R1, R1
ORR g, R2, R2
ORR R11, R3, R3
ORR R9, R4, R4
ORR R1<<26, R0, R0
MOVW R1>>6, R1
ORR R2<<20, R1, R1
MOVW R2>>12, R2
ORR R3<<14, R2, R2
MOVW R3>>18, R3
ORR R4<<8, R3, R3
MOVW 40(R5), R6
MOVW 44(R5), R7
MOVW 48(R5), g
MOVW 52(R5), R11
ADD.S R6, R0, R0
ADC.S R7, R1, R1
ADC.S g, R2, R2
ADC.S R11, R3, R3
MOVM.IA [R0-R3], (R8)
MOVW R5, R12
EOR R0, R0, R0
EOR R1, R1, R1
EOR R2, R2, R2
EOR R3, R3, R3
EOR R4, R4, R4
EOR R5, R5, R5
EOR R6, R6, R6
EOR R7, R7, R7
MOVM.IA.W [R0-R7], (R12)
MOVM.IA [R0-R7], (R12)
MOVW 4(R13), g
RET

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vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_noasm.go generated vendored Normal file
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// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
// +build s390x,!go1.11 !arm,!amd64,!s390x gccgo appengine nacl
package poly1305
// Sum generates an authenticator for msg using a one-time key and puts the
// 16-byte result into out. Authenticating two different messages with the same
// key allows an attacker to forge messages at will.
func Sum(out *[TagSize]byte, msg []byte, key *[32]byte) {
sumGeneric(out, msg, key)
}

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vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_ref.go generated vendored Normal file
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// Copyright 2012 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
package poly1305
import "encoding/binary"
// sumGeneric generates an authenticator for msg using a one-time key and
// puts the 16-byte result into out. This is the generic implementation of
// Sum and should be called if no assembly implementation is available.
func sumGeneric(out *[TagSize]byte, msg []byte, key *[32]byte) {
var (
h0, h1, h2, h3, h4 uint32 // the hash accumulators
r0, r1, r2, r3, r4 uint64 // the r part of the key
)
r0 = uint64(binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[0:]) & 0x3ffffff)
r1 = uint64((binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[3:]) >> 2) & 0x3ffff03)
r2 = uint64((binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[6:]) >> 4) & 0x3ffc0ff)
r3 = uint64((binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[9:]) >> 6) & 0x3f03fff)
r4 = uint64((binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[12:]) >> 8) & 0x00fffff)
R1, R2, R3, R4 := r1*5, r2*5, r3*5, r4*5
for len(msg) >= TagSize {
// h += msg
h0 += binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(msg[0:]) & 0x3ffffff
h1 += (binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(msg[3:]) >> 2) & 0x3ffffff
h2 += (binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(msg[6:]) >> 4) & 0x3ffffff
h3 += (binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(msg[9:]) >> 6) & 0x3ffffff
h4 += (binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(msg[12:]) >> 8) | (1 << 24)
// h *= r
d0 := (uint64(h0) * r0) + (uint64(h1) * R4) + (uint64(h2) * R3) + (uint64(h3) * R2) + (uint64(h4) * R1)
d1 := (d0 >> 26) + (uint64(h0) * r1) + (uint64(h1) * r0) + (uint64(h2) * R4) + (uint64(h3) * R3) + (uint64(h4) * R2)
d2 := (d1 >> 26) + (uint64(h0) * r2) + (uint64(h1) * r1) + (uint64(h2) * r0) + (uint64(h3) * R4) + (uint64(h4) * R3)
d3 := (d2 >> 26) + (uint64(h0) * r3) + (uint64(h1) * r2) + (uint64(h2) * r1) + (uint64(h3) * r0) + (uint64(h4) * R4)
d4 := (d3 >> 26) + (uint64(h0) * r4) + (uint64(h1) * r3) + (uint64(h2) * r2) + (uint64(h3) * r1) + (uint64(h4) * r0)
// h %= p
h0 = uint32(d0) & 0x3ffffff
h1 = uint32(d1) & 0x3ffffff
h2 = uint32(d2) & 0x3ffffff
h3 = uint32(d3) & 0x3ffffff
h4 = uint32(d4) & 0x3ffffff
h0 += uint32(d4>>26) * 5
h1 += h0 >> 26
h0 = h0 & 0x3ffffff
msg = msg[TagSize:]
}
if len(msg) > 0 {
var block [TagSize]byte
off := copy(block[:], msg)
block[off] = 0x01
// h += msg
h0 += binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(block[0:]) & 0x3ffffff
h1 += (binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(block[3:]) >> 2) & 0x3ffffff
h2 += (binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(block[6:]) >> 4) & 0x3ffffff
h3 += (binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(block[9:]) >> 6) & 0x3ffffff
h4 += (binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(block[12:]) >> 8)
// h *= r
d0 := (uint64(h0) * r0) + (uint64(h1) * R4) + (uint64(h2) * R3) + (uint64(h3) * R2) + (uint64(h4) * R1)
d1 := (d0 >> 26) + (uint64(h0) * r1) + (uint64(h1) * r0) + (uint64(h2) * R4) + (uint64(h3) * R3) + (uint64(h4) * R2)
d2 := (d1 >> 26) + (uint64(h0) * r2) + (uint64(h1) * r1) + (uint64(h2) * r0) + (uint64(h3) * R4) + (uint64(h4) * R3)
d3 := (d2 >> 26) + (uint64(h0) * r3) + (uint64(h1) * r2) + (uint64(h2) * r1) + (uint64(h3) * r0) + (uint64(h4) * R4)
d4 := (d3 >> 26) + (uint64(h0) * r4) + (uint64(h1) * r3) + (uint64(h2) * r2) + (uint64(h3) * r1) + (uint64(h4) * r0)
// h %= p
h0 = uint32(d0) & 0x3ffffff
h1 = uint32(d1) & 0x3ffffff
h2 = uint32(d2) & 0x3ffffff
h3 = uint32(d3) & 0x3ffffff
h4 = uint32(d4) & 0x3ffffff
h0 += uint32(d4>>26) * 5
h1 += h0 >> 26
h0 = h0 & 0x3ffffff
}
// h %= p reduction
h2 += h1 >> 26
h1 &= 0x3ffffff
h3 += h2 >> 26
h2 &= 0x3ffffff
h4 += h3 >> 26
h3 &= 0x3ffffff
h0 += 5 * (h4 >> 26)
h4 &= 0x3ffffff
h1 += h0 >> 26
h0 &= 0x3ffffff
// h - p
t0 := h0 + 5
t1 := h1 + (t0 >> 26)
t2 := h2 + (t1 >> 26)
t3 := h3 + (t2 >> 26)
t4 := h4 + (t3 >> 26) - (1 << 26)
t0 &= 0x3ffffff
t1 &= 0x3ffffff
t2 &= 0x3ffffff
t3 &= 0x3ffffff
// select h if h < p else h - p
t_mask := (t4 >> 31) - 1
h_mask := ^t_mask
h0 = (h0 & h_mask) | (t0 & t_mask)
h1 = (h1 & h_mask) | (t1 & t_mask)
h2 = (h2 & h_mask) | (t2 & t_mask)
h3 = (h3 & h_mask) | (t3 & t_mask)
h4 = (h4 & h_mask) | (t4 & t_mask)
// h %= 2^128
h0 |= h1 << 26
h1 = ((h1 >> 6) | (h2 << 20))
h2 = ((h2 >> 12) | (h3 << 14))
h3 = ((h3 >> 18) | (h4 << 8))
// s: the s part of the key
// tag = (h + s) % (2^128)
t := uint64(h0) + uint64(binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[16:]))
h0 = uint32(t)
t = uint64(h1) + uint64(binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[20:])) + (t >> 32)
h1 = uint32(t)
t = uint64(h2) + uint64(binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[24:])) + (t >> 32)
h2 = uint32(t)
t = uint64(h3) + uint64(binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[28:])) + (t >> 32)
h3 = uint32(t)
binary.LittleEndian.PutUint32(out[0:], h0)
binary.LittleEndian.PutUint32(out[4:], h1)
binary.LittleEndian.PutUint32(out[8:], h2)
binary.LittleEndian.PutUint32(out[12:], h3)
}

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vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_s390x.go generated vendored Normal file
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// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
// +build s390x,go1.11,!gccgo,!appengine
package poly1305
// hasVectorFacility reports whether the machine supports
// the vector facility (vx).
func hasVectorFacility() bool
// hasVMSLFacility reports whether the machine supports
// Vector Multiply Sum Logical (VMSL).
func hasVMSLFacility() bool
var hasVX = hasVectorFacility()
var hasVMSL = hasVMSLFacility()
// poly1305vx is an assembly implementation of Poly1305 that uses vector
// instructions. It must only be called if the vector facility (vx) is
// available.
//go:noescape
func poly1305vx(out *[16]byte, m *byte, mlen uint64, key *[32]byte)
// poly1305vmsl is an assembly implementation of Poly1305 that uses vector
// instructions, including VMSL. It must only be called if the vector facility (vx) is
// available and if VMSL is supported.
//go:noescape
func poly1305vmsl(out *[16]byte, m *byte, mlen uint64, key *[32]byte)
// Sum generates an authenticator for m using a one-time key and puts the
// 16-byte result into out. Authenticating two different messages with the same
// key allows an attacker to forge messages at will.
func Sum(out *[16]byte, m []byte, key *[32]byte) {
if hasVX {
var mPtr *byte
if len(m) > 0 {
mPtr = &m[0]
}
if hasVMSL && len(m) > 256 {
poly1305vmsl(out, mPtr, uint64(len(m)), key)
} else {
poly1305vx(out, mPtr, uint64(len(m)), key)
}
} else {
sumGeneric(out, m, key)
}
}

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vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_s390x.s generated vendored Normal file
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// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
// +build s390x,go1.11,!gccgo,!appengine
#include "textflag.h"
// Implementation of Poly1305 using the vector facility (vx).
// constants
#define MOD26 V0
#define EX0 V1
#define EX1 V2
#define EX2 V3
// temporaries
#define T_0 V4
#define T_1 V5
#define T_2 V6
#define T_3 V7
#define T_4 V8
// key (r)
#define R_0 V9
#define R_1 V10
#define R_2 V11
#define R_3 V12
#define R_4 V13
#define R5_1 V14
#define R5_2 V15
#define R5_3 V16
#define R5_4 V17
#define RSAVE_0 R5
#define RSAVE_1 R6
#define RSAVE_2 R7
#define RSAVE_3 R8
#define RSAVE_4 R9
#define R5SAVE_1 V28
#define R5SAVE_2 V29
#define R5SAVE_3 V30
#define R5SAVE_4 V31
// message block
#define F_0 V18
#define F_1 V19
#define F_2 V20
#define F_3 V21
#define F_4 V22
// accumulator
#define H_0 V23
#define H_1 V24
#define H_2 V25
#define H_3 V26
#define H_4 V27
GLOBL ·keyMask<>(SB), RODATA, $16
DATA ·keyMask<>+0(SB)/8, $0xffffff0ffcffff0f
DATA ·keyMask<>+8(SB)/8, $0xfcffff0ffcffff0f
GLOBL ·bswapMask<>(SB), RODATA, $16
DATA ·bswapMask<>+0(SB)/8, $0x0f0e0d0c0b0a0908
DATA ·bswapMask<>+8(SB)/8, $0x0706050403020100
GLOBL ·constants<>(SB), RODATA, $64
// MOD26
DATA ·constants<>+0(SB)/8, $0x3ffffff
DATA ·constants<>+8(SB)/8, $0x3ffffff
// EX0
DATA ·constants<>+16(SB)/8, $0x0006050403020100
DATA ·constants<>+24(SB)/8, $0x1016151413121110
// EX1
DATA ·constants<>+32(SB)/8, $0x060c0b0a09080706
DATA ·constants<>+40(SB)/8, $0x161c1b1a19181716
// EX2
DATA ·constants<>+48(SB)/8, $0x0d0d0d0d0d0f0e0d
DATA ·constants<>+56(SB)/8, $0x1d1d1d1d1d1f1e1d
// h = (f*g) % (2**130-5) [partial reduction]
#define MULTIPLY(f0, f1, f2, f3, f4, g0, g1, g2, g3, g4, g51, g52, g53, g54, h0, h1, h2, h3, h4) \
VMLOF f0, g0, h0 \
VMLOF f0, g1, h1 \
VMLOF f0, g2, h2 \
VMLOF f0, g3, h3 \
VMLOF f0, g4, h4 \
VMLOF f1, g54, T_0 \
VMLOF f1, g0, T_1 \
VMLOF f1, g1, T_2 \
VMLOF f1, g2, T_3 \
VMLOF f1, g3, T_4 \
VMALOF f2, g53, h0, h0 \
VMALOF f2, g54, h1, h1 \
VMALOF f2, g0, h2, h2 \
VMALOF f2, g1, h3, h3 \
VMALOF f2, g2, h4, h4 \
VMALOF f3, g52, T_0, T_0 \
VMALOF f3, g53, T_1, T_1 \
VMALOF f3, g54, T_2, T_2 \
VMALOF f3, g0, T_3, T_3 \
VMALOF f3, g1, T_4, T_4 \
VMALOF f4, g51, h0, h0 \
VMALOF f4, g52, h1, h1 \
VMALOF f4, g53, h2, h2 \
VMALOF f4, g54, h3, h3 \
VMALOF f4, g0, h4, h4 \
VAG T_0, h0, h0 \
VAG T_1, h1, h1 \
VAG T_2, h2, h2 \
VAG T_3, h3, h3 \
VAG T_4, h4, h4
// carry h0->h1 h3->h4, h1->h2 h4->h0, h0->h1 h2->h3, h3->h4
#define REDUCE(h0, h1, h2, h3, h4) \
VESRLG $26, h0, T_0 \
VESRLG $26, h3, T_1 \
VN MOD26, h0, h0 \
VN MOD26, h3, h3 \
VAG T_0, h1, h1 \
VAG T_1, h4, h4 \
VESRLG $26, h1, T_2 \
VESRLG $26, h4, T_3 \
VN MOD26, h1, h1 \
VN MOD26, h4, h4 \
VESLG $2, T_3, T_4 \
VAG T_3, T_4, T_4 \
VAG T_2, h2, h2 \
VAG T_4, h0, h0 \
VESRLG $26, h2, T_0 \
VESRLG $26, h0, T_1 \
VN MOD26, h2, h2 \
VN MOD26, h0, h0 \
VAG T_0, h3, h3 \
VAG T_1, h1, h1 \
VESRLG $26, h3, T_2 \
VN MOD26, h3, h3 \
VAG T_2, h4, h4
// expand in0 into d[0] and in1 into d[1]
#define EXPAND(in0, in1, d0, d1, d2, d3, d4) \
VGBM $0x0707, d1 \ // d1=tmp
VPERM in0, in1, EX2, d4 \
VPERM in0, in1, EX0, d0 \
VPERM in0, in1, EX1, d2 \
VN d1, d4, d4 \
VESRLG $26, d0, d1 \
VESRLG $30, d2, d3 \
VESRLG $4, d2, d2 \
VN MOD26, d0, d0 \
VN MOD26, d1, d1 \
VN MOD26, d2, d2 \
VN MOD26, d3, d3
// pack h4:h0 into h1:h0 (no carry)
#define PACK(h0, h1, h2, h3, h4) \
VESLG $26, h1, h1 \
VESLG $26, h3, h3 \
VO h0, h1, h0 \
VO h2, h3, h2 \
VESLG $4, h2, h2 \
VLEIB $7, $48, h1 \
VSLB h1, h2, h2 \
VO h0, h2, h0 \
VLEIB $7, $104, h1 \
VSLB h1, h4, h3 \
VO h3, h0, h0 \
VLEIB $7, $24, h1 \
VSRLB h1, h4, h1
// if h > 2**130-5 then h -= 2**130-5
#define MOD(h0, h1, t0, t1, t2) \
VZERO t0 \
VLEIG $1, $5, t0 \
VACCQ h0, t0, t1 \
VAQ h0, t0, t0 \
VONE t2 \
VLEIG $1, $-4, t2 \
VAQ t2, t1, t1 \
VACCQ h1, t1, t1 \
VONE t2 \
VAQ t2, t1, t1 \
VN h0, t1, t2 \
VNC t0, t1, t1 \
VO t1, t2, h0
// func poly1305vx(out *[16]byte, m *byte, mlen uint64, key *[32]key)
TEXT ·poly1305vx(SB), $0-32
// This code processes up to 2 blocks (32 bytes) per iteration
// using the algorithm described in:
// NEON crypto, Daniel J. Bernstein & Peter Schwabe
// https://cryptojedi.org/papers/neoncrypto-20120320.pdf
LMG out+0(FP), R1, R4 // R1=out, R2=m, R3=mlen, R4=key
// load MOD26, EX0, EX1 and EX2
MOVD $·constants<>(SB), R5
VLM (R5), MOD26, EX2
// setup r
VL (R4), T_0
MOVD $·keyMask<>(SB), R6
VL (R6), T_1
VN T_0, T_1, T_0
EXPAND(T_0, T_0, R_0, R_1, R_2, R_3, R_4)
// setup r*5
VLEIG $0, $5, T_0
VLEIG $1, $5, T_0
// store r (for final block)
VMLOF T_0, R_1, R5SAVE_1
VMLOF T_0, R_2, R5SAVE_2
VMLOF T_0, R_3, R5SAVE_3
VMLOF T_0, R_4, R5SAVE_4
VLGVG $0, R_0, RSAVE_0
VLGVG $0, R_1, RSAVE_1
VLGVG $0, R_2, RSAVE_2
VLGVG $0, R_3, RSAVE_3
VLGVG $0, R_4, RSAVE_4
// skip r**2 calculation
CMPBLE R3, $16, skip
// calculate r**2
MULTIPLY(R_0, R_1, R_2, R_3, R_4, R_0, R_1, R_2, R_3, R_4, R5SAVE_1, R5SAVE_2, R5SAVE_3, R5SAVE_4, H_0, H_1, H_2, H_3, H_4)
REDUCE(H_0, H_1, H_2, H_3, H_4)
VLEIG $0, $5, T_0
VLEIG $1, $5, T_0
VMLOF T_0, H_1, R5_1
VMLOF T_0, H_2, R5_2
VMLOF T_0, H_3, R5_3
VMLOF T_0, H_4, R5_4
VLR H_0, R_0
VLR H_1, R_1
VLR H_2, R_2
VLR H_3, R_3
VLR H_4, R_4
// initialize h
VZERO H_0
VZERO H_1
VZERO H_2
VZERO H_3
VZERO H_4
loop:
CMPBLE R3, $32, b2
VLM (R2), T_0, T_1
SUB $32, R3
MOVD $32(R2), R2
EXPAND(T_0, T_1, F_0, F_1, F_2, F_3, F_4)
VLEIB $4, $1, F_4
VLEIB $12, $1, F_4
multiply:
VAG H_0, F_0, F_0
VAG H_1, F_1, F_1
VAG H_2, F_2, F_2
VAG H_3, F_3, F_3
VAG H_4, F_4, F_4
MULTIPLY(F_0, F_1, F_2, F_3, F_4, R_0, R_1, R_2, R_3, R_4, R5_1, R5_2, R5_3, R5_4, H_0, H_1, H_2, H_3, H_4)
REDUCE(H_0, H_1, H_2, H_3, H_4)
CMPBNE R3, $0, loop
finish:
// sum vectors
VZERO T_0
VSUMQG H_0, T_0, H_0
VSUMQG H_1, T_0, H_1
VSUMQG H_2, T_0, H_2
VSUMQG H_3, T_0, H_3
VSUMQG H_4, T_0, H_4
// h may be >= 2*(2**130-5) so we need to reduce it again
REDUCE(H_0, H_1, H_2, H_3, H_4)
// carry h1->h4
VESRLG $26, H_1, T_1
VN MOD26, H_1, H_1
VAQ T_1, H_2, H_2
VESRLG $26, H_2, T_2
VN MOD26, H_2, H_2
VAQ T_2, H_3, H_3
VESRLG $26, H_3, T_3
VN MOD26, H_3, H_3
VAQ T_3, H_4, H_4
// h is now < 2*(2**130-5)
// pack h into h1 (hi) and h0 (lo)
PACK(H_0, H_1, H_2, H_3, H_4)
// if h > 2**130-5 then h -= 2**130-5
MOD(H_0, H_1, T_0, T_1, T_2)
// h += s
MOVD $·bswapMask<>(SB), R5
VL (R5), T_1
VL 16(R4), T_0
VPERM T_0, T_0, T_1, T_0 // reverse bytes (to big)
VAQ T_0, H_0, H_0
VPERM H_0, H_0, T_1, H_0 // reverse bytes (to little)
VST H_0, (R1)
RET
b2:
CMPBLE R3, $16, b1
// 2 blocks remaining
SUB $17, R3
VL (R2), T_0
VLL R3, 16(R2), T_1
ADD $1, R3
MOVBZ $1, R0
CMPBEQ R3, $16, 2(PC)
VLVGB R3, R0, T_1
EXPAND(T_0, T_1, F_0, F_1, F_2, F_3, F_4)
CMPBNE R3, $16, 2(PC)
VLEIB $12, $1, F_4
VLEIB $4, $1, F_4
// setup [r²,r]
VLVGG $1, RSAVE_0, R_0
VLVGG $1, RSAVE_1, R_1
VLVGG $1, RSAVE_2, R_2
VLVGG $1, RSAVE_3, R_3
VLVGG $1, RSAVE_4, R_4
VPDI $0, R5_1, R5SAVE_1, R5_1
VPDI $0, R5_2, R5SAVE_2, R5_2
VPDI $0, R5_3, R5SAVE_3, R5_3
VPDI $0, R5_4, R5SAVE_4, R5_4
MOVD $0, R3
BR multiply
skip:
VZERO H_0
VZERO H_1
VZERO H_2
VZERO H_3
VZERO H_4
CMPBEQ R3, $0, finish
b1:
// 1 block remaining
SUB $1, R3
VLL R3, (R2), T_0
ADD $1, R3
MOVBZ $1, R0
CMPBEQ R3, $16, 2(PC)
VLVGB R3, R0, T_0
VZERO T_1
EXPAND(T_0, T_1, F_0, F_1, F_2, F_3, F_4)
CMPBNE R3, $16, 2(PC)
VLEIB $4, $1, F_4
VLEIG $1, $1, R_0
VZERO R_1
VZERO R_2
VZERO R_3
VZERO R_4
VZERO R5_1
VZERO R5_2
VZERO R5_3
VZERO R5_4
// setup [r, 1]
VLVGG $0, RSAVE_0, R_0
VLVGG $0, RSAVE_1, R_1
VLVGG $0, RSAVE_2, R_2
VLVGG $0, RSAVE_3, R_3
VLVGG $0, RSAVE_4, R_4
VPDI $0, R5SAVE_1, R5_1, R5_1
VPDI $0, R5SAVE_2, R5_2, R5_2
VPDI $0, R5SAVE_3, R5_3, R5_3
VPDI $0, R5SAVE_4, R5_4, R5_4
MOVD $0, R3
BR multiply
TEXT ·hasVectorFacility(SB), NOSPLIT, $24-1
MOVD $x-24(SP), R1
XC $24, 0(R1), 0(R1) // clear the storage
MOVD $2, R0 // R0 is the number of double words stored -1
WORD $0xB2B01000 // STFLE 0(R1)
XOR R0, R0 // reset the value of R0
MOVBZ z-8(SP), R1
AND $0x40, R1
BEQ novector
vectorinstalled:
// check if the vector instruction has been enabled
VLEIB $0, $0xF, V16
VLGVB $0, V16, R1
CMPBNE R1, $0xF, novector
MOVB $1, ret+0(FP) // have vx
RET
novector:
MOVB $0, ret+0(FP) // no vx
RET

931
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_vmsl_s390x.s generated vendored Normal file
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// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
// +build s390x,go1.11,!gccgo,!appengine
#include "textflag.h"
// Implementation of Poly1305 using the vector facility (vx) and the VMSL instruction.
// constants
#define EX0 V1
#define EX1 V2
#define EX2 V3
// temporaries
#define T_0 V4
#define T_1 V5
#define T_2 V6
#define T_3 V7
#define T_4 V8
#define T_5 V9
#define T_6 V10
#define T_7 V11
#define T_8 V12
#define T_9 V13
#define T_10 V14
// r**2 & r**4
#define R_0 V15
#define R_1 V16
#define R_2 V17
#define R5_1 V18
#define R5_2 V19
// key (r)
#define RSAVE_0 R7
#define RSAVE_1 R8
#define RSAVE_2 R9
#define R5SAVE_1 R10
#define R5SAVE_2 R11
// message block
#define M0 V20
#define M1 V21
#define M2 V22
#define M3 V23
#define M4 V24
#define M5 V25
// accumulator
#define H0_0 V26
#define H1_0 V27
#define H2_0 V28
#define H0_1 V29
#define H1_1 V30
#define H2_1 V31
GLOBL ·keyMask<>(SB), RODATA, $16
DATA ·keyMask<>+0(SB)/8, $0xffffff0ffcffff0f
DATA ·keyMask<>+8(SB)/8, $0xfcffff0ffcffff0f
GLOBL ·bswapMask<>(SB), RODATA, $16
DATA ·bswapMask<>+0(SB)/8, $0x0f0e0d0c0b0a0908
DATA ·bswapMask<>+8(SB)/8, $0x0706050403020100
GLOBL ·constants<>(SB), RODATA, $48
// EX0
DATA ·constants<>+0(SB)/8, $0x18191a1b1c1d1e1f
DATA ·constants<>+8(SB)/8, $0x0000050403020100
// EX1
DATA ·constants<>+16(SB)/8, $0x18191a1b1c1d1e1f
DATA ·constants<>+24(SB)/8, $0x00000a0908070605
// EX2
DATA ·constants<>+32(SB)/8, $0x18191a1b1c1d1e1f
DATA ·constants<>+40(SB)/8, $0x0000000f0e0d0c0b
GLOBL ·c<>(SB), RODATA, $48
// EX0
DATA ·c<>+0(SB)/8, $0x0000050403020100
DATA ·c<>+8(SB)/8, $0x0000151413121110
// EX1
DATA ·c<>+16(SB)/8, $0x00000a0908070605
DATA ·c<>+24(SB)/8, $0x00001a1918171615
// EX2
DATA ·c<>+32(SB)/8, $0x0000000f0e0d0c0b
DATA ·c<>+40(SB)/8, $0x0000001f1e1d1c1b
GLOBL ·reduce<>(SB), RODATA, $32
// 44 bit
DATA ·reduce<>+0(SB)/8, $0x0
DATA ·reduce<>+8(SB)/8, $0xfffffffffff
// 42 bit
DATA ·reduce<>+16(SB)/8, $0x0
DATA ·reduce<>+24(SB)/8, $0x3ffffffffff
// h = (f*g) % (2**130-5) [partial reduction]
// uses T_0...T_9 temporary registers
// input: m02_0, m02_1, m02_2, m13_0, m13_1, m13_2, r_0, r_1, r_2, r5_1, r5_2, m4_0, m4_1, m4_2, m5_0, m5_1, m5_2
// temp: t0, t1, t2, t3, t4, t5, t6, t7, t8, t9
// output: m02_0, m02_1, m02_2, m13_0, m13_1, m13_2
#define MULTIPLY(m02_0, m02_1, m02_2, m13_0, m13_1, m13_2, r_0, r_1, r_2, r5_1, r5_2, m4_0, m4_1, m4_2, m5_0, m5_1, m5_2, t0, t1, t2, t3, t4, t5, t6, t7, t8, t9) \
\ // Eliminate the dependency for the last 2 VMSLs
VMSLG m02_0, r_2, m4_2, m4_2 \
VMSLG m13_0, r_2, m5_2, m5_2 \ // 8 VMSLs pipelined
VMSLG m02_0, r_0, m4_0, m4_0 \
VMSLG m02_1, r5_2, V0, T_0 \
VMSLG m02_0, r_1, m4_1, m4_1 \
VMSLG m02_1, r_0, V0, T_1 \
VMSLG m02_1, r_1, V0, T_2 \
VMSLG m02_2, r5_1, V0, T_3 \
VMSLG m02_2, r5_2, V0, T_4 \
VMSLG m13_0, r_0, m5_0, m5_0 \
VMSLG m13_1, r5_2, V0, T_5 \
VMSLG m13_0, r_1, m5_1, m5_1 \
VMSLG m13_1, r_0, V0, T_6 \
VMSLG m13_1, r_1, V0, T_7 \
VMSLG m13_2, r5_1, V0, T_8 \
VMSLG m13_2, r5_2, V0, T_9 \
VMSLG m02_2, r_0, m4_2, m4_2 \
VMSLG m13_2, r_0, m5_2, m5_2 \
VAQ m4_0, T_0, m02_0 \
VAQ m4_1, T_1, m02_1 \
VAQ m5_0, T_5, m13_0 \
VAQ m5_1, T_6, m13_1 \
VAQ m02_0, T_3, m02_0 \
VAQ m02_1, T_4, m02_1 \
VAQ m13_0, T_8, m13_0 \
VAQ m13_1, T_9, m13_1 \
VAQ m4_2, T_2, m02_2 \
VAQ m5_2, T_7, m13_2 \
// SQUARE uses three limbs of r and r_2*5 to output square of r
// uses T_1, T_5 and T_7 temporary registers
// input: r_0, r_1, r_2, r5_2
// temp: TEMP0, TEMP1, TEMP2
// output: p0, p1, p2
#define SQUARE(r_0, r_1, r_2, r5_2, p0, p1, p2, TEMP0, TEMP1, TEMP2) \
VMSLG r_0, r_0, p0, p0 \
VMSLG r_1, r5_2, V0, TEMP0 \
VMSLG r_2, r5_2, p1, p1 \
VMSLG r_0, r_1, V0, TEMP1 \
VMSLG r_1, r_1, p2, p2 \
VMSLG r_0, r_2, V0, TEMP2 \
VAQ TEMP0, p0, p0 \
VAQ TEMP1, p1, p1 \
VAQ TEMP2, p2, p2 \
VAQ TEMP0, p0, p0 \
VAQ TEMP1, p1, p1 \
VAQ TEMP2, p2, p2 \
// carry h0->h1->h2->h0 || h3->h4->h5->h3
// uses T_2, T_4, T_5, T_7, T_8, T_9
// t6, t7, t8, t9, t10, t11
// input: h0, h1, h2, h3, h4, h5
// temp: t0, t1, t2, t3, t4, t5, t6, t7, t8, t9, t10, t11
// output: h0, h1, h2, h3, h4, h5
#define REDUCE(h0, h1, h2, h3, h4, h5, t0, t1, t2, t3, t4, t5, t6, t7, t8, t9, t10, t11) \
VLM (R12), t6, t7 \ // 44 and 42 bit clear mask
VLEIB $7, $0x28, t10 \ // 5 byte shift mask
VREPIB $4, t8 \ // 4 bit shift mask
VREPIB $2, t11 \ // 2 bit shift mask
VSRLB t10, h0, t0 \ // h0 byte shift
VSRLB t10, h1, t1 \ // h1 byte shift
VSRLB t10, h2, t2 \ // h2 byte shift
VSRLB t10, h3, t3 \ // h3 byte shift
VSRLB t10, h4, t4 \ // h4 byte shift
VSRLB t10, h5, t5 \ // h5 byte shift
VSRL t8, t0, t0 \ // h0 bit shift
VSRL t8, t1, t1 \ // h2 bit shift
VSRL t11, t2, t2 \ // h2 bit shift
VSRL t8, t3, t3 \ // h3 bit shift
VSRL t8, t4, t4 \ // h4 bit shift
VESLG $2, t2, t9 \ // h2 carry x5
VSRL t11, t5, t5 \ // h5 bit shift
VN t6, h0, h0 \ // h0 clear carry
VAQ t2, t9, t2 \ // h2 carry x5
VESLG $2, t5, t9 \ // h5 carry x5
VN t6, h1, h1 \ // h1 clear carry
VN t7, h2, h2 \ // h2 clear carry
VAQ t5, t9, t5 \ // h5 carry x5
VN t6, h3, h3 \ // h3 clear carry
VN t6, h4, h4 \ // h4 clear carry
VN t7, h5, h5 \ // h5 clear carry
VAQ t0, h1, h1 \ // h0->h1
VAQ t3, h4, h4 \ // h3->h4
VAQ t1, h2, h2 \ // h1->h2
VAQ t4, h5, h5 \ // h4->h5
VAQ t2, h0, h0 \ // h2->h0
VAQ t5, h3, h3 \ // h5->h3
VREPG $1, t6, t6 \ // 44 and 42 bit masks across both halves
VREPG $1, t7, t7 \
VSLDB $8, h0, h0, h0 \ // set up [h0/1/2, h3/4/5]
VSLDB $8, h1, h1, h1 \
VSLDB $8, h2, h2, h2 \
VO h0, h3, h3 \
VO h1, h4, h4 \
VO h2, h5, h5 \
VESRLG $44, h3, t0 \ // 44 bit shift right
VESRLG $44, h4, t1 \
VESRLG $42, h5, t2 \
VN t6, h3, h3 \ // clear carry bits
VN t6, h4, h4 \
VN t7, h5, h5 \
VESLG $2, t2, t9 \ // multiply carry by 5
VAQ t9, t2, t2 \
VAQ t0, h4, h4 \
VAQ t1, h5, h5 \
VAQ t2, h3, h3 \
// carry h0->h1->h2->h0
// input: h0, h1, h2
// temp: t0, t1, t2, t3, t4, t5, t6, t7, t8
// output: h0, h1, h2
#define REDUCE2(h0, h1, h2, t0, t1, t2, t3, t4, t5, t6, t7, t8) \
VLEIB $7, $0x28, t3 \ // 5 byte shift mask
VREPIB $4, t4 \ // 4 bit shift mask
VREPIB $2, t7 \ // 2 bit shift mask
VGBM $0x003F, t5 \ // mask to clear carry bits
VSRLB t3, h0, t0 \
VSRLB t3, h1, t1 \
VSRLB t3, h2, t2 \
VESRLG $4, t5, t5 \ // 44 bit clear mask
VSRL t4, t0, t0 \
VSRL t4, t1, t1 \
VSRL t7, t2, t2 \
VESRLG $2, t5, t6 \ // 42 bit clear mask
VESLG $2, t2, t8 \
VAQ t8, t2, t2 \
VN t5, h0, h0 \
VN t5, h1, h1 \
VN t6, h2, h2 \
VAQ t0, h1, h1 \
VAQ t1, h2, h2 \
VAQ t2, h0, h0 \
VSRLB t3, h0, t0 \
VSRLB t3, h1, t1 \
VSRLB t3, h2, t2 \
VSRL t4, t0, t0 \
VSRL t4, t1, t1 \
VSRL t7, t2, t2 \
VN t5, h0, h0 \
VN t5, h1, h1 \
VESLG $2, t2, t8 \
VN t6, h2, h2 \
VAQ t0, h1, h1 \
VAQ t8, t2, t2 \
VAQ t1, h2, h2 \
VAQ t2, h0, h0 \
// expands two message blocks into the lower halfs of the d registers
// moves the contents of the d registers into upper halfs
// input: in1, in2, d0, d1, d2, d3, d4, d5
// temp: TEMP0, TEMP1, TEMP2, TEMP3
// output: d0, d1, d2, d3, d4, d5
#define EXPACC(in1, in2, d0, d1, d2, d3, d4, d5, TEMP0, TEMP1, TEMP2, TEMP3) \
VGBM $0xff3f, TEMP0 \
VGBM $0xff1f, TEMP1 \
VESLG $4, d1, TEMP2 \
VESLG $4, d4, TEMP3 \
VESRLG $4, TEMP0, TEMP0 \
VPERM in1, d0, EX0, d0 \
VPERM in2, d3, EX0, d3 \
VPERM in1, d2, EX2, d2 \
VPERM in2, d5, EX2, d5 \
VPERM in1, TEMP2, EX1, d1 \
VPERM in2, TEMP3, EX1, d4 \
VN TEMP0, d0, d0 \
VN TEMP0, d3, d3 \
VESRLG $4, d1, d1 \
VESRLG $4, d4, d4 \
VN TEMP1, d2, d2 \
VN TEMP1, d5, d5 \
VN TEMP0, d1, d1 \
VN TEMP0, d4, d4 \
// expands one message block into the lower halfs of the d registers
// moves the contents of the d registers into upper halfs
// input: in, d0, d1, d2
// temp: TEMP0, TEMP1, TEMP2
// output: d0, d1, d2
#define EXPACC2(in, d0, d1, d2, TEMP0, TEMP1, TEMP2) \
VGBM $0xff3f, TEMP0 \
VESLG $4, d1, TEMP2 \
VGBM $0xff1f, TEMP1 \
VPERM in, d0, EX0, d0 \
VESRLG $4, TEMP0, TEMP0 \
VPERM in, d2, EX2, d2 \
VPERM in, TEMP2, EX1, d1 \
VN TEMP0, d0, d0 \
VN TEMP1, d2, d2 \
VESRLG $4, d1, d1 \
VN TEMP0, d1, d1 \
// pack h2:h0 into h1:h0 (no carry)
// input: h0, h1, h2
// output: h0, h1, h2
#define PACK(h0, h1, h2) \
VMRLG h1, h2, h2 \ // copy h1 to upper half h2
VESLG $44, h1, h1 \ // shift limb 1 44 bits, leaving 20
VO h0, h1, h0 \ // combine h0 with 20 bits from limb 1
VESRLG $20, h2, h1 \ // put top 24 bits of limb 1 into h1
VLEIG $1, $0, h1 \ // clear h2 stuff from lower half of h1
VO h0, h1, h0 \ // h0 now has 88 bits (limb 0 and 1)
VLEIG $0, $0, h2 \ // clear upper half of h2
VESRLG $40, h2, h1 \ // h1 now has upper two bits of result
VLEIB $7, $88, h1 \ // for byte shift (11 bytes)
VSLB h1, h2, h2 \ // shift h2 11 bytes to the left
VO h0, h2, h0 \ // combine h0 with 20 bits from limb 1
VLEIG $0, $0, h1 \ // clear upper half of h1
// if h > 2**130-5 then h -= 2**130-5
// input: h0, h1
// temp: t0, t1, t2
// output: h0
#define MOD(h0, h1, t0, t1, t2) \
VZERO t0 \
VLEIG $1, $5, t0 \
VACCQ h0, t0, t1 \
VAQ h0, t0, t0 \
VONE t2 \
VLEIG $1, $-4, t2 \
VAQ t2, t1, t1 \
VACCQ h1, t1, t1 \
VONE t2 \
VAQ t2, t1, t1 \
VN h0, t1, t2 \
VNC t0, t1, t1 \
VO t1, t2, h0 \
// func poly1305vmsl(out *[16]byte, m *byte, mlen uint64, key *[32]key)
TEXT ·poly1305vmsl(SB), $0-32
// This code processes 6 + up to 4 blocks (32 bytes) per iteration
// using the algorithm described in:
// NEON crypto, Daniel J. Bernstein & Peter Schwabe
// https://cryptojedi.org/papers/neoncrypto-20120320.pdf
// And as moddified for VMSL as described in
// Accelerating Poly1305 Cryptographic Message Authentication on the z14
// O'Farrell et al, CASCON 2017, p48-55
// https://ibm.ent.box.com/s/jf9gedj0e9d2vjctfyh186shaztavnht
LMG out+0(FP), R1, R4 // R1=out, R2=m, R3=mlen, R4=key
VZERO V0 // c
// load EX0, EX1 and EX2
MOVD $·constants<>(SB), R5
VLM (R5), EX0, EX2 // c
// setup r
VL (R4), T_0
MOVD $·keyMask<>(SB), R6
VL (R6), T_1
VN T_0, T_1, T_0
VZERO T_2 // limbs for r
VZERO T_3
VZERO T_4
EXPACC2(T_0, T_2, T_3, T_4, T_1, T_5, T_7)
// T_2, T_3, T_4: [0, r]
// setup r*20
VLEIG $0, $0, T_0
VLEIG $1, $20, T_0 // T_0: [0, 20]
VZERO T_5
VZERO T_6
VMSLG T_0, T_3, T_5, T_5
VMSLG T_0, T_4, T_6, T_6
// store r for final block in GR
VLGVG $1, T_2, RSAVE_0 // c
VLGVG $1, T_3, RSAVE_1 // c
VLGVG $1, T_4, RSAVE_2 // c
VLGVG $1, T_5, R5SAVE_1 // c
VLGVG $1, T_6, R5SAVE_2 // c
// initialize h
VZERO H0_0
VZERO H1_0
VZERO H2_0
VZERO H0_1
VZERO H1_1
VZERO H2_1
// initialize pointer for reduce constants
MOVD $·reduce<>(SB), R12
// calculate r**2 and 20*(r**2)
VZERO R_0
VZERO R_1
VZERO R_2
SQUARE(T_2, T_3, T_4, T_6, R_0, R_1, R_2, T_1, T_5, T_7)
REDUCE2(R_0, R_1, R_2, M0, M1, M2, M3, M4, R5_1, R5_2, M5, T_1)
VZERO R5_1
VZERO R5_2
VMSLG T_0, R_1, R5_1, R5_1
VMSLG T_0, R_2, R5_2, R5_2
// skip r**4 calculation if 3 blocks or less
CMPBLE R3, $48, b4
// calculate r**4 and 20*(r**4)
VZERO T_8
VZERO T_9
VZERO T_10
SQUARE(R_0, R_1, R_2, R5_2, T_8, T_9, T_10, T_1, T_5, T_7)
REDUCE2(T_8, T_9, T_10, M0, M1, M2, M3, M4, T_2, T_3, M5, T_1)
VZERO T_2
VZERO T_3
VMSLG T_0, T_9, T_2, T_2
VMSLG T_0, T_10, T_3, T_3
// put r**2 to the right and r**4 to the left of R_0, R_1, R_2
VSLDB $8, T_8, T_8, T_8
VSLDB $8, T_9, T_9, T_9
VSLDB $8, T_10, T_10, T_10
VSLDB $8, T_2, T_2, T_2
VSLDB $8, T_3, T_3, T_3
VO T_8, R_0, R_0
VO T_9, R_1, R_1
VO T_10, R_2, R_2
VO T_2, R5_1, R5_1
VO T_3, R5_2, R5_2
CMPBLE R3, $80, load // less than or equal to 5 blocks in message
// 6(or 5+1) blocks
SUB $81, R3
VLM (R2), M0, M4
VLL R3, 80(R2), M5
ADD $1, R3
MOVBZ $1, R0
CMPBGE R3, $16, 2(PC)
VLVGB R3, R0, M5
MOVD $96(R2), R2
EXPACC(M0, M1, H0_0, H1_0, H2_0, H0_1, H1_1, H2_1, T_0, T_1, T_2, T_3)
EXPACC(M2, M3, H0_0, H1_0, H2_0, H0_1, H1_1, H2_1, T_0, T_1, T_2, T_3)
VLEIB $2, $1, H2_0
VLEIB $2, $1, H2_1
VLEIB $10, $1, H2_0
VLEIB $10, $1, H2_1
VZERO M0
VZERO M1
VZERO M2
VZERO M3
VZERO T_4
VZERO T_10
EXPACC(M4, M5, M0, M1, M2, M3, T_4, T_10, T_0, T_1, T_2, T_3)
VLR T_4, M4
VLEIB $10, $1, M2
CMPBLT R3, $16, 2(PC)
VLEIB $10, $1, T_10
MULTIPLY(H0_0, H1_0, H2_0, H0_1, H1_1, H2_1, R_0, R_1, R_2, R5_1, R5_2, M0, M1, M2, M3, M4, T_10, T_0, T_1, T_2, T_3, T_4, T_5, T_6, T_7, T_8, T_9)
REDUCE(H0_0, H1_0, H2_0, H0_1, H1_1, H2_1, T_10, M0, M1, M2, M3, M4, T_4, T_5, T_2, T_7, T_8, T_9)
VMRHG V0, H0_1, H0_0
VMRHG V0, H1_1, H1_0
VMRHG V0, H2_1, H2_0
VMRLG V0, H0_1, H0_1
VMRLG V0, H1_1, H1_1
VMRLG V0, H2_1, H2_1
SUB $16, R3
CMPBLE R3, $0, square
load:
// load EX0, EX1 and EX2
MOVD $·c<>(SB), R5
VLM (R5), EX0, EX2
loop:
CMPBLE R3, $64, add // b4 // last 4 or less blocks left
// next 4 full blocks
VLM (R2), M2, M5
SUB $64, R3
MOVD $64(R2), R2
REDUCE(H0_0, H1_0, H2_0, H0_1, H1_1, H2_1, T_10, M0, M1, T_0, T_1, T_3, T_4, T_5, T_2, T_7, T_8, T_9)
// expacc in-lined to create [m2, m3] limbs
VGBM $0x3f3f, T_0 // 44 bit clear mask
VGBM $0x1f1f, T_1 // 40 bit clear mask
VPERM M2, M3, EX0, T_3
VESRLG $4, T_0, T_0 // 44 bit clear mask ready
VPERM M2, M3, EX1, T_4
VPERM M2, M3, EX2, T_5
VN T_0, T_3, T_3
VESRLG $4, T_4, T_4
VN T_1, T_5, T_5
VN T_0, T_4, T_4
VMRHG H0_1, T_3, H0_0
VMRHG H1_1, T_4, H1_0
VMRHG H2_1, T_5, H2_0
VMRLG H0_1, T_3, H0_1
VMRLG H1_1, T_4, H1_1
VMRLG H2_1, T_5, H2_1
VLEIB $10, $1, H2_0
VLEIB $10, $1, H2_1
VPERM M4, M5, EX0, T_3
VPERM M4, M5, EX1, T_4
VPERM M4, M5, EX2, T_5
VN T_0, T_3, T_3
VESRLG $4, T_4, T_4
VN T_1, T_5, T_5
VN T_0, T_4, T_4
VMRHG V0, T_3, M0
VMRHG V0, T_4, M1
VMRHG V0, T_5, M2
VMRLG V0, T_3, M3
VMRLG V0, T_4, M4
VMRLG V0, T_5, M5
VLEIB $10, $1, M2
VLEIB $10, $1, M5
MULTIPLY(H0_0, H1_0, H2_0, H0_1, H1_1, H2_1, R_0, R_1, R_2, R5_1, R5_2, M0, M1, M2, M3, M4, M5, T_0, T_1, T_2, T_3, T_4, T_5, T_6, T_7, T_8, T_9)
CMPBNE R3, $0, loop
REDUCE(H0_0, H1_0, H2_0, H0_1, H1_1, H2_1, T_10, M0, M1, M3, M4, M5, T_4, T_5, T_2, T_7, T_8, T_9)
VMRHG V0, H0_1, H0_0
VMRHG V0, H1_1, H1_0
VMRHG V0, H2_1, H2_0
VMRLG V0, H0_1, H0_1
VMRLG V0, H1_1, H1_1
VMRLG V0, H2_1, H2_1
// load EX0, EX1, EX2
MOVD $·constants<>(SB), R5
VLM (R5), EX0, EX2
// sum vectors
VAQ H0_0, H0_1, H0_0
VAQ H1_0, H1_1, H1_0
VAQ H2_0, H2_1, H2_0
// h may be >= 2*(2**130-5) so we need to reduce it again
// M0...M4 are used as temps here
REDUCE2(H0_0, H1_0, H2_0, M0, M1, M2, M3, M4, T_9, T_10, H0_1, M5)
next: // carry h1->h2
VLEIB $7, $0x28, T_1
VREPIB $4, T_2
VGBM $0x003F, T_3
VESRLG $4, T_3
// byte shift
VSRLB T_1, H1_0, T_4
// bit shift
VSRL T_2, T_4, T_4
// clear h1 carry bits
VN T_3, H1_0, H1_0
// add carry
VAQ T_4, H2_0, H2_0
// h is now < 2*(2**130-5)
// pack h into h1 (hi) and h0 (lo)
PACK(H0_0, H1_0, H2_0)
// if h > 2**130-5 then h -= 2**130-5
MOD(H0_0, H1_0, T_0, T_1, T_2)
// h += s
MOVD $·bswapMask<>(SB), R5
VL (R5), T_1
VL 16(R4), T_0
VPERM T_0, T_0, T_1, T_0 // reverse bytes (to big)
VAQ T_0, H0_0, H0_0
VPERM H0_0, H0_0, T_1, H0_0 // reverse bytes (to little)
VST H0_0, (R1)
RET
add:
// load EX0, EX1, EX2
MOVD $·constants<>(SB), R5
VLM (R5), EX0, EX2
REDUCE(H0_0, H1_0, H2_0, H0_1, H1_1, H2_1, T_10, M0, M1, M3, M4, M5, T_4, T_5, T_2, T_7, T_8, T_9)
VMRHG V0, H0_1, H0_0
VMRHG V0, H1_1, H1_0
VMRHG V0, H2_1, H2_0
VMRLG V0, H0_1, H0_1
VMRLG V0, H1_1, H1_1
VMRLG V0, H2_1, H2_1
CMPBLE R3, $64, b4
b4:
CMPBLE R3, $48, b3 // 3 blocks or less
// 4(3+1) blocks remaining
SUB $49, R3
VLM (R2), M0, M2
VLL R3, 48(R2), M3
ADD $1, R3
MOVBZ $1, R0
CMPBEQ R3, $16, 2(PC)
VLVGB R3, R0, M3
MOVD $64(R2), R2
EXPACC(M0, M1, H0_0, H1_0, H2_0, H0_1, H1_1, H2_1, T_0, T_1, T_2, T_3)
VLEIB $10, $1, H2_0
VLEIB $10, $1, H2_1
VZERO M0
VZERO M1
VZERO M4
VZERO M5
VZERO T_4
VZERO T_10
EXPACC(M2, M3, M0, M1, M4, M5, T_4, T_10, T_0, T_1, T_2, T_3)
VLR T_4, M2
VLEIB $10, $1, M4
CMPBNE R3, $16, 2(PC)
VLEIB $10, $1, T_10
MULTIPLY(H0_0, H1_0, H2_0, H0_1, H1_1, H2_1, R_0, R_1, R_2, R5_1, R5_2, M0, M1, M4, M5, M2, T_10, T_0, T_1, T_2, T_3, T_4, T_5, T_6, T_7, T_8, T_9)
REDUCE(H0_0, H1_0, H2_0, H0_1, H1_1, H2_1, T_10, M0, M1, M3, M4, M5, T_4, T_5, T_2, T_7, T_8, T_9)
VMRHG V0, H0_1, H0_0
VMRHG V0, H1_1, H1_0
VMRHG V0, H2_1, H2_0
VMRLG V0, H0_1, H0_1
VMRLG V0, H1_1, H1_1
VMRLG V0, H2_1, H2_1
SUB $16, R3
CMPBLE R3, $0, square // this condition must always hold true!
b3:
CMPBLE R3, $32, b2
// 3 blocks remaining
// setup [r²,r]
VSLDB $8, R_0, R_0, R_0
VSLDB $8, R_1, R_1, R_1
VSLDB $8, R_2, R_2, R_2
VSLDB $8, R5_1, R5_1, R5_1
VSLDB $8, R5_2, R5_2, R5_2
VLVGG $1, RSAVE_0, R_0
VLVGG $1, RSAVE_1, R_1
VLVGG $1, RSAVE_2, R_2
VLVGG $1, R5SAVE_1, R5_1
VLVGG $1, R5SAVE_2, R5_2
// setup [h0, h1]
VSLDB $8, H0_0, H0_0, H0_0
VSLDB $8, H1_0, H1_0, H1_0
VSLDB $8, H2_0, H2_0, H2_0
VO H0_1, H0_0, H0_0
VO H1_1, H1_0, H1_0
VO H2_1, H2_0, H2_0
VZERO H0_1
VZERO H1_1
VZERO H2_1
VZERO M0
VZERO M1
VZERO M2
VZERO M3
VZERO M4
VZERO M5
// H*[r**2, r]
MULTIPLY(H0_0, H1_0, H2_0, H0_1, H1_1, H2_1, R_0, R_1, R_2, R5_1, R5_2, M0, M1, M2, M3, M4, M5, T_0, T_1, T_2, T_3, T_4, T_5, T_6, T_7, T_8, T_9)
REDUCE2(H0_0, H1_0, H2_0, M0, M1, M2, M3, M4, H0_1, H1_1, T_10, M5)
SUB $33, R3
VLM (R2), M0, M1
VLL R3, 32(R2), M2
ADD $1, R3
MOVBZ $1, R0
CMPBEQ R3, $16, 2(PC)
VLVGB R3, R0, M2
// H += m0
VZERO T_1
VZERO T_2
VZERO T_3
EXPACC2(M0, T_1, T_2, T_3, T_4, T_5, T_6)
VLEIB $10, $1, T_3
VAG H0_0, T_1, H0_0
VAG H1_0, T_2, H1_0
VAG H2_0, T_3, H2_0
VZERO M0
VZERO M3
VZERO M4
VZERO M5
VZERO T_10
// (H+m0)*r
MULTIPLY(H0_0, H1_0, H2_0, H0_1, H1_1, H2_1, R_0, R_1, R_2, R5_1, R5_2, M0, M3, M4, M5, V0, T_10, T_0, T_1, T_2, T_3, T_4, T_5, T_6, T_7, T_8, T_9)
REDUCE2(H0_0, H1_0, H2_0, M0, M3, M4, M5, T_10, H0_1, H1_1, H2_1, T_9)
// H += m1
VZERO V0
VZERO T_1
VZERO T_2
VZERO T_3
EXPACC2(M1, T_1, T_2, T_3, T_4, T_5, T_6)
VLEIB $10, $1, T_3
VAQ H0_0, T_1, H0_0
VAQ H1_0, T_2, H1_0
VAQ H2_0, T_3, H2_0
REDUCE2(H0_0, H1_0, H2_0, M0, M3, M4, M5, T_9, H0_1, H1_1, H2_1, T_10)
// [H, m2] * [r**2, r]
EXPACC2(M2, H0_0, H1_0, H2_0, T_1, T_2, T_3)
CMPBNE R3, $16, 2(PC)
VLEIB $10, $1, H2_0
VZERO M0
VZERO M1
VZERO M2
VZERO M3
VZERO M4
VZERO M5
MULTIPLY(H0_0, H1_0, H2_0, H0_1, H1_1, H2_1, R_0, R_1, R_2, R5_1, R5_2, M0, M1, M2, M3, M4, M5, T_0, T_1, T_2, T_3, T_4, T_5, T_6, T_7, T_8, T_9)
REDUCE2(H0_0, H1_0, H2_0, M0, M1, M2, M3, M4, H0_1, H1_1, M5, T_10)
SUB $16, R3
CMPBLE R3, $0, next // this condition must always hold true!
b2:
CMPBLE R3, $16, b1
// 2 blocks remaining
// setup [r²,r]
VSLDB $8, R_0, R_0, R_0
VSLDB $8, R_1, R_1, R_1
VSLDB $8, R_2, R_2, R_2
VSLDB $8, R5_1, R5_1, R5_1
VSLDB $8, R5_2, R5_2, R5_2
VLVGG $1, RSAVE_0, R_0
VLVGG $1, RSAVE_1, R_1
VLVGG $1, RSAVE_2, R_2
VLVGG $1, R5SAVE_1, R5_1
VLVGG $1, R5SAVE_2, R5_2
// setup [h0, h1]
VSLDB $8, H0_0, H0_0, H0_0
VSLDB $8, H1_0, H1_0, H1_0
VSLDB $8, H2_0, H2_0, H2_0
VO H0_1, H0_0, H0_0
VO H1_1, H1_0, H1_0
VO H2_1, H2_0, H2_0
VZERO H0_1
VZERO H1_1
VZERO H2_1
VZERO M0
VZERO M1
VZERO M2
VZERO M3
VZERO M4
VZERO M5
// H*[r**2, r]
MULTIPLY(H0_0, H1_0, H2_0, H0_1, H1_1, H2_1, R_0, R_1, R_2, R5_1, R5_2, M0, M1, M2, M3, M4, M5, T_0, T_1, T_2, T_3, T_4, T_5, T_6, T_7, T_8, T_9)
REDUCE(H0_0, H1_0, H2_0, H0_1, H1_1, H2_1, T_10, M0, M1, M2, M3, M4, T_4, T_5, T_2, T_7, T_8, T_9)
VMRHG V0, H0_1, H0_0
VMRHG V0, H1_1, H1_0
VMRHG V0, H2_1, H2_0
VMRLG V0, H0_1, H0_1
VMRLG V0, H1_1, H1_1
VMRLG V0, H2_1, H2_1
// move h to the left and 0s at the right
VSLDB $8, H0_0, H0_0, H0_0
VSLDB $8, H1_0, H1_0, H1_0
VSLDB $8, H2_0, H2_0, H2_0
// get message blocks and append 1 to start
SUB $17, R3
VL (R2), M0
VLL R3, 16(R2), M1
ADD $1, R3
MOVBZ $1, R0
CMPBEQ R3, $16, 2(PC)
VLVGB R3, R0, M1
VZERO T_6
VZERO T_7
VZERO T_8
EXPACC2(M0, T_6, T_7, T_8, T_1, T_2, T_3)
EXPACC2(M1, T_6, T_7, T_8, T_1, T_2, T_3)
VLEIB $2, $1, T_8
CMPBNE R3, $16, 2(PC)
VLEIB $10, $1, T_8
// add [m0, m1] to h
VAG H0_0, T_6, H0_0
VAG H1_0, T_7, H1_0
VAG H2_0, T_8, H2_0
VZERO M2
VZERO M3
VZERO M4
VZERO M5
VZERO T_10
VZERO M0
// at this point R_0 .. R5_2 look like [r**2, r]
MULTIPLY(H0_0, H1_0, H2_0, H0_1, H1_1, H2_1, R_0, R_1, R_2, R5_1, R5_2, M2, M3, M4, M5, T_10, M0, T_0, T_1, T_2, T_3, T_4, T_5, T_6, T_7, T_8, T_9)
REDUCE2(H0_0, H1_0, H2_0, M2, M3, M4, M5, T_9, H0_1, H1_1, H2_1, T_10)
SUB $16, R3, R3
CMPBLE R3, $0, next
b1:
CMPBLE R3, $0, next
// 1 block remaining
// setup [r²,r]
VSLDB $8, R_0, R_0, R_0
VSLDB $8, R_1, R_1, R_1
VSLDB $8, R_2, R_2, R_2
VSLDB $8, R5_1, R5_1, R5_1
VSLDB $8, R5_2, R5_2, R5_2
VLVGG $1, RSAVE_0, R_0
VLVGG $1, RSAVE_1, R_1
VLVGG $1, RSAVE_2, R_2
VLVGG $1, R5SAVE_1, R5_1
VLVGG $1, R5SAVE_2, R5_2
// setup [h0, h1]
VSLDB $8, H0_0, H0_0, H0_0
VSLDB $8, H1_0, H1_0, H1_0
VSLDB $8, H2_0, H2_0, H2_0
VO H0_1, H0_0, H0_0
VO H1_1, H1_0, H1_0
VO H2_1, H2_0, H2_0
VZERO H0_1
VZERO H1_1
VZERO H2_1
VZERO M0
VZERO M1
VZERO M2
VZERO M3
VZERO M4
VZERO M5
// H*[r**2, r]
MULTIPLY(H0_0, H1_0, H2_0, H0_1, H1_1, H2_1, R_0, R_1, R_2, R5_1, R5_2, M0, M1, M2, M3, M4, M5, T_0, T_1, T_2, T_3, T_4, T_5, T_6, T_7, T_8, T_9)
REDUCE2(H0_0, H1_0, H2_0, M0, M1, M2, M3, M4, T_9, T_10, H0_1, M5)
// set up [0, m0] limbs
SUB $1, R3
VLL R3, (R2), M0
ADD $1, R3
MOVBZ $1, R0
CMPBEQ R3, $16, 2(PC)
VLVGB R3, R0, M0
VZERO T_1
VZERO T_2
VZERO T_3
EXPACC2(M0, T_1, T_2, T_3, T_4, T_5, T_6)// limbs: [0, m]
CMPBNE R3, $16, 2(PC)
VLEIB $10, $1, T_3
// h+m0
VAQ H0_0, T_1, H0_0
VAQ H1_0, T_2, H1_0
VAQ H2_0, T_3, H2_0
VZERO M0
VZERO M1
VZERO M2
VZERO M3
VZERO M4
VZERO M5
MULTIPLY(H0_0, H1_0, H2_0, H0_1, H1_1, H2_1, R_0, R_1, R_2, R5_1, R5_2, M0, M1, M2, M3, M4, M5, T_0, T_1, T_2, T_3, T_4, T_5, T_6, T_7, T_8, T_9)
REDUCE2(H0_0, H1_0, H2_0, M0, M1, M2, M3, M4, T_9, T_10, H0_1, M5)
BR next
square:
// setup [r²,r]
VSLDB $8, R_0, R_0, R_0
VSLDB $8, R_1, R_1, R_1
VSLDB $8, R_2, R_2, R_2
VSLDB $8, R5_1, R5_1, R5_1
VSLDB $8, R5_2, R5_2, R5_2
VLVGG $1, RSAVE_0, R_0
VLVGG $1, RSAVE_1, R_1
VLVGG $1, RSAVE_2, R_2
VLVGG $1, R5SAVE_1, R5_1
VLVGG $1, R5SAVE_2, R5_2
// setup [h0, h1]
VSLDB $8, H0_0, H0_0, H0_0
VSLDB $8, H1_0, H1_0, H1_0
VSLDB $8, H2_0, H2_0, H2_0
VO H0_1, H0_0, H0_0
VO H1_1, H1_0, H1_0
VO H2_1, H2_0, H2_0
VZERO H0_1
VZERO H1_1
VZERO H2_1
VZERO M0
VZERO M1
VZERO M2
VZERO M3
VZERO M4
VZERO M5
// (h0*r**2) + (h1*r)
MULTIPLY(H0_0, H1_0, H2_0, H0_1, H1_1, H2_1, R_0, R_1, R_2, R5_1, R5_2, M0, M1, M2, M3, M4, M5, T_0, T_1, T_2, T_3, T_4, T_5, T_6, T_7, T_8, T_9)
REDUCE2(H0_0, H1_0, H2_0, M0, M1, M2, M3, M4, T_9, T_10, H0_1, M5)
BR next
TEXT ·hasVMSLFacility(SB), NOSPLIT, $24-1
MOVD $x-24(SP), R1
XC $24, 0(R1), 0(R1) // clear the storage
MOVD $2, R0 // R0 is the number of double words stored -1
WORD $0xB2B01000 // STFLE 0(R1)
XOR R0, R0 // reset the value of R0
MOVBZ z-8(SP), R1
AND $0x01, R1
BEQ novmsl
vectorinstalled:
// check if the vector instruction has been enabled
VLEIB $0, $0xF, V16
VLGVB $0, V16, R1
CMPBNE R1, $0xF, novmsl
MOVB $1, ret+0(FP) // have vx
RET
novmsl:
MOVB $0, ret+0(FP) // no vx
RET

2
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ripemd160/ripemd160.go generated vendored
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@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
// Package ripemd160 implements the RIPEMD-160 hash algorithm.
package ripemd160 // import "golang.org/x/crypto/ripemd160"
// RIPEMD-160 is designed by by Hans Dobbertin, Antoon Bosselaers, and Bart
// RIPEMD-160 is designed by Hans Dobbertin, Antoon Bosselaers, and Bart
// Preneel with specifications available at:
// http://homes.esat.kuleuven.be/~cosicart/pdf/AB-9601/AB-9601.pdf.

64
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ripemd160/ripemd160block.go generated vendored
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@ -8,6 +8,10 @@
package ripemd160
import (
"math/bits"
)
// work buffer indices and roll amounts for one line
var _n = [80]uint{
0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15,
@ -59,16 +63,16 @@ func _Block(md *digest, p []byte) int {
i := 0
for i < 16 {
alpha = a + (b ^ c ^ d) + x[_n[i]]
s := _r[i]
alpha = (alpha<<s | alpha>>(32-s)) + e
beta = c<<10 | c>>22
s := int(_r[i])
alpha = bits.RotateLeft32(alpha, s) + e
beta = bits.RotateLeft32(c, 10)
a, b, c, d, e = e, alpha, b, beta, d
// parallel line
alpha = aa + (bb ^ (cc | ^dd)) + x[n_[i]] + 0x50a28be6
s = r_[i]
alpha = (alpha<<s | alpha>>(32-s)) + ee
beta = cc<<10 | cc>>22
s = int(r_[i])
alpha = bits.RotateLeft32(alpha, s) + ee
beta = bits.RotateLeft32(cc, 10)
aa, bb, cc, dd, ee = ee, alpha, bb, beta, dd
i++
@ -77,16 +81,16 @@ func _Block(md *digest, p []byte) int {
// round 2
for i < 32 {
alpha = a + (b&c | ^b&d) + x[_n[i]] + 0x5a827999
s := _r[i]
alpha = (alpha<<s | alpha>>(32-s)) + e
beta = c<<10 | c>>22
s := int(_r[i])
alpha = bits.RotateLeft32(alpha, s) + e
beta = bits.RotateLeft32(c, 10)
a, b, c, d, e = e, alpha, b, beta, d
// parallel line
alpha = aa + (bb&dd | cc&^dd) + x[n_[i]] + 0x5c4dd124
s = r_[i]
alpha = (alpha<<s | alpha>>(32-s)) + ee
beta = cc<<10 | cc>>22
s = int(r_[i])
alpha = bits.RotateLeft32(alpha, s) + ee
beta = bits.RotateLeft32(cc, 10)
aa, bb, cc, dd, ee = ee, alpha, bb, beta, dd
i++
@ -95,16 +99,16 @@ func _Block(md *digest, p []byte) int {
// round 3
for i < 48 {
alpha = a + (b | ^c ^ d) + x[_n[i]] + 0x6ed9eba1
s := _r[i]
alpha = (alpha<<s | alpha>>(32-s)) + e
beta = c<<10 | c>>22
s := int(_r[i])
alpha = bits.RotateLeft32(alpha, s) + e
beta = bits.RotateLeft32(c, 10)
a, b, c, d, e = e, alpha, b, beta, d
// parallel line
alpha = aa + (bb | ^cc ^ dd) + x[n_[i]] + 0x6d703ef3
s = r_[i]
alpha = (alpha<<s | alpha>>(32-s)) + ee
beta = cc<<10 | cc>>22
s = int(r_[i])
alpha = bits.RotateLeft32(alpha, s) + ee
beta = bits.RotateLeft32(cc, 10)
aa, bb, cc, dd, ee = ee, alpha, bb, beta, dd
i++
@ -113,16 +117,16 @@ func _Block(md *digest, p []byte) int {
// round 4
for i < 64 {
alpha = a + (b&d | c&^d) + x[_n[i]] + 0x8f1bbcdc
s := _r[i]
alpha = (alpha<<s | alpha>>(32-s)) + e
beta = c<<10 | c>>22
s := int(_r[i])
alpha = bits.RotateLeft32(alpha, s) + e
beta = bits.RotateLeft32(c, 10)
a, b, c, d, e = e, alpha, b, beta, d
// parallel line
alpha = aa + (bb&cc | ^bb&dd) + x[n_[i]] + 0x7a6d76e9
s = r_[i]
alpha = (alpha<<s | alpha>>(32-s)) + ee
beta = cc<<10 | cc>>22
s = int(r_[i])
alpha = bits.RotateLeft32(alpha, s) + ee
beta = bits.RotateLeft32(cc, 10)
aa, bb, cc, dd, ee = ee, alpha, bb, beta, dd
i++
@ -131,16 +135,16 @@ func _Block(md *digest, p []byte) int {
// round 5
for i < 80 {
alpha = a + (b ^ (c | ^d)) + x[_n[i]] + 0xa953fd4e
s := _r[i]
alpha = (alpha<<s | alpha>>(32-s)) + e
beta = c<<10 | c>>22
s := int(_r[i])
alpha = bits.RotateLeft32(alpha, s) + e
beta = bits.RotateLeft32(c, 10)
a, b, c, d, e = e, alpha, b, beta, d
// parallel line
alpha = aa + (bb ^ cc ^ dd) + x[n_[i]]
s = r_[i]
alpha = (alpha<<s | alpha>>(32-s)) + ee
beta = cc<<10 | cc>>22
s = int(r_[i])
alpha = bits.RotateLeft32(alpha, s) + ee
beta = bits.RotateLeft32(cc, 10)
aa, bb, cc, dd, ee = ee, alpha, bb, beta, dd
i++

4
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/scrypt/scrypt.go generated vendored
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@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ func blockXOR(dst, src []uint32, n int) {
}
// salsaXOR applies Salsa20/8 to the XOR of 16 numbers from tmp and in,
// and puts the result into both both tmp and out.
// and puts the result into both tmp and out.
func salsaXOR(tmp *[16]uint32, in, out []uint32) {
w0 := tmp[0] ^ in[0]
w1 := tmp[1] ^ in[1]
@ -218,7 +218,7 @@ func smix(b []byte, r, N int, v, xy []uint32) {
// For example, you can get a derived key for e.g. AES-256 (which needs a
// 32-byte key) by doing:
//
// dk, err := scrypt.Key([]byte("some password"), salt, 16384, 8, 1, 32)
// dk, err := scrypt.Key([]byte("some password"), salt, 32768, 8, 1, 32)
//
// The recommended parameters for interactive logins as of 2017 are N=32768, r=8
// and p=1. The parameters N, r, and p should be increased as memory latency and

4
crypto/sha3/doc.go → vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/sha3/doc.go generated vendored
View File

@ -43,7 +43,7 @@
// is then "full" and the permutation is applied to "empty" it. This process is
// repeated until all the input has been "absorbed". The input is then padded.
// The digest is "squeezed" from the sponge in the same way, except that output
// output is copied out instead of input being XORed in.
// is copied out instead of input being XORed in.
//
// A sponge is parameterized by its generic security strength, which is equal
// to half its capacity; capacity + rate is equal to the permutation's width.
@ -63,4 +63,4 @@
// They produce output of the same length, with the same security strengths
// against all attacks. This means, in particular, that SHA3-256 only has
// 128-bit collision resistance, because its output length is 32 bytes.
package sha3
package sha3 // import "golang.org/x/crypto/sha3"

46
crypto/sha3/hashes.go → vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/sha3/hashes.go generated vendored
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@ -12,31 +12,57 @@ import (
"hash"
)
// NewKeccak256 creates a new Keccak-256 hash.
func NewKeccak256() hash.Hash { return &state{rate: 136, outputLen: 32, dsbyte: 0x01} }
// NewKeccak512 creates a new Keccak-512 hash.
func NewKeccak512() hash.Hash { return &state{rate: 72, outputLen: 64, dsbyte: 0x01} }
// New224 creates a new SHA3-224 hash.
// Its generic security strength is 224 bits against preimage attacks,
// and 112 bits against collision attacks.
func New224() hash.Hash { return &state{rate: 144, outputLen: 28, dsbyte: 0x06} }
func New224() hash.Hash {
if h := new224Asm(); h != nil {
return h
}
return &state{rate: 144, outputLen: 28, dsbyte: 0x06}
}
// New256 creates a new SHA3-256 hash.
// Its generic security strength is 256 bits against preimage attacks,
// and 128 bits against collision attacks.
func New256() hash.Hash { return &state{rate: 136, outputLen: 32, dsbyte: 0x06} }
func New256() hash.Hash {
if h := new256Asm(); h != nil {
return h
}
return &state{rate: 136, outputLen: 32, dsbyte: 0x06}
}
// New384 creates a new SHA3-384 hash.
// Its generic security strength is 384 bits against preimage attacks,
// and 192 bits against collision attacks.
func New384() hash.Hash { return &state{rate: 104, outputLen: 48, dsbyte: 0x06} }
func New384() hash.Hash {
if h := new384Asm(); h != nil {
return h
}
return &state{rate: 104, outputLen: 48, dsbyte: 0x06}
}
// New512 creates a new SHA3-512 hash.
// Its generic security strength is 512 bits against preimage attacks,
// and 256 bits against collision attacks.
func New512() hash.Hash { return &state{rate: 72, outputLen: 64, dsbyte: 0x06} }
func New512() hash.Hash {
if h := new512Asm(); h != nil {
return h
}
return &state{rate: 72, outputLen: 64, dsbyte: 0x06}
}
// NewLegacyKeccak256 creates a new Keccak-256 hash.
//
// Only use this function if you require compatibility with an existing cryptosystem
// that uses non-standard padding. All other users should use New256 instead.
func NewLegacyKeccak256() hash.Hash { return &state{rate: 136, outputLen: 32, dsbyte: 0x01} }
// NewLegacyKeccak512 creates a new Keccak-512 hash.
//
// Only use this function if you require compatibility with an existing cryptosystem
// that uses non-standard padding. All other users should use New512 instead.
func NewLegacyKeccak512() hash.Hash { return &state{rate: 72, outputLen: 64, dsbyte: 0x01} }
// Sum224 returns the SHA3-224 digest of the data.
func Sum224(data []byte) (digest [28]byte) {

27
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/sha3/hashes_generic.go generated vendored Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
// Copyright 2017 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
//+build gccgo appengine !s390x
package sha3
import (
"hash"
)
// new224Asm returns an assembly implementation of SHA3-224 if available,
// otherwise it returns nil.
func new224Asm() hash.Hash { return nil }
// new256Asm returns an assembly implementation of SHA3-256 if available,
// otherwise it returns nil.
func new256Asm() hash.Hash { return nil }
// new384Asm returns an assembly implementation of SHA3-384 if available,
// otherwise it returns nil.
func new384Asm() hash.Hash { return nil }
// new512Asm returns an assembly implementation of SHA3-512 if available,
// otherwise it returns nil.
func new512Asm() hash.Hash { return nil }

0
crypto/sha3/keccakf.go → vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/sha3/keccakf.go generated vendored
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2
crypto/sha3/keccakf_amd64.go → vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/sha3/keccakf_amd64.go generated vendored
View File

@ -10,4 +10,4 @@ package sha3
//go:noescape
func keccakF1600(state *[25]uint64)
func keccakF1600(a *[25]uint64)

0
crypto/sha3/keccakf_amd64.s → vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/sha3/keccakf_amd64.s generated vendored
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0
crypto/sha3/register.go → vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/sha3/register.go generated vendored
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0
crypto/sha3/sha3.go → vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/sha3/sha3.go generated vendored
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289
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/sha3/sha3_s390x.go generated vendored Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,289 @@
// Copyright 2017 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
//+build !gccgo,!appengine
package sha3
// This file contains code for using the 'compute intermediate
// message digest' (KIMD) and 'compute last message digest' (KLMD)
// instructions to compute SHA-3 and SHAKE hashes on IBM Z.
import (
"hash"
)
// codes represent 7-bit KIMD/KLMD function codes as defined in
// the Principles of Operation.
type code uint64
const (
// function codes for KIMD/KLMD
sha3_224 code = 32
sha3_256 = 33
sha3_384 = 34
sha3_512 = 35
shake_128 = 36
shake_256 = 37
nopad = 0x100
)
// hasMSA6 reports whether the machine supports the SHA-3 and SHAKE function
// codes, as defined in message-security-assist extension 6.
func hasMSA6() bool
// hasAsm caches the result of hasMSA6 (which might be expensive to call).
var hasAsm = hasMSA6()
// kimd is a wrapper for the 'compute intermediate message digest' instruction.
// src must be a multiple of the rate for the given function code.
//go:noescape
func kimd(function code, chain *[200]byte, src []byte)
// klmd is a wrapper for the 'compute last message digest' instruction.
// src padding is handled by the instruction.
//go:noescape
func klmd(function code, chain *[200]byte, dst, src []byte)
type asmState struct {
a [200]byte // 1600 bit state
buf []byte // care must be taken to ensure cap(buf) is a multiple of rate
rate int // equivalent to block size
storage [3072]byte // underlying storage for buf
outputLen int // output length if fixed, 0 if not
function code // KIMD/KLMD function code
state spongeDirection // whether the sponge is absorbing or squeezing
}
func newAsmState(function code) *asmState {
var s asmState
s.function = function
switch function {
case sha3_224:
s.rate = 144
s.outputLen = 28
case sha3_256:
s.rate = 136
s.outputLen = 32
case sha3_384:
s.rate = 104
s.outputLen = 48
case sha3_512:
s.rate = 72
s.outputLen = 64
case shake_128:
s.rate = 168
case shake_256:
s.rate = 136
default:
panic("sha3: unrecognized function code")
}
// limit s.buf size to a multiple of s.rate
s.resetBuf()
return &s
}
func (s *asmState) clone() *asmState {
c := *s
c.buf = c.storage[:len(s.buf):cap(s.buf)]
return &c
}
// copyIntoBuf copies b into buf. It will panic if there is not enough space to
// store all of b.
func (s *asmState) copyIntoBuf(b []byte) {
bufLen := len(s.buf)
s.buf = s.buf[:len(s.buf)+len(b)]
copy(s.buf[bufLen:], b)
}
// resetBuf points buf at storage, sets the length to 0 and sets cap to be a
// multiple of the rate.
func (s *asmState) resetBuf() {
max := (cap(s.storage) / s.rate) * s.rate
s.buf = s.storage[:0:max]
}
// Write (via the embedded io.Writer interface) adds more data to the running hash.
// It never returns an error.
func (s *asmState) Write(b []byte) (int, error) {
if s.state != spongeAbsorbing {
panic("sha3: write to sponge after read")
}
length := len(b)
for len(b) > 0 {
if len(s.buf) == 0 && len(b) >= cap(s.buf) {
// Hash the data directly and push any remaining bytes
// into the buffer.
remainder := len(s.buf) % s.rate
kimd(s.function, &s.a, b[:len(b)-remainder])
if remainder != 0 {
s.copyIntoBuf(b[len(b)-remainder:])
}
return length, nil
}
if len(s.buf) == cap(s.buf) {
// flush the buffer
kimd(s.function, &s.a, s.buf)
s.buf = s.buf[:0]
}
// copy as much as we can into the buffer
n := len(b)
if len(b) > cap(s.buf)-len(s.buf) {
n = cap(s.buf) - len(s.buf)
}
s.copyIntoBuf(b[:n])
b = b[n:]
}
return length, nil
}
// Read squeezes an arbitrary number of bytes from the sponge.
func (s *asmState) Read(out []byte) (n int, err error) {
n = len(out)
// need to pad if we were absorbing
if s.state == spongeAbsorbing {
s.state = spongeSqueezing
// write hash directly into out if possible
if len(out)%s.rate == 0 {
klmd(s.function, &s.a, out, s.buf) // len(out) may be 0
s.buf = s.buf[:0]
return
}
// write hash into buffer
max := cap(s.buf)
if max > len(out) {
max = (len(out)/s.rate)*s.rate + s.rate
}
klmd(s.function, &s.a, s.buf[:max], s.buf)
s.buf = s.buf[:max]
}
for len(out) > 0 {
// flush the buffer
if len(s.buf) != 0 {
c := copy(out, s.buf)
out = out[c:]
s.buf = s.buf[c:]
continue
}
// write hash directly into out if possible
if len(out)%s.rate == 0 {
klmd(s.function|nopad, &s.a, out, nil)
return
}
// write hash into buffer
s.resetBuf()
if cap(s.buf) > len(out) {
s.buf = s.buf[:(len(out)/s.rate)*s.rate+s.rate]
}
klmd(s.function|nopad, &s.a, s.buf, nil)
}
return
}
// Sum appends the current hash to b and returns the resulting slice.
// It does not change the underlying hash state.
func (s *asmState) Sum(b []byte) []byte {
if s.outputLen == 0 {
panic("sha3: cannot call Sum on SHAKE functions")
}
// Copy the state to preserve the original.
a := s.a
// Hash the buffer. Note that we don't clear it because we
// aren't updating the state.
klmd(s.function, &a, nil, s.buf)
return append(b, a[:s.outputLen]...)
}
// Reset resets the Hash to its initial state.
func (s *asmState) Reset() {
for i := range s.a {
s.a[i] = 0
}
s.resetBuf()
s.state = spongeAbsorbing
}
// Size returns the number of bytes Sum will return.
func (s *asmState) Size() int {
return s.outputLen
}
// BlockSize returns the hash's underlying block size.
// The Write method must be able to accept any amount
// of data, but it may operate more efficiently if all writes
// are a multiple of the block size.
func (s *asmState) BlockSize() int {
return s.rate
}
// Clone returns a copy of the ShakeHash in its current state.
func (s *asmState) Clone() ShakeHash {
return s.clone()
}
// new224Asm returns an assembly implementation of SHA3-224 if available,
// otherwise it returns nil.
func new224Asm() hash.Hash {
if hasAsm {
return newAsmState(sha3_224)
}
return nil
}
// new256Asm returns an assembly implementation of SHA3-256 if available,
// otherwise it returns nil.
func new256Asm() hash.Hash {
if hasAsm {
return newAsmState(sha3_256)
}
return nil
}
// new384Asm returns an assembly implementation of SHA3-384 if available,
// otherwise it returns nil.
func new384Asm() hash.Hash {
if hasAsm {
return newAsmState(sha3_384)
}
return nil
}
// new512Asm returns an assembly implementation of SHA3-512 if available,
// otherwise it returns nil.
func new512Asm() hash.Hash {
if hasAsm {
return newAsmState(sha3_512)
}
return nil
}
// newShake128Asm returns an assembly implementation of SHAKE-128 if available,
// otherwise it returns nil.
func newShake128Asm() ShakeHash {
if hasAsm {
return newAsmState(shake_128)
}
return nil
}
// newShake256Asm returns an assembly implementation of SHAKE-256 if available,
// otherwise it returns nil.
func newShake256Asm() ShakeHash {
if hasAsm {
return newAsmState(shake_256)
}
return nil
}

49
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/sha3/sha3_s390x.s generated vendored Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
// Copyright 2017 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
//+build !gccgo,!appengine
#include "textflag.h"
TEXT ·hasMSA6(SB), NOSPLIT, $16-1
MOVD $0, R0 // KIMD-Query function code
MOVD $tmp-16(SP), R1 // parameter block
XC $16, (R1), (R1) // clear the parameter block
WORD $0xB93E0002 // KIMD --, --
WORD $0x91FC1004 // TM 4(R1), 0xFC (test bits [32-37])
BVS yes
no:
MOVB $0, ret+0(FP)
RET
yes:
MOVB $1, ret+0(FP)
RET
// func kimd(function code, params *[200]byte, src []byte)
TEXT ·kimd(SB), NOFRAME|NOSPLIT, $0-40
MOVD function+0(FP), R0
MOVD params+8(FP), R1
LMG src+16(FP), R2, R3 // R2=base, R3=len
continue:
WORD $0xB93E0002 // KIMD --, R2
BVS continue // continue if interrupted
MOVD $0, R0 // reset R0 for pre-go1.8 compilers
RET
// func klmd(function code, params *[200]byte, dst, src []byte)
TEXT ·klmd(SB), NOFRAME|NOSPLIT, $0-64
// TODO: SHAKE support
MOVD function+0(FP), R0
MOVD params+8(FP), R1
LMG dst+16(FP), R2, R3 // R2=base, R3=len
LMG src+40(FP), R4, R5 // R4=base, R5=len
continue:
WORD $0xB93F0024 // KLMD R2, R4
BVS continue // continue if interrupted
MOVD $0, R0 // reset R0 for pre-go1.8 compilers
RET

16
crypto/sha3/shake.go → vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/sha3/shake.go generated vendored
View File

@ -38,12 +38,22 @@ func (d *state) Clone() ShakeHash {
// NewShake128 creates a new SHAKE128 variable-output-length ShakeHash.
// Its generic security strength is 128 bits against all attacks if at
// least 32 bytes of its output are used.
func NewShake128() ShakeHash { return &state{rate: 168, dsbyte: 0x1f} }
func NewShake128() ShakeHash {
if h := newShake128Asm(); h != nil {
return h
}
return &state{rate: 168, dsbyte: 0x1f}
}
// NewShake256 creates a new SHAKE128 variable-output-length ShakeHash.
// NewShake256 creates a new SHAKE256 variable-output-length ShakeHash.
// Its generic security strength is 256 bits against all attacks if
// at least 64 bytes of its output are used.
func NewShake256() ShakeHash { return &state{rate: 136, dsbyte: 0x1f} }
func NewShake256() ShakeHash {
if h := newShake256Asm(); h != nil {
return h
}
return &state{rate: 136, dsbyte: 0x1f}
}
// ShakeSum128 writes an arbitrary-length digest of data into hash.
func ShakeSum128(hash, data []byte) {

19
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/sha3/shake_generic.go generated vendored Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
// Copyright 2017 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
//+build gccgo appengine !s390x
package sha3
// newShake128Asm returns an assembly implementation of SHAKE-128 if available,
// otherwise it returns nil.
func newShake128Asm() ShakeHash {
return nil
}
// newShake256Asm returns an assembly implementation of SHAKE-256 if available,
// otherwise it returns nil.
func newShake256Asm() ShakeHash {
return nil
}

0
crypto/sha3/xor.go → vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/sha3/xor.go generated vendored
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0
crypto/sha3/xor_generic.go → vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/sha3/xor_generic.go generated vendored
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0
crypto/sha3/xor_unaligned.go → vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/sha3/xor_unaligned.go generated vendored
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24
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/certs.go generated vendored
View File

@ -44,7 +44,9 @@ type Signature struct {
const CertTimeInfinity = 1<<64 - 1
// An Certificate represents an OpenSSH certificate as defined in
// [PROTOCOL.certkeys]?rev=1.8.
// [PROTOCOL.certkeys]?rev=1.8. The Certificate type implements the
// PublicKey interface, so it can be unmarshaled using
// ParsePublicKey.
type Certificate struct {
Nonce []byte
Key PublicKey
@ -220,6 +222,11 @@ type openSSHCertSigner struct {
signer Signer
}
type algorithmOpenSSHCertSigner struct {
*openSSHCertSigner
algorithmSigner AlgorithmSigner
}
// NewCertSigner returns a Signer that signs with the given Certificate, whose
// private key is held by signer. It returns an error if the public key in cert
// doesn't match the key used by signer.
@ -228,7 +235,12 @@ func NewCertSigner(cert *Certificate, signer Signer) (Signer, error) {
return nil, errors.New("ssh: signer and cert have different public key")
}
return &openSSHCertSigner{cert, signer}, nil
if algorithmSigner, ok := signer.(AlgorithmSigner); ok {
return &algorithmOpenSSHCertSigner{
&openSSHCertSigner{cert, signer}, algorithmSigner}, nil
} else {
return &openSSHCertSigner{cert, signer}, nil
}
}
func (s *openSSHCertSigner) Sign(rand io.Reader, data []byte) (*Signature, error) {
@ -239,6 +251,10 @@ func (s *openSSHCertSigner) PublicKey() PublicKey {
return s.pub
}
func (s *algorithmOpenSSHCertSigner) SignWithAlgorithm(rand io.Reader, data []byte, algorithm string) (*Signature, error) {
return s.algorithmSigner.SignWithAlgorithm(rand, data, algorithm)
}
const sourceAddressCriticalOption = "source-address"
// CertChecker does the work of verifying a certificate. Its methods
@ -340,10 +356,10 @@ func (c *CertChecker) Authenticate(conn ConnMetadata, pubKey PublicKey) (*Permis
// the signature of the certificate.
func (c *CertChecker) CheckCert(principal string, cert *Certificate) error {
if c.IsRevoked != nil && c.IsRevoked(cert) {
return fmt.Errorf("ssh: certicate serial %d revoked", cert.Serial)
return fmt.Errorf("ssh: certificate serial %d revoked", cert.Serial)
}
for opt, _ := range cert.CriticalOptions {
for opt := range cert.CriticalOptions {
// sourceAddressCriticalOption will be enforced by
// serverAuthenticate
if opt == sourceAddressCriticalOption {

142
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/channel.go generated vendored
View File

@ -205,32 +205,32 @@ type channel struct {
// writePacket sends a packet. If the packet is a channel close, it updates
// sentClose. This method takes the lock c.writeMu.
func (c *channel) writePacket(packet []byte) error {
c.writeMu.Lock()
if c.sentClose {
c.writeMu.Unlock()
func (ch *channel) writePacket(packet []byte) error {
ch.writeMu.Lock()
if ch.sentClose {
ch.writeMu.Unlock()
return io.EOF
}
c.sentClose = (packet[0] == msgChannelClose)
err := c.mux.conn.writePacket(packet)
c.writeMu.Unlock()
ch.sentClose = (packet[0] == msgChannelClose)
err := ch.mux.conn.writePacket(packet)
ch.writeMu.Unlock()
return err
}
func (c *channel) sendMessage(msg interface{}) error {
func (ch *channel) sendMessage(msg interface{}) error {
if debugMux {
log.Printf("send(%d): %#v", c.mux.chanList.offset, msg)
log.Printf("send(%d): %#v", ch.mux.chanList.offset, msg)
}
p := Marshal(msg)
binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(p[1:], c.remoteId)
return c.writePacket(p)
binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(p[1:], ch.remoteId)
return ch.writePacket(p)
}
// WriteExtended writes data to a specific extended stream. These streams are
// used, for example, for stderr.
func (c *channel) WriteExtended(data []byte, extendedCode uint32) (n int, err error) {
if c.sentEOF {
func (ch *channel) WriteExtended(data []byte, extendedCode uint32) (n int, err error) {
if ch.sentEOF {
return 0, io.EOF
}
// 1 byte message type, 4 bytes remoteId, 4 bytes data length
@ -241,16 +241,16 @@ func (c *channel) WriteExtended(data []byte, extendedCode uint32) (n int, err er
opCode = msgChannelExtendedData
}
c.writeMu.Lock()
packet := c.packetPool[extendedCode]
ch.writeMu.Lock()
packet := ch.packetPool[extendedCode]
// We don't remove the buffer from packetPool, so
// WriteExtended calls from different goroutines will be
// flagged as errors by the race detector.
c.writeMu.Unlock()
ch.writeMu.Unlock()
for len(data) > 0 {
space := min(c.maxRemotePayload, len(data))
if space, err = c.remoteWin.reserve(space); err != nil {
space := min(ch.maxRemotePayload, len(data))
if space, err = ch.remoteWin.reserve(space); err != nil {
return n, err
}
if want := headerLength + space; uint32(cap(packet)) < want {
@ -262,13 +262,13 @@ func (c *channel) WriteExtended(data []byte, extendedCode uint32) (n int, err er
todo := data[:space]
packet[0] = opCode
binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(packet[1:], c.remoteId)
binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(packet[1:], ch.remoteId)
if extendedCode > 0 {
binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(packet[5:], uint32(extendedCode))
}
binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(packet[headerLength-4:], uint32(len(todo)))
copy(packet[headerLength:], todo)
if err = c.writePacket(packet); err != nil {
if err = ch.writePacket(packet); err != nil {
return n, err
}
@ -276,14 +276,14 @@ func (c *channel) WriteExtended(data []byte, extendedCode uint32) (n int, err er
data = data[len(todo):]
}
c.writeMu.Lock()
c.packetPool[extendedCode] = packet
c.writeMu.Unlock()
ch.writeMu.Lock()
ch.packetPool[extendedCode] = packet
ch.writeMu.Unlock()
return n, err
}
func (c *channel) handleData(packet []byte) error {
func (ch *channel) handleData(packet []byte) error {
headerLen := 9
isExtendedData := packet[0] == msgChannelExtendedData
if isExtendedData {
@ -303,7 +303,7 @@ func (c *channel) handleData(packet []byte) error {
if length == 0 {
return nil
}
if length > c.maxIncomingPayload {
if length > ch.maxIncomingPayload {
// TODO(hanwen): should send Disconnect?
return errors.New("ssh: incoming packet exceeds maximum payload size")
}
@ -313,21 +313,21 @@ func (c *channel) handleData(packet []byte) error {
return errors.New("ssh: wrong packet length")
}
c.windowMu.Lock()
if c.myWindow < length {
c.windowMu.Unlock()
ch.windowMu.Lock()
if ch.myWindow < length {
ch.windowMu.Unlock()
// TODO(hanwen): should send Disconnect with reason?
return errors.New("ssh: remote side wrote too much")
}
c.myWindow -= length
c.windowMu.Unlock()
ch.myWindow -= length
ch.windowMu.Unlock()
if extended == 1 {
c.extPending.write(data)
ch.extPending.write(data)
} else if extended > 0 {
// discard other extended data.
} else {
c.pending.write(data)
ch.pending.write(data)
}
return nil
}
@ -384,31 +384,31 @@ func (c *channel) close() {
// responseMessageReceived is called when a success or failure message is
// received on a channel to check that such a message is reasonable for the
// given channel.
func (c *channel) responseMessageReceived() error {
if c.direction == channelInbound {
func (ch *channel) responseMessageReceived() error {
if ch.direction == channelInbound {
return errors.New("ssh: channel response message received on inbound channel")
}
if c.decided {
if ch.decided {
return errors.New("ssh: duplicate response received for channel")
}
c.decided = true
ch.decided = true
return nil
}
func (c *channel) handlePacket(packet []byte) error {
func (ch *channel) handlePacket(packet []byte) error {
switch packet[0] {
case msgChannelData, msgChannelExtendedData:
return c.handleData(packet)
return ch.handleData(packet)
case msgChannelClose:
c.sendMessage(channelCloseMsg{PeersId: c.remoteId})
c.mux.chanList.remove(c.localId)
c.close()
ch.sendMessage(channelCloseMsg{PeersID: ch.remoteId})
ch.mux.chanList.remove(ch.localId)
ch.close()
return nil
case msgChannelEOF:
// RFC 4254 is mute on how EOF affects dataExt messages but
// it is logical to signal EOF at the same time.
c.extPending.eof()
c.pending.eof()
ch.extPending.eof()
ch.pending.eof()
return nil
}
@ -419,24 +419,24 @@ func (c *channel) handlePacket(packet []byte) error {
switch msg := decoded.(type) {
case *channelOpenFailureMsg:
if err := c.responseMessageReceived(); err != nil {
if err := ch.responseMessageReceived(); err != nil {
return err
}
c.mux.chanList.remove(msg.PeersId)
c.msg <- msg
ch.mux.chanList.remove(msg.PeersID)
ch.msg <- msg
case *channelOpenConfirmMsg:
if err := c.responseMessageReceived(); err != nil {
if err := ch.responseMessageReceived(); err != nil {
return err
}
if msg.MaxPacketSize < minPacketLength || msg.MaxPacketSize > 1<<31 {
return fmt.Errorf("ssh: invalid MaxPacketSize %d from peer", msg.MaxPacketSize)
}
c.remoteId = msg.MyId
c.maxRemotePayload = msg.MaxPacketSize
c.remoteWin.add(msg.MyWindow)
c.msg <- msg
ch.remoteId = msg.MyID
ch.maxRemotePayload = msg.MaxPacketSize
ch.remoteWin.add(msg.MyWindow)
ch.msg <- msg
case *windowAdjustMsg:
if !c.remoteWin.add(msg.AdditionalBytes) {
if !ch.remoteWin.add(msg.AdditionalBytes) {
return fmt.Errorf("ssh: invalid window update for %d bytes", msg.AdditionalBytes)
}
case *channelRequestMsg:
@ -444,12 +444,12 @@ func (c *channel) handlePacket(packet []byte) error {
Type: msg.Request,
WantReply: msg.WantReply,
Payload: msg.RequestSpecificData,
ch: c,
ch: ch,
}
c.incomingRequests <- &req
ch.incomingRequests <- &req
default:
c.msg <- msg
ch.msg <- msg
}
return nil
}
@ -488,23 +488,23 @@ func (e *extChannel) Read(data []byte) (n int, err error) {
return e.ch.ReadExtended(data, e.code)
}
func (c *channel) Accept() (Channel, <-chan *Request, error) {
if c.decided {
func (ch *channel) Accept() (Channel, <-chan *Request, error) {
if ch.decided {
return nil, nil, errDecidedAlready
}
c.maxIncomingPayload = channelMaxPacket
ch.maxIncomingPayload = channelMaxPacket
confirm := channelOpenConfirmMsg{
PeersId: c.remoteId,
MyId: c.localId,
MyWindow: c.myWindow,
MaxPacketSize: c.maxIncomingPayload,
PeersID: ch.remoteId,
MyID: ch.localId,
MyWindow: ch.myWindow,
MaxPacketSize: ch.maxIncomingPayload,
}
c.decided = true
if err := c.sendMessage(confirm); err != nil {
ch.decided = true
if err := ch.sendMessage(confirm); err != nil {
return nil, nil, err
}
return c, c.incomingRequests, nil
return ch, ch.incomingRequests, nil
}
func (ch *channel) Reject(reason RejectionReason, message string) error {
@ -512,7 +512,7 @@ func (ch *channel) Reject(reason RejectionReason, message string) error {
return errDecidedAlready
}
reject := channelOpenFailureMsg{
PeersId: ch.remoteId,
PeersID: ch.remoteId,
Reason: reason,
Message: message,
Language: "en",
@ -541,7 +541,7 @@ func (ch *channel) CloseWrite() error {
}
ch.sentEOF = true
return ch.sendMessage(channelEOFMsg{
PeersId: ch.remoteId})
PeersID: ch.remoteId})
}
func (ch *channel) Close() error {
@ -550,7 +550,7 @@ func (ch *channel) Close() error {
}
return ch.sendMessage(channelCloseMsg{
PeersId: ch.remoteId})
PeersID: ch.remoteId})
}
// Extended returns an io.ReadWriter that sends and receives data on the given,
@ -577,7 +577,7 @@ func (ch *channel) SendRequest(name string, wantReply bool, payload []byte) (boo
}
msg := channelRequestMsg{
PeersId: ch.remoteId,
PeersID: ch.remoteId,
Request: name,
WantReply: wantReply,
RequestSpecificData: payload,
@ -614,11 +614,11 @@ func (ch *channel) ackRequest(ok bool) error {
var msg interface{}
if !ok {
msg = channelRequestFailureMsg{
PeersId: ch.remoteId,
PeersID: ch.remoteId,
}
} else {
msg = channelRequestSuccessMsg{
PeersId: ch.remoteId,
PeersID: ch.remoteId,
}
}
return ch.sendMessage(msg)

251
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/cipher.go generated vendored
View File

@ -16,6 +16,10 @@ import (
"hash"
"io"
"io/ioutil"
"math/bits"
"golang.org/x/crypto/internal/chacha20"
"golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305"
)
const (
@ -53,78 +57,78 @@ func newRC4(key, iv []byte) (cipher.Stream, error) {
return rc4.NewCipher(key)
}
type streamCipherMode struct {
keySize int
ivSize int
skip int
createFunc func(key, iv []byte) (cipher.Stream, error)
type cipherMode struct {
keySize int
ivSize int
create func(key, iv []byte, macKey []byte, algs directionAlgorithms) (packetCipher, error)
}
func (c *streamCipherMode) createStream(key, iv []byte) (cipher.Stream, error) {
if len(key) < c.keySize {
panic("ssh: key length too small for cipher")
}
if len(iv) < c.ivSize {
panic("ssh: iv too small for cipher")
}
stream, err := c.createFunc(key[:c.keySize], iv[:c.ivSize])
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
var streamDump []byte
if c.skip > 0 {
streamDump = make([]byte, 512)
}
for remainingToDump := c.skip; remainingToDump > 0; {
dumpThisTime := remainingToDump
if dumpThisTime > len(streamDump) {
dumpThisTime = len(streamDump)
func streamCipherMode(skip int, createFunc func(key, iv []byte) (cipher.Stream, error)) func(key, iv []byte, macKey []byte, algs directionAlgorithms) (packetCipher, error) {
return func(key, iv, macKey []byte, algs directionAlgorithms) (packetCipher, error) {
stream, err := createFunc(key, iv)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
stream.XORKeyStream(streamDump[:dumpThisTime], streamDump[:dumpThisTime])
remainingToDump -= dumpThisTime
}
return stream, nil
var streamDump []byte
if skip > 0 {
streamDump = make([]byte, 512)
}
for remainingToDump := skip; remainingToDump > 0; {
dumpThisTime := remainingToDump
if dumpThisTime > len(streamDump) {
dumpThisTime = len(streamDump)
}
stream.XORKeyStream(streamDump[:dumpThisTime], streamDump[:dumpThisTime])
remainingToDump -= dumpThisTime
}
mac := macModes[algs.MAC].new(macKey)
return &streamPacketCipher{
mac: mac,
etm: macModes[algs.MAC].etm,
macResult: make([]byte, mac.Size()),
cipher: stream,
}, nil
}
}
// cipherModes documents properties of supported ciphers. Ciphers not included
// are not supported and will not be negotiated, even if explicitly requested in
// ClientConfig.Crypto.Ciphers.
var cipherModes = map[string]*streamCipherMode{
var cipherModes = map[string]*cipherMode{
// Ciphers from RFC4344, which introduced many CTR-based ciphers. Algorithms
// are defined in the order specified in the RFC.
"aes128-ctr": {16, aes.BlockSize, 0, newAESCTR},
"aes192-ctr": {24, aes.BlockSize, 0, newAESCTR},
"aes256-ctr": {32, aes.BlockSize, 0, newAESCTR},
"aes128-ctr": {16, aes.BlockSize, streamCipherMode(0, newAESCTR)},
"aes192-ctr": {24, aes.BlockSize, streamCipherMode(0, newAESCTR)},
"aes256-ctr": {32, aes.BlockSize, streamCipherMode(0, newAESCTR)},
// Ciphers from RFC4345, which introduces security-improved arcfour ciphers.
// They are defined in the order specified in the RFC.
"arcfour128": {16, 0, 1536, newRC4},
"arcfour256": {32, 0, 1536, newRC4},
"arcfour128": {16, 0, streamCipherMode(1536, newRC4)},
"arcfour256": {32, 0, streamCipherMode(1536, newRC4)},
// Cipher defined in RFC 4253, which describes SSH Transport Layer Protocol.
// Note that this cipher is not safe, as stated in RFC 4253: "Arcfour (and
// RC4) has problems with weak keys, and should be used with caution."
// RFC4345 introduces improved versions of Arcfour.
"arcfour": {16, 0, 0, newRC4},
"arcfour": {16, 0, streamCipherMode(0, newRC4)},
// AES-GCM is not a stream cipher, so it is constructed with a
// special case. If we add any more non-stream ciphers, we
// should invest a cleaner way to do this.
gcmCipherID: {16, 12, 0, nil},
// AEAD ciphers
gcmCipherID: {16, 12, newGCMCipher},
chacha20Poly1305ID: {64, 0, newChaCha20Cipher},
// CBC mode is insecure and so is not included in the default config.
// (See http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/~kp/SandPfinal.pdf). If absolutely
// needed, it's possible to specify a custom Config to enable it.
// You should expect that an active attacker can recover plaintext if
// you do.
aes128cbcID: {16, aes.BlockSize, 0, nil},
aes128cbcID: {16, aes.BlockSize, newAESCBCCipher},
// 3des-cbc is insecure and is disabled by default.
tripledescbcID: {24, des.BlockSize, 0, nil},
// 3des-cbc is insecure and is not included in the default
// config.
tripledescbcID: {24, des.BlockSize, newTripleDESCBCCipher},
}
// prefixLen is the length of the packet prefix that contains the packet length
@ -304,7 +308,7 @@ type gcmCipher struct {
buf []byte
}
func newGCMCipher(iv, key []byte) (packetCipher, error) {
func newGCMCipher(key, iv, unusedMacKey []byte, unusedAlgs directionAlgorithms) (packetCipher, error) {
c, err := aes.NewCipher(key)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
@ -372,7 +376,7 @@ func (c *gcmCipher) readPacket(seqNum uint32, r io.Reader) ([]byte, error) {
}
length := binary.BigEndian.Uint32(c.prefix[:])
if length > maxPacket {
return nil, errors.New("ssh: max packet length exceeded.")
return nil, errors.New("ssh: max packet length exceeded")
}
if cap(c.buf) < int(length+gcmTagSize) {
@ -422,7 +426,7 @@ type cbcCipher struct {
oracleCamouflage uint32
}
func newCBCCipher(c cipher.Block, iv, key, macKey []byte, algs directionAlgorithms) (packetCipher, error) {
func newCBCCipher(c cipher.Block, key, iv, macKey []byte, algs directionAlgorithms) (packetCipher, error) {
cbc := &cbcCipher{
mac: macModes[algs.MAC].new(macKey),
decrypter: cipher.NewCBCDecrypter(c, iv),
@ -436,13 +440,13 @@ func newCBCCipher(c cipher.Block, iv, key, macKey []byte, algs directionAlgorith
return cbc, nil
}
func newAESCBCCipher(iv, key, macKey []byte, algs directionAlgorithms) (packetCipher, error) {
func newAESCBCCipher(key, iv, macKey []byte, algs directionAlgorithms) (packetCipher, error) {
c, err := aes.NewCipher(key)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
cbc, err := newCBCCipher(c, iv, key, macKey, algs)
cbc, err := newCBCCipher(c, key, iv, macKey, algs)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
@ -450,13 +454,13 @@ func newAESCBCCipher(iv, key, macKey []byte, algs directionAlgorithms) (packetCi
return cbc, nil
}
func newTripleDESCBCCipher(iv, key, macKey []byte, algs directionAlgorithms) (packetCipher, error) {
func newTripleDESCBCCipher(key, iv, macKey []byte, algs directionAlgorithms) (packetCipher, error) {
c, err := des.NewTripleDESCipher(key)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
cbc, err := newCBCCipher(c, iv, key, macKey, algs)
cbc, err := newCBCCipher(c, key, iv, macKey, algs)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
@ -548,11 +552,11 @@ func (c *cbcCipher) readPacketLeaky(seqNum uint32, r io.Reader) ([]byte, error)
c.packetData = c.packetData[:entirePacketSize]
}
if n, err := io.ReadFull(r, c.packetData[firstBlockLength:]); err != nil {
n, err := io.ReadFull(r, c.packetData[firstBlockLength:])
if err != nil {
return nil, err
} else {
c.oracleCamouflage -= uint32(n)
}
c.oracleCamouflage -= uint32(n)
remainingCrypted := c.packetData[firstBlockLength:macStart]
c.decrypter.CryptBlocks(remainingCrypted, remainingCrypted)
@ -627,3 +631,140 @@ func (c *cbcCipher) writePacket(seqNum uint32, w io.Writer, rand io.Reader, pack
return nil
}
const chacha20Poly1305ID = "chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com"
// chacha20Poly1305Cipher implements the chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com
// AEAD, which is described here:
//
// https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-josefsson-ssh-chacha20-poly1305-openssh-00
//
// the methods here also implement padding, which RFC4253 Section 6
// also requires of stream ciphers.
type chacha20Poly1305Cipher struct {
lengthKey [8]uint32
contentKey [8]uint32
buf []byte
}
func newChaCha20Cipher(key, unusedIV, unusedMACKey []byte, unusedAlgs directionAlgorithms) (packetCipher, error) {
if len(key) != 64 {
panic(len(key))
}
c := &chacha20Poly1305Cipher{
buf: make([]byte, 256),
}
for i := range c.contentKey {
c.contentKey[i] = binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[i*4 : (i+1)*4])
}
for i := range c.lengthKey {
c.lengthKey[i] = binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[(i+8)*4 : (i+9)*4])
}
return c, nil
}
func (c *chacha20Poly1305Cipher) readPacket(seqNum uint32, r io.Reader) ([]byte, error) {
nonce := [3]uint32{0, 0, bits.ReverseBytes32(seqNum)}
s := chacha20.New(c.contentKey, nonce)
var polyKey [32]byte
s.XORKeyStream(polyKey[:], polyKey[:])
s.Advance() // skip next 32 bytes
encryptedLength := c.buf[:4]
if _, err := io.ReadFull(r, encryptedLength); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
var lenBytes [4]byte
chacha20.New(c.lengthKey, nonce).XORKeyStream(lenBytes[:], encryptedLength)
length := binary.BigEndian.Uint32(lenBytes[:])
if length > maxPacket {
return nil, errors.New("ssh: invalid packet length, packet too large")
}
contentEnd := 4 + length
packetEnd := contentEnd + poly1305.TagSize
if uint32(cap(c.buf)) < packetEnd {
c.buf = make([]byte, packetEnd)
copy(c.buf[:], encryptedLength)
} else {
c.buf = c.buf[:packetEnd]
}
if _, err := io.ReadFull(r, c.buf[4:packetEnd]); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
var mac [poly1305.TagSize]byte
copy(mac[:], c.buf[contentEnd:packetEnd])
if !poly1305.Verify(&mac, c.buf[:contentEnd], &polyKey) {
return nil, errors.New("ssh: MAC failure")
}
plain := c.buf[4:contentEnd]
s.XORKeyStream(plain, plain)
padding := plain[0]
if padding < 4 {
// padding is a byte, so it automatically satisfies
// the maximum size, which is 255.
return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: illegal padding %d", padding)
}
if int(padding)+1 >= len(plain) {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: padding %d too large", padding)
}
plain = plain[1 : len(plain)-int(padding)]
return plain, nil
}
func (c *chacha20Poly1305Cipher) writePacket(seqNum uint32, w io.Writer, rand io.Reader, payload []byte) error {
nonce := [3]uint32{0, 0, bits.ReverseBytes32(seqNum)}
s := chacha20.New(c.contentKey, nonce)
var polyKey [32]byte
s.XORKeyStream(polyKey[:], polyKey[:])
s.Advance() // skip next 32 bytes
// There is no blocksize, so fall back to multiple of 8 byte
// padding, as described in RFC 4253, Sec 6.
const packetSizeMultiple = 8
padding := packetSizeMultiple - (1+len(payload))%packetSizeMultiple
if padding < 4 {
padding += packetSizeMultiple
}
// size (4 bytes), padding (1), payload, padding, tag.
totalLength := 4 + 1 + len(payload) + padding + poly1305.TagSize
if cap(c.buf) < totalLength {
c.buf = make([]byte, totalLength)
} else {
c.buf = c.buf[:totalLength]
}
binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(c.buf, uint32(1+len(payload)+padding))
chacha20.New(c.lengthKey, nonce).XORKeyStream(c.buf, c.buf[:4])
c.buf[4] = byte(padding)
copy(c.buf[5:], payload)
packetEnd := 5 + len(payload) + padding
if _, err := io.ReadFull(rand, c.buf[5+len(payload):packetEnd]); err != nil {
return err
}
s.XORKeyStream(c.buf[4:], c.buf[4:packetEnd])
var mac [poly1305.TagSize]byte
poly1305.Sum(&mac, c.buf[:packetEnd], &polyKey)
copy(c.buf[packetEnd:], mac[:])
if _, err := w.Write(c.buf); err != nil {
return err
}
return nil
}

27
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/client.go generated vendored
View File

@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ import (
"errors"
"fmt"
"net"
"os"
"sync"
"time"
)
@ -18,6 +19,8 @@ import (
type Client struct {
Conn
handleForwardsOnce sync.Once // guards calling (*Client).handleForwards
forwards forwardList // forwarded tcpip connections from the remote side
mu sync.Mutex
channelHandlers map[string]chan NewChannel
@ -59,8 +62,6 @@ func NewClient(c Conn, chans <-chan NewChannel, reqs <-chan *Request) *Client {
conn.Wait()
conn.forwards.closeAll()
}()
go conn.forwards.handleChannels(conn.HandleChannelOpen("forwarded-tcpip"))
go conn.forwards.handleChannels(conn.HandleChannelOpen("forwarded-streamlocal@openssh.com"))
return conn
}
@ -184,9 +185,13 @@ func Dial(network, addr string, config *ClientConfig) (*Client, error) {
// keys. A HostKeyCallback must return nil if the host key is OK, or
// an error to reject it. It receives the hostname as passed to Dial
// or NewClientConn. The remote address is the RemoteAddr of the
// net.Conn underlying the the SSH connection.
// net.Conn underlying the SSH connection.
type HostKeyCallback func(hostname string, remote net.Addr, key PublicKey) error
// BannerCallback is the function type used for treat the banner sent by
// the server. A BannerCallback receives the message sent by the remote server.
type BannerCallback func(message string) error
// A ClientConfig structure is used to configure a Client. It must not be
// modified after having been passed to an SSH function.
type ClientConfig struct {
@ -209,6 +214,12 @@ type ClientConfig struct {
// FixedHostKey can be used for simplistic host key checks.
HostKeyCallback HostKeyCallback
// BannerCallback is called during the SSH dance to display a custom
// server's message. The client configuration can supply this callback to
// handle it as wished. The function BannerDisplayStderr can be used for
// simplistic display on Stderr.
BannerCallback BannerCallback
// ClientVersion contains the version identification string that will
// be used for the connection. If empty, a reasonable default is used.
ClientVersion string
@ -255,3 +266,13 @@ func FixedHostKey(key PublicKey) HostKeyCallback {
hk := &fixedHostKey{key}
return hk.check
}
// BannerDisplayStderr returns a function that can be used for
// ClientConfig.BannerCallback to display banners on os.Stderr.
func BannerDisplayStderr() BannerCallback {
return func(banner string) error {
_, err := os.Stderr.WriteString(banner)
return err
}
}

121
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/client_auth.go generated vendored
View File

@ -11,6 +11,14 @@ import (
"io"
)
type authResult int
const (
authFailure authResult = iota
authPartialSuccess
authSuccess
)
// clientAuthenticate authenticates with the remote server. See RFC 4252.
func (c *connection) clientAuthenticate(config *ClientConfig) error {
// initiate user auth session
@ -37,11 +45,12 @@ func (c *connection) clientAuthenticate(config *ClientConfig) error {
if err != nil {
return err
}
if ok {
if ok == authSuccess {
// success
return nil
} else if ok == authFailure {
tried[auth.method()] = true
}
tried[auth.method()] = true
if methods == nil {
methods = lastMethods
}
@ -82,7 +91,7 @@ type AuthMethod interface {
// If authentication is not successful, a []string of alternative
// method names is returned. If the slice is nil, it will be ignored
// and the previous set of possible methods will be reused.
auth(session []byte, user string, p packetConn, rand io.Reader) (bool, []string, error)
auth(session []byte, user string, p packetConn, rand io.Reader) (authResult, []string, error)
// method returns the RFC 4252 method name.
method() string
@ -91,13 +100,13 @@ type AuthMethod interface {
// "none" authentication, RFC 4252 section 5.2.
type noneAuth int
func (n *noneAuth) auth(session []byte, user string, c packetConn, rand io.Reader) (bool, []string, error) {
func (n *noneAuth) auth(session []byte, user string, c packetConn, rand io.Reader) (authResult, []string, error) {
if err := c.writePacket(Marshal(&userAuthRequestMsg{
User: user,
Service: serviceSSH,
Method: "none",
})); err != nil {
return false, nil, err
return authFailure, nil, err
}
return handleAuthResponse(c)
@ -111,7 +120,7 @@ func (n *noneAuth) method() string {
// a function call, e.g. by prompting the user.
type passwordCallback func() (password string, err error)
func (cb passwordCallback) auth(session []byte, user string, c packetConn, rand io.Reader) (bool, []string, error) {
func (cb passwordCallback) auth(session []byte, user string, c packetConn, rand io.Reader) (authResult, []string, error) {
type passwordAuthMsg struct {
User string `sshtype:"50"`
Service string
@ -125,7 +134,7 @@ func (cb passwordCallback) auth(session []byte, user string, c packetConn, rand
// The program may only find out that the user doesn't have a password
// when prompting.
if err != nil {
return false, nil, err
return authFailure, nil, err
}
if err := c.writePacket(Marshal(&passwordAuthMsg{
@ -135,7 +144,7 @@ func (cb passwordCallback) auth(session []byte, user string, c packetConn, rand
Reply: false,
Password: pw,
})); err != nil {
return false, nil, err
return authFailure, nil, err
}
return handleAuthResponse(c)
@ -178,7 +187,7 @@ func (cb publicKeyCallback) method() string {
return "publickey"
}
func (cb publicKeyCallback) auth(session []byte, user string, c packetConn, rand io.Reader) (bool, []string, error) {
func (cb publicKeyCallback) auth(session []byte, user string, c packetConn, rand io.Reader) (authResult, []string, error) {
// Authentication is performed by sending an enquiry to test if a key is
// acceptable to the remote. If the key is acceptable, the client will
// attempt to authenticate with the valid key. If not the client will repeat
@ -186,13 +195,13 @@ func (cb publicKeyCallback) auth(session []byte, user string, c packetConn, rand
signers, err := cb()
if err != nil {
return false, nil, err
return authFailure, nil, err
}
var methods []string
for _, signer := range signers {
ok, err := validateKey(signer.PublicKey(), user, c)
if err != nil {
return false, nil, err
return authFailure, nil, err
}
if !ok {
continue
@ -206,7 +215,7 @@ func (cb publicKeyCallback) auth(session []byte, user string, c packetConn, rand
Method: cb.method(),
}, []byte(pub.Type()), pubKey))
if err != nil {
return false, nil, err
return authFailure, nil, err
}
// manually wrap the serialized signature in a string
@ -224,24 +233,24 @@ func (cb publicKeyCallback) auth(session []byte, user string, c packetConn, rand
}
p := Marshal(&msg)
if err := c.writePacket(p); err != nil {
return false, nil, err
return authFailure, nil, err
}
var success bool
var success authResult
success, methods, err = handleAuthResponse(c)
if err != nil {
return false, nil, err
return authFailure, nil, err
}
// If authentication succeeds or the list of available methods does not
// contain the "publickey" method, do not attempt to authenticate with any
// other keys. According to RFC 4252 Section 7, the latter can occur when
// additional authentication methods are required.
if success || !containsMethod(methods, cb.method()) {
if success == authSuccess || !containsMethod(methods, cb.method()) {
return success, methods, err
}
}
return false, methods, nil
return authFailure, methods, nil
}
func containsMethod(methods []string, method string) bool {
@ -283,7 +292,9 @@ func confirmKeyAck(key PublicKey, c packetConn) (bool, error) {
}
switch packet[0] {
case msgUserAuthBanner:
// TODO(gpaul): add callback to present the banner to the user
if err := handleBannerResponse(c, packet); err != nil {
return false, err
}
case msgUserAuthPubKeyOk:
var msg userAuthPubKeyOkMsg
if err := Unmarshal(packet, &msg); err != nil {
@ -316,30 +327,53 @@ func PublicKeysCallback(getSigners func() (signers []Signer, err error)) AuthMet
// handleAuthResponse returns whether the preceding authentication request succeeded
// along with a list of remaining authentication methods to try next and
// an error if an unexpected response was received.
func handleAuthResponse(c packetConn) (bool, []string, error) {
func handleAuthResponse(c packetConn) (authResult, []string, error) {
for {
packet, err := c.readPacket()
if err != nil {
return false, nil, err
return authFailure, nil, err
}
switch packet[0] {
case msgUserAuthBanner:
// TODO: add callback to present the banner to the user
if err := handleBannerResponse(c, packet); err != nil {
return authFailure, nil, err
}
case msgUserAuthFailure:
var msg userAuthFailureMsg
if err := Unmarshal(packet, &msg); err != nil {
return false, nil, err
return authFailure, nil, err
}
return false, msg.Methods, nil
if msg.PartialSuccess {
return authPartialSuccess, msg.Methods, nil
}
return authFailure, msg.Methods, nil
case msgUserAuthSuccess:
return true, nil, nil
return authSuccess, nil, nil
default:
return false, nil, unexpectedMessageError(msgUserAuthSuccess, packet[0])
return authFailure, nil, unexpectedMessageError(msgUserAuthSuccess, packet[0])
}
}
}
func handleBannerResponse(c packetConn, packet []byte) error {
var msg userAuthBannerMsg
if err := Unmarshal(packet, &msg); err != nil {
return err
}
transport, ok := c.(*handshakeTransport)
if !ok {
return nil
}
if transport.bannerCallback != nil {
return transport.bannerCallback(msg.Message)
}
return nil
}
// KeyboardInteractiveChallenge should print questions, optionally
// disabling echoing (e.g. for passwords), and return all the answers.
// Challenge may be called multiple times in a single session. After
@ -359,7 +393,7 @@ func (cb KeyboardInteractiveChallenge) method() string {
return "keyboard-interactive"
}
func (cb KeyboardInteractiveChallenge) auth(session []byte, user string, c packetConn, rand io.Reader) (bool, []string, error) {
func (cb KeyboardInteractiveChallenge) auth(session []byte, user string, c packetConn, rand io.Reader) (authResult, []string, error) {
type initiateMsg struct {
User string `sshtype:"50"`
Service string
@ -373,37 +407,42 @@ func (cb KeyboardInteractiveChallenge) auth(session []byte, user string, c packe
Service: serviceSSH,
Method: "keyboard-interactive",
})); err != nil {
return false, nil, err
return authFailure, nil, err
}
for {
packet, err := c.readPacket()
if err != nil {
return false, nil, err
return authFailure, nil, err
}
// like handleAuthResponse, but with less options.
switch packet[0] {
case msgUserAuthBanner:
// TODO: Print banners during userauth.
if err := handleBannerResponse(c, packet); err != nil {
return authFailure, nil, err
}
continue
case msgUserAuthInfoRequest:
// OK
case msgUserAuthFailure:
var msg userAuthFailureMsg
if err := Unmarshal(packet, &msg); err != nil {
return false, nil, err
return authFailure, nil, err
}
return false, msg.Methods, nil
if msg.PartialSuccess {
return authPartialSuccess, msg.Methods, nil
}
return authFailure, msg.Methods, nil
case msgUserAuthSuccess:
return true, nil, nil
return authSuccess, nil, nil
default:
return false, nil, unexpectedMessageError(msgUserAuthInfoRequest, packet[0])
return authFailure, nil, unexpectedMessageError(msgUserAuthInfoRequest, packet[0])
}
var msg userAuthInfoRequestMsg
if err := Unmarshal(packet, &msg); err != nil {
return false, nil, err
return authFailure, nil, err
}
// Manually unpack the prompt/echo pairs.
@ -413,7 +452,7 @@ func (cb KeyboardInteractiveChallenge) auth(session []byte, user string, c packe
for i := 0; i < int(msg.NumPrompts); i++ {
prompt, r, ok := parseString(rest)
if !ok || len(r) == 0 {
return false, nil, errors.New("ssh: prompt format error")
return authFailure, nil, errors.New("ssh: prompt format error")
}
prompts = append(prompts, string(prompt))
echos = append(echos, r[0] != 0)
@ -421,16 +460,16 @@ func (cb KeyboardInteractiveChallenge) auth(session []byte, user string, c packe
}
if len(rest) != 0 {
return false, nil, errors.New("ssh: extra data following keyboard-interactive pairs")
return authFailure, nil, errors.New("ssh: extra data following keyboard-interactive pairs")
}
answers, err := cb(msg.User, msg.Instruction, prompts, echos)
if err != nil {
return false, nil, err
return authFailure, nil, err
}
if len(answers) != len(prompts) {
return false, nil, errors.New("ssh: not enough answers from keyboard-interactive callback")
return authFailure, nil, errors.New("ssh: not enough answers from keyboard-interactive callback")
}
responseLength := 1 + 4
for _, a := range answers {
@ -446,7 +485,7 @@ func (cb KeyboardInteractiveChallenge) auth(session []byte, user string, c packe
}
if err := c.writePacket(serialized); err != nil {
return false, nil, err
return authFailure, nil, err
}
}
}
@ -456,10 +495,10 @@ type retryableAuthMethod struct {
maxTries int
}
func (r *retryableAuthMethod) auth(session []byte, user string, c packetConn, rand io.Reader) (ok bool, methods []string, err error) {
func (r *retryableAuthMethod) auth(session []byte, user string, c packetConn, rand io.Reader) (ok authResult, methods []string, err error) {
for i := 0; r.maxTries <= 0 || i < r.maxTries; i++ {
ok, methods, err = r.authMethod.auth(session, user, c, rand)
if ok || err != nil { // either success or error terminate
if ok != authFailure || err != nil { // either success, partial success or error terminate
return ok, methods, err
}
}

20
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/common.go generated vendored
View File

@ -24,11 +24,21 @@ const (
serviceSSH = "ssh-connection"
)
// supportedCiphers specifies the supported ciphers in preference order.
// supportedCiphers lists ciphers we support but might not recommend.
var supportedCiphers = []string{
"aes128-ctr", "aes192-ctr", "aes256-ctr",
"aes128-gcm@openssh.com",
"arcfour256", "arcfour128",
chacha20Poly1305ID,
"arcfour256", "arcfour128", "arcfour",
aes128cbcID,
tripledescbcID,
}
// preferredCiphers specifies the default preference for ciphers.
var preferredCiphers = []string{
"aes128-gcm@openssh.com",
chacha20Poly1305ID,
"aes128-ctr", "aes192-ctr", "aes256-ctr",
}
// supportedKexAlgos specifies the supported key-exchange algorithms in
@ -211,7 +221,7 @@ func (c *Config) SetDefaults() {
c.Rand = rand.Reader
}
if c.Ciphers == nil {
c.Ciphers = supportedCiphers
c.Ciphers = preferredCiphers
}
var ciphers []string
for _, c := range c.Ciphers {
@ -242,7 +252,7 @@ func (c *Config) SetDefaults() {
// buildDataSignedForAuth returns the data that is signed in order to prove
// possession of a private key. See RFC 4252, section 7.
func buildDataSignedForAuth(sessionId []byte, req userAuthRequestMsg, algo, pubKey []byte) []byte {
func buildDataSignedForAuth(sessionID []byte, req userAuthRequestMsg, algo, pubKey []byte) []byte {
data := struct {
Session []byte
Type byte
@ -253,7 +263,7 @@ func buildDataSignedForAuth(sessionId []byte, req userAuthRequestMsg, algo, pubK
Algo []byte
PubKey []byte
}{
sessionId,
sessionID,
msgUserAuthRequest,
req.User,
req.Service,

6
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/handshake.go generated vendored
View File

@ -78,6 +78,11 @@ type handshakeTransport struct {
dialAddress string
remoteAddr net.Addr
// bannerCallback is non-empty if we are the client and it has been set in
// ClientConfig. In that case it is called during the user authentication
// dance to handle a custom server's message.
bannerCallback BannerCallback
// Algorithms agreed in the last key exchange.
algorithms *algorithms
@ -120,6 +125,7 @@ func newClientTransport(conn keyingTransport, clientVersion, serverVersion []byt
t.dialAddress = dialAddr
t.remoteAddr = addr
t.hostKeyCallback = config.HostKeyCallback
t.bannerCallback = config.BannerCallback
if config.HostKeyAlgorithms != nil {
t.hostKeyAlgorithms = config.HostKeyAlgorithms
} else {

24
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/kex.go generated vendored
View File

@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ func (group *dhGroup) Client(c packetConn, randSource io.Reader, magics *handsha
return nil, err
}
kInt, err := group.diffieHellman(kexDHReply.Y, x)
ki, err := group.diffieHellman(kexDHReply.Y, x)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
@ -129,8 +129,8 @@ func (group *dhGroup) Client(c packetConn, randSource io.Reader, magics *handsha
writeString(h, kexDHReply.HostKey)
writeInt(h, X)
writeInt(h, kexDHReply.Y)
K := make([]byte, intLength(kInt))
marshalInt(K, kInt)
K := make([]byte, intLength(ki))
marshalInt(K, ki)
h.Write(K)
return &kexResult{
@ -164,7 +164,7 @@ func (group *dhGroup) Server(c packetConn, randSource io.Reader, magics *handsha
}
Y := new(big.Int).Exp(group.g, y, group.p)
kInt, err := group.diffieHellman(kexDHInit.X, y)
ki, err := group.diffieHellman(kexDHInit.X, y)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
@ -177,8 +177,8 @@ func (group *dhGroup) Server(c packetConn, randSource io.Reader, magics *handsha
writeInt(h, kexDHInit.X)
writeInt(h, Y)
K := make([]byte, intLength(kInt))
marshalInt(K, kInt)
K := make([]byte, intLength(ki))
marshalInt(K, ki)
h.Write(K)
H := h.Sum(nil)
@ -462,9 +462,9 @@ func (kex *curve25519sha256) Client(c packetConn, rand io.Reader, magics *handsh
writeString(h, kp.pub[:])
writeString(h, reply.EphemeralPubKey)
kInt := new(big.Int).SetBytes(secret[:])
K := make([]byte, intLength(kInt))
marshalInt(K, kInt)
ki := new(big.Int).SetBytes(secret[:])
K := make([]byte, intLength(ki))
marshalInt(K, ki)
h.Write(K)
return &kexResult{
@ -510,9 +510,9 @@ func (kex *curve25519sha256) Server(c packetConn, rand io.Reader, magics *handsh
writeString(h, kexInit.ClientPubKey)
writeString(h, kp.pub[:])
kInt := new(big.Int).SetBytes(secret[:])
K := make([]byte, intLength(kInt))
marshalInt(K, kInt)
ki := new(big.Int).SetBytes(secret[:])
K := make([]byte, intLength(ki))
marshalInt(K, ki)
h.Write(K)
H := h.Sum(nil)

145
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/keys.go generated vendored
View File

@ -38,6 +38,16 @@ const (
KeyAlgoED25519 = "ssh-ed25519"
)
// These constants represent non-default signature algorithms that are supported
// as algorithm parameters to AlgorithmSigner.SignWithAlgorithm methods. See
// [PROTOCOL.agent] section 4.5.1 and
// https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-curdle-rsa-sha2-10
const (
SigAlgoRSA = "ssh-rsa"
SigAlgoRSASHA2256 = "rsa-sha2-256"
SigAlgoRSASHA2512 = "rsa-sha2-512"
)
// parsePubKey parses a public key of the given algorithm.
// Use ParsePublicKey for keys with prepended algorithm.
func parsePubKey(in []byte, algo string) (pubKey PublicKey, rest []byte, err error) {
@ -276,7 +286,8 @@ type PublicKey interface {
Type() string
// Marshal returns the serialized key data in SSH wire format,
// with the name prefix.
// with the name prefix. To unmarshal the returned data, use
// the ParsePublicKey function.
Marshal() []byte
// Verify that sig is a signature on the given data using this
@ -300,6 +311,19 @@ type Signer interface {
Sign(rand io.Reader, data []byte) (*Signature, error)
}
// A AlgorithmSigner is a Signer that also supports specifying a specific
// algorithm to use for signing.
type AlgorithmSigner interface {
Signer
// SignWithAlgorithm is like Signer.Sign, but allows specification of a
// non-default signing algorithm. See the SigAlgo* constants in this
// package for signature algorithms supported by this package. Callers may
// pass an empty string for the algorithm in which case the AlgorithmSigner
// will use its default algorithm.
SignWithAlgorithm(rand io.Reader, data []byte, algorithm string) (*Signature, error)
}
type rsaPublicKey rsa.PublicKey
func (r *rsaPublicKey) Type() string {
@ -348,13 +372,21 @@ func (r *rsaPublicKey) Marshal() []byte {
}
func (r *rsaPublicKey) Verify(data []byte, sig *Signature) error {
if sig.Format != r.Type() {
var hash crypto.Hash
switch sig.Format {
case SigAlgoRSA:
hash = crypto.SHA1
case SigAlgoRSASHA2256:
hash = crypto.SHA256
case SigAlgoRSASHA2512:
hash = crypto.SHA512
default:
return fmt.Errorf("ssh: signature type %s for key type %s", sig.Format, r.Type())
}
h := crypto.SHA1.New()
h := hash.New()
h.Write(data)
digest := h.Sum(nil)
return rsa.VerifyPKCS1v15((*rsa.PublicKey)(r), crypto.SHA1, digest, sig.Blob)
return rsa.VerifyPKCS1v15((*rsa.PublicKey)(r), hash, digest, sig.Blob)
}
func (r *rsaPublicKey) CryptoPublicKey() crypto.PublicKey {
@ -363,7 +395,7 @@ func (r *rsaPublicKey) CryptoPublicKey() crypto.PublicKey {
type dsaPublicKey dsa.PublicKey
func (r *dsaPublicKey) Type() string {
func (k *dsaPublicKey) Type() string {
return "ssh-dss"
}
@ -458,6 +490,14 @@ func (k *dsaPrivateKey) PublicKey() PublicKey {
}
func (k *dsaPrivateKey) Sign(rand io.Reader, data []byte) (*Signature, error) {
return k.SignWithAlgorithm(rand, data, "")
}
func (k *dsaPrivateKey) SignWithAlgorithm(rand io.Reader, data []byte, algorithm string) (*Signature, error) {
if algorithm != "" && algorithm != k.PublicKey().Type() {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: unsupported signature algorithm %s", algorithm)
}
h := crypto.SHA1.New()
h.Write(data)
digest := h.Sum(nil)
@ -481,12 +521,12 @@ func (k *dsaPrivateKey) Sign(rand io.Reader, data []byte) (*Signature, error) {
type ecdsaPublicKey ecdsa.PublicKey
func (key *ecdsaPublicKey) Type() string {
return "ecdsa-sha2-" + key.nistID()
func (k *ecdsaPublicKey) Type() string {
return "ecdsa-sha2-" + k.nistID()
}
func (key *ecdsaPublicKey) nistID() string {
switch key.Params().BitSize {
func (k *ecdsaPublicKey) nistID() string {
switch k.Params().BitSize {
case 256:
return "nistp256"
case 384:
@ -499,7 +539,7 @@ func (key *ecdsaPublicKey) nistID() string {
type ed25519PublicKey ed25519.PublicKey
func (key ed25519PublicKey) Type() string {
func (k ed25519PublicKey) Type() string {
return KeyAlgoED25519
}
@ -518,23 +558,23 @@ func parseED25519(in []byte) (out PublicKey, rest []byte, err error) {
return (ed25519PublicKey)(key), w.Rest, nil
}
func (key ed25519PublicKey) Marshal() []byte {
func (k ed25519PublicKey) Marshal() []byte {
w := struct {
Name string
KeyBytes []byte
}{
KeyAlgoED25519,
[]byte(key),
[]byte(k),
}
return Marshal(&w)
}
func (key ed25519PublicKey) Verify(b []byte, sig *Signature) error {
if sig.Format != key.Type() {
return fmt.Errorf("ssh: signature type %s for key type %s", sig.Format, key.Type())
func (k ed25519PublicKey) Verify(b []byte, sig *Signature) error {
if sig.Format != k.Type() {
return fmt.Errorf("ssh: signature type %s for key type %s", sig.Format, k.Type())
}
edKey := (ed25519.PublicKey)(key)
edKey := (ed25519.PublicKey)(k)
if ok := ed25519.Verify(edKey, b, sig.Blob); !ok {
return errors.New("ssh: signature did not verify")
}
@ -595,9 +635,9 @@ func parseECDSA(in []byte) (out PublicKey, rest []byte, err error) {
return (*ecdsaPublicKey)(key), w.Rest, nil
}
func (key *ecdsaPublicKey) Marshal() []byte {
func (k *ecdsaPublicKey) Marshal() []byte {
// See RFC 5656, section 3.1.
keyBytes := elliptic.Marshal(key.Curve, key.X, key.Y)
keyBytes := elliptic.Marshal(k.Curve, k.X, k.Y)
// ECDSA publickey struct layout should match the struct used by
// parseECDSACert in the x/crypto/ssh/agent package.
w := struct {
@ -605,20 +645,20 @@ func (key *ecdsaPublicKey) Marshal() []byte {
ID string
Key []byte
}{
key.Type(),
key.nistID(),
k.Type(),
k.nistID(),
keyBytes,
}
return Marshal(&w)
}
func (key *ecdsaPublicKey) Verify(data []byte, sig *Signature) error {
if sig.Format != key.Type() {
return fmt.Errorf("ssh: signature type %s for key type %s", sig.Format, key.Type())
func (k *ecdsaPublicKey) Verify(data []byte, sig *Signature) error {
if sig.Format != k.Type() {
return fmt.Errorf("ssh: signature type %s for key type %s", sig.Format, k.Type())
}
h := ecHash(key.Curve).New()
h := ecHash(k.Curve).New()
h.Write(data)
digest := h.Sum(nil)
@ -635,7 +675,7 @@ func (key *ecdsaPublicKey) Verify(data []byte, sig *Signature) error {
return err
}
if ecdsa.Verify((*ecdsa.PublicKey)(key), digest, ecSig.R, ecSig.S) {
if ecdsa.Verify((*ecdsa.PublicKey)(k), digest, ecSig.R, ecSig.S) {
return nil
}
return errors.New("ssh: signature did not verify")
@ -690,16 +730,42 @@ func (s *wrappedSigner) PublicKey() PublicKey {
}
func (s *wrappedSigner) Sign(rand io.Reader, data []byte) (*Signature, error) {
return s.SignWithAlgorithm(rand, data, "")
}
func (s *wrappedSigner) SignWithAlgorithm(rand io.Reader, data []byte, algorithm string) (*Signature, error) {
var hashFunc crypto.Hash
switch key := s.pubKey.(type) {
case *rsaPublicKey, *dsaPublicKey:
hashFunc = crypto.SHA1
case *ecdsaPublicKey:
hashFunc = ecHash(key.Curve)
case ed25519PublicKey:
default:
return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: unsupported key type %T", key)
if _, ok := s.pubKey.(*rsaPublicKey); ok {
// RSA keys support a few hash functions determined by the requested signature algorithm
switch algorithm {
case "", SigAlgoRSA:
algorithm = SigAlgoRSA
hashFunc = crypto.SHA1
case SigAlgoRSASHA2256:
hashFunc = crypto.SHA256
case SigAlgoRSASHA2512:
hashFunc = crypto.SHA512
default:
return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: unsupported signature algorithm %s", algorithm)
}
} else {
// The only supported algorithm for all other key types is the same as the type of the key
if algorithm == "" {
algorithm = s.pubKey.Type()
} else if algorithm != s.pubKey.Type() {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: unsupported signature algorithm %s", algorithm)
}
switch key := s.pubKey.(type) {
case *dsaPublicKey:
hashFunc = crypto.SHA1
case *ecdsaPublicKey:
hashFunc = ecHash(key.Curve)
case ed25519PublicKey:
default:
return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: unsupported key type %T", key)
}
}
var digest []byte
@ -744,7 +810,7 @@ func (s *wrappedSigner) Sign(rand io.Reader, data []byte) (*Signature, error) {
}
return &Signature{
Format: s.pubKey.Type(),
Format: algorithm,
Blob: signature,
}, nil
}
@ -758,7 +824,7 @@ func NewPublicKey(key interface{}) (PublicKey, error) {
return (*rsaPublicKey)(key), nil
case *ecdsa.PublicKey:
if !supportedEllipticCurve(key.Curve) {
return nil, errors.New("ssh: only P-256, P-384 and P-521 EC keys are supported.")
return nil, errors.New("ssh: only P-256, P-384 and P-521 EC keys are supported")
}
return (*ecdsaPublicKey)(key), nil
case *dsa.PublicKey:
@ -802,7 +868,7 @@ func encryptedBlock(block *pem.Block) bool {
}
// ParseRawPrivateKey returns a private key from a PEM encoded private key. It
// supports RSA (PKCS#1), DSA (OpenSSL), and ECDSA private keys.
// supports RSA (PKCS#1), PKCS#8, DSA (OpenSSL), and ECDSA private keys.
func ParseRawPrivateKey(pemBytes []byte) (interface{}, error) {
block, _ := pem.Decode(pemBytes)
if block == nil {
@ -816,6 +882,9 @@ func ParseRawPrivateKey(pemBytes []byte) (interface{}, error) {
switch block.Type {
case "RSA PRIVATE KEY":
return x509.ParsePKCS1PrivateKey(block.Bytes)
// RFC5208 - https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5208
case "PRIVATE KEY":
return x509.ParsePKCS8PrivateKey(block.Bytes)
case "EC PRIVATE KEY":
return x509.ParseECPrivateKey(block.Bytes)
case "DSA PRIVATE KEY":
@ -899,8 +968,8 @@ func ParseDSAPrivateKey(der []byte) (*dsa.PrivateKey, error) {
// Implemented based on the documentation at
// https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/blob/master/PROTOCOL.key
func parseOpenSSHPrivateKey(key []byte) (crypto.PrivateKey, error) {
magic := append([]byte("openssh-key-v1"), 0)
if !bytes.Equal(magic, key[0:len(magic)]) {
const magic = "openssh-key-v1\x00"
if len(key) < len(magic) || string(key[:len(magic)]) != magic {
return nil, errors.New("ssh: invalid openssh private key format")
}
remaining := key[len(magic):]

38
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/messages.go generated vendored
View File

@ -23,10 +23,6 @@ const (
msgUnimplemented = 3
msgDebug = 4
msgNewKeys = 21
// Standard authentication messages
msgUserAuthSuccess = 52
msgUserAuthBanner = 53
)
// SSH messages:
@ -137,6 +133,18 @@ type userAuthFailureMsg struct {
PartialSuccess bool
}
// See RFC 4252, section 5.1
const msgUserAuthSuccess = 52
// See RFC 4252, section 5.4
const msgUserAuthBanner = 53
type userAuthBannerMsg struct {
Message string `sshtype:"53"`
// unused, but required to allow message parsing
Language string
}
// See RFC 4256, section 3.2
const msgUserAuthInfoRequest = 60
const msgUserAuthInfoResponse = 61
@ -154,7 +162,7 @@ const msgChannelOpen = 90
type channelOpenMsg struct {
ChanType string `sshtype:"90"`
PeersId uint32
PeersID uint32
PeersWindow uint32
MaxPacketSize uint32
TypeSpecificData []byte `ssh:"rest"`
@ -165,7 +173,7 @@ const msgChannelData = 94
// Used for debug print outs of packets.
type channelDataMsg struct {
PeersId uint32 `sshtype:"94"`
PeersID uint32 `sshtype:"94"`
Length uint32
Rest []byte `ssh:"rest"`
}
@ -174,8 +182,8 @@ type channelDataMsg struct {
const msgChannelOpenConfirm = 91
type channelOpenConfirmMsg struct {
PeersId uint32 `sshtype:"91"`
MyId uint32
PeersID uint32 `sshtype:"91"`
MyID uint32
MyWindow uint32
MaxPacketSize uint32
TypeSpecificData []byte `ssh:"rest"`
@ -185,7 +193,7 @@ type channelOpenConfirmMsg struct {
const msgChannelOpenFailure = 92
type channelOpenFailureMsg struct {
PeersId uint32 `sshtype:"92"`
PeersID uint32 `sshtype:"92"`
Reason RejectionReason
Message string
Language string
@ -194,7 +202,7 @@ type channelOpenFailureMsg struct {
const msgChannelRequest = 98
type channelRequestMsg struct {
PeersId uint32 `sshtype:"98"`
PeersID uint32 `sshtype:"98"`
Request string
WantReply bool
RequestSpecificData []byte `ssh:"rest"`
@ -204,28 +212,28 @@ type channelRequestMsg struct {
const msgChannelSuccess = 99
type channelRequestSuccessMsg struct {
PeersId uint32 `sshtype:"99"`
PeersID uint32 `sshtype:"99"`
}
// See RFC 4254, section 5.4.
const msgChannelFailure = 100
type channelRequestFailureMsg struct {
PeersId uint32 `sshtype:"100"`
PeersID uint32 `sshtype:"100"`
}
// See RFC 4254, section 5.3
const msgChannelClose = 97
type channelCloseMsg struct {
PeersId uint32 `sshtype:"97"`
PeersID uint32 `sshtype:"97"`
}
// See RFC 4254, section 5.3
const msgChannelEOF = 96
type channelEOFMsg struct {
PeersId uint32 `sshtype:"96"`
PeersID uint32 `sshtype:"96"`
}
// See RFC 4254, section 4
@ -255,7 +263,7 @@ type globalRequestFailureMsg struct {
const msgChannelWindowAdjust = 93
type windowAdjustMsg struct {
PeersId uint32 `sshtype:"93"`
PeersID uint32 `sshtype:"93"`
AdditionalBytes uint32
}

6
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/mux.go generated vendored
View File

@ -278,7 +278,7 @@ func (m *mux) handleChannelOpen(packet []byte) error {
if msg.MaxPacketSize < minPacketLength || msg.MaxPacketSize > 1<<31 {
failMsg := channelOpenFailureMsg{
PeersId: msg.PeersId,
PeersID: msg.PeersID,
Reason: ConnectionFailed,
Message: "invalid request",
Language: "en_US.UTF-8",
@ -287,7 +287,7 @@ func (m *mux) handleChannelOpen(packet []byte) error {
}
c := m.newChannel(msg.ChanType, channelInbound, msg.TypeSpecificData)
c.remoteId = msg.PeersId
c.remoteId = msg.PeersID
c.maxRemotePayload = msg.MaxPacketSize
c.remoteWin.add(msg.PeersWindow)
m.incomingChannels <- c
@ -313,7 +313,7 @@ func (m *mux) openChannel(chanType string, extra []byte) (*channel, error) {
PeersWindow: ch.myWindow,
MaxPacketSize: ch.maxIncomingPayload,
TypeSpecificData: extra,
PeersId: ch.localId,
PeersID: ch.localId,
}
if err := m.sendMessage(open); err != nil {
return nil, err

45
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/server.go generated vendored
View File

@ -95,6 +95,10 @@ type ServerConfig struct {
// Note that RFC 4253 section 4.2 requires that this string start with
// "SSH-2.0-".
ServerVersion string
// BannerCallback, if present, is called and the return string is sent to
// the client after key exchange completed but before authentication.
BannerCallback func(conn ConnMetadata) string
}
// AddHostKey adds a private key as a host key. If an existing host
@ -162,6 +166,9 @@ type ServerConn struct {
// unsuccessful, it closes the connection and returns an error. The
// Request and NewChannel channels must be serviced, or the connection
// will hang.
//
// The returned error may be of type *ServerAuthError for
// authentication errors.
func NewServerConn(c net.Conn, config *ServerConfig) (*ServerConn, <-chan NewChannel, <-chan *Request, error) {
fullConf := *config
fullConf.SetDefaults()
@ -252,7 +259,7 @@ func (s *connection) serverHandshake(config *ServerConfig) (*Permissions, error)
func isAcceptableAlgo(algo string) bool {
switch algo {
case KeyAlgoRSA, KeyAlgoDSA, KeyAlgoECDSA256, KeyAlgoECDSA384, KeyAlgoECDSA521, KeyAlgoED25519,
CertAlgoRSAv01, CertAlgoDSAv01, CertAlgoECDSA256v01, CertAlgoECDSA384v01, CertAlgoECDSA521v01:
CertAlgoRSAv01, CertAlgoDSAv01, CertAlgoECDSA256v01, CertAlgoECDSA384v01, CertAlgoECDSA521v01, CertAlgoED25519v01:
return true
}
return false
@ -288,12 +295,13 @@ func checkSourceAddress(addr net.Addr, sourceAddrs string) error {
return fmt.Errorf("ssh: remote address %v is not allowed because of source-address restriction", addr)
}
// ServerAuthError implements the error interface. It appends any authentication
// errors that may occur, and is returned if all of the authentication methods
// provided by the user failed to authenticate.
// ServerAuthError represents server authentication errors and is
// sometimes returned by NewServerConn. It appends any authentication
// errors that may occur, and is returned if all of the authentication
// methods provided by the user failed to authenticate.
type ServerAuthError struct {
// Errors contains authentication errors returned by the authentication
// callback methods.
// callback methods. The first entry is typically ErrNoAuth.
Errors []error
}
@ -305,6 +313,13 @@ func (l ServerAuthError) Error() string {
return "[" + strings.Join(errs, ", ") + "]"
}
// ErrNoAuth is the error value returned if no
// authentication method has been passed yet. This happens as a normal
// part of the authentication loop, since the client first tries
// 'none' authentication to discover available methods.
// It is returned in ServerAuthError.Errors from NewServerConn.
var ErrNoAuth = errors.New("ssh: no auth passed yet")
func (s *connection) serverAuthenticate(config *ServerConfig) (*Permissions, error) {
sessionID := s.transport.getSessionID()
var cache pubKeyCache
@ -312,6 +327,7 @@ func (s *connection) serverAuthenticate(config *ServerConfig) (*Permissions, err
authFailures := 0
var authErrs []error
var displayedBanner bool
userAuthLoop:
for {
@ -343,8 +359,22 @@ userAuthLoop:
}
s.user = userAuthReq.User
if !displayedBanner && config.BannerCallback != nil {
displayedBanner = true
msg := config.BannerCallback(s)
if msg != "" {
bannerMsg := &userAuthBannerMsg{
Message: msg,
}
if err := s.transport.writePacket(Marshal(bannerMsg)); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
}
}
perms = nil
authErr := errors.New("no auth passed yet")
authErr := ErrNoAuth
switch userAuthReq.Method {
case "none":
@ -374,7 +404,7 @@ userAuthLoop:
perms, authErr = config.PasswordCallback(s, password)
case "keyboard-interactive":
if config.KeyboardInteractiveCallback == nil {
authErr = errors.New("ssh: keyboard-interactive auth not configubred")
authErr = errors.New("ssh: keyboard-interactive auth not configured")
break
}
@ -454,6 +484,7 @@ userAuthLoop:
// sig.Format. This is usually the same, but
// for certs, the names differ.
if !isAcceptableAlgo(sig.Format) {
authErr = fmt.Errorf("ssh: algorithm %q not accepted", sig.Format)
break
}
signedData := buildDataSignedForAuth(sessionID, userAuthReq, algoBytes, pubKeyData)

2
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/session.go generated vendored
View File

@ -406,7 +406,7 @@ func (s *Session) Wait() error {
s.stdinPipeWriter.Close()
}
var copyError error
for _ = range s.copyFuncs {
for range s.copyFuncs {
if err := <-s.errors; err != nil && copyError == nil {
copyError = err
}

1
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/streamlocal.go generated vendored
View File

@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ type streamLocalChannelForwardMsg struct {
// ListenUnix is similar to ListenTCP but uses a Unix domain socket.
func (c *Client) ListenUnix(socketPath string) (net.Listener, error) {
c.handleForwardsOnce.Do(c.handleForwards)
m := streamLocalChannelForwardMsg{
socketPath,
}

9
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/tcpip.go generated vendored
View File

@ -90,10 +90,19 @@ type channelForwardMsg struct {
rport uint32
}
// handleForwards starts goroutines handling forwarded connections.
// It's called on first use by (*Client).ListenTCP to not launch
// goroutines until needed.
func (c *Client) handleForwards() {
go c.forwards.handleChannels(c.HandleChannelOpen("forwarded-tcpip"))
go c.forwards.handleChannels(c.HandleChannelOpen("forwarded-streamlocal@openssh.com"))
}
// ListenTCP requests the remote peer open a listening socket
// on laddr. Incoming connections will be available by calling
// Accept on the returned net.Listener.
func (c *Client) ListenTCP(laddr *net.TCPAddr) (net.Listener, error) {
c.handleForwardsOnce.Do(c.handleForwards)
if laddr.Port == 0 && isBrokenOpenSSHVersion(string(c.ServerVersion())) {
return c.autoPortListenWorkaround(laddr)
}

2
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/terminal/terminal.go generated vendored
View File

@ -617,7 +617,7 @@ func writeWithCRLF(w io.Writer, buf []byte) (n int, err error) {
if _, err = w.Write(crlf); err != nil {
return n, err
}
n += 1
n++
buf = buf[1:]
}
}

8
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/terminal/util.go generated vendored
View File

@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
// +build darwin dragonfly freebsd linux,!appengine netbsd openbsd
// +build aix darwin dragonfly freebsd linux,!appengine netbsd openbsd
// Package terminal provides support functions for dealing with terminals, as
// commonly found on UNIX systems.
@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ type State struct {
termios unix.Termios
}
// IsTerminal returns true if the given file descriptor is a terminal.
// IsTerminal returns whether the given file descriptor is a terminal.
func IsTerminal(fd int) bool {
_, err := unix.IoctlGetTermios(fd, ioctlReadTermios)
return err == nil
@ -108,9 +108,7 @@ func ReadPassword(fd int) ([]byte, error) {
return nil, err
}
defer func() {
unix.IoctlSetTermios(fd, ioctlWriteTermios, termios)
}()
defer unix.IoctlSetTermios(fd, ioctlWriteTermios, termios)
return readPasswordLine(passwordReader(fd))
}

12
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/terminal/util_aix.go generated vendored Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
// +build aix
package terminal
import "golang.org/x/sys/unix"
const ioctlReadTermios = unix.TCGETS
const ioctlWriteTermios = unix.TCSETS

2
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/terminal/util_plan9.go generated vendored
View File

@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ import (
type State struct{}
// IsTerminal returns true if the given file descriptor is a terminal.
// IsTerminal returns whether the given file descriptor is a terminal.
func IsTerminal(fd int) bool {
return false
}

38
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/terminal/util_solaris.go generated vendored
View File

@ -14,10 +14,10 @@ import (
// State contains the state of a terminal.
type State struct {
state *unix.Termios
termios unix.Termios
}
// IsTerminal returns true if the given file descriptor is a terminal.
// IsTerminal returns whether the given file descriptor is a terminal.
func IsTerminal(fd int) bool {
_, err := unix.IoctlGetTermio(fd, unix.TCGETA)
return err == nil
@ -75,47 +75,43 @@ func ReadPassword(fd int) ([]byte, error) {
// restored.
// see http://cr.illumos.org/~webrev/andy_js/1060/
func MakeRaw(fd int) (*State, error) {
oldTermiosPtr, err := unix.IoctlGetTermios(fd, unix.TCGETS)
termios, err := unix.IoctlGetTermios(fd, unix.TCGETS)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
oldTermios := *oldTermiosPtr
newTermios := oldTermios
newTermios.Iflag &^= syscall.IGNBRK | syscall.BRKINT | syscall.PARMRK | syscall.ISTRIP | syscall.INLCR | syscall.IGNCR | syscall.ICRNL | syscall.IXON
newTermios.Oflag &^= syscall.OPOST
newTermios.Lflag &^= syscall.ECHO | syscall.ECHONL | syscall.ICANON | syscall.ISIG | syscall.IEXTEN
newTermios.Cflag &^= syscall.CSIZE | syscall.PARENB
newTermios.Cflag |= syscall.CS8
newTermios.Cc[unix.VMIN] = 1
newTermios.Cc[unix.VTIME] = 0
oldState := State{termios: *termios}
if err := unix.IoctlSetTermios(fd, unix.TCSETS, &newTermios); err != nil {
termios.Iflag &^= unix.IGNBRK | unix.BRKINT | unix.PARMRK | unix.ISTRIP | unix.INLCR | unix.IGNCR | unix.ICRNL | unix.IXON
termios.Oflag &^= unix.OPOST
termios.Lflag &^= unix.ECHO | unix.ECHONL | unix.ICANON | unix.ISIG | unix.IEXTEN
termios.Cflag &^= unix.CSIZE | unix.PARENB
termios.Cflag |= unix.CS8
termios.Cc[unix.VMIN] = 1
termios.Cc[unix.VTIME] = 0
if err := unix.IoctlSetTermios(fd, unix.TCSETS, termios); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return &State{
state: oldTermiosPtr,
}, nil
return &oldState, nil
}
// Restore restores the terminal connected to the given file descriptor to a
// previous state.
func Restore(fd int, oldState *State) error {
return unix.IoctlSetTermios(fd, unix.TCSETS, oldState.state)
return unix.IoctlSetTermios(fd, unix.TCSETS, &oldState.termios)
}
// GetState returns the current state of a terminal which may be useful to
// restore the terminal after a signal.
func GetState(fd int) (*State, error) {
oldTermiosPtr, err := unix.IoctlGetTermios(fd, unix.TCGETS)
termios, err := unix.IoctlGetTermios(fd, unix.TCGETS)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return &State{
state: oldTermiosPtr,
}, nil
return &State{termios: *termios}, nil
}
// GetSize returns the dimensions of the given terminal.

25
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/terminal/util_windows.go generated vendored
View File

@ -17,6 +17,8 @@
package terminal
import (
"os"
"golang.org/x/sys/windows"
)
@ -24,7 +26,7 @@ type State struct {
mode uint32
}
// IsTerminal returns true if the given file descriptor is a terminal.
// IsTerminal returns whether the given file descriptor is a terminal.
func IsTerminal(fd int) bool {
var st uint32
err := windows.GetConsoleMode(windows.Handle(fd), &st)
@ -71,13 +73,6 @@ func GetSize(fd int) (width, height int, err error) {
return int(info.Size.X), int(info.Size.Y), nil
}
// passwordReader is an io.Reader that reads from a specific Windows HANDLE.
type passwordReader int
func (r passwordReader) Read(buf []byte) (int, error) {
return windows.Read(windows.Handle(r), buf)
}
// ReadPassword reads a line of input from a terminal without local echo. This
// is commonly used for inputting passwords and other sensitive data. The slice
// returned does not include the \n.
@ -94,9 +89,15 @@ func ReadPassword(fd int) ([]byte, error) {
return nil, err
}
defer func() {
windows.SetConsoleMode(windows.Handle(fd), old)
}()
defer windows.SetConsoleMode(windows.Handle(fd), old)
return readPasswordLine(passwordReader(fd))
var h windows.Handle
p, _ := windows.GetCurrentProcess()
if err := windows.DuplicateHandle(p, windows.Handle(fd), p, &h, 0, false, windows.DUPLICATE_SAME_ACCESS); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
f := os.NewFile(uintptr(h), "stdin")
defer f.Close()
return readPasswordLine(f)
}

72
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/transport.go generated vendored
View File

@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ package ssh
import (
"bufio"
"bytes"
"errors"
"io"
"log"
@ -76,17 +77,17 @@ type connectionState struct {
// both directions are triggered by reading and writing a msgNewKey packet
// respectively.
func (t *transport) prepareKeyChange(algs *algorithms, kexResult *kexResult) error {
if ciph, err := newPacketCipher(t.reader.dir, algs.r, kexResult); err != nil {
ciph, err := newPacketCipher(t.reader.dir, algs.r, kexResult)
if err != nil {
return err
} else {
t.reader.pendingKeyChange <- ciph
}
t.reader.pendingKeyChange <- ciph
if ciph, err := newPacketCipher(t.writer.dir, algs.w, kexResult); err != nil {
ciph, err = newPacketCipher(t.writer.dir, algs.w, kexResult)
if err != nil {
return err
} else {
t.writer.pendingKeyChange <- ciph
}
t.writer.pendingKeyChange <- ciph
return nil
}
@ -139,7 +140,7 @@ func (s *connectionState) readPacket(r *bufio.Reader) ([]byte, error) {
case cipher := <-s.pendingKeyChange:
s.packetCipher = cipher
default:
return nil, errors.New("ssh: got bogus newkeys message.")
return nil, errors.New("ssh: got bogus newkeys message")
}
case msgDisconnect:
@ -232,52 +233,22 @@ var (
clientKeys = direction{[]byte{'A'}, []byte{'C'}, []byte{'E'}}
)
// generateKeys generates key material for IV, MAC and encryption.
func generateKeys(d direction, algs directionAlgorithms, kex *kexResult) (iv, key, macKey []byte) {
cipherMode := cipherModes[algs.Cipher]
macMode := macModes[algs.MAC]
iv = make([]byte, cipherMode.ivSize)
key = make([]byte, cipherMode.keySize)
macKey = make([]byte, macMode.keySize)
generateKeyMaterial(iv, d.ivTag, kex)
generateKeyMaterial(key, d.keyTag, kex)
generateKeyMaterial(macKey, d.macKeyTag, kex)
return
}
// setupKeys sets the cipher and MAC keys from kex.K, kex.H and sessionId, as
// described in RFC 4253, section 6.4. direction should either be serverKeys
// (to setup server->client keys) or clientKeys (for client->server keys).
func newPacketCipher(d direction, algs directionAlgorithms, kex *kexResult) (packetCipher, error) {
iv, key, macKey := generateKeys(d, algs, kex)
cipherMode := cipherModes[algs.Cipher]
macMode := macModes[algs.MAC]
if algs.Cipher == gcmCipherID {
return newGCMCipher(iv, key)
}
iv := make([]byte, cipherMode.ivSize)
key := make([]byte, cipherMode.keySize)
macKey := make([]byte, macMode.keySize)
if algs.Cipher == aes128cbcID {
return newAESCBCCipher(iv, key, macKey, algs)
}
generateKeyMaterial(iv, d.ivTag, kex)
generateKeyMaterial(key, d.keyTag, kex)
generateKeyMaterial(macKey, d.macKeyTag, kex)
if algs.Cipher == tripledescbcID {
return newTripleDESCBCCipher(iv, key, macKey, algs)
}
c := &streamPacketCipher{
mac: macModes[algs.MAC].new(macKey),
etm: macModes[algs.MAC].etm,
}
c.macResult = make([]byte, c.mac.Size())
var err error
c.cipher, err = cipherModes[algs.Cipher].createStream(key, iv)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return c, nil
return cipherModes[algs.Cipher].create(key, iv, macKey, algs)
}
// generateKeyMaterial fills out with key material generated from tag, K, H
@ -342,7 +313,7 @@ func readVersion(r io.Reader) ([]byte, error) {
var ok bool
var buf [1]byte
for len(versionString) < maxVersionStringBytes {
for length := 0; length < maxVersionStringBytes; length++ {
_, err := io.ReadFull(r, buf[:])
if err != nil {
return nil, err
@ -350,6 +321,13 @@ func readVersion(r io.Reader) ([]byte, error) {
// The RFC says that the version should be terminated with \r\n
// but several SSH servers actually only send a \n.
if buf[0] == '\n' {
if !bytes.HasPrefix(versionString, []byte("SSH-")) {
// RFC 4253 says we need to ignore all version string lines
// except the one containing the SSH version (provided that
// all the lines do not exceed 255 bytes in total).
versionString = versionString[:0]
continue
}
ok = true
break
}

100
vendor/vendor.json vendored
View File

@ -631,92 +631,116 @@
{
"checksumSHA1": "TT1rac6kpQp2vz24m5yDGUNQ/QQ=",
"path": "golang.org/x/crypto/cast5",
"revision": "6a293f2d4b14b8e6d3f0539e383f6d0d30fce3fd",
"revisionTime": "2017-09-25T11:22:06Z"
"revision": "ff983b9c42bc9fbf91556e191cc8efb585c16908",
"revisionTime": "2018-07-25T11:53:45Z"
},
{
"checksumSHA1": "IQkUIOnvlf0tYloFx9mLaXSvXWQ=",
"path": "golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519",
"revision": "6a293f2d4b14b8e6d3f0539e383f6d0d30fce3fd",
"revisionTime": "2017-09-25T11:22:06Z"
"revision": "ff983b9c42bc9fbf91556e191cc8efb585c16908",
"revisionTime": "2018-07-25T11:53:45Z"
},
{
"checksumSHA1": "1hwn8cgg4EVXhCpJIqmMbzqnUo0=",
"checksumSHA1": "2LpxYGSf068307b7bhAuVjvzLLc=",
"path": "golang.org/x/crypto/ed25519",
"revision": "6a293f2d4b14b8e6d3f0539e383f6d0d30fce3fd",
"revisionTime": "2017-09-25T11:22:06Z"
"revision": "ff983b9c42bc9fbf91556e191cc8efb585c16908",
"revisionTime": "2018-07-25T11:53:45Z"
},
{
"checksumSHA1": "LXFcVx8I587SnWmKycSDEq9yvK8=",
"checksumSHA1": "0JTAFXPkankmWcZGQJGScLDiaN8=",
"path": "golang.org/x/crypto/ed25519/internal/edwards25519",
"revision": "6a293f2d4b14b8e6d3f0539e383f6d0d30fce3fd",
"revisionTime": "2017-09-25T11:22:06Z"
"revision": "ff983b9c42bc9fbf91556e191cc8efb585c16908",
"revisionTime": "2018-07-25T11:53:45Z"
},
{
"checksumSHA1": "IIhFTrLlmlc6lEFSitqi4aw2lw0=",
"checksumSHA1": "fhxj9uzosD3dQefNF5JuGJzGZwg=",
"path": "golang.org/x/crypto/internal/chacha20",
"revision": "ff983b9c42bc9fbf91556e191cc8efb585c16908",
"revisionTime": "2018-07-25T11:53:45Z"
},
{
"checksumSHA1": "/U7f2gaH6DnEmLguVLDbipU6kXU=",
"path": "golang.org/x/crypto/internal/subtle",
"revision": "ff983b9c42bc9fbf91556e191cc8efb585c16908",
"revisionTime": "2018-07-25T11:53:45Z"
},
{
"checksumSHA1": "M7MQqB1xKzwQh5aEjckVsVCxpoY=",
"path": "golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp",
"revision": "6a293f2d4b14b8e6d3f0539e383f6d0d30fce3fd",
"revisionTime": "2017-09-25T11:22:06Z"
"revision": "ff983b9c42bc9fbf91556e191cc8efb585c16908",
"revisionTime": "2018-07-25T11:53:45Z"
},
{
"checksumSHA1": "olOKkhrdkYQHZ0lf1orrFQPQrv4=",
"path": "golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp/armor",
"revision": "6a293f2d4b14b8e6d3f0539e383f6d0d30fce3fd",
"revisionTime": "2017-09-25T11:22:06Z"
"revision": "ff983b9c42bc9fbf91556e191cc8efb585c16908",
"revisionTime": "2018-07-25T11:53:45Z"
},
{
"checksumSHA1": "eo/KtdjieJQXH7Qy+faXFcF70ME=",
"path": "golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp/elgamal",
"revision": "6a293f2d4b14b8e6d3f0539e383f6d0d30fce3fd",
"revisionTime": "2017-09-25T11:22:06Z"
"revision": "ff983b9c42bc9fbf91556e191cc8efb585c16908",
"revisionTime": "2018-07-25T11:53:45Z"
},
{
"checksumSHA1": "rlxVSaGgqdAgwblsErxTxIfuGfg=",
"path": "golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp/errors",
"revision": "6a293f2d4b14b8e6d3f0539e383f6d0d30fce3fd",
"revisionTime": "2017-09-25T11:22:06Z"
"revision": "ff983b9c42bc9fbf91556e191cc8efb585c16908",
"revisionTime": "2018-07-25T11:53:45Z"
},
{
"checksumSHA1": "Pq88+Dgh04UdXWZN6P+bLgYnbRc=",
"checksumSHA1": "DwKua4mYaqKBGxCrwgLP2JqkPA0=",
"path": "golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp/packet",
"revision": "6a293f2d4b14b8e6d3f0539e383f6d0d30fce3fd",
"revisionTime": "2017-09-25T11:22:06Z"
"revision": "ff983b9c42bc9fbf91556e191cc8efb585c16908",
"revisionTime": "2018-07-25T11:53:45Z"
},
{
"checksumSHA1": "s2qT4UwvzBSkzXuiuMkowif1Olw=",
"path": "golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp/s2k",
"revision": "6a293f2d4b14b8e6d3f0539e383f6d0d30fce3fd",
"revisionTime": "2017-09-25T11:22:06Z"
"revision": "ff983b9c42bc9fbf91556e191cc8efb585c16908",
"revisionTime": "2018-07-25T11:53:45Z"
},
{
"checksumSHA1": "1MGpGDQqnUoRpv7VEcQrXOBydXE=",
"path": "golang.org/x/crypto/pbkdf2",
"revision": "6a293f2d4b14b8e6d3f0539e383f6d0d30fce3fd",
"revisionTime": "2017-09-25T11:22:06Z"
"revision": "ff983b9c42bc9fbf91556e191cc8efb585c16908",
"revisionTime": "2018-07-25T11:53:45Z"
},
{
"checksumSHA1": "y/oIaxq2d3WPizRZfVjo8RCRYTU=",
"checksumSHA1": "vKbPb9fpjCdzuoOvajOJnYfHG2g=",
"path": "golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305",
"revision": "ff983b9c42bc9fbf91556e191cc8efb585c16908",
"revisionTime": "2018-07-25T11:53:45Z"
},
{
"checksumSHA1": "GP0QdBhWPoH4hsHedU7935MjGWo=",
"path": "golang.org/x/crypto/ripemd160",
"revision": "6a293f2d4b14b8e6d3f0539e383f6d0d30fce3fd",
"revisionTime": "2017-09-25T11:22:06Z"
"revision": "ff983b9c42bc9fbf91556e191cc8efb585c16908",
"revisionTime": "2018-07-25T11:53:45Z"
},
{
"checksumSHA1": "dHh6VeHcbNg11miGjGEl8LbPe7w=",
"checksumSHA1": "q+Rqy6Spw6qDSj75TGEZF7nzoFM=",
"path": "golang.org/x/crypto/scrypt",
"revision": "6a293f2d4b14b8e6d3f0539e383f6d0d30fce3fd",
"revisionTime": "2017-09-25T11:22:06Z"
"revision": "ff983b9c42bc9fbf91556e191cc8efb585c16908",
"revisionTime": "2018-07-25T11:53:45Z"
},
{
"checksumSHA1": "Wi44TcpIOXdojyVWkvyOBnBKIS4=",
"checksumSHA1": "hUsBzxJ8KTL4v0vpPT/mqvdJ46s=",
"path": "golang.org/x/crypto/sha3",
"revision": "ff983b9c42bc9fbf91556e191cc8efb585c16908",
"revisionTime": "2018-07-25T11:53:45Z"
},
{
"checksumSHA1": "eMiE+YWT0hJF4B9/hrKHaRp39aU=",
"path": "golang.org/x/crypto/ssh",
"revision": "6a293f2d4b14b8e6d3f0539e383f6d0d30fce3fd",
"revisionTime": "2017-09-25T11:22:06Z"
"revision": "ff983b9c42bc9fbf91556e191cc8efb585c16908",
"revisionTime": "2018-07-25T11:53:45Z"
},
{
"checksumSHA1": "5Yb2z6UO+Arm/TEd+OEtdnwOt1A=",
"checksumSHA1": "BSPDVKviqHQaG2phOFN690zAKB8=",
"path": "golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/terminal",
"revision": "6a293f2d4b14b8e6d3f0539e383f6d0d30fce3fd",
"revisionTime": "2017-09-25T11:22:06Z"
"revision": "ff983b9c42bc9fbf91556e191cc8efb585c16908",
"revisionTime": "2018-07-25T11:53:45Z"
},
{
"checksumSHA1": "Y+HGqEkYM15ir+J93MEaHdyFy0c=",