plugeth/swarm/storage/mru/request_test.go

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swarm/storage/mru: Client-side MRU signatures (#784) * swarm/storage/mru: Add embedded publickey and remove ENS dep This commit breaks swarm, swarm/api... but tests in swarm/storage/mru pass * swarm: Refactor swarm, swarm/api to mru changes, make tests pass * swarm/storage/mru: Remove self from recv, remove test ens vldtr * swarm/storage/mru: Remove redundant test, expose ResourceHash mthd * swarm/storage/mru: Make HeaderGetter mandatory + godoc fixes * swarm/storage: Remove validator prefix for metadata chunk * swarm/storage/mru: Use Address instead of PublicKey * swarm/storage/mru: Change index from name to metadata chunk addr * swarm/storage/mru: Refactor swarm/api/... to MRU index changes * swarm/storage/mru: Refactor cleanup * swarm/storage/mru: Rebase cleanup * swarm: Use constructor for GenericSigner MRU in swarm.go * swarm/storage: Change to BMTHash for MRU hashing * swarm/storage: Reduce loglevel on chunk validator logs * swarm/storage/mru: Delint * swarm: MRU Rebase cleanup * swarm/storage/mru: client-side mru signatures Rebase to PR #668 and fix all conflicts * swarm/storage/mru: refactor and documentation * swarm/resource/mru: error-checking tests for parseUpdate/newUpdateChunk * swarm/storage/mru: Added resourcemetadata tests * swarm/storage/mru: Added tests for UpdateRequest * swarm/storage/mru: more test coverage for UpdateRequest and comments * swarm/storage/mru: Avoid fake chunks in parseUpdate() * swarm/storage/mru: Documented resource.go extensively moved some functions where they make most sense * swarm/storage/mru: increase test coverage for UpdateRequest and variable name changes throughout to increase consistency * swarm/storage/mru: moved default timestamp to NewCreateRequest- * swarm/storage/mru: lookup refactor * swarm/storage/mru: added comments and renamed raw flag to rawmru * swarm/storage/mru: fix receiver typo * swarm/storage/mru: refactored update chunk new/create * swarm/storage/mru: refactored signature digest to avoid malleability * swarm/storage/mru: optimize update data serialization * swarm/storage/mru: refactor and cleanup * swarm/storage/mru: add timestamp struct and serialization * swarm/storage/mru: fix lint error and mark some old code for deletion * swarm/storage/mru: remove unnecessary variable * swarm/storage/mru: Added more comments throughout * swarm/storage/mru: Refactored metadata chunk layout + extensive error... * swarm/storage/mru: refactor cli parser Changed resource info output to JSON * swarm/storage/mru: refactor serialization for extensibility refactored error messages to NewErrorf * swarm/storage/mru: Moved Signature to resource_sign. Check Sign errors in server tests * swarm/storage/mru: Remove isSafeName() checks * swarm/storage/mru: scrubbed off all references to "block" for time * swarm/storage/mru: removed superfluous isSynced() call. * swarm/storage/mru: remove isMultihash() and ToSafeName functions * swarm/storage/mru: various fixes and comments * swarm/storage/mru: decoupled cli for independent create/update * Made resource name optional * Removed unused LookupPrevious * swarm/storage/mru: Decoupled resource create / update & refactor * swarm/storage/mru: Fixed some comments as per issues raised in PR #743 * swarm/storage/mru: Cosmetic changes as per #743 comments * swarm/storage/mru: refct request encoder/decoder > marshal/unmarshal * swarm/storage/mru: Cosmetic changes as per review in #748 * swarm/storage/mru: removed timestamp proof placeholder * swarm/storage/mru: cosmetic/doc/fixes changes as per comments in #704 * swarm/storage/mru: removed unnecessary check in Handler.update * swarm/storage/mru: Implemented Marshaler/Unmarshaler iface in Request * swarm/storage/mru: Fixed linter error * swarm/storage/mru: removed redundant address in signature digest * swarm/storage/mru: fixed bug: LookupLatestVersionInPeriod not working * swarm/storage/mru: Unfold Request creation API for create or update+create set common time source for mru package * swarm/api/http: fix HandleGetResource error variable shadowed when requesting a resource that does not exist * swarm/storage/mru: Add simple check to detect duplicate updates * swarm/storage/mru: moved Multihash() to the right place. * cmd/swarm: remove unneeded clientaccountmanager.go * swarm/storage/mru: Changed some comments as per reviews in #784 * swarm/storage/mru: Made SignedResourceUpdate.GetDigest() public * swarm/storage/mru: cosmetic changes as per comments in #784 * cmd/swarm: Inverted --multihash flag default * swarm/storage/mru: removed Verify from SignedResourceUpdate.fromChunk * swarm/storage/mru: Moved validation code out of serializer Cosmetic / comment changes * swarm/storage/mru: Added unit tests for UpdateLookup * swarm/storage/mru: Increased coverage of metadata serialization * swarm/storage/mru: Increased test coverage of updateHeader serializers * swarm/storage/mru: Add resourceUpdate serializer test
2018-07-21 19:49:36 +00:00
package mru
import (
"encoding/binary"
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"reflect"
"testing"
)
func areEqualJSON(s1, s2 string) (bool, error) {
//credit for the trick: turtlemonvh https://gist.github.com/turtlemonvh/e4f7404e28387fadb8ad275a99596f67
var o1 interface{}
var o2 interface{}
err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(s1), &o1)
if err != nil {
return false, fmt.Errorf("Error mashalling string 1 :: %s", err.Error())
}
err = json.Unmarshal([]byte(s2), &o2)
if err != nil {
return false, fmt.Errorf("Error mashalling string 2 :: %s", err.Error())
}
return reflect.DeepEqual(o1, o2), nil
}
// TestEncodingDecodingUpdateRequests ensures that requests are serialized properly
// while also checking cryptographically that only the owner of a resource can update it.
func TestEncodingDecodingUpdateRequests(t *testing.T) {
signer := newCharlieSigner() //Charlie, our good guy
falseSigner := newBobSigner() //Bob will play the bad guy again
// Create a resource to our good guy Charlie's name
createRequest, err := NewCreateRequest(&ResourceMetadata{
Name: "a good resource name",
Frequency: 300,
StartTime: Timestamp{Time: 1528900000},
Owner: signer.Address()})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Error creating resource name: %s", err)
}
// We now encode the create message to simulate we send it over the wire
messageRawData, err := createRequest.MarshalJSON()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Error encoding create resource request: %s", err)
}
// ... the message arrives and is decoded...
var recoveredCreateRequest Request
if err := recoveredCreateRequest.UnmarshalJSON(messageRawData); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Error decoding create resource request: %s", err)
}
// ... but verification should fail because it is not signed!
if err := recoveredCreateRequest.Verify(); err == nil {
t.Fatal("Expected Verify to fail since the message is not signed")
}
// We now assume that the resource was created and propagated. With rootAddr we can retrieve the resource metadata
// and recover the information above. To sign an update, we need the rootAddr and the metaHash to construct
// proof of ownership
metaHash := createRequest.metaHash
rootAddr := createRequest.rootAddr
const expectedSignature = "0x1c2bab66dc4ed63783d62934e3a628e517888d6949aef0349f3bd677121db9aa09bbfb865904e6c50360e209e0fe6fe757f8a2474cf1b34169c99b95e3fd5a5101"
const expectedJSON = `{"rootAddr":"0x6e744a730f7ea0881528576f0354b6268b98e35a6981ef703153ff1b8d32bbef","metaHash":"0x0c0d5c18b89da503af92302a1a64fab6acb60f78e288eb9c3d541655cd359b60","version":1,"period":7,"data":"0x5468697320686f75722773207570646174653a20537761726d2039392e3020686173206265656e2072656c656173656421","multiHash":false}`
//Put together an unsigned update request that we will serialize to send it to the signer.
data := []byte("This hour's update: Swarm 99.0 has been released!")
request := &Request{
SignedResourceUpdate: SignedResourceUpdate{
resourceUpdate: resourceUpdate{
updateHeader: updateHeader{
UpdateLookup: UpdateLookup{
period: 7,
version: 1,
rootAddr: rootAddr,
},
multihash: false,
metaHash: metaHash,
},
data: data,
},
},
}
messageRawData, err = request.MarshalJSON()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Error encoding update request: %s", err)
}
equalJSON, err := areEqualJSON(string(messageRawData), expectedJSON)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Error decoding update request JSON: %s", err)
}
if !equalJSON {
t.Fatalf("Received a different JSON message. Expected %s, got %s", expectedJSON, string(messageRawData))
}
// now the encoded message messageRawData is sent over the wire and arrives to the signer
//Attempt to extract an UpdateRequest out of the encoded message
var recoveredRequest Request
if err := recoveredRequest.UnmarshalJSON(messageRawData); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Error decoding update request: %s", err)
}
//sign the request and see if it matches our predefined signature above.
if err := recoveredRequest.Sign(signer); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Error signing request: %s", err)
}
compareByteSliceToExpectedHex(t, "signature", recoveredRequest.signature[:], expectedSignature)
// mess with the signature and see what happens. To alter the signature, we briefly decode it as JSON
// to alter the signature field.
var j updateRequestJSON
if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(expectedJSON), &j); err != nil {
t.Fatal("Error unmarshalling test json, check expectedJSON constant")
}
j.Signature = "Certainly not a signature"
corruptMessage, _ := json.Marshal(j) // encode the message with the bad signature
var corruptRequest Request
if err = corruptRequest.UnmarshalJSON(corruptMessage); err == nil {
t.Fatal("Expected DecodeUpdateRequest to fail when trying to interpret a corrupt message with an invalid signature")
}
// Now imagine Evil Bob (why always Bob, poor Bob) attempts to update Charlie's resource,
// signing a message with his private key
if err := request.Sign(falseSigner); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Error signing: %s", err)
}
// Now Bob encodes the message to send it over the wire...
messageRawData, err = request.MarshalJSON()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Error encoding message:%s", err)
}
// ... the message arrives to our Swarm node and it is decoded.
recoveredRequest = Request{}
if err := recoveredRequest.UnmarshalJSON(messageRawData); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Error decoding message:%s", err)
}
// Before discovering Bob's misdemeanor, let's see what would happen if we mess
// with the signature big time to see if Verify catches it
savedSignature := *recoveredRequest.signature // save the signature for later
binary.LittleEndian.PutUint64(recoveredRequest.signature[5:], 556845463424) // write some random data to break the signature
if err = recoveredRequest.Verify(); err == nil {
t.Fatal("Expected Verify to fail on corrupt signature")
}
// restore the Evil Bob's signature from corruption
*recoveredRequest.signature = savedSignature
// Now the signature is not corrupt, however Verify should now fail because Bob doesn't own the resource
if err = recoveredRequest.Verify(); err == nil {
t.Fatalf("Expected Verify to fail because this resource belongs to Charlie, not Bob the attacker:%s", err)
}
// Sign with our friend Charlie's private key
if err := recoveredRequest.Sign(signer); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Error signing with the correct private key: %s", err)
}
// And now, Verify should work since this resource belongs to Charlie
if err = recoveredRequest.Verify(); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Error verifying that Charlie, the good guy, can sign his resource:%s", err)
}
}