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345 lines
15 KiB
ReStructuredText
.. _security_considerations:
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#######################
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Security Considerations
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#######################
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While it is usually quite easy to build software that works as expected,
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it is much harder to check that nobody can use it in a way that was **not** anticipated.
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In Solidity, this is even more important because you can use smart contracts
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to handle tokens or, possibly, even more valuable things. Furthermore, every
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execution of a smart contract happens in public and, in addition to that,
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the source code is often available.
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Of course you always have to consider how much is at stake:
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You can compare a smart contract with a web service that is open to the
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public (and thus, also to malicious actors) and perhaps even open source.
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If you only store your grocery list on that web service, you might not have
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to take too much care, but if you manage your bank account using that web service,
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you should be more careful.
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This section will list some pitfalls and general security recommendations but
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can, of course, never be complete. Also, keep in mind that even if your
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smart contract code is bug-free, the compiler or the platform itself might
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have a bug. A list of some publicly known security-relevant bugs of the compiler
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can be found in the
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:ref:`list of known bugs<known_bugs>`, which is also machine-readable. Note
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that there is a bug bounty program that covers the code generator of the
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Solidity compiler.
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As always, with open source documentation, please help us extend this section
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(especially, some examples would not hurt)!
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********
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Pitfalls
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********
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Private Information and Randomness
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==================================
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Everything you use in a smart contract is publicly visible, even
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local variables and state variables marked ``private``.
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Using random numbers in smart contracts is quite tricky if you do not want
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miners to be able to cheat.
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Re-Entrancy
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===========
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Any interaction from a contract (A) with another contract (B) and any transfer
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of Ether hands over control to that contract (B). This makes it possible for B
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to call back into A before this interaction is completed. To give an example,
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the following code contains a bug (it is just a snippet and not a
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complete contract):
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::
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pragma solidity >=0.4.0 <0.6.0;
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// THIS CONTRACT CONTAINS A BUG - DO NOT USE
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contract Fund {
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/// Mapping of ether shares of the contract.
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mapping(address => uint) shares;
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/// Withdraw your share.
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function withdraw() public {
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if (msg.sender.send(shares[msg.sender]))
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shares[msg.sender] = 0;
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}
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}
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The problem is not too serious here because of the limited gas as part
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of ``send``, but it still exposes a weakness: Ether transfer can always
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include code execution, so the recipient could be a contract that calls
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back into ``withdraw``. This would let it get multiple refunds and
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basically retrieve all the Ether in the contract. In particular, the
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following contract will allow an attacker to refund multiple times
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as it uses ``call`` which forwards all remaining gas by default:
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::
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pragma solidity >=0.4.0 <0.6.0;
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// THIS CONTRACT CONTAINS A BUG - DO NOT USE
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contract Fund {
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/// Mapping of ether shares of the contract.
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mapping(address => uint) shares;
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/// Withdraw your share.
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function withdraw() public {
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(bool success,) = msg.sender.call.value(shares[msg.sender])("");
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if (success)
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shares[msg.sender] = 0;
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}
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}
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To avoid re-entrancy, you can use the Checks-Effects-Interactions pattern as
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outlined further below:
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::
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pragma solidity >=0.4.11 <0.6.0;
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contract Fund {
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/// Mapping of ether shares of the contract.
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mapping(address => uint) shares;
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/// Withdraw your share.
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function withdraw() public {
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uint share = shares[msg.sender];
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shares[msg.sender] = 0;
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msg.sender.transfer(share);
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}
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}
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Note that re-entrancy is not only an effect of Ether transfer but of any
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function call on another contract. Furthermore, you also have to take
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multi-contract situations into account. A called contract could modify the
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state of another contract you depend on.
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Gas Limit and Loops
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===================
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Loops that do not have a fixed number of iterations, for example, loops that depend on storage values, have to be used carefully:
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Due to the block gas limit, transactions can only consume a certain amount of gas. Either explicitly or just due to
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normal operation, the number of iterations in a loop can grow beyond the block gas limit which can cause the complete
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contract to be stalled at a certain point. This may not apply to ``view`` functions that are only executed
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to read data from the blockchain. Still, such functions may be called by other contracts as part of on-chain operations
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and stall those. Please be explicit about such cases in the documentation of your contracts.
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Sending and Receiving Ether
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===========================
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- Neither contracts nor "external accounts" are currently able to prevent that someone sends them Ether.
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Contracts can react on and reject a regular transfer, but there are ways
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to move Ether without creating a message call. One way is to simply "mine to"
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the contract address and the second way is using ``selfdestruct(x)``.
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- If a contract receives Ether (without a function being called), the fallback function is executed.
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If it does not have a fallback function, the Ether will be rejected (by throwing an exception).
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During the execution of the fallback function, the contract can only rely
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on the "gas stipend" it is passed (2300 gas) being available to it at that time. This stipend is not enough to modify storage
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(do not take this for granted though, the stipend might change with future hard forks).
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To be sure that your contract can receive Ether in that way, check the gas requirements of the fallback function
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(for example in the "details" section in Remix).
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- There is a way to forward more gas to the receiving contract using
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``addr.call.value(x)("")``. This is essentially the same as ``addr.transfer(x)``,
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only that it forwards all remaining gas and opens up the ability for the
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recipient to perform more expensive actions (and it returns a failure code
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instead of automatically propagating the error). This might include calling back
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into the sending contract or other state changes you might not have thought of.
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So it allows for great flexibility for honest users but also for malicious actors.
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- If you want to send Ether using ``address.transfer``, there are certain details to be aware of:
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1. If the recipient is a contract, it causes its fallback function to be executed which can, in turn, call back the sending contract.
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2. Sending Ether can fail due to the call depth going above 1024. Since the caller is in total control of the call
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depth, they can force the transfer to fail; take this possibility into account or use ``send`` and make sure to always check its return value. Better yet,
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write your contract using a pattern where the recipient can withdraw Ether instead.
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3. Sending Ether can also fail because the execution of the recipient contract
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requires more than the allotted amount of gas (explicitly by using ``require``,
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``assert``, ``revert``, ``throw`` or
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because the operation is just too expensive) - it "runs out of gas" (OOG).
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If you use ``transfer`` or ``send`` with a return value check, this might provide a
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means for the recipient to block progress in the sending contract. Again, the best practice here is to use
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a :ref:`"withdraw" pattern instead of a "send" pattern <withdrawal_pattern>`.
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Callstack Depth
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===============
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External function calls can fail any time because they exceed the maximum
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call stack of 1024. In such situations, Solidity throws an exception.
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Malicious actors might be able to force the call stack to a high value
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before they interact with your contract.
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Note that ``.send()`` does **not** throw an exception if the call stack is
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depleted but rather returns ``false`` in that case. The low-level functions
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``.call()``, ``.callcode()``, ``.delegatecall()`` and ``.staticcall()`` behave
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in the same way.
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tx.origin
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=========
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Never use tx.origin for authorization. Let's say you have a wallet contract like this:
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::
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pragma solidity >0.4.99 <0.6.0;
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// THIS CONTRACT CONTAINS A BUG - DO NOT USE
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contract TxUserWallet {
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address owner;
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constructor() public {
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owner = msg.sender;
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}
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function transferTo(address payable dest, uint amount) public {
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require(tx.origin == owner);
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dest.transfer(amount);
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}
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}
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Now someone tricks you into sending ether to the address of this attack wallet:
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::
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pragma solidity >0.4.99 <0.6.0;
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interface TxUserWallet {
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function transferTo(address payable dest, uint amount) external;
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}
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contract TxAttackWallet {
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address payable owner;
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constructor() public {
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owner = msg.sender;
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}
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function() external {
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TxUserWallet(msg.sender).transferTo(owner, msg.sender.balance);
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}
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}
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If your wallet had checked ``msg.sender`` for authorization, it would get the address of the attack wallet, instead of the owner address. But by checking ``tx.origin``, it gets the original address that kicked off the transaction, which is still the owner address. The attack wallet instantly drains all your funds.
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Two's Complement / Underflows / Overflows
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=========================================
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As in many programming languages, Solidity's integer types are not actually integers.
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They resemble integers when the values are small, but behave differently if the numbers are larger.
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For example, the following is true: ``uint8(255) + uint8(1) == 0``. This situation is called
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an *overflow*. It occurs when an operation is performed that requires a fixed size variable
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to store a number (or piece of data) that is outside the range of the variable's data type.
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An *underflow* is the converse situation: ``uint8(0) - uint8(1) == 255``.
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In general, read about the limits of two's complement representation, which even has some
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more special edge cases for signed numbers.
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Try to use ``require`` to limit the size of inputs to a reasonable range and use the
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:ref:`SMT checker<smt_checker>` to find potential overflows, or
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use a library like
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`SafeMath<https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-solidity/blob/master/contracts/math/SafeMath.sol>`
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if you want all overflows to cause a revert.
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Minor Details
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=============
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- Types that do not occupy the full 32 bytes might contain "dirty higher order bits".
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This is especially important if you access ``msg.data`` - it poses a malleability risk:
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You can craft transactions that call a function ``f(uint8 x)`` with a raw byte argument
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of ``0xff000001`` and with ``0x00000001``. Both are fed to the contract and both will
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look like the number ``1`` as far as ``x`` is concerned, but ``msg.data`` will
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be different, so if you use ``keccak256(msg.data)`` for anything, you will get different results.
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***************
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Recommendations
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***************
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Take Warnings Seriously
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=======================
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If the compiler warns you about something, you should better change it.
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Even if you do not think that this particular warning has security
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implications, there might be another issue buried beneath it.
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Any compiler warning we issue can be silenced by slight changes to the
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code.
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Always use the latest version of the compiler to be notified about all recently
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introduced warnings.
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Restrict the Amount of Ether
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============================
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Restrict the amount of Ether (or other tokens) that can be stored in a smart
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contract. If your source code, the compiler or the platform has a bug, these
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funds may be lost. If you want to limit your loss, limit the amount of Ether.
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Keep it Small and Modular
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=========================
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Keep your contracts small and easily understandable. Single out unrelated
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functionality in other contracts or into libraries. General recommendations
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about source code quality of course apply: Limit the amount of local variables,
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the length of functions and so on. Document your functions so that others
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can see what your intention was and whether it is different than what the code does.
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Use the Checks-Effects-Interactions Pattern
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===========================================
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Most functions will first perform some checks (who called the function,
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are the arguments in range, did they send enough Ether, does the person
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have tokens, etc.). These checks should be done first.
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As the second step, if all checks passed, effects to the state variables
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of the current contract should be made. Interaction with other contracts
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should be the very last step in any function.
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Early contracts delayed some effects and waited for external function
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calls to return in a non-error state. This is often a serious mistake
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because of the re-entrancy problem explained above.
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Note that, also, calls to known contracts might in turn cause calls to
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unknown contracts, so it is probably better to just always apply this pattern.
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Include a Fail-Safe Mode
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========================
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While making your system fully decentralised will remove any intermediary,
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it might be a good idea, especially for new code, to include some kind
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of fail-safe mechanism:
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You can add a function in your smart contract that performs some
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self-checks like "Has any Ether leaked?",
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"Is the sum of the tokens equal to the balance of the contract?" or similar things.
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Keep in mind that you cannot use too much gas for that, so help through off-chain
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computations might be needed there.
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If the self-check fails, the contract automatically switches into some kind
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of "failsafe" mode, which, for example, disables most of the features, hands over
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control to a fixed and trusted third party or just converts the contract into
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a simple "give me back my money" contract.
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Ask for Peer Review
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===================
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The more people examine a piece of code, the more issues are found.
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Asking people to review your code also helps as a cross-check to find out whether your code
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is easy to understand - a very important criterion for good smart contracts.
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*******************
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Formal Verification
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*******************
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Using formal verification, it is possible to perform an automated mathematical
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proof that your source code fulfills a certain formal specification.
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The specification is still formal (just as the source code), but usually much
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simpler.
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Note that formal verification itself can only help you understand the
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difference between what you did (the specification) and how you did it
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(the actual implementation). You still need to check whether the specification
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is what you wanted and that you did not miss any unintended effects of it.
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