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e10297a2ef
Expanded malleability risks.
226 lines
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226 lines
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#######################
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Security Considerations
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While it is usually quite easy to build software that works as expected,
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it is much harder to check that nobody can use it in a way that was **not** anticipated.
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In Solidity, this is even more important because you can use smart contracts
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to handle tokens or, possibly, even more valuable things. Furthermore, every
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execution of a smart contract happens in public and, in addition to that,
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the source code is often available.
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Of course you always have to consider how much is at stake:
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You can compare a smart contract with a web service that is open to the
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public (and thus, also to malicous actors) and perhaps even open source.
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If you only store your grocery list on that web service, you might not have
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to take too much care, but if you manage your bank account using that web service,
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you should be more careful.
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This section will list some pitfalls and general security recommendations but
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can, of course, never be complete. Also, keep in mind that even if your
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smart contract code is bug-free, the compiler or the platform itself might
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have a bug.
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As always, with open source documentation, please help us extend this section
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(especially, some examples would not hurt)!
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********
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Pitfalls
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********
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Private Information and Randomness
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==================================
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Everything you use in a smart contract is publicly visible, even
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local variables and state variables marked ``private``.
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Using random numbers in smart contracts is quite tricky if you do not want
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miners to be able to cheat.
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Re-Entrancy
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===========
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Any interaction from a contract (A) with another contract (B) and any transfer
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of Ether hands over control to that contract (B). This makes it possible for B
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to call back into A before this interaction is completed. To give an example,
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the following code contains a bug (it is just a snippet and not a
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complete contract):
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::
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// THIS CONTRACT CONTAINS A BUG - DO NOT USE
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contract Fund {
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/// Mapping of ether shares of the contract.
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mapping(address => uint) shares;
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/// Withdraw your share.
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function withdraw() {
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if (msg.sender.send(shares[msg.sender]))
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shares[msg.sender] = 0;
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}
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}
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The problem is not too serious here because of the limited gas as part
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of ``send``, but it still exposes a weakness: Ether transfer always
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includes code execution, so the recipient could be a contract that calls
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back into ``withdraw``. This would let it get multiple refunds and
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basically retrieve all the Ether in the contract.
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To avoid re-entrancy, you can use the Checks-Effects-Interactions pattern as
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outlined further below:
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::
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contract Fund {
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/// Mapping of ether shares of the contract.
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mapping(address => uint) shares;
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/// Withdraw your share.
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function withdraw() {
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var share = shares[msg.sender];
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shares[msg.sender] = 0;
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if (!msg.sender.send(share))
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throw;
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}
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}
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Note that re-entrancy is not only an effect of Ether transfer but of any
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function call on another contract. Furthermore, you also have to take
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multi-contract situations into account. A called contract could modify the
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state of another contract you depend on.
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Gas Limit and Loops
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===================
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Loops that do not have a fixed number of iterations, for example, loops that depend on storage values, have to be used carefully:
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Due to the block gas limit, transactions can only consume a certain amount of gas. Either explicitly or just due to
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normal operation, the number of iterations in a loop can grow beyond the block gas limit which can cause the complete
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contract to be stalled at a certain point. This may not apply to ``constant`` functions that are only executed
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to read data from the blockchain. Still, such functions may be called by other contracts as part of on-chain operations
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and stall those. Please be explicit about such cases in the documentation of your contracts.
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Sending and Receiving Ether
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===========================
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- If a contract receives Ether (without a function being called), the fallback function is executed. The contract can only rely
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on the "gas stipend" (2300 gas) being available to it at that time. This stipend is not enough to access storage in any way.
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To be sure that your contract can receive Ether in that way, check the gas requirements of the fallback function
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(for example in the "details" section in browser-solidity).
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- There is a way to forward more gas to the receiving contract using
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``addr.call.value(x)()``. This is essentially the same as ``addr.send(x)``,
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only that it forwards all remaining gas and opens up the ability for the
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recipient to perform more expensive actions. This might include calling back
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into the sending contract or other state changes you might not have though of.
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So it allows for great flexibility for honest users but also for malicious actors.
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- If you want to send Ether using ``address.send``, there are certain details to be aware of:
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1. If the recipient is a contract, it causes its fallback function to be executed which can, in turn, call back the sending contract.
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2. Sending Ether can fail due to the call depth going above 1024. Since the caller is in total control of the call
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depth, they can force the transfer to fail; make sure to always check the return value of ``send``. Better yet,
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write your contract using a pattern where the recipient can withdraw Ether instead.
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3. Sending Ether can also fail because the execution of the recipient contract
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requires more than the allotted amount of gas (explicitly by using ``throw`` or
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because the operation is just too expensive) - it "runs out of gas" (OOG).
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If the return value of ``send`` is checked, this might provide a
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means for the recipient to block progress in the sending contract. Again, the best practice here is to use
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a "withdraw" pattern instead of a "send" pattern.
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Callstack Depth
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===============
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External function calls can fail any time because they exceed the maximum
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call stack of 1024. In such situations, Solidity throws an exception.
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Malicious actors might be able to force the call stack to a high value
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before they interact with your contract.
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Note that ``.send()`` does **not** throw an exception if the call stack is
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depleted but rather returns ``false`` in that case. The low-level functions
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``.call()``, ``.callcode()`` and ``.delegatecall()`` behave in the same way.
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Minor Details
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=============
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- In ``for (var i = 0; i < arrayName.length; i++) { ... }``, the type of ``i`` will be ``uint8``, because this is the smallest type that is required to hold the value ``0``. If the array has more than 255 elements, the loop will not terminate.
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- The ``constant`` keyword for functions is currently not enforced by the compiler.
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Furthermore, it is not enforced by the EVM, so a contract function that "claims"
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to be constant might still cause changes to the state.
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- Types that do not occupy the full 32 bytes might contain "dirty higher order bits".
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This is especially important if you access ``msg.data`` - it poses a malleability risk:
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You can craft transactions that call a function ``f(uint8 x)`` with a raw byte argument
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of ``0xff000001`` and with ``0x00000001``. Both are fed to the contract and both will
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look like the number ``1`` as far as ``x`` is concerned, but ``msg.data`` will
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be different, so if you use ``sha3(msg.data)`` for anything, you will get different results.
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***************
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Recommendations
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***************
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Restrict the Amount of Ether
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============================
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Restrict the amount of Ether (or other tokens) that can be stored in a smart
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contract. If your source code, the compiler or the platform has a bug, these
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funds may be lost. If you want to limit your loss, limit the amount of Ether.
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Keep it Small and Modular
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=========================
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Keep your contracts small and easily understandable. Single out unrelated
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functionality in other contracts or into libraries. General recommendations
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about source code quality of course apply: Limit the amount of local variables,
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the length of functions and so on. Document your functions so that others
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can see what your intention was and whether it is different than what the code does.
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Use the Checks-Effects-Interactions Pattern
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===========================================
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Most functions will first perform some checks (who called the function,
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are the arguments in range, did they send enough Ether, does the person
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have tokens, etc.). These checks should be done first.
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As the second step, if all checks passed, effects to the state variables
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of the current contract should be made. Interaction with other contracts
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should be the very last step in any function.
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Early contracts delayed some effects and waited for external function
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calls to return in a non-error state. This is often a serious mistake
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because of the re-entrancy problem explained above.
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Note that, also, calls to known contracts might in turn cause calls to
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unknown contracts, so it is probably better to just always apply this pattern.
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Include a Fail-Safe Mode
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========================
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While making your system fully decentralised will remove any intermediary,
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it might be a good idea, especially for new code, to include some kind
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of fail-safe mechanism:
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You can add a function in your smart contract that performs some
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self-checks like "Has any Ether leaked?",
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"Is the sum of the tokens equal to the balance of the contract?" or similar things.
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Keep in mind that you cannot use too much gas for that, so help through off-chain
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computations might be needed there.
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If the self-check fails, the contract automatically switches into some kind
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of "failsafe" mode, which, for example, disables most of the features, hands over
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control to a fixed and trusted third party or just converts the contract into
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a simple "give me back my money" contract.
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*******************
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Formal Verification
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*******************
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Using formal verification, it is possible to perform an automated mathematical
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proof that your source code fulfills a certain formal specification.
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The specification is still formal (just as the source code), but usually much
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simpler. There is a prototype in Solidity that performs formal verification and
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it will be better documented soon.
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Note that formal verification itself can only help you understand the
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difference between what you did (the specification) and how you did it
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(the actual implementation). You still need to check whether the specification
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is what you wanted and that you did not miss any unintended effects of it.
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