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https://github.com/ethereum/solidity
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basic ecies class
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5693de0f13
commit
224f43bf81
@ -21,8 +21,6 @@
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#pragma once
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//#include <ostream>
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#pragma warning(push)
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#pragma warning(disable:4100 4244)
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#pragma GCC diagnostic push
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114
crypto.cpp
114
crypto.cpp
@ -27,27 +27,38 @@
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#include <libdevcore/Log.h>
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#include <libethereum/Transaction.h>
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#include <boost/test/unit_test.hpp>
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#include <libdevcrypto/EC.h>
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#include <libdevcrypto/ECIES.h>
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#include "TestHelperCrypto.h"
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using namespace std;
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using namespace dev;
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namespace dev
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{
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namespace crypto
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{
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inline CryptoPP::AutoSeededRandomPool& PRNG() {
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static CryptoPP::AutoSeededRandomPool prng;
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return prng;
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}
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}
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}
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using namespace dev::crypto;
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using namespace CryptoPP;
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BOOST_AUTO_TEST_SUITE(crypto)
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BOOST_AUTO_TEST_SUITE(devcrypto)
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BOOST_AUTO_TEST_CASE(ecies)
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{
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ECKeyPair k = ECKeyPair::create();
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string message("Now is the time for all good men to come to the aide of humanity.");
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bytes b = bytesConstRef(message).toBytes();
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ECIESEncryptor(&k).encrypt(b);
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bytesConstRef br(&b);
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bytes plain = ECIESDecryptor(&k).decrypt(br);
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assert(plain == bytesConstRef(message).toBytes());
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}
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BOOST_AUTO_TEST_CASE(ecdhe_aes128_ctr_sha3mac)
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{
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// New connections require new ECDH keypairs
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// Every new connection requires a new EC keypair
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// Every new trust requires a new EC keypair
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// All connections should share seed for PRF (or PRNG) for nonces
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}
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BOOST_AUTO_TEST_CASE(cryptopp_ecies_message)
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{
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@ -55,9 +66,7 @@ BOOST_AUTO_TEST_CASE(cryptopp_ecies_message)
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string const message("Now is the time for all good men to come to the aide of humanity.");
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AutoSeededRandomPool prng;
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ECIES<ECP>::Decryptor localDecryptor(prng, ASN1::secp256r1());
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ECIES<ECP>::Decryptor localDecryptor(crypto::PRNG(), crypto::secp256k1());
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SavePrivateKey(localDecryptor.GetPrivateKey());
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ECIES<ECP>::Encryptor localEncryptor(localDecryptor);
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@ -65,31 +74,31 @@ BOOST_AUTO_TEST_CASE(cryptopp_ecies_message)
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ECIES<ECP>::Decryptor futureDecryptor;
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LoadPrivateKey(futureDecryptor.AccessPrivateKey());
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futureDecryptor.GetPrivateKey().ThrowIfInvalid(prng, 3);
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futureDecryptor.GetPrivateKey().ThrowIfInvalid(crypto::PRNG(), 3);
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ECIES<ECP>::Encryptor futureEncryptor;
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LoadPublicKey(futureEncryptor.AccessPublicKey());
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futureEncryptor.GetPublicKey().ThrowIfInvalid(prng, 3);
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futureEncryptor.GetPublicKey().ThrowIfInvalid(crypto::PRNG(), 3);
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// encrypt/decrypt with local
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string cipherLocal;
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StringSource ss1 (message, true, new PK_EncryptorFilter(prng, localEncryptor, new StringSink(cipherLocal) ) );
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StringSource ss1 (message, true, new PK_EncryptorFilter(crypto::PRNG(), localEncryptor, new StringSink(cipherLocal) ) );
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string plainLocal;
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StringSource ss2 (cipherLocal, true, new PK_DecryptorFilter(prng, localDecryptor, new StringSink(plainLocal) ) );
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StringSource ss2 (cipherLocal, true, new PK_DecryptorFilter(crypto::PRNG(), localDecryptor, new StringSink(plainLocal) ) );
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// encrypt/decrypt with future
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string cipherFuture;
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StringSource ss3 (message, true, new PK_EncryptorFilter(prng, futureEncryptor, new StringSink(cipherFuture) ) );
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StringSource ss3 (message, true, new PK_EncryptorFilter(crypto::PRNG(), futureEncryptor, new StringSink(cipherFuture) ) );
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string plainFuture;
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StringSource ss4 (cipherFuture, true, new PK_DecryptorFilter(prng, futureDecryptor, new StringSink(plainFuture) ) );
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StringSource ss4 (cipherFuture, true, new PK_DecryptorFilter(crypto::PRNG(), futureDecryptor, new StringSink(plainFuture) ) );
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// decrypt local w/future
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string plainFutureFromLocal;
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StringSource ss5 (cipherLocal, true, new PK_DecryptorFilter(prng, futureDecryptor, new StringSink(plainFutureFromLocal) ) );
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StringSource ss5 (cipherLocal, true, new PK_DecryptorFilter(crypto::PRNG(), futureDecryptor, new StringSink(plainFutureFromLocal) ) );
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// decrypt future w/local
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string plainLocalFromFuture;
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StringSource ss6 (cipherFuture, true, new PK_DecryptorFilter(prng, localDecryptor, new StringSink(plainLocalFromFuture) ) );
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StringSource ss6 (cipherFuture, true, new PK_DecryptorFilter(crypto::PRNG(), localDecryptor, new StringSink(plainLocalFromFuture) ) );
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assert(plainLocal == message);
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@ -173,60 +182,7 @@ BOOST_AUTO_TEST_CASE(cryptopp_aes128_cbc)
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cbcDecryption.ProcessData((byte*)&cipher[0], (byte*)&string192[0], cipher.size());
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assert(string192 == plainOriginal);
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}
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BOOST_AUTO_TEST_CASE(cryptopp_ecdh_aes128_cbc_noauth)
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{
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// ECDH gives 256-bit shared while aes uses 128-bits
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// Use first 128-bits of shared secret as symmetric key
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// IV is 0
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// New connections require new ECDH keypairs
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}
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BOOST_AUTO_TEST_CASE(cryptopp_eth_fbba)
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{
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// Initial Authentication:
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//
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// New/Known Peer:
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// pubkeyL = knownR? ? myKnown : myECDH
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// pubkeyR = knownR? ? theirKnown : theirECDH
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//
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// Initial message = hmac(k=sha3(shared-secret[128..255]), address(pubkeyL)) || ECIES encrypt(pubkeyR, pubkeyL)
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//
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// Key Exchange (this could occur after handshake messages):
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// If peers do not know each other they will need to exchange public keys.
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//
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// Drop ECDH (this could occur after handshake messages):
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// After authentication and/or key exchange, both sides generate shared key
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// from their 'known' keys and use this to encrypt all future messages.
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//
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// v2: If one side doesn't trust the other then a single-use key maybe sent.
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// This will need to be tracked for future connections; when non-trusting peer
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// wants to trust the other, it can request that it's old, 'new', public key be
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// accepted. And, if the peer *really* doesn't trust the other side, it can request
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// that a new, 'new', public key be accepted.
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//
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// Handshake (all or nothing, padded):
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// All Peers (except blacklisted):
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//
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//
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// New Peer:
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//
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//
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// Known Untrusted Peer:
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//
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//
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// Known Trusted Peer:
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//
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//
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// Blacklisted Peeer:
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// Already dropped by now.
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//
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//
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// MAC:
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// ...
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}
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BOOST_AUTO_TEST_CASE(eth_keypairs)
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{
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cnote << "Testing Crypto...";
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