2019-01-14 08:36:47 +00:00
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.. index:: auction;blind, auction;open, blind auction, open auction
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*************
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Blind Auction
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*************
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In this section, we will show how easy it is to create a
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completely blind auction contract on Ethereum.
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We will start with an open auction where everyone
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can see the bids that are made and then extend this
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contract into a blind auction where it is not
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possible to see the actual bid until the bidding
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period ends.
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.. _simple_auction:
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Simple Open Auction
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===================
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The general idea of the following simple auction contract
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is that everyone can send their bids during
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a bidding period. The bids already include sending
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money / ether in order to bind the bidders to their
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bid. If the highest bid is raised, the previously
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highest bidder gets her money back.
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After the end of the bidding period, the
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contract has to be called manually for the
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beneficiary to receive their money - contracts cannot
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activate themselves.
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::
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2019-03-05 17:10:09 +00:00
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pragma solidity >=0.4.22 <0.7.0;
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2019-01-14 08:36:47 +00:00
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contract SimpleAuction {
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// Parameters of the auction. Times are either
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// absolute unix timestamps (seconds since 1970-01-01)
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// or time periods in seconds.
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address payable public beneficiary;
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uint public auctionEndTime;
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// Current state of the auction.
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address public highestBidder;
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uint public highestBid;
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// Allowed withdrawals of previous bids
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mapping(address => uint) pendingReturns;
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// Set to true at the end, disallows any change.
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// By default initialized to `false`.
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bool ended;
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// Events that will be emitted on changes.
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event HighestBidIncreased(address bidder, uint amount);
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event AuctionEnded(address winner, uint amount);
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// The following is a so-called natspec comment,
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// recognizable by the three slashes.
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// It will be shown when the user is asked to
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// confirm a transaction.
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/// Create a simple auction with `_biddingTime`
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/// seconds bidding time on behalf of the
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/// beneficiary address `_beneficiary`.
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constructor(
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uint _biddingTime,
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address payable _beneficiary
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) public {
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beneficiary = _beneficiary;
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auctionEndTime = now + _biddingTime;
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}
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/// Bid on the auction with the value sent
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/// together with this transaction.
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/// The value will only be refunded if the
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/// auction is not won.
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function bid() public payable {
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// No arguments are necessary, all
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// information is already part of
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// the transaction. The keyword payable
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// is required for the function to
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// be able to receive Ether.
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// Revert the call if the bidding
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// period is over.
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require(
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now <= auctionEndTime,
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"Auction already ended."
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);
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// If the bid is not higher, send the
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2019-12-12 14:09:09 +00:00
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// money back (the failing require
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// will revert all changes in this
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// function execution including
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// it having received the money).
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2019-01-14 08:36:47 +00:00
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require(
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msg.value > highestBid,
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"There already is a higher bid."
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);
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if (highestBid != 0) {
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// Sending back the money by simply using
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// highestBidder.send(highestBid) is a security risk
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// because it could execute an untrusted contract.
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// It is always safer to let the recipients
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// withdraw their money themselves.
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pendingReturns[highestBidder] += highestBid;
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}
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highestBidder = msg.sender;
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highestBid = msg.value;
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emit HighestBidIncreased(msg.sender, msg.value);
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}
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/// Withdraw a bid that was overbid.
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function withdraw() public returns (bool) {
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uint amount = pendingReturns[msg.sender];
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if (amount > 0) {
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// It is important to set this to zero because the recipient
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// can call this function again as part of the receiving call
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// before `send` returns.
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pendingReturns[msg.sender] = 0;
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if (!msg.sender.send(amount)) {
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// No need to call throw here, just reset the amount owing
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pendingReturns[msg.sender] = amount;
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return false;
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}
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}
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return true;
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}
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/// End the auction and send the highest bid
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/// to the beneficiary.
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function auctionEnd() public {
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// It is a good guideline to structure functions that interact
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// with other contracts (i.e. they call functions or send Ether)
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// into three phases:
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// 1. checking conditions
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// 2. performing actions (potentially changing conditions)
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// 3. interacting with other contracts
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// If these phases are mixed up, the other contract could call
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// back into the current contract and modify the state or cause
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// effects (ether payout) to be performed multiple times.
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// If functions called internally include interaction with external
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// contracts, they also have to be considered interaction with
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// external contracts.
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// 1. Conditions
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require(now >= auctionEndTime, "Auction not yet ended.");
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require(!ended, "auctionEnd has already been called.");
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// 2. Effects
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ended = true;
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emit AuctionEnded(highestBidder, highestBid);
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// 3. Interaction
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beneficiary.transfer(highestBid);
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}
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}
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Blind Auction
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=============
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The previous open auction is extended to a blind auction
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in the following. The advantage of a blind auction is
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that there is no time pressure towards the end of
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the bidding period. Creating a blind auction on a
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transparent computing platform might sound like a
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contradiction, but cryptography comes to the rescue.
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During the **bidding period**, a bidder does not
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actually send her bid, but only a hashed version of it.
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Since it is currently considered practically impossible
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to find two (sufficiently long) values whose hash
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values are equal, the bidder commits to the bid by that.
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After the end of the bidding period, the bidders have
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to reveal their bids: They send their values
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unencrypted and the contract checks that the hash value
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is the same as the one provided during the bidding period.
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Another challenge is how to make the auction
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**binding and blind** at the same time: The only way to
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prevent the bidder from just not sending the money
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after they won the auction is to make her send it
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together with the bid. Since value transfers cannot
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be blinded in Ethereum, anyone can see the value.
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The following contract solves this problem by
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accepting any value that is larger than the highest
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bid. Since this can of course only be checked during
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the reveal phase, some bids might be **invalid**, and
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this is on purpose (it even provides an explicit
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flag to place invalid bids with high value transfers):
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Bidders can confuse competition by placing several
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high or low invalid bids.
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::
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2019-03-05 17:10:09 +00:00
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pragma solidity >0.4.23 <0.7.0;
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2019-01-14 08:36:47 +00:00
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contract BlindAuction {
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struct Bid {
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bytes32 blindedBid;
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uint deposit;
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}
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address payable public beneficiary;
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uint public biddingEnd;
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uint public revealEnd;
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bool public ended;
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mapping(address => Bid[]) public bids;
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address public highestBidder;
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uint public highestBid;
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// Allowed withdrawals of previous bids
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mapping(address => uint) pendingReturns;
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event AuctionEnded(address winner, uint highestBid);
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/// Modifiers are a convenient way to validate inputs to
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/// functions. `onlyBefore` is applied to `bid` below:
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/// The new function body is the modifier's body where
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/// `_` is replaced by the old function body.
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modifier onlyBefore(uint _time) { require(now < _time); _; }
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modifier onlyAfter(uint _time) { require(now > _time); _; }
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constructor(
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uint _biddingTime,
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uint _revealTime,
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address payable _beneficiary
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) public {
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beneficiary = _beneficiary;
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biddingEnd = now + _biddingTime;
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revealEnd = biddingEnd + _revealTime;
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}
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/// Place a blinded bid with `_blindedBid` =
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/// keccak256(abi.encodePacked(value, fake, secret)).
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/// The sent ether is only refunded if the bid is correctly
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/// revealed in the revealing phase. The bid is valid if the
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/// ether sent together with the bid is at least "value" and
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/// "fake" is not true. Setting "fake" to true and sending
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/// not the exact amount are ways to hide the real bid but
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/// still make the required deposit. The same address can
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/// place multiple bids.
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function bid(bytes32 _blindedBid)
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public
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payable
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onlyBefore(biddingEnd)
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{
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bids[msg.sender].push(Bid({
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blindedBid: _blindedBid,
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deposit: msg.value
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}));
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}
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/// Reveal your blinded bids. You will get a refund for all
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/// correctly blinded invalid bids and for all bids except for
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/// the totally highest.
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function reveal(
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uint[] memory _values,
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bool[] memory _fake,
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bytes32[] memory _secret
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)
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public
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onlyAfter(biddingEnd)
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onlyBefore(revealEnd)
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{
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uint length = bids[msg.sender].length;
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require(_values.length == length);
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require(_fake.length == length);
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require(_secret.length == length);
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uint refund;
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for (uint i = 0; i < length; i++) {
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Bid storage bidToCheck = bids[msg.sender][i];
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(uint value, bool fake, bytes32 secret) =
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(_values[i], _fake[i], _secret[i]);
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if (bidToCheck.blindedBid != keccak256(abi.encodePacked(value, fake, secret))) {
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// Bid was not actually revealed.
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// Do not refund deposit.
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continue;
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}
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refund += bidToCheck.deposit;
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if (!fake && bidToCheck.deposit >= value) {
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if (placeBid(msg.sender, value))
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refund -= value;
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}
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// Make it impossible for the sender to re-claim
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// the same deposit.
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bidToCheck.blindedBid = bytes32(0);
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}
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msg.sender.transfer(refund);
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}
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// This is an "internal" function which means that it
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// can only be called from the contract itself (or from
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// derived contracts).
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function placeBid(address bidder, uint value) internal
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returns (bool success)
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{
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if (value <= highestBid) {
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return false;
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}
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if (highestBidder != address(0)) {
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// Refund the previously highest bidder.
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pendingReturns[highestBidder] += highestBid;
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}
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highestBid = value;
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highestBidder = bidder;
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return true;
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}
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/// Withdraw a bid that was overbid.
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function withdraw() public {
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uint amount = pendingReturns[msg.sender];
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if (amount > 0) {
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// It is important to set this to zero because the recipient
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// can call this function again as part of the receiving call
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// before `transfer` returns (see the remark above about
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// conditions -> effects -> interaction).
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pendingReturns[msg.sender] = 0;
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msg.sender.transfer(amount);
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}
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}
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/// End the auction and send the highest bid
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/// to the beneficiary.
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function auctionEnd()
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public
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onlyAfter(revealEnd)
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{
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require(!ended);
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emit AuctionEnded(highestBidder, highestBid);
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ended = true;
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beneficiary.transfer(highestBid);
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}
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}
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