2019-01-14 08:54:07 +00:00
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********************
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Micropayment Channel
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********************
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In this section we will learn how to build an example implementation
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of a payment channel. It uses cryptographic signatures to make
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repeated transfers of Ether between the same parties secure, instantaneous, and
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without transaction fees. For the example, we need to understand how to
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sign and verify signatures, and setup the payment channel.
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Creating and verifying signatures
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=================================
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Imagine Alice wants to send a quantity of Ether to Bob, i.e.
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Alice is the sender and the Bob is the recipient.
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Alice only needs to send cryptographically signed messages off-chain
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(e.g. via email) to Bob and it is similar to writing checks.
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Alice and Bob use signatures to authorise transactions, which is possible with smart contracts on Ethereum.
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Alice will build a simple smart contract that lets her transmit Ether, but instead of calling a function herself
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to initiate a payment, she will let Bob do that, and therefore pay the transaction fee.
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The contract will work as follows:
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1. Alice deploys the ``ReceiverPays`` contract, attaching enough Ether to cover the payments that will be made.
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2021-02-09 18:11:00 +00:00
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2. Alice authorises a payment by signing a message with her private key.
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2019-01-14 08:54:07 +00:00
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3. Alice sends the cryptographically signed message to Bob. The message does not need to be kept secret
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(explained later), and the mechanism for sending it does not matter.
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2021-02-09 18:11:00 +00:00
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4. Bob claims his payment by presenting the signed message to the smart contract, it verifies the
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2019-01-14 08:54:07 +00:00
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authenticity of the message and then releases the funds.
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Creating the signature
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----------------------
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2019-12-12 14:09:09 +00:00
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Alice does not need to interact with the Ethereum network
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to sign the transaction, the process is completely offline.
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In this tutorial, we will sign messages in the browser
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using `web3.js <https://github.com/ethereum/web3.js>`_ and
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`MetaMask <https://metamask.io>`_, using the method described in `EIP-762 <https://github.com/ethereum/EIPs/pull/712>`_,
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2019-01-14 08:54:07 +00:00
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as it provides a number of other security benefits.
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::
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2019-03-23 10:38:59 +00:00
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2019-01-14 08:54:07 +00:00
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/// Hashing first makes things easier
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var hash = web3.utils.sha3("message to sign");
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web3.eth.personal.sign(hash, web3.eth.defaultAccount, function () { console.log("Signed"); });
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.. note::
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2019-12-12 14:09:09 +00:00
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The ``web3.eth.personal.sign`` prepends the length of the
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message to the signed data. Since we hash first, the message
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will always be exactly 32 bytes long, and thus this length
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prefix is always the same.
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2019-01-14 08:54:07 +00:00
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What to Sign
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------------
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For a contract that fulfils payments, the signed message must include:
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1. The recipient's address.
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2. The amount to be transferred.
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3. Protection against replay attacks.
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2020-09-11 16:32:15 +00:00
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A replay attack is when a signed message is reused to claim
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authorization for a second action. To avoid replay attacks
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we use the same technique as in Ethereum transactions themselves,
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a so-called nonce, which is the number of transactions sent by
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an account. The smart contract checks if a nonce is used multiple times.
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2019-01-14 08:54:07 +00:00
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2019-12-12 14:09:09 +00:00
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Another type of replay attack can occur when the owner
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deploys a ``ReceiverPays`` smart contract, makes some
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payments, and then destroys the contract. Later, they decide
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to deploy the ``RecipientPays`` smart contract again, but the
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new contract does not know the nonces used in the previous
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deployment, so the attacker can use the old messages again.
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2019-01-14 08:54:07 +00:00
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2019-12-12 14:09:09 +00:00
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Alice can protect against this attack by including the
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contract's address in the message, and only messages containing
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the contract's address itself will be accepted. You can find
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an example of this in the first two lines of the ``claimPayment()``
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function of the full contract at the end of this section.
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2019-01-14 08:54:07 +00:00
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Packing arguments
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-----------------
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Now that we have identified what information to include in the signed message,
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we are ready to put the message together, hash it, and sign it. For simplicity,
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we concatenate the data. The `ethereumjs-abi <https://github.com/ethereumjs/ethereumjs-abi>`_
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library provides a function called ``soliditySHA3`` that mimics the behaviour of
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Solidity's ``keccak256`` function applied to arguments encoded using ``abi.encodePacked``.
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Here is a JavaScript function that creates the proper signature for the ``ReceiverPays`` example:
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::
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// recipient is the address that should be paid.
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// amount, in wei, specifies how much ether should be sent.
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// nonce can be any unique number to prevent replay attacks
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// contractAddress is used to prevent cross-contract replay attacks
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function signPayment(recipient, amount, nonce, contractAddress, callback) {
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var hash = "0x" + abi.soliditySHA3(
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["address", "uint256", "uint256", "address"],
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[recipient, amount, nonce, contractAddress]
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).toString("hex");
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web3.eth.personal.sign(hash, web3.eth.defaultAccount, callback);
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}
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Recovering the Message Signer in Solidity
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-----------------------------------------
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2019-12-12 14:09:09 +00:00
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In general, ECDSA signatures consist of two parameters,
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``r`` and ``s``. Signatures in Ethereum include a third
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parameter called ``v``, that you can use to verify which
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account's private key was used to sign the message, and
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the transaction's sender. Solidity provides a built-in
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2020-08-06 10:56:17 +00:00
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function :ref:`ecrecover <mathematical-and-cryptographic-functions>` that
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2019-12-12 14:09:09 +00:00
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accepts a message along with the ``r``, ``s`` and ``v`` parameters
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and returns the address that was used to sign the message.
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2019-01-14 08:54:07 +00:00
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Extracting the Signature Parameters
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-----------------------------------
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2019-12-12 14:09:09 +00:00
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Signatures produced by web3.js are the concatenation of ``r``,
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``s`` and ``v``, so the first step is to split these parameters
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apart. You can do this on the client-side, but doing it inside
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the smart contract means you only need to send one signature
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parameter rather than three. Splitting apart a byte array into
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its constituent parts is a mess, so we use
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2020-08-06 10:56:17 +00:00
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:doc:`inline assembly <assembly>` to do the job in the ``splitSignature``
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function (the third function in the full contract at the end of this section).
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2019-01-14 08:54:07 +00:00
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Computing the Message Hash
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--------------------------
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The smart contract needs to know exactly what parameters were signed, and so it
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must recreate the message from the parameters and use that for signature verification.
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The functions ``prefixed`` and ``recoverSigner`` do this in the ``claimPayment`` function.
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The full contract
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-----------------
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::
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2020-05-13 15:45:58 +00:00
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// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0
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2020-09-29 07:53:50 +00:00
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pragma solidity >=0.7.0 <0.9.0;
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2019-01-14 08:54:07 +00:00
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contract ReceiverPays {
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address owner = msg.sender;
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mapping(uint256 => bool) usedNonces;
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2020-06-23 16:11:34 +00:00
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constructor() payable {}
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2019-01-14 08:54:07 +00:00
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function claimPayment(uint256 amount, uint256 nonce, bytes memory signature) public {
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require(!usedNonces[nonce]);
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usedNonces[nonce] = true;
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// this recreates the message that was signed on the client
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bytes32 message = prefixed(keccak256(abi.encodePacked(msg.sender, amount, nonce, this)));
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require(recoverSigner(message, signature) == owner);
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2020-12-03 22:05:05 +00:00
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payable(msg.sender).transfer(amount);
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2019-01-14 08:54:07 +00:00
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}
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/// destroy the contract and reclaim the leftover funds.
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2019-12-04 01:39:24 +00:00
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function shutdown() public {
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2019-01-14 08:54:07 +00:00
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require(msg.sender == owner);
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2020-12-03 22:05:05 +00:00
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selfdestruct(payable(msg.sender));
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2019-01-14 08:54:07 +00:00
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}
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/// signature methods.
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function splitSignature(bytes memory sig)
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internal
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pure
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returns (uint8 v, bytes32 r, bytes32 s)
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{
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require(sig.length == 65);
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assembly {
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// first 32 bytes, after the length prefix.
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r := mload(add(sig, 32))
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// second 32 bytes.
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s := mload(add(sig, 64))
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// final byte (first byte of the next 32 bytes).
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v := byte(0, mload(add(sig, 96)))
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}
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return (v, r, s);
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}
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function recoverSigner(bytes32 message, bytes memory sig)
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internal
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pure
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returns (address)
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{
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(uint8 v, bytes32 r, bytes32 s) = splitSignature(sig);
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return ecrecover(message, v, r, s);
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}
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/// builds a prefixed hash to mimic the behavior of eth_sign.
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function prefixed(bytes32 hash) internal pure returns (bytes32) {
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return keccak256(abi.encodePacked("\x19Ethereum Signed Message:\n32", hash));
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}
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}
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Writing a Simple Payment Channel
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================================
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2019-12-12 14:09:09 +00:00
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Alice now builds a simple but complete implementation of a payment
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channel. Payment channels use cryptographic signatures to make
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repeated transfers of Ether securely, instantaneously, and without transaction fees.
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2019-01-14 08:54:07 +00:00
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What is a Payment Channel?
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--------------------------
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2019-12-12 14:09:09 +00:00
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Payment channels allow participants to make repeated transfers of Ether
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without using transactions. This means that you can avoid the delays and
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fees associated with transactions. We are going to explore a simple
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unidirectional payment channel between two parties (Alice and Bob). It involves three steps:
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2019-01-14 08:54:07 +00:00
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1. Alice funds a smart contract with Ether. This "opens" the payment channel.
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2. Alice signs messages that specify how much of that Ether is owed to the recipient. This step is repeated for each payment.
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2021-02-09 18:11:00 +00:00
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3. Bob "closes" the payment channel, withdrawing his portion of the Ether and sending the remainder back to the sender.
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2019-01-14 08:54:07 +00:00
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.. note::
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2019-12-12 14:09:09 +00:00
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Only steps 1 and 3 require Ethereum transactions, step 2 means that the sender
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transmits a cryptographically signed message to the recipient via off chain
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methods (e.g. email). This means only two transactions are required to support
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any number of transfers.
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2021-02-09 18:11:00 +00:00
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Bob is guaranteed to receive his funds because the smart contract escrows the
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2019-12-12 14:09:09 +00:00
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Ether and honours a valid signed message. The smart contract also enforces a
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2021-02-09 18:11:00 +00:00
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timeout, so Alice is guaranteed to eventually recover her funds even if the
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2019-12-12 14:09:09 +00:00
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recipient refuses to close the channel. It is up to the participants in a payment
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channel to decide how long to keep it open. For a short-lived transaction,
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2019-12-12 17:16:36 +00:00
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such as paying an internet café for each minute of network access, the payment
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channel may be kept open for a limited duration. On the other hand, for a
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recurring payment, such as paying an employee an hourly wage, the payment channel
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may be kept open for several months or years.
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2019-01-14 08:54:07 +00:00
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Opening the Payment Channel
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---------------------------
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2019-12-12 14:09:09 +00:00
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To open the payment channel, Alice deploys the smart contract, attaching
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the Ether to be escrowed and specifying the intended recipient and a
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maximum duration for the channel to exist. This is the function
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``SimplePaymentChannel`` in the contract, at the end of this section.
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2019-01-14 08:54:07 +00:00
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Making Payments
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---------------
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Alice makes payments by sending signed messages to Bob.
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This step is performed entirely outside of the Ethereum network.
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Messages are cryptographically signed by the sender and then transmitted directly to the recipient.
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Each message includes the following information:
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* The smart contract's address, used to prevent cross-contract replay attacks.
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* The total amount of Ether that is owed the recipient so far.
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A payment channel is closed just once, at the end of a series of transfers.
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Because of this, only one of the messages sent is redeemed. This is why
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each message specifies a cumulative total amount of Ether owed, rather than the
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amount of the individual micropayment. The recipient will naturally choose to
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redeem the most recent message because that is the one with the highest total.
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2019-12-12 14:09:09 +00:00
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The nonce per-message is not needed anymore, because the smart contract only
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honours a single message. The address of the smart contract is still used
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2019-01-14 08:54:07 +00:00
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to prevent a message intended for one payment channel from being used for a different channel.
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Here is the modified JavaScript code to cryptographically sign a message from the previous section:
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::
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function constructPaymentMessage(contractAddress, amount) {
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return abi.soliditySHA3(
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["address", "uint256"],
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[contractAddress, amount]
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);
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}
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function signMessage(message, callback) {
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web3.eth.personal.sign(
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"0x" + message.toString("hex"),
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web3.eth.defaultAccount,
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callback
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);
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}
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// contractAddress is used to prevent cross-contract replay attacks.
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// amount, in wei, specifies how much Ether should be sent.
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function signPayment(contractAddress, amount, callback) {
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var message = constructPaymentMessage(contractAddress, amount);
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signMessage(message, callback);
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}
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Closing the Payment Channel
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---------------------------
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2021-02-09 18:11:00 +00:00
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When Bob is ready to receive his funds, it is time to
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2019-01-14 08:54:07 +00:00
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close the payment channel by calling a ``close`` function on the smart contract.
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2019-12-12 14:09:09 +00:00
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Closing the channel pays the recipient the Ether they are owed and
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destroys the contract, sending any remaining Ether back to Alice. To
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close the channel, Bob needs to provide a message signed by Alice.
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2019-01-14 08:54:07 +00:00
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The smart contract must verify that the message contains a valid signature from the sender.
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The process for doing this verification is the same as the process the recipient uses.
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The Solidity functions ``isValidSignature`` and ``recoverSigner`` work just like their
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JavaScript counterparts in the previous section, with the latter function borrowed from the ``ReceiverPays`` contract.
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Only the payment channel recipient can call the ``close`` function,
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who naturally passes the most recent payment message because that message
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carries the highest total owed. If the sender were allowed to call this function,
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they could provide a message with a lower amount and cheat the recipient out of what they are owed.
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The function verifies the signed message matches the given parameters.
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If everything checks out, the recipient is sent their portion of the Ether,
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and the sender is sent the rest via a ``selfdestruct``.
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You can see the ``close`` function in the full contract.
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Channel Expiration
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-------------------
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Bob can close the payment channel at any time, but if they fail to do so,
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2021-02-09 18:11:00 +00:00
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Alice needs a way to recover her escrowed funds. An *expiration* time was set
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2019-01-14 08:54:07 +00:00
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at the time of contract deployment. Once that time is reached, Alice can call
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2021-02-09 18:11:00 +00:00
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``claimTimeout`` to recover her funds. You can see the ``claimTimeout`` function in the full contract.
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2019-01-14 08:54:07 +00:00
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After this function is called, Bob can no longer receive any Ether,
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so it is important that Bob closes the channel before the expiration is reached.
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The full contract
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-----------------
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::
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2020-05-13 15:45:58 +00:00
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// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0
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2020-09-29 07:53:50 +00:00
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pragma solidity >=0.7.0 <0.9.0;
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2019-01-14 08:54:07 +00:00
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contract SimplePaymentChannel {
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address payable public sender; // The account sending payments.
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address payable public recipient; // The account receiving the payments.
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uint256 public expiration; // Timeout in case the recipient never closes.
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constructor (address payable _recipient, uint256 duration)
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payable
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{
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2020-12-03 22:05:05 +00:00
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sender = payable(msg.sender);
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2019-01-14 08:54:07 +00:00
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recipient = _recipient;
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2020-05-05 08:56:31 +00:00
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expiration = block.timestamp + duration;
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2019-01-14 08:54:07 +00:00
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}
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/// the recipient can close the channel at any time by presenting a
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/// signed amount from the sender. the recipient will be sent that amount,
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/// and the remainder will go back to the sender
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function close(uint256 amount, bytes memory signature) public {
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require(msg.sender == recipient);
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require(isValidSignature(amount, signature));
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recipient.transfer(amount);
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selfdestruct(sender);
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}
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/// the sender can extend the expiration at any time
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function extend(uint256 newExpiration) public {
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require(msg.sender == sender);
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require(newExpiration > expiration);
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expiration = newExpiration;
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}
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/// if the timeout is reached without the recipient closing the channel,
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/// then the Ether is released back to the sender.
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function claimTimeout() public {
|
2020-05-05 08:56:31 +00:00
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require(block.timestamp >= expiration);
|
2019-01-14 08:54:07 +00:00
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selfdestruct(sender);
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}
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|
2019-12-13 15:19:49 +00:00
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function isValidSignature(uint256 amount, bytes memory signature)
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internal
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view
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returns (bool)
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{
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bytes32 message = prefixed(keccak256(abi.encodePacked(this, amount)));
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// check that the signature is from the payment sender
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return recoverSigner(message, signature) == sender;
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}
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|
2019-01-14 08:54:07 +00:00
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/// All functions below this are just taken from the chapter
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/// 'creating and verifying signatures' chapter.
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function splitSignature(bytes memory sig)
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internal
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pure
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returns (uint8 v, bytes32 r, bytes32 s)
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{
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require(sig.length == 65);
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assembly {
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// first 32 bytes, after the length prefix
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r := mload(add(sig, 32))
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// second 32 bytes
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s := mload(add(sig, 64))
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// final byte (first byte of the next 32 bytes)
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v := byte(0, mload(add(sig, 96)))
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}
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return (v, r, s);
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}
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function recoverSigner(bytes32 message, bytes memory sig)
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|
internal
|
|
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|
pure
|
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|
returns (address)
|
|
|
|
{
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|
(uint8 v, bytes32 r, bytes32 s) = splitSignature(sig);
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|
return ecrecover(message, v, r, s);
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|
}
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|
|
/// builds a prefixed hash to mimic the behavior of eth_sign.
|
|
|
|
function prefixed(bytes32 hash) internal pure returns (bytes32) {
|
|
|
|
return keccak256(abi.encodePacked("\x19Ethereum Signed Message:\n32", hash));
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
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|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
.. note::
|
|
|
|
The function ``splitSignature`` does not use all security
|
|
|
|
checks. A real implementation should use a more rigorously tested library,
|
2020-04-08 14:46:59 +00:00
|
|
|
such as openzepplin's `version <https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts/blob/master/contracts/cryptography/ECDSA.sol>`_ of this code.
|
2019-01-14 08:54:07 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Verifying Payments
|
|
|
|
------------------
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Unlike in the previous section, messages in a payment channel aren't
|
|
|
|
redeemed right away. The recipient keeps track of the latest message and
|
|
|
|
redeems it when it's time to close the payment channel. This means it's
|
|
|
|
critical that the recipient perform their own verification of each message.
|
|
|
|
Otherwise there is no guarantee that the recipient will be able to get paid
|
|
|
|
in the end.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The recipient should verify each message using the following process:
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
1. Verify that the contact address in the message matches the payment channel.
|
|
|
|
2. Verify that the new total is the expected amount.
|
|
|
|
3. Verify that the new total does not exceed the amount of Ether escrowed.
|
|
|
|
4. Verify that the signature is valid and comes from the payment channel sender.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
We'll use the `ethereumjs-util <https://github.com/ethereumjs/ethereumjs-util>`_
|
|
|
|
library to write this verification. The final step can be done a number of ways,
|
2020-04-20 16:24:31 +00:00
|
|
|
and we use JavaScript. The following code borrows the ``constructMessage`` function from the signing **JavaScript code** above:
|
2019-01-14 08:54:07 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
::
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// this mimics the prefixing behavior of the eth_sign JSON-RPC method.
|
|
|
|
function prefixed(hash) {
|
|
|
|
return ethereumjs.ABI.soliditySHA3(
|
|
|
|
["string", "bytes32"],
|
|
|
|
["\x19Ethereum Signed Message:\n32", hash]
|
|
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
function recoverSigner(message, signature) {
|
|
|
|
var split = ethereumjs.Util.fromRpcSig(signature);
|
|
|
|
var publicKey = ethereumjs.Util.ecrecover(message, split.v, split.r, split.s);
|
|
|
|
var signer = ethereumjs.Util.pubToAddress(publicKey).toString("hex");
|
|
|
|
return signer;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
function isValidSignature(contractAddress, amount, signature, expectedSigner) {
|
|
|
|
var message = prefixed(constructPaymentMessage(contractAddress, amount));
|
|
|
|
var signer = recoverSigner(message, signature);
|
|
|
|
return signer.toLowerCase() ==
|
|
|
|
ethereumjs.Util.stripHexPrefix(expectedSigner).toLowerCase();
|
|
|
|
}
|