e252c634cb
- abstract the entire handshake logic in cryptoId.Run() taking session-relevant parameters - changes in peer to accomodate how the encryption layer would be switched on - modify arguments of handshake components - fixed test getting the wrong pubkey but it till crashes on DH in newSession()
316 lines
12 KiB
Go
316 lines
12 KiB
Go
package p2p
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import (
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"crypto/ecdsa"
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"crypto/rand"
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"fmt"
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"io"
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"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/crypto"
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"github.com/obscuren/ecies"
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"github.com/obscuren/secp256k1-go"
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)
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var (
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sskLen int = 16 // ecies.MaxSharedKeyLength(pubKey) / 2
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sigLen int = 65 // elliptic S256
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keyLen int = 32 // ECDSA
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msgLen int = sigLen + 3*keyLen + 1 // 162
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resLen int = 65 //
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)
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// aesSecret, macSecret, egressMac, ingress
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type secretRW struct {
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aesSecret, macSecret, egressMac, ingressMac []byte
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}
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type cryptoId struct {
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prvKey *ecdsa.PrivateKey
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pubKey *ecdsa.PublicKey
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pubKeyDER []byte
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}
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func newCryptoId(id ClientIdentity) (self *cryptoId, err error) {
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// will be at server init
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var prvKeyDER []byte = id.PrivKey()
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if prvKeyDER == nil {
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err = fmt.Errorf("no private key for client")
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return
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}
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// initialise ecies private key via importing DER encoded keys (known via our own clientIdentity)
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var prvKey = crypto.ToECDSA(prvKeyDER)
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if prvKey == nil {
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err = fmt.Errorf("invalid private key for client")
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return
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}
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self = &cryptoId{
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prvKey: prvKey,
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// initialise public key from the imported private key
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pubKey: &prvKey.PublicKey,
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// to be created at server init shared between peers and sessions
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// for reuse, call wth ReadAt, no reset seek needed
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}
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self.pubKeyDER = id.Pubkey()
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return
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}
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func (self *cryptoId) Run(conn io.ReadWriter, remotePubKeyDER []byte, sessionToken []byte, initiator bool) (token []byte, rw *secretRW, err error) {
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var auth, initNonce, recNonce []byte
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var randomPrivKey *ecdsa.PrivateKey
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var remoteRandomPubKey *ecdsa.PublicKey
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if initiator {
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if auth, initNonce, randomPrivKey, _, err = self.startHandshake(remotePubKeyDER, sessionToken); err != nil {
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return
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}
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conn.Write(auth)
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var response []byte
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conn.Read(response)
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// write out auth message
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// wait for response, then call complete
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if recNonce, remoteRandomPubKey, _, err = self.completeHandshake(response); err != nil {
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return
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}
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} else {
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conn.Read(auth)
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// we are listening connection. we are responders in the handshake.
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// Extract info from the authentication. The initiator starts by sending us a handshake that we need to respond to.
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// so we read auth message first, then respond
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var response []byte
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if response, recNonce, initNonce, randomPrivKey, err = self.respondToHandshake(auth, remotePubKeyDER, sessionToken); err != nil {
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return
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}
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remoteRandomPubKey = &randomPrivKey.PublicKey
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conn.Write(response)
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}
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return self.newSession(initNonce, recNonce, auth, randomPrivKey, remoteRandomPubKey)
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}
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/* startHandshake is called by peer if it initiated the connection.
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By protocol spec, the party who initiates the connection (initiator) will send an 'auth' packet
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New: authInitiator -> E(remote-pubk, S(ecdhe-random, ecdh-shared-secret^nonce) || H(ecdhe-random-pubk) || pubk || nonce || 0x0)
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authRecipient -> E(remote-pubk, ecdhe-random-pubk || nonce || 0x0)
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Known: authInitiator = E(remote-pubk, S(ecdhe-random, token^nonce) || H(ecdhe-random-pubk) || pubk || nonce || 0x1)
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authRecipient = E(remote-pubk, ecdhe-random-pubk || nonce || 0x1) // token found
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authRecipient = E(remote-pubk, ecdhe-random-pubk || nonce || 0x0) // token not found
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The caller provides the public key of the peer as conjuctured from lookup based on IP:port, given as user input or proven by signatures. The caller must have access to persistant information about the peers, and pass the previous session token as an argument to cryptoId.
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The handshake is the process by which the peers establish their connection for a session.
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*/
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func (self *cryptoId) startHandshake(remotePubKeyDER, sessionToken []byte) (auth []byte, initNonce []byte, randomPrvKey *ecdsa.PrivateKey, remotePubKey *ecdsa.PublicKey, err error) {
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// session init, common to both parties
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remotePubKey = crypto.ToECDSAPub(remotePubKeyDER)
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if remotePubKey == nil {
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err = fmt.Errorf("invalid remote public key")
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return
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}
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var tokenFlag byte
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if sessionToken == nil {
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// no session token found means we need to generate shared secret.
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// ecies shared secret is used as initial session token for new peers
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// generate shared key from prv and remote pubkey
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if sessionToken, err = ecies.ImportECDSA(self.prvKey).GenerateShared(ecies.ImportECDSAPublic(remotePubKey), sskLen, sskLen); err != nil {
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return
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}
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// this will not stay here ;)
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fmt.Printf("secret generated: %v %x", len(sessionToken), sessionToken)
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// tokenFlag = 0x00 // redundant
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} else {
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// for known peers, we use stored token from the previous session
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tokenFlag = 0x01
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}
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//E(remote-pubk, S(ecdhe-random, ecdh-shared-secret^nonce) || H(ecdhe-random-pubk) || pubk || nonce || 0x0)
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// E(remote-pubk, S(ecdhe-random, token^nonce) || H(ecdhe-random-pubk) || pubk || nonce || 0x1)
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// allocate msgLen long message,
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var msg []byte = make([]byte, msgLen)
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// generate sskLen long nonce
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initNonce = msg[msgLen-keyLen-1 : msgLen-1]
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// nonce = msg[msgLen-sskLen-1 : msgLen-1]
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if _, err = rand.Read(initNonce); err != nil {
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return
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}
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// create known message
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// ecdh-shared-secret^nonce for new peers
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// token^nonce for old peers
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var sharedSecret = Xor(sessionToken, initNonce)
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// generate random keypair to use for signing
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if randomPrvKey, err = crypto.GenerateKey(); err != nil {
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return
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}
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// sign shared secret (message known to both parties): shared-secret
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var signature []byte
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// signature = sign(ecdhe-random, shared-secret)
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// uses secp256k1.Sign
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if signature, err = crypto.Sign(sharedSecret, randomPrvKey); err != nil {
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return
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}
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fmt.Printf("signature generated: %v %x", len(signature), signature)
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// message
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// signed-shared-secret || H(ecdhe-random-pubk) || pubk || nonce || 0x0
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copy(msg, signature) // copy signed-shared-secret
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// H(ecdhe-random-pubk)
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copy(msg[sigLen:sigLen+keyLen], crypto.Sha3(crypto.FromECDSAPub(&randomPrvKey.PublicKey)))
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// pubkey copied to the correct segment.
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copy(msg[sigLen+keyLen:sigLen+2*keyLen], self.pubKeyDER)
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// nonce is already in the slice
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// stick tokenFlag byte to the end
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msg[msgLen-1] = tokenFlag
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fmt.Printf("plaintext message generated: %v %x", len(msg), msg)
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// encrypt using remote-pubk
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// auth = eciesEncrypt(remote-pubk, msg)
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if auth, err = crypto.Encrypt(remotePubKey, msg); err != nil {
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return
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}
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fmt.Printf("encrypted message generated: %v %x\n used pubkey: %x\n", len(auth), auth, crypto.FromECDSAPub(remotePubKey))
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return
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}
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// verifyAuth is called by peer if it accepted (but not initiated) the connection
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func (self *cryptoId) respondToHandshake(auth, remotePubKeyDER, sessionToken []byte) (authResp []byte, respNonce []byte, initNonce []byte, randomPrivKey *ecdsa.PrivateKey, err error) {
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var msg []byte
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remotePubKey := crypto.ToECDSAPub(remotePubKeyDER)
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if remotePubKey == nil {
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err = fmt.Errorf("invalid public key")
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return
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}
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fmt.Printf("encrypted message received: %v %x\n used pubkey: %x\n", len(auth), auth, crypto.FromECDSAPub(self.pubKey))
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// they prove that msg is meant for me,
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// I prove I possess private key if i can read it
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if msg, err = crypto.Decrypt(self.prvKey, auth); err != nil {
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return
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}
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fmt.Printf("\nplaintext message retrieved: %v %x\n", len(msg), msg)
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var tokenFlag byte
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if sessionToken == nil {
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// no session token found means we need to generate shared secret.
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// ecies shared secret is used as initial session token for new peers
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// generate shared key from prv and remote pubkey
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if sessionToken, err = ecies.ImportECDSA(self.prvKey).GenerateShared(ecies.ImportECDSAPublic(remotePubKey), sskLen, sskLen); err != nil {
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return
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}
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fmt.Printf("secret generated: %v %x", len(sessionToken), sessionToken)
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// tokenFlag = 0x00 // redundant
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} else {
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// for known peers, we use stored token from the previous session
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tokenFlag = 0x01
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}
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// the initiator nonce is read off the end of the message
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initNonce = msg[msgLen-keyLen-1 : msgLen-1]
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// I prove that i own prv key (to derive shared secret, and read nonce off encrypted msg) and that I own shared secret
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// they prove they own the private key belonging to ecdhe-random-pubk
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// we can now reconstruct the signed message and recover the peers pubkey
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var signedMsg = Xor(sessionToken, initNonce)
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var remoteRandomPubKeyDER []byte
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if remoteRandomPubKeyDER, err = secp256k1.RecoverPubkey(signedMsg, msg[:sigLen]); err != nil {
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return
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}
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// convert to ECDSA standard
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remoteRandomPubKey := crypto.ToECDSAPub(remoteRandomPubKeyDER)
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if remoteRandomPubKey == nil {
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err = fmt.Errorf("invalid remote public key")
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return
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}
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// now we find ourselves a long task too, fill it random
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var resp = make([]byte, resLen)
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// generate keyLen long nonce
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respNonce = msg[resLen-keyLen-1 : msgLen-1]
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if _, err = rand.Read(respNonce); err != nil {
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return
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}
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// generate random keypair for session
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if randomPrivKey, err = crypto.GenerateKey(); err != nil {
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return
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}
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// responder auth message
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// E(remote-pubk, ecdhe-random-pubk || nonce || 0x0)
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copy(resp[:keyLen], crypto.FromECDSAPub(&randomPrivKey.PublicKey))
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// nonce is already in the slice
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resp[resLen-1] = tokenFlag
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// encrypt using remote-pubk
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// auth = eciesEncrypt(remote-pubk, msg)
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// why not encrypt with ecdhe-random-remote
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if authResp, err = crypto.Encrypt(remotePubKey, resp); err != nil {
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return
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}
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return
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}
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func (self *cryptoId) completeHandshake(auth []byte) (respNonce []byte, remoteRandomPubKey *ecdsa.PublicKey, tokenFlag bool, err error) {
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var msg []byte
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// they prove that msg is meant for me,
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// I prove I possess private key if i can read it
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if msg, err = crypto.Decrypt(self.prvKey, auth); err != nil {
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return
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}
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respNonce = msg[resLen-keyLen-1 : resLen-1]
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var remoteRandomPubKeyDER = msg[:keyLen]
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remoteRandomPubKey = crypto.ToECDSAPub(remoteRandomPubKeyDER)
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if remoteRandomPubKey == nil {
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err = fmt.Errorf("invalid ecdh random remote public key")
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return
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}
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if msg[resLen-1] == 0x01 {
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tokenFlag = true
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}
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return
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}
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func (self *cryptoId) newSession(initNonce, respNonce, auth []byte, privKey *ecdsa.PrivateKey, remoteRandomPubKey *ecdsa.PublicKey) (sessionToken []byte, rw *secretRW, err error) {
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// 3) Now we can trust ecdhe-random-pubk to derive new keys
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//ecdhe-shared-secret = ecdh.agree(ecdhe-random, remote-ecdhe-random-pubk)
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var dhSharedSecret []byte
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pubKey := ecies.ImportECDSAPublic(remoteRandomPubKey)
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if dhSharedSecret, err = ecies.ImportECDSA(privKey).GenerateShared(pubKey, sskLen, sskLen); err != nil {
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return
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}
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// shared-secret = crypto.Sha3(ecdhe-shared-secret || crypto.Sha3(nonce || initiator-nonce))
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var sharedSecret = crypto.Sha3(append(dhSharedSecret, crypto.Sha3(append(respNonce, initNonce...))...))
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// token = crypto.Sha3(shared-secret)
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sessionToken = crypto.Sha3(sharedSecret)
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// aes-secret = crypto.Sha3(ecdhe-shared-secret || shared-secret)
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var aesSecret = crypto.Sha3(append(dhSharedSecret, sharedSecret...))
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// # destroy shared-secret
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// mac-secret = crypto.Sha3(ecdhe-shared-secret || aes-secret)
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var macSecret = crypto.Sha3(append(dhSharedSecret, aesSecret...))
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// # destroy ecdhe-shared-secret
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// egress-mac = crypto.Sha3(mac-secret^nonce || auth)
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var egressMac = crypto.Sha3(append(Xor(macSecret, respNonce), auth...))
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// # destroy nonce
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// ingress-mac = crypto.Sha3(mac-secret^initiator-nonce || auth),
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var ingressMac = crypto.Sha3(append(Xor(macSecret, initNonce), auth...))
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// # destroy remote-nonce
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rw = &secretRW{
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aesSecret: aesSecret,
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macSecret: macSecret,
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egressMac: egressMac,
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ingressMac: ingressMac,
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}
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return
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}
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// should use cipher.xorBytes from crypto/cipher/xor.go for fast xor
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func Xor(one, other []byte) (xor []byte) {
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xor = make([]byte, len(one))
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for i := 0; i < len(one); i++ {
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xor[i] = one[i] ^ other[i]
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}
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return
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}
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