This a fix for an attack vector where the discovery protocol could be
used to amplify traffic in a DDOS attack. A malicious actor would send a
findnode request with the IP address and UDP port of the target as the
source address. The recipient of the findnode packet would then send a
neighbors packet (which is 16x the size of findnode) to the victim.
Our solution is to require a 'bond' with the sender of findnode. If no
bond exists, the findnode packet is not processed. A bond between nodes
α and β is created when α replies to a ping from β.
This (initial) version of the bonding implementation might still be
vulnerable against replay attacks during the expiration time window.
We will add stricter source address validation later.
This is better because protocols might not actually read the payload for
some errors (msg too big, etc.) which can be a pain to test with the old
behaviour.
Message encoding functions have been renamed to catch any uses.
The switch to the new encoder can cause subtle incompatibilities.
If there are any users outside of our tree, they will at least be
alerted that there was a change.
NewMsg no longer exists. The replacements for EncodeMsg are called
Send and SendItems.
With RLPx frames, the message code is contained in the
frame and is no longer part of the encoded data.
EncodeMsg, Msg.Decode have been updated to match.
Code that decodes RLP directly from Msg.Payload will need
to change.
This mostly changes how information is passed around.
Instead of using many function parameters and return values,
put the entire state in a struct and pass that.
This also adds back derivation of ecdhe-shared-secret. I deleted
it by accident in a previous refactoring.
The diff is a bit bigger than expected because the protocol handshake
logic has moved out of Peer. This is necessary because the protocol
handshake will have custom framing in the final protocol.
Range expressions capture the length of the slice once before the first
iteration. A range expression cannot be used here since the loop
modifies the slice variable (including length changes).
There are now two deadlines, frameReadTimeout and payloadReadTimeout.
The frame timeout is longer and allows for connections that are idle.
The message timeout is still short and ensures that we don't get stuck
in the middle of a message.
I have verified that UPnP and NAT-PMP work against an older version of
the MiniUPnP daemon running on pfSense. This code is kind of hard to
test automatically.
