## Issue Addressed Resolves #3267 Resolves #3156 ## Proposed Changes - Move the log for fee recipient checks from proposer cache insertion into block proposal so we are directly checking what we get from the EE - Only log when there is a discrepancy with the local EE, not when using the builder API. In the `builder-api` branch there is an `info` log when there is a discrepancy, I think it is more likely there will be a difference in fee recipient with the builder api because proposer payments might be made via a transaction in the block. Not really sure what patterns will become commong. - Upgrade the log from a `warn` to an `error` - not actually sure which we want, but I think this is worth an error because the local EE with default transaction ordering I think should pretty much always use the provided fee recipient - add a `strict-fee-recipient` flag to the VC so we only sign blocks with matching fee recipients. Falls back from the builder API to the local API if there is a discrepancy . Co-authored-by: realbigsean <sean@sigmaprime.io>
275 lines
13 KiB
Rust
275 lines
13 KiB
Rust
use clap::{App, Arg};
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pub fn cli_app<'a, 'b>() -> App<'a, 'b> {
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App::new("validator_client")
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.visible_aliases(&["v", "vc", "validator"])
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.setting(clap::AppSettings::ColoredHelp)
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.about(
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"When connected to a beacon node, performs the duties of a staked \
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validator (e.g., proposing blocks and attestations).",
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)
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// This argument is deprecated, use `--beacon-nodes` instead.
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.arg(
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Arg::with_name("beacon-node")
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.long("beacon-node")
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.value_name("NETWORK_ADDRESS")
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.help("Deprecated. Use --beacon-nodes.")
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.takes_value(true)
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.conflicts_with("beacon-nodes"),
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)
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.arg(
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Arg::with_name("beacon-nodes")
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.long("beacon-nodes")
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.value_name("NETWORK_ADDRESSES")
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.help("Comma-separated addresses to one or more beacon node HTTP APIs. \
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Default is http://localhost:5052."
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)
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.takes_value(true),
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)
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// This argument is deprecated, use `--beacon-nodes` instead.
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.arg(
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Arg::with_name("server")
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.long("server")
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.value_name("NETWORK_ADDRESS")
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.help("Deprecated. Use --beacon-nodes.")
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.takes_value(true)
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.conflicts_with_all(&["beacon-node", "beacon-nodes"]),
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)
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.arg(
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Arg::with_name("validators-dir")
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.long("validators-dir")
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.alias("validator-dir")
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.value_name("VALIDATORS_DIR")
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.help(
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"The directory which contains the validator keystores, deposit data for \
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each validator along with the common slashing protection database \
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and the validator_definitions.yml"
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)
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.takes_value(true)
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.conflicts_with("datadir")
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)
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.arg(
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Arg::with_name("secrets-dir")
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.long("secrets-dir")
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.value_name("SECRETS_DIRECTORY")
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.help(
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"The directory which contains the password to unlock the validator \
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voting keypairs. Each password should be contained in a file where the \
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name is the 0x-prefixed hex representation of the validators voting public \
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key. Defaults to ~/.lighthouse/{network}/secrets.",
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)
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.takes_value(true)
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.conflicts_with("datadir")
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)
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.arg(
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Arg::with_name("delete-lockfiles")
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.long("delete-lockfiles")
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.help(
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"DEPRECATED. This flag does nothing and will be removed in a future release."
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)
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)
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.arg(
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Arg::with_name("init-slashing-protection")
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.long("init-slashing-protection")
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.help(
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"If present, do not require the slashing protection database to exist before \
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running. You SHOULD NOT use this flag unless you're certain that a new \
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slashing protection database is required. Usually, your database \
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will have been initialized when you imported your validator keys. If you \
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misplace your database and then run with this flag you risk being slashed."
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)
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)
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.arg(
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Arg::with_name("disable-auto-discover")
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.long("disable-auto-discover")
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.help(
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"If present, do not attempt to discover new validators in the validators-dir. Validators \
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will need to be manually added to the validator_definitions.yml file."
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)
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)
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.arg(
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Arg::with_name("allow-unsynced")
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.long("allow-unsynced")
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.help(
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"If present, the validator client will still poll for duties if the beacon
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node is not synced.",
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),
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)
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.arg(
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Arg::with_name("use-long-timeouts")
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.long("use-long-timeouts")
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.help("If present, the validator client will use longer timeouts for requests \
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made to the beacon node. This flag is generally not recommended, \
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longer timeouts can cause missed duties when fallbacks are used.")
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)
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.arg(
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Arg::with_name("beacon-nodes-tls-certs")
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.long("beacon-nodes-tls-certs")
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.value_name("CERTIFICATE-FILES")
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.takes_value(true)
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.help("Comma-separated paths to custom TLS certificates to use when connecting \
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to a beacon node. These certificates must be in PEM format and are used \
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in addition to the OS trust store. Commas must only be used as a \
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delimiter, and must not be part of the certificate path.")
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)
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// This overwrites the graffiti configured in the beacon node.
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.arg(
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Arg::with_name("graffiti")
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.long("graffiti")
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.help("Specify your custom graffiti to be included in blocks.")
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.value_name("GRAFFITI")
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.takes_value(true)
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)
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.arg(
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Arg::with_name("graffiti-file")
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.long("graffiti-file")
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.help("Specify a graffiti file to load validator graffitis from.")
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.value_name("GRAFFITI-FILE")
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.takes_value(true)
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.conflicts_with("graffiti")
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)
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.arg(
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Arg::with_name("suggested-fee-recipient")
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.long("suggested-fee-recipient")
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.help("The fallback address provided to the BN if nothing suitable is found \
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in the validator definitions or fee recipient file.")
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.value_name("FEE-RECIPIENT")
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.takes_value(true)
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)
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/* REST API related arguments */
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.arg(
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Arg::with_name("http")
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.long("http")
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.help("Enable the RESTful HTTP API server. Disabled by default.")
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.takes_value(false),
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)
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/*
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* Note: The HTTP server is **not** encrypted (i.e., not HTTPS) and therefore it is
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* unsafe to publish on a public network.
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*
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* If the `--http-address` flag is used, the `--unencrypted-http-transport` flag
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* must also be used in order to make it clear to the user that this is unsafe.
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*/
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.arg(
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Arg::with_name("http-address")
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.long("http-address")
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.value_name("ADDRESS")
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.help("Set the address for the HTTP address. The HTTP server is not encrypted \
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and therefore it is unsafe to publish on a public network. When this \
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flag is used, it additionally requires the explicit use of the \
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`--unencrypted-http-transport` flag to ensure the user is aware of the \
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risks involved. For access via the Internet, users should apply \
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transport-layer security like a HTTPS reverse-proxy or SSH tunnelling.")
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.requires("unencrypted-http-transport"),
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)
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.arg(
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Arg::with_name("unencrypted-http-transport")
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.long("unencrypted-http-transport")
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.help("This is a safety flag to ensure that the user is aware that the http \
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transport is unencrypted and using a custom HTTP address is unsafe.")
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.requires("http-address"),
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)
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.arg(
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Arg::with_name("http-port")
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.long("http-port")
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.value_name("PORT")
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.help("Set the listen TCP port for the RESTful HTTP API server.")
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.default_value("5062")
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.takes_value(true),
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)
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.arg(
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Arg::with_name("http-allow-origin")
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.long("http-allow-origin")
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.value_name("ORIGIN")
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.help("Set the value of the Access-Control-Allow-Origin response HTTP header. \
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Use * to allow any origin (not recommended in production). \
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If no value is supplied, the CORS allowed origin is set to the listen \
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address of this server (e.g., http://localhost:5062).")
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.takes_value(true),
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)
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/* Prometheus metrics HTTP server related arguments */
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.arg(
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Arg::with_name("metrics")
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.long("metrics")
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.help("Enable the Prometheus metrics HTTP server. Disabled by default.")
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.takes_value(false),
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)
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.arg(
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Arg::with_name("metrics-address")
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.long("metrics-address")
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.value_name("ADDRESS")
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.help("Set the listen address for the Prometheus metrics HTTP server.")
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.default_value("127.0.0.1")
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.takes_value(true),
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)
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.arg(
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Arg::with_name("metrics-port")
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.long("metrics-port")
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.value_name("PORT")
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.help("Set the listen TCP port for the Prometheus metrics HTTP server.")
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.default_value("5064")
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.takes_value(true),
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)
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.arg(
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Arg::with_name("metrics-allow-origin")
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.long("metrics-allow-origin")
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.value_name("ORIGIN")
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.help("Set the value of the Access-Control-Allow-Origin response HTTP header. \
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Use * to allow any origin (not recommended in production). \
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If no value is supplied, the CORS allowed origin is set to the listen \
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address of this server (e.g., http://localhost:5064).")
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.takes_value(true),
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)
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/*
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* Explorer metrics
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*/
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.arg(
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Arg::with_name("monitoring-endpoint")
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.long("monitoring-endpoint")
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.value_name("ADDRESS")
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.help("Enables the monitoring service for sending system metrics to a remote endpoint. \
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This can be used to monitor your setup on certain services (e.g. beaconcha.in). \
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This flag sets the endpoint where the beacon node metrics will be sent. \
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Note: This will send information to a remote sever which may identify and associate your \
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validators, IP address and other personal information. Always use a HTTPS connection \
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and never provide an untrusted URL.")
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.takes_value(true),
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)
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.arg(
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Arg::with_name("enable-doppelganger-protection")
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.long("enable-doppelganger-protection")
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.value_name("ENABLE_DOPPELGANGER_PROTECTION")
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.help("If this flag is set, Lighthouse will delay startup for three epochs and \
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monitor for messages on the network by any of the validators managed by this \
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client. This will result in three (possibly four) epochs worth of missed \
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attestations. If an attestation is detected during this period, it means it is \
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very likely that you are running a second validator client with the same keys. \
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This validator client will immediately shutdown if this is detected in order \
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to avoid potentially committing a slashable offense. Use this flag in order to \
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ENABLE this functionality, without this flag Lighthouse will begin attesting \
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immediately.")
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.takes_value(false),
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)
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.arg(
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Arg::with_name("private-tx-proposals")
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.long("private-tx-proposals")
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.help("If this flag is set, Lighthouse will query the Beacon Node for only block \
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headers during proposals and will sign over headers. Useful for outsourcing \
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execution payload construction during proposals.")
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.takes_value(false),
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)
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.arg(
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Arg::with_name("strict-fee-recipient")
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.long("strict-fee-recipient")
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.help("If this flag is set, Lighthouse will refuse to sign any block whose \
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`fee_recipient` does not match the `suggested_fee_recipient` sent by this validator. \
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This applies to both the normal block proposal flow, as well as block proposals \
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through the builder API. Proposals through the builder API are more likely to have a \
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discrepancy in `fee_recipient` so you should be aware of how your connected relay \
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sends proposer payments before using this flag. If this flag is used, a fee recipient \
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mismatch in the builder API flow will result in a fallback to the local execution engine \
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for payload construction, where a strict fee recipient check will still be applied.")
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.takes_value(false),
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)
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}
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