142 lines
6.3 KiB
Rust
142 lines
6.3 KiB
Rust
use crate::config::DEFAULT_BEACON_NODE;
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use clap::{App, Arg};
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pub fn cli_app<'a, 'b>() -> App<'a, 'b> {
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App::new("validator_client")
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.visible_aliases(&["v", "vc", "validator"])
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.setting(clap::AppSettings::ColoredHelp)
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.about(
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"When connected to a beacon node, performs the duties of a staked \
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validator (e.g., proposing blocks and attestations).",
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)
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.arg(
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Arg::with_name("beacon-node")
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.long("beacon-node")
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.value_name("NETWORK_ADDRESS")
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.help("Address to a beacon node HTTP API")
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.default_value(&DEFAULT_BEACON_NODE)
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.takes_value(true),
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)
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// This argument is deprecated, use `--beacon-node` instead.
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.arg(
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Arg::with_name("server")
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.long("server")
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.value_name("NETWORK_ADDRESS")
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.help("Deprecated. Use --beacon-node.")
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.takes_value(true)
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.conflicts_with("beacon-node"),
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)
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.arg(
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Arg::with_name("validators-dir")
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.long("validators-dir")
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.value_name("VALIDATORS_DIR")
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.help(
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"The directory which contains the validator keystores, deposit data for \
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each validator along with the common slashing protection database \
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and the validator_definitions.yml"
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)
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.takes_value(true)
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.conflicts_with("datadir")
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.requires("secrets-dir")
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)
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.arg(
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Arg::with_name("secrets-dir")
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.long("secrets-dir")
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.value_name("SECRETS_DIRECTORY")
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.help(
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"The directory which contains the password to unlock the validator \
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voting keypairs. Each password should be contained in a file where the \
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name is the 0x-prefixed hex representation of the validators voting public \
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key. Defaults to ~/.lighthouse/{network}/secrets.",
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)
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.takes_value(true)
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.conflicts_with("datadir")
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.requires("validators-dir"),
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)
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.arg(
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Arg::with_name("delete-lockfiles")
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.long("delete-lockfiles")
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.help(
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"If present, ignore and delete any keystore lockfiles encountered during start up. \
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This is useful if the validator client did not exit gracefully on the last run. \
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WARNING: lockfiles help prevent users from accidentally running the same validator \
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using two different validator clients, an action that likely leads to slashing. \
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Ensure you are certain that there are no other validator client instances running \
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that might also be using the same keystores."
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)
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)
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.arg(
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Arg::with_name("init-slashing-protection")
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.long("init-slashing-protection")
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.help(
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"If present, do not require the slashing protection database to exist before \
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running. You SHOULD NOT use this flag unless you're certain that a new \
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slashing protection database is required. Usually, your database \
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will have been initialized when you imported your validator keys. If you \
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misplace your database and then run with this flag you risk being slashed."
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)
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)
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.arg(
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Arg::with_name("disable-auto-discover")
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.long("disable-auto-discover")
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.help(
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"If present, do not attempt to discover new validators in the validators-dir. Validators \
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will need to be manually added to the validator_definitions.yml file."
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)
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)
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.arg(
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Arg::with_name("allow-unsynced")
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.long("allow-unsynced")
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.help(
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"If present, the validator client will still poll for duties if the beacon
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node is not synced.",
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),
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)
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// This overwrites the graffiti configured in the beacon node.
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.arg(
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Arg::with_name("graffiti")
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.long("graffiti")
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.help("Specify your custom graffiti to be included in blocks.")
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.value_name("GRAFFITI")
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.takes_value(true)
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)
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/* REST API related arguments */
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.arg(
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Arg::with_name("http")
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.long("http")
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.help("Enable the RESTful HTTP API server. Disabled by default.")
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.takes_value(false),
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)
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/*
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* Note: there is purposefully no `--http-address` flag provided.
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*
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* The HTTP server is **not** encrypted (i.e., not HTTPS) and therefore it is unsafe to
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* publish on a public network.
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*
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* We restrict the user to `127.0.0.1` and they must provide some other transport-layer
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* encryption (e.g., SSH tunnels).
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*/
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.arg(
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Arg::with_name("http-port")
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.long("http-port")
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.value_name("PORT")
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.help("Set the listen TCP port for the RESTful HTTP API server. This server does **not** \
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provide encryption and is completely unsuitable to expose to a public network. \
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We do not provide a --http-address flag and restrict the user to listening on \
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127.0.0.1. For access via the Internet, apply a transport-layer security like \
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a HTTPS reverse-proxy or SSH tunnelling.")
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.default_value("5062")
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.takes_value(true),
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)
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.arg(
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Arg::with_name("http-allow-origin")
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.long("http-allow-origin")
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.value_name("ORIGIN")
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.help("Set the value of the Access-Control-Allow-Origin response HTTP header. \
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Use * to allow any origin (not recommended in production). \
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If no value is supplied, the CORS allowed origin is set to the listen \
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address of this server (e.g., http://localhost:5062).")
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.takes_value(true),
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)
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}
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