a764c3b247
## Issue Addressed NA ## Problem this PR addresses There's an issue where Lighthouse is banning a lot of peers due to the following sequence of events: 1. Gossip block 0xabc arrives ~200ms early - It is propagated across the network, with respect to [`MAXIMUM_GOSSIP_CLOCK_DISPARITY`](https://github.com/ethereum/eth2.0-specs/blob/v1.0.0/specs/phase0/p2p-interface.md#why-is-there-maximum_gossip_clock_disparity-when-validating-slot-ranges-of-messages-in-gossip-subnets). - However, it is not imported to our database since the block is early. 2. Attestations for 0xabc arrive, but the block was not imported. - The peer that sent the attestation is down-voted. - Each unknown-block attestation causes a score loss of 1, the peer is banned at -100. - When the peer is on an attestation subnet there can be hundreds of attestations, so the peer is banned quickly (before the missed block can be obtained via rpc). ## Potential solutions I can think of three solutions to this: 1. Wait for attestation-queuing (#635) to arrive and solve this. - Easy - Not immediate fix. - Whilst this would work, I don't think it's a perfect solution for this particular issue, rather (3) is better. 1. Allow importing blocks with a tolerance of `MAXIMUM_GOSSIP_CLOCK_DISPARITY`. - Easy - ~~I have implemented this, for now.~~ 1. If a block is verified for gossip propagation (i.e., signature verified) and it's within `MAXIMUM_GOSSIP_CLOCK_DISPARITY`, then queue it to be processed at the start of the appropriate slot. - More difficult - Feels like the best solution, I will try to implement this. **This PR takes approach (3).** ## Changes included - Implement the `block_delay_queue`, based upon a [`DelayQueue`](https://docs.rs/tokio-util/0.6.3/tokio_util/time/delay_queue/struct.DelayQueue.html) which can store blocks until it's time to import them. - Add a new `DelayedImportBlock` variant to the `beacon_processor::WorkEvent` enum to handle this new event. - In the `BeaconProcessor`, refactor a `tokio::select!` to a struct with an explicit `Stream` implementation. I experienced some issues with `tokio::select!` in the block delay queue and I also found it hard to debug. I think this explicit implementation is nicer and functionally equivalent (apart from the fact that `tokio::select!` randomly chooses futures to poll, whereas now we're deterministic). - Add a testing framework to the `beacon_processor` module that tests this new block delay logic. I also tested a handful of other operations in the beacon processor (attns, slashings, exits) since it was super easy to copy-pasta the code from the `http_api` tester. - To implement these tests I added the concept of an optional `work_journal_tx` to the `BeaconProcessor` which will spit out a log of events. I used this in the tests to ensure that things were happening as I expect. - The tests are a little racey, but it's hard to avoid that when testing timing-based code. If we see CI failures I can revise. I haven't observed *any* failures due to races on my machine or on CI yet. - To assist with testing I allowed for directly setting the time on the `ManualSlotClock`. - I gave the `beacon_processor::Worker` a `Toolbox` for two reasons; (a) it avoids changing tons of function sigs when you want to pass a new object to the worker and (b) it seemed cute. |
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account_manager | ||
beacon_node | ||
book | ||
boot_node | ||
common | ||
consensus | ||
crypto | ||
lcli | ||
lighthouse | ||
remote_signer | ||
scripts | ||
slasher | ||
testing | ||
validator_client | ||
.dockerignore | ||
.editorconfig | ||
.gitignore | ||
.gitmodules | ||
bors.toml | ||
Cargo.lock | ||
Cargo.toml | ||
CONTRIBUTING.md | ||
Cross.toml | ||
Dockerfile | ||
Dockerfile.cross | ||
LICENSE | ||
Makefile | ||
README.md |
Lighthouse: Ethereum 2.0
An open-source Ethereum 2.0 client, written in Rust and maintained by Sigma Prime.
Overview
Lighthouse is:
- Ready for use on Eth2 mainnet.
- Fully open-source, licensed under Apache 2.0.
- Security-focused. Fuzzing techniques have been continuously applied and several external security reviews have been performed.
- Built in Rust, a modern language providing unique safety guarantees and excellent performance (comparable to C++).
- Funded by various organisations, including Sigma Prime, the Ethereum Foundation, ConsenSys, the Decentralization Foundation and private individuals.
- Actively involved in the specification and security analysis of the Ethereum 2.0 specification.
Eth2 Deposit Contract
The Lighthouse team acknowledges
0x00000000219ab540356cBB839Cbe05303d7705Fa
as the canonical Eth2 deposit contract address.
Documentation
The Lighthouse Book contains information for users and developers.
The Lighthouse team maintains a blog at lighthouse.sigmaprime.io which contains periodical progress updates, roadmap insights and interesting findings.
Branches
Lighthouse maintains two permanent branches:
stable
: Always points to the latest stable release.- This is ideal for most users.
unstable
: Used for development, contains the latest PRs.- Developers should base thier PRs on this branch.
Contributing
Lighthouse welcomes contributors.
If you are looking to contribute, please head to the Contributing section of the Lighthouse book.
Contact
The best place for discussion is the Lighthouse Discord server. Alternatively, you may use the sigp/lighthouse gitter.
Sign up to the Lighthouse Development Updates mailing list for email notifications about releases, network status and other important information.
Encrypt sensitive messages using our PGP key.
Donations
Lighthouse is an open-source project and a public good. Funding public goods is hard and we're grateful for the donations we receive from the community via:
- Gitcoin Grants.
- Ethereum address:
0x25c4a76E7d118705e7Ea2e9b7d8C59930d8aCD3b
(donation.sigmaprime.eth).