## Issue Addressed
`make lint` failing on rust 1.53.0.
## Proposed Changes
1.53.0 updates
## Additional Info
I haven't figure out why yet, we were now hitting the recursion limit in a few crates. So I had to add `#![recursion_limit = "256"]` in a few places
Co-authored-by: realbigsean <seananderson33@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Michael Sproul <michael@sigmaprime.io>
## Issue Addressed
NA
## Proposed Changes
Updates out of date dependencies.
## Additional Info
See also https://github.com/sigp/lighthouse/issues/1712 for a list of dependencies that are still out of date and the resasons.
## Issue Addressed
Closes#1906Closes#1907
## Proposed Changes
- Emits warnings when the KDF parameters are two low.
- Returns errors when the KDF parameters are high enough to pose a potential DoS threat.
- Validates AES IV length is 128 bits, errors if empty, warnings otherwise.
## Additional Info
NIST advice used for PBKDF2 ranges https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-132.pdf.
Scrypt ranges are based on the maximum value of the `u32` (i.e 4GB of memory)
The minimum range has been set to anything below the default fields.
## Issue Addressed
Closes#1889
## Proposed Changes
- Error when passwords which use invalid UTF-8 characters during encryption.
- Add some tests
## Additional Info
I've decided to error when bad characters are used to create/encrypt a keystore but think we should allow them during decryption since either the keystore was created
- with invalid UTF-8 characters (possibly by another client or someone whose password is random bytes) in which case we'd want them to be able to decrypt their keystore using the right key.
- without invalid characters then the password checksum would almost certainly fail.
Happy to add them to decryption if we want to make the decryption more trigger happy 😋 , it would only be a one line change and would tell the user which character index is causing the issue.
See https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-2335#password-requirements
## Issue Addressed
- Resolves#1706
## Proposed Changes
Updates dependencies across the workspace. Any crate that was not able to be brought to the latest version is listed in #1712.
## Additional Info
NA
## Issue Addressed
NA
## Proposed Changes
- Implements a HTTP API for the validator client.
- Creates EIP-2335 keystores with an empty `description` field, instead of a missing `description` field. Adds option to set name.
- Be more graceful with setups without any validators (yet)
- Remove an error log when there are no validators.
- Create the `validator` dir if it doesn't exist.
- Allow building a `ValidatorDir` without a withdrawal keystore (required for the API method where we only post a voting keystore).
- Add optional `description` field to `validator_definitions.yml`
## TODO
- [x] Signature header, as per https://github.com/sigp/lighthouse/issues/1269#issuecomment-649879855
- [x] Return validator descriptions
- [x] Return deposit data
- [x] Respect the mnemonic offset
- [x] Check that mnemonic can derive returned keys
- [x] Be strict about non-localhost
- [x] Allow graceful start without any validators (+ create validator dir)
- [x] Docs final pass
- [x] Swap to EIP-2335 description field.
- [x] Fix Zerioze TODO in VC api types.
- [x] Zeroize secp256k1 key
## Endpoints
- [x] `GET /lighthouse/version`
- [x] `GET /lighthouse/health`
- [x] `GET /lighthouse/validators`
- [x] `POST /lighthouse/validators/hd`
- [x] `POST /lighthouse/validators/keystore`
- [x] `PATCH /lighthouse/validators/:validator_pubkey`
- [ ] ~~`POST /lighthouse/validators/:validator_pubkey/exit/:epoch`~~ Future works
## Additional Info
TBC
## Issue Addressed
- Resolves#1361
## Proposed Changes
Loosens the constraints imposed by EIP-2335 so we can import keys from Prysm.
## Additional Info
NA
## Issue Addressed
NA
## Proposed Changes
- Refactor the `bls` crate to support multiple BLS "backends" (e.g., milagro, blst, etc).
- Removes some duplicate, unused code in `common/rest_types/src/validator.rs`.
- Removes the old "upgrade legacy keypairs" functionality (these were unencrypted keys that haven't been supported for a few testnets, no one should be using them anymore).
## Additional Info
Most of the files changed are just inconsequential changes to function names.
## TODO
- [x] Optimization levels
- [x] Infinity point: https://github.com/supranational/blst/issues/11
- [x] Ensure milagro *and* blst are tested via CI
- [x] What to do with unsafe code?
- [x] Test infinity point in signature sets
* Update milagro_bls to new release
Signed-off-by: Kirk Baird <baird.k@outlook.com>
* Tidy up fake cryptos
Signed-off-by: Kirk Baird <baird.k@outlook.com>
* move SecretHash to bls and put plaintext back
Signed-off-by: Kirk Baird <baird.k@outlook.com>
