## Issue Addressed
NA
## Proposed Changes
Fixes a bug in Doppelganger Protection which would cause false-positives when a VC is restarted in the same epoch where it has already produced a signed message.
It could also cause a false-negative in the scenario where time skips forward (perhaps due to host suspend/wake). The new `time_skips_forward_with_doppelgangers` test covers this case.
This was a simple (and embarrassing, on my behalf) `>=` instead of `<=` bug that was missed by my tests but detected during manual testing by @michaelsproul (🙏). Regression tests have been added.
## Additional Info
NA
## TODO
- [x] Add test for doppelganger in epoch > next_check_epoch
## Issue Addressed
Resolves#2069
## Proposed Changes
- Adds a `--doppelganger-detection` flag
- Adds a `lighthouse/seen_validators` endpoint, which will make it so the lighthouse VC is not interopable with other client beacon nodes if the `--doppelganger-detection` flag is used, but hopefully this will become standardized. Relevant Eth2 API repo issue: https://github.com/ethereum/eth2.0-APIs/issues/64
- If the `--doppelganger-detection` flag is used, the VC will wait until the beacon node is synced, and then wait an additional 2 epochs. The reason for this is to make sure the beacon node is able to subscribe to the subnets our validators should be attesting on. I think an alternative would be to have the beacon node subscribe to all subnets for 2+ epochs on startup by default.
## Additional Info
I'd like to add tests and would appreciate feedback.
TODO: handle validators started via the API, potentially make this default behavior
Co-authored-by: realbigsean <seananderson33@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Michael Sproul <michael@sigmaprime.io>
Co-authored-by: Paul Hauner <paul@paulhauner.com>
Replace all --process-all-attestations with --import-all-attestations
## Issue Addressed
Which issue # does this PR address?
## Proposed Changes
Please list or describe the changes introduced by this PR.
## Additional Info
Please provide any additional information. For example, future considerations
or information useful for reviewers.
## Issue Addressed
N/A
## Proposed Changes
- Removing a bunch of unnecessary references
- Updated `Error::VariantError` to `Error::Variant`
- There were additional enum variant lints that I ignored, because I thought our variant names were fine
- removed `MonitoredValidator`'s `pubkey` field, because I couldn't find it used anywhere. It looks like we just use the string version of the pubkey (the `id` field) if there is no index
## Additional Info
Co-authored-by: realbigsean <seananderson33@gmail.com>
## Issue Addressed
- Resolves#2169
## Proposed Changes
Adds the `AttesterCache` to allow validators to produce attestations for older slots. Presently, some arbitrary restrictions can force validators to receive an error when attesting to a slot earlier than the present one. This can cause attestation misses when there is excessive load on the validator client or time sync issues between the VC and BN.
## Additional Info
NA
## Proposed Changes
Add the `sync_aggregate` from `BeaconBlock` to the bulk signature verifier for blocks. This necessitates a new signature set constructor for the sync aggregate, which is different from the others due to the use of [`eth2_fast_aggregate_verify`](https://github.com/ethereum/eth2.0-specs/blob/v1.1.0-alpha.7/specs/altair/bls.md#eth2_fast_aggregate_verify) for sync aggregates, per [`process_sync_aggregate`](https://github.com/ethereum/eth2.0-specs/blob/v1.1.0-alpha.7/specs/altair/beacon-chain.md#sync-aggregate-processing). I made the choice to return an optional signature set, with `None` representing the case where the signature is valid on account of being the point at infinity (requires no further checking).
To "dogfood" the changes and prevent duplication, the consensus logic now uses the signature set approach as well whenever it is required to verify signatures (which should only be in testing AFAIK). The EF tests pass with the code as it exists currently, but failed before I adapted the `eth2_fast_aggregate_verify` changes (which is good).
As a result of this change Altair block processing should be a little faster, and importantly, we will no longer accidentally verify signatures when replaying blocks, e.g. when replaying blocks from the database.
## Issue Addressed
NA
## Proposed Changes
This PR addresses two things:
1. Allows the `ValidatorMonitor` to work with Altair states.
1. Optimizes `altair::process_epoch` (see [code](https://github.com/paulhauner/lighthouse/blob/participation-cache/consensus/state_processing/src/per_epoch_processing/altair/participation_cache.rs) for description)
## Breaking Changes
The breaking changes in this PR revolve around one premise:
*After the Altair fork, it's not longer possible (given only a `BeaconState`) to identify if a validator had *any* attestation included during some epoch. The best we can do is see if that validator made the "timely" source/target/head flags.*
Whilst this seems annoying, it's not actually too bad. Finalization is based upon "timely target" attestations, so that's really the most important thing. Although there's *some* value in knowing if a validator had *any* attestation included, it's far more important to know about "timely target" participation, since this is what affects finality and justification.
For simplicity and consistency, I've also removed the ability to determine if *any* attestation was included from metrics and API endpoints. Now, all Altair and non-Altair states will simply report on the head/target attestations.
The following section details where we've removed fields and provides replacement values.
### Breaking Changes: Prometheus Metrics
Some participation metrics have been removed and replaced. Some were removed since they are no longer relevant to Altair (e.g., total attesting balance) and others replaced with gwei values instead of pre-computed values. This provides more flexibility at display-time (e.g., Grafana).
The following metrics were added as replacements:
- `beacon_participation_prev_epoch_head_attesting_gwei_total`
- `beacon_participation_prev_epoch_target_attesting_gwei_total`
- `beacon_participation_prev_epoch_source_attesting_gwei_total`
- `beacon_participation_prev_epoch_active_gwei_total`
The following metrics were removed:
- `beacon_participation_prev_epoch_attester`
- instead use `beacon_participation_prev_epoch_source_attesting_gwei_total / beacon_participation_prev_epoch_active_gwei_total`.
- `beacon_participation_prev_epoch_target_attester`
- instead use `beacon_participation_prev_epoch_target_attesting_gwei_total / beacon_participation_prev_epoch_active_gwei_total`.
- `beacon_participation_prev_epoch_head_attester`
- instead use `beacon_participation_prev_epoch_head_attesting_gwei_total / beacon_participation_prev_epoch_active_gwei_total`.
The `beacon_participation_prev_epoch_attester` endpoint has been removed. Users should instead use the pre-existing `beacon_participation_prev_epoch_target_attester`.
### Breaking Changes: HTTP API
The `/lighthouse/validator_inclusion/{epoch}/{validator_id}` endpoint loses the following fields:
- `current_epoch_attesting_gwei` (use `current_epoch_target_attesting_gwei` instead)
- `previous_epoch_attesting_gwei` (use `previous_epoch_target_attesting_gwei` instead)
The `/lighthouse/validator_inclusion/{epoch}/{validator_id}` endpoint lose the following fields:
- `is_current_epoch_attester` (use `is_current_epoch_target_attester` instead)
- `is_previous_epoch_attester` (use `is_previous_epoch_target_attester` instead)
- `is_active_in_current_epoch` becomes `is_active_unslashed_in_current_epoch`.
- `is_active_in_previous_epoch` becomes `is_active_unslashed_in_previous_epoch`.
## Additional Info
NA
## TODO
- [x] Deal with total balances
- [x] Update validator_inclusion API
- [ ] Ensure `beacon_participation_prev_epoch_target_attester` and `beacon_participation_prev_epoch_head_attester` work before Altair
Co-authored-by: realbigsean <seananderson33@gmail.com>
## Proposed Changes
Update to the latest version of the Altair spec, which includes new tests and a tweak to the target sync aggregators.
## Additional Info
This change is _not_ required for the imminent Altair devnet, and is waiting on the merge of #2321 to unstable.
Co-authored-by: Paul Hauner <paul@paulhauner.com>
## Proposed Changes
Remove the remaining Altair `FIXME`s from consensus land.
1. Implement tree hash caching for the participation lists. This required some light type manipulation, including removing the `TreeHash` bound from `CachedTreeHash` which was purely descriptive.
2. Plumb the proposer index through Altair attestation processing, to avoid calculating it for _every_ attestation (potentially 128ms on large networks). This duplicates some work from #2431, but with the aim of getting it in sooner, particularly for the Altair devnets.
3. Removes two FIXMEs related to `superstruct` and cloning, which are unlikely to be particularly detrimental and will be tracked here instead: https://github.com/sigp/superstruct/issues/5
## Issue Addressed
Closes#2468
## Proposed Changes
Document security considerations for the beacon node API, with strong recommendations against exposing it to the internet.
## Issue Addressed
#2454
## Proposed Changes
Adds the `--http-address` flag to allow the user to use custom HTTP addresses. This can be helpful for certain Docker setups.
Since using custom HTTP addresses is unsafe due to the server being unencrypted, `--unencrypted-http-transport` was also added as a safety flag and must be used in tandem with `--http-address`. This is to ensure the user is aware of the risks associated with using non-local HTTP addresses.
## Issue Addressed
Resolves: #2087
## Proposed Changes
- Add a `Dockerfile` to the `lcli` directory
- Add a github actions job to build and push and `lcli` docker image on pushes to `unstable` and `stable`
## Additional Info
It's a little awkward but `lcli` requires the full project scope so must be built:
- from the `lighthouse` dir with: `docker build -f ./lcli/Dockerflie .`
- from the `lcli` dir with: `docker build -f ./Dockerfile ../`
Didn't include `libssl-dev` or `ca-certificates`, `lcli` doesn't need these right?
Co-authored-by: realbigsean <seananderson33@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Michael Sproul <micsproul@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Michael Sproul <michael@sigmaprime.io>
* Adjust beacon node timeouts for validator client HTTP requests (#2352)
Resolves#2313
Provide `BeaconNodeHttpClient` with a dedicated `Timeouts` struct.
This will allow granular adjustment of the timeout duration for different calls made from the VC to the BN. These can either be a constant value, or as a ratio of the slot duration.
Improve timeout performance by using these adjusted timeout duration's only whenever a fallback endpoint is available.
Add a CLI flag called `use-long-timeouts` to revert to the old behavior.
Additionally set the default `BeaconNodeHttpClient` timeouts to the be the slot duration of the network, rather than a constant 12 seconds. This will allow it to adjust to different network specifications.
Co-authored-by: Paul Hauner <paul@paulhauner.com>
* Use read_recursive locks in database (#2417)
Closes#2245
Replace all calls to `RwLock::read` in the `store` crate with `RwLock::read_recursive`.
* Unfortunately we can't run the deadlock detector on CI because it's pinned to an old Rust 1.51.0 nightly which cannot compile Lighthouse (one of our deps uses `ptr::addr_of!` which is too new). A fun side-project at some point might be to update the deadlock detector.
* The reason I think we haven't seen this deadlock (at all?) in practice is that _writes_ to the database's split point are quite infrequent, and a concurrent write is required to trigger the deadlock. The split point is only written when finalization advances, which is once per epoch (every ~6 minutes), and state reads are also quite sporadic. Perhaps we've just been incredibly lucky, or there's something about the timing of state reads vs database migration that protects us.
* I wrote a few small programs to demo the deadlock, and the effectiveness of the `read_recursive` fix: https://github.com/michaelsproul/relock_deadlock_mvp
* [The docs for `read_recursive`](https://docs.rs/lock_api/0.4.2/lock_api/struct.RwLock.html#method.read_recursive) warn of starvation for writers. I think in order for starvation to occur the database would have to be spammed with so many state reads that it's unable to ever clear them all and find time for a write, in which case migration of states to the freezer would cease. If an attack could be performed to trigger this starvation then it would likely trigger a deadlock in the current code, and I think ceasing migration is preferable to deadlocking in this extreme situation. In practice neither should occur due to protection from spammy peers at the network layer. Nevertheless, it would be prudent to run this change on the testnet nodes to check that it doesn't cause accidental starvation.
* Return more detail when invalid data is found in the DB during startup (#2445)
- Resolves#2444
Adds some more detail to the error message returned when the `BeaconChainBuilder` is unable to access or decode block/state objects during startup.
NA
* Use hardware acceleration for SHA256 (#2426)
Modify the SHA256 implementation in `eth2_hashing` so that it switches between `ring` and `sha2` to take advantage of [x86_64 SHA extensions](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intel_SHA_extensions). The extensions are available on modern Intel and AMD CPUs, and seem to provide a considerable speed-up: on my Ryzen 5950X it dropped state tree hashing times by about 30% from 35ms to 25ms (on Prater).
The extensions became available in the `sha2` crate [last year](https://www.reddit.com/r/rust/comments/hf2vcx/ann_rustcryptos_sha1_and_sha2_now_support/), and are not available in Ring, which uses a [pure Rust implementation of sha2](https://github.com/briansmith/ring/blob/main/src/digest/sha2.rs). Ring is faster on CPUs that lack the extensions so I've implemented a runtime switch to use `sha2` only when the extensions are available. The runtime switching seems to impose a miniscule penalty (see the benchmarks linked below).
* Start a release checklist (#2270)
NA
Add a checklist to the release draft created by CI. I know @michaelsproul was also working on this and I suspect @realbigsean also might have useful input.
NA
* Serious banning
* fmt
Co-authored-by: Mac L <mjladson@pm.me>
Co-authored-by: Paul Hauner <paul@paulhauner.com>
Co-authored-by: Michael Sproul <michael@sigmaprime.io>
## Issue Addressed
- Resolves#2452
## Proposed Changes
I've seen a few people confused by this and I don't think the message is really worth it.
## Additional Info
NA
## Issue Addressed
#635
## Proposed Changes
- Keep attestations that reference a block we have not seen for 30secs before being re processed
- If we do import the block before that time elapses, it is reprocessed in that moment
- The first time it fails, do nothing wrt to gossipsub propagation or peer downscoring. If after being re processed it fails, downscore with a `LowToleranceError` and ignore the message.
## Issue Addressed
NA
## Proposed Changes
Adds a metric to see how many set bits are in the sync aggregate for each beacon block being imported.
## Additional Info
NA
## Issue Addressed
NA
## Proposed Changes
Adds more detail to the log when an attestation is ignored due to a prior one being known. This will help identify which validators are causing the issue.
## Additional Info
NA
## Issue Addressed
NA
## Proposed Changes
Add a checklist to the release draft created by CI. I know @michaelsproul was also working on this and I suspect @realbigsean also might have useful input.
## Additional Info
NA
## Proposed Changes
Modify the SHA256 implementation in `eth2_hashing` so that it switches between `ring` and `sha2` to take advantage of [x86_64 SHA extensions](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intel_SHA_extensions). The extensions are available on modern Intel and AMD CPUs, and seem to provide a considerable speed-up: on my Ryzen 5950X it dropped state tree hashing times by about 30% from 35ms to 25ms (on Prater).
## Additional Info
The extensions became available in the `sha2` crate [last year](https://www.reddit.com/r/rust/comments/hf2vcx/ann_rustcryptos_sha1_and_sha2_now_support/), and are not available in Ring, which uses a [pure Rust implementation of sha2](https://github.com/briansmith/ring/blob/main/src/digest/sha2.rs). Ring is faster on CPUs that lack the extensions so I've implemented a runtime switch to use `sha2` only when the extensions are available. The runtime switching seems to impose a miniscule penalty (see the benchmarks linked below).
## Issue Addressed
- Resolves#2444
## Proposed Changes
Adds some more detail to the error message returned when the `BeaconChainBuilder` is unable to access or decode block/state objects during startup.
## Additional Info
NA
## Issue Addressed
Closes#2245
## Proposed Changes
Replace all calls to `RwLock::read` in the `store` crate with `RwLock::read_recursive`.
## Additional Info
* Unfortunately we can't run the deadlock detector on CI because it's pinned to an old Rust 1.51.0 nightly which cannot compile Lighthouse (one of our deps uses `ptr::addr_of!` which is too new). A fun side-project at some point might be to update the deadlock detector.
* The reason I think we haven't seen this deadlock (at all?) in practice is that _writes_ to the database's split point are quite infrequent, and a concurrent write is required to trigger the deadlock. The split point is only written when finalization advances, which is once per epoch (every ~6 minutes), and state reads are also quite sporadic. Perhaps we've just been incredibly lucky, or there's something about the timing of state reads vs database migration that protects us.
* I wrote a few small programs to demo the deadlock, and the effectiveness of the `read_recursive` fix: https://github.com/michaelsproul/relock_deadlock_mvp
* [The docs for `read_recursive`](https://docs.rs/lock_api/0.4.2/lock_api/struct.RwLock.html#method.read_recursive) warn of starvation for writers. I think in order for starvation to occur the database would have to be spammed with so many state reads that it's unable to ever clear them all and find time for a write, in which case migration of states to the freezer would cease. If an attack could be performed to trigger this starvation then it would likely trigger a deadlock in the current code, and I think ceasing migration is preferable to deadlocking in this extreme situation. In practice neither should occur due to protection from spammy peers at the network layer. Nevertheless, it would be prudent to run this change on the testnet nodes to check that it doesn't cause accidental starvation.
## Issue Addressed
Resolves#2313
## Proposed Changes
Provide `BeaconNodeHttpClient` with a dedicated `Timeouts` struct.
This will allow granular adjustment of the timeout duration for different calls made from the VC to the BN. These can either be a constant value, or as a ratio of the slot duration.
Improve timeout performance by using these adjusted timeout duration's only whenever a fallback endpoint is available.
Add a CLI flag called `use-long-timeouts` to revert to the old behavior.
## Additional Info
Additionally set the default `BeaconNodeHttpClient` timeouts to the be the slot duration of the network, rather than a constant 12 seconds. This will allow it to adjust to different network specifications.
Co-authored-by: Paul Hauner <paul@paulhauner.com>
## Proposed Changes
Implement the consensus changes necessary for the upcoming Altair hard fork.
## Additional Info
This is quite a heavy refactor, with pivotal types like the `BeaconState` and `BeaconBlock` changing from structs to enums. This ripples through the whole codebase with field accesses changing to methods, e.g. `state.slot` => `state.slot()`.
Co-authored-by: realbigsean <seananderson33@gmail.com>
## Issue Addressed
#2377
## Proposed Changes
Implement the same code used for block root lookups (from #2376) to state root lookups in order to improve performance and reduce associated memory spikes (e.g. from certain HTTP API requests).
## Additional Changes
- Tests using `rev_iter_state_roots` and `rev_iter_block_roots` have been refactored to use their `forwards` versions instead.
- The `rev_iter_state_roots` and `rev_iter_block_roots` functions are now unused and have been removed.
- The `state_at_slot` function has been changed to use the `forwards` iterator.
## Additional Info
- Some tests still need to be refactored to use their `forwards_iter` versions. These tests start their iteration from a specific beacon state and thus use the `rev_iter_state_roots_from` and `rev_iter_block_roots_from` functions. If they can be refactored, those functions can also be removed.
This updates some older dependencies to address a few cargo audit warnings.
The majority of warnings come from network dependencies which will be addressed in #2389.
This PR contains some minor dep updates that are not network related.
Co-authored-by: Michael Sproul <michael@sigmaprime.io>
## Issue Addressed
#2225
## Proposed Changes
Exposes the version given from the `lighthouse_version` crate to the Prometheus metrics server.
## Additional Info
- This metric appears in both the Beacon Node and Validator Client metrics servers.
- This is the simplest solution. It might be better to include the version and commit hash as separate labels rather than combined, however this would be more involved. Happy to do it that way if this is too cumbersome to use.
- The metric appears as:
```
# HELP lighthouse_info The build of Lighthouse running on the server
# TYPE lighthouse_info gauge
lighthouse_info{version="Lighthouse/v1.4.0-379664a+"} 1
```
## Issue Addressed
Closes#1661
## Proposed Changes
Add a dummy package called `target_check` which gets compiled early in the build and fails if the target is 32-bit
## Additional Info
You can test the efficacy of this check with:
```
cross build --release --manifest-path lighthouse/Cargo.toml --target i686-unknown-linux-gnu
```
In which case this compilation error is shown:
```
error: Lighthouse requires a 64-bit CPU and operating system
--> common/target_check/src/lib.rs:8:1
|
8 | / assert_cfg!(
9 | | target_pointer_width = "64",
10 | | "Lighthouse requires a 64-bit CPU and operating system",
11 | | );
| |__^
```
## Issue Addressed
None.
## Proposed Changes
Run apt-get upgrade to install latest security updates.
## Additional Info
Images often take a long time to get the latest security updates, while running apt-get upgrade will pull the latest updates.
Co-authored-by: Age Manning <Age@AgeManning.com>
## Issue Addressed
Closes#2354
## Proposed Changes
Add a `minify` method to `slashing_protection::Interchange` that keeps only the maximum-epoch attestation and maximum-slot block for each validator. Specifically, `minify` constructs "synthetic" attestations (with no `signing_root`) containing the maximum source epoch _and_ the maximum target epoch from the input. This is equivalent to the `minify_synth` algorithm that I've formally verified in this repository:
https://github.com/michaelsproul/slashing-proofs
## Additional Info
Includes the JSON loading optimisation from #2347
