## Issue Addressed
Addresses #4238
## Proposed Changes
- [x] Add tests for the scenarios
- [x] Use the fork of the attestation slot for signature verification.
## Issue Addressed
Update some broken links in Lighthouse Book
## Proposed Changes
The updated links correctly link to the section of the book
## Additional Info
Please provide any additional information. For example, future considerations
or information useful for reviewers.
## Issue Addressed
Addresses #4234
## Proposed Changes
- Skip withdrawals processing in an inconsistent state replay.
- Repurpose `StateRootStrategy`: rename to `StateProcessingStrategy` and always skip withdrawals if using `StateProcessingStrategy::Inconsistent`
- Add a test to reproduce the scenario
Co-authored-by: Jimmy Chen <jimmy@sigmaprime.io>
## Issue Addressed
#4266
## Proposed Changes
- Log `Using external block builder` instead of `Connected to external block builder` on its initialization to resolve the confusion (there's no actual connection there)
## Additional Info
The log is mentioned in builders docs, so it's changed there too.
This commit adds a check to the networking service when handling core gossipsub topic subscription requests. If the BN is already subscribed to the core topics, we won't attempt to resubscribe.
## Issue Addressed
#4258
## Proposed Changes
- In the networking service, check if we're already subscribed to all of the core gossipsub topics and, if so, do nothing
## Additional Info
N/A
## Limit Backfill Sync
This PR transitions Lighthouse from syncing all the way back to genesis to only syncing back to the weak subjectivity point (~ 5 months) when syncing via a checkpoint sync.
There are a number of important points to note with this PR:
- Firstly and most importantly, this PR fundamentally shifts the default security guarantees of checkpoint syncing in Lighthouse. Prior to this PR, Lighthouse could verify the checkpoint of any given chain by ensuring the chain eventually terminates at the corresponding genesis. This guarantee can still be employed via the new CLI flag --genesis-backfill which will prompt lighthouse to the old behaviour of downloading all blocks back to genesis. The new behaviour only checks the proposer signatures for the last 5 months of blocks but cannot guarantee the chain matches the genesis chain.
- I have not modified any of the peer scoring or RPC responses. Clients syncing from gensis, will downscore new Lighthouse peers that do not possess blocks prior to the WSP. This is by design, as Lighthouse nodes of this form, need a mechanism to sort through peers in order to find useful peers in order to complete their genesis sync. We therefore do not discriminate between empty/error responses for blocks prior or post the local WSP. If we request a block that a peer does not posses, then fundamentally that peer is less useful to us than other peers.
- This will make a radical shift in that the majority of nodes will no longer store the full history of the chain. In the future we could add a pruning mechanism to remove old blocks from the db also.
Co-authored-by: Paul Hauner <paul@paulhauner.com>
## Issue Addressed
#3873
## Proposed Changes
add a cache to optimise historical state lookup.
## Additional Info
N/A
Co-authored-by: Michael Sproul <micsproul@gmail.com>
## Issue Addressed
Update Lighthouse book to include latest information especially after Capella upgrade
## Proposed Changes
Notable changes:
- Combine Sec 4.1 & 6.1 into Sec 4, because Sec 6.1 is importing validator key which is a required step when want to run a validator
- Combine Sec 5.1 & 5.2 with Sec 5, and move Sec 5 to under Sec 9
- Added partial withdrawals in Sec 6
## Additional Info
Please provide any additional information. For example, future considerations
or information useful for reviewers.
Co-authored-by: chonghe <tanck2005@gmail.com>
## Issue Addressed
This PR un-deprecates some commonly used test util functions, e.g. `extend_chain`. Most of these were deprecated in 2020 but some of us still found them quite convenient and they're still being used a lot. If there's no issue with using them, I think we should remove the "Deprecated" comment to avoid confusion.
## Proposed Changes
- Allow Docker images to be built with different profiles via e.g. `--build-arg PROFILE=maxperf`.
- Include the build profile in `lighthouse --version`.
## Additional Info
This only affects Docker images built from source. Our published Docker images use `cross`-compiled binaries that get copied into place.
## Issue Addressed
#4150
## Proposed Changes
Maintain trusted peers in the pruning logic. ~~In principle the changes here are not necessary as a trusted peer has a max score (100) and all other peers can have at most 0 (because we don't implement positive scores). This means that we should never prune trusted peers unless we have more trusted peers than the target peer count.~~
This change shifts this logic to explicitly never prune trusted peers which I expect is the intuitive behaviour.
~~I suspect the issue in #4150 arises when a trusted peer disconnects from us for one reason or another and then we remove that peer from our peerdb as it becomes stale. When it re-connects at some large time later, it is no longer a trusted peer.~~
Currently we do disconnect trusted peers, and this PR corrects this to maintain trusted peers in the pruning logic.
As suggested in #4150 we maintain trusted peers in the db and thus we remember them even if they disconnect from us.
## Issue Addressed
[#4162](https://github.com/sigp/lighthouse/issues/4162)
## Proposed Changes
update `--logfile-no-restricted-perms` flag help text to indicate that, for Windows users, the file permissions are inherited from the parent folder
## Additional Info
N/A
## Proposed Changes
Added page explanation for authentication under Siren UI book.
## Additional Info
Please provide any additional information. For example, future considerations
or information useful for reviewers.
* Update Engine API to Latest
* Get Mock EE Working
* Fix Mock EE
* Update Engine API Again
* Rip out get_blobs_bundle Stuff
* Fix Test Harness
* Fix Clippy Complaints
* Fix Beacon Chain Tests
* Temp hack to compile
* Fix doppelganger tests
* Kill in groups instead of storing pid
* Install geth in CI
* Install geth first
* Fix eth1_block_hash
* Fix directory paths and block hash
* Fix workflow for local testnets; reset genesis.json after running script
* Disable capella and deneb forks for doppelganger tests
* oops not capella
* Spin up a spare bn for the doppelganger validator
* testing
* Revert "testing"
This reverts commit 14eb178bca5b7d27b9cd9b665b5cd2c916f50901.
* Modify beacon_node script to take trusted peers
* Set doppelganger bn as a trusted peer
* Update var
* update another
* Fix port
* Add a flag to disable peer scoring
* Disable peer scoring in local testnet bn script
* Revert trusted peers hack
* fmt
* Fix proposer boost score
It is a well-known fact that IP addresses for beacon nodes used by specific validators can be de-anonymized. There is an assumed risk that a malicious user may attempt to DOS validators when producing blocks to prevent chain growth/liveness.
Although there are a number of ideas put forward to address this, there a few simple approaches we can take to mitigate this risk.
Currently, a Lighthouse user is able to set a number of beacon-nodes that their validator client can connect to. If one beacon node is taken offline, it can fallback to another. Different beacon nodes can use VPNs or rotate IPs in order to mask their IPs.
This PR provides an additional setup option which further mitigates attacks of this kind.
This PR introduces a CLI flag --proposer-only to the beacon node. Setting this flag will configure the beacon node to run with minimal peers and crucially will not subscribe to subnets or sync committees. Therefore nodes of this kind should not be identified as nodes connected to validators of any kind.
It also introduces a CLI flag --proposer-nodes to the validator client. Users can then provide a number of beacon nodes (which may or may not run the --proposer-only flag) that the Validator client will use for block production and propagation only. If these nodes fail, the validator client will fallback to the default list of beacon nodes.
Users are then able to set up a number of beacon nodes dedicated to block proposals (which are unlikely to be identified as validator nodes) and point their validator clients to produce blocks on these nodes and attest on other beacon nodes. An attack attempting to prevent liveness on the eth2 network would then need to preemptively find and attack the proposer nodes which is significantly more difficult than the default setup.
This is a follow on from: #3328
Co-authored-by: Michael Sproul <michael@sigmaprime.io>
Co-authored-by: Paul Hauner <paul@paulhauner.com>
## Issue Addressed
The latest stable version (1.69.0) of Rust was released on 20 April and contains this change:
- [Update the minimum external LLVM to 14.](https://github.com/rust-lang/rust/pull/107573/)
This impacts some of our CI workflows (build and release-test-windows) that uses LLVM 13.0. This PR updates the workflows to install LLVM 15.0.
**UPDATE**: Also updated `h2` to address [this issue](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-f8vr-r385-rh5r)
## Issue Addressed
NA
## Proposed Changes
Avoids reprocessing loops introduced in #4179. (Also somewhat related to #4192).
Breaks the re-queue loop by only re-queuing when an RPC block is received before the attestation creation deadline.
I've put `proposal_is_known` behind a closure to avoid interacting with the `observed_proposers` lock unnecessarily.
## Additional Info
NA
## Issue Addressed
There was a [`VecDeque` bug](https://github.com/rust-lang/rust/issues/108453) in some recent versions of the Rust standard library (1.67.0 & 1.67.1) that could cause Lighthouse to panic (reported by `@Sea Monkey` on discord). See full logs below.
The issue was likely introduced in Rust 1.67.0 and [fixed](https://github.com/rust-lang/rust/pull/108475) in 1.68, and we were able to reproduce the panic ourselves using [@michaelsproul's fuzz tests](https://github.com/michaelsproul/lighthouse/blob/fuzz-lru-time-cache/beacon_node/lighthouse_network/src/peer_manager/fuzz.rs#L111) on both Rust 1.67.0 and 1.67.1.
Users that uses our Docker images or binaries are unlikely affected, as our Docker images were built with `1.66`, and latest binaries were built with latest stable (`1.68.2`). It likely impacts user that builds from source using Rust versions 1.67.x.
## Proposed Changes
Bump Rust version (MSRV) to latest stable `1.68.2`.
## Additional Info
From `@Sea Monkey` on Lighthouse Discord:
> Crash on goerli using `unstable` `dd124b2d6804d02e4e221f29387a56775acccd08`
```
thread 'tokio-runtime-worker' panicked at 'Key must exist', /mnt/goerli/goerli/lighthouse/common/lru_cache/src/time.rs:68:28
stack backtrace:
Apr 15 09:37:36.993 WARN Peer sent invalid block in single block lookup, peer_id: 16Uiu2HAm6ZuyJpVpR6y51X4Enbp8EhRBqGycQsDMPX7e5XfPYznG, error: WouldRevertFinalizedSlot { block_slot: Slot(5420212), finalized_slot: Slot(5420224) }, root: 0x10f6…3165, service: sync
0: rust_begin_unwind
at /rustc/d5a82bbd26e1ad8b7401f6a718a9c57c96905483/library/std/src/panicking.rs:575:5
1: core::panicking::panic_fmt
at /rustc/d5a82bbd26e1ad8b7401f6a718a9c57c96905483/library/core/src/panicking.rs:64:14
2: core::panicking::panic_display
at /rustc/d5a82bbd26e1ad8b7401f6a718a9c57c96905483/library/core/src/panicking.rs:135:5
3: core::panicking::panic_str
at /rustc/d5a82bbd26e1ad8b7401f6a718a9c57c96905483/library/core/src/panicking.rs:119:5
4: core::option::expect_failed
at /rustc/d5a82bbd26e1ad8b7401f6a718a9c57c96905483/library/core/src/option.rs:1879:5
5: lru_cache::time::LRUTimeCache<Key>::raw_remove
6: lighthouse_network::peer_manager::PeerManager<TSpec>::handle_ban_operation
7: lighthouse_network::peer_manager::PeerManager<TSpec>::handle_score_action
8: lighthouse_network::peer_manager::PeerManager<TSpec>::report_peer
9: network::service::NetworkService<T>::spawn_service::{{closure}}
10: <futures_util::future::select::Select<A,B> as core::future::future::Future>::poll
11: <futures_util::future::future::map::Map<Fut,F> as core::future::future::Future>::poll
12: <futures_util::future::future::flatten::Flatten<Fut,<Fut as core::future::future::Future>::Output> as core::future::future::Future>::poll
13: tokio::loom::std::unsafe_cell::UnsafeCell<T>::with_mut
14: tokio::runtime::task::core::Core<T,S>::poll
15: tokio::runtime::task::harness::Harness<T,S>::poll
16: tokio::runtime::scheduler::multi_thread::worker::Context::run_task
17: tokio::runtime::scheduler::multi_thread::worker::Context::run
18: tokio::macros::scoped_tls::ScopedKey<T>::set
19: tokio::runtime::scheduler::multi_thread::worker::run
20: tokio::loom::std::unsafe_cell::UnsafeCell<T>::with_mut
21: tokio::runtime::task::core::Core<T,S>::poll
22: tokio::runtime::task::harness::Harness<T,S>::poll
23: tokio::runtime::blocking::pool::Inner::run
note: Some details are omitted, run with `RUST_BACKTRACE=full` for a verbose backtrace.
Apr 15 09:37:37.069 INFO Saved DHT state service: network
Apr 15 09:37:37.070 INFO Network service shutdown service: network
Apr 15 09:37:37.132 CRIT Task panic. This is a bug! advice: Please check above for a backtrace and notify the developers, message: <none>, task_name: network
Apr 15 09:37:37.132 INFO Internal shutdown received reason: Panic (fatal error)
Apr 15 09:37:37.133 INFO Shutting down.. reason: Failure("Panic (fatal error)")
Apr 15 09:37:37.135 WARN Unable to free worker error: channel closed, msg: did not free worker, shutdown may be underway
Apr 15 09:37:39.350 INFO Saved beacon chain to disk service: beacon
Panic (fatal error)
```
## Issue Addressed
Closes#4185
## Proposed Changes
- Set user agent to `Lighthouse/vX.Y.Z-<commit hash>` by default
- Allow tweaking user agent via `--builder-user-agent "agent"`
## Proposed Changes
Builds on #4028 to use the new payload bodies methods in the HTTP API as well.
## Caveats
The payloads by range method only works for the finalized chain, so it can't be used in the execution engine integration tests because we try to reconstruct unfinalized payloads there.
## Issue Addressed
NA
## Proposed Changes
Apply two changes to code introduced in #4179:
1. Remove the `ERRO` log for when we error on `proposer_has_been_observed()`. We were seeing a lot of this in our logs for finalized blocks and it's a bit noisy.
1. Use `false` rather than `true` for `proposal_already_known` when there is an error. If a block raises an error in `proposer_has_been_observed()` then the block must be invalid, so we should process (and reject) it now rather than queuing it.
For reference, here is one of the offending `ERRO` logs:
```
ERRO Failed to check observed proposers block_root: 0x5845…878e, source: rpc, error: FinalizedBlock { slot: Slot(5410983), finalized_slot: Slot(5411232) }
```
## Additional Info
NA
## Issue Addressed
NA
## Proposed Changes
Similar to #4181 but without the version bump and a more nuanced fix.
Patches the high CPU usage seen after the Capella fork which was caused by processing exits when there are skip slots.
## Additional Info
~~This is an imperfect solution that will cause us to drop some exits at the fork boundary. This is tracked at #4184.~~
## Issue Addressed
Updated Lighthouse book on Section 2 and added some FAQs
## Proposed Changes
All changes are made in the book/src .md files.
## Additional Info
Please provide any additional information. For example, future considerations
or information useful for reviewers.
Co-authored-by: chonghe <tanck2005@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Michael Sproul <micsproul@gmail.com>
