## Issue Addressed
#4386
## Proposed Changes
The original proposal described in the issue adds a new endpoint to support updating validator graffiti, but I realized we already have an endpoint that we use for updating various validator fields in memory and in the validator definitions file, so I think that would be the best place to add this to.
### API endpoint
`PATCH lighthouse/validators/{validator_pubkey}`
This endpoint updates the graffiti in both the [ validator definition file](https://lighthouse-book.sigmaprime.io/graffiti.html#2-setting-the-graffiti-in-the-validator_definitionsyml) and the in memory `InitializedValidators`. In the next block proposal, the new graffiti will be used.
Note that the [`--graffiti-file`](https://lighthouse-book.sigmaprime.io/graffiti.html#1-using-the---graffiti-file-flag-on-the-validator-client) flag has a priority over the validator definitions file, so if the caller attempts to update the graffiti while the `--graffiti-file` flag is present, the endpoint will return an error (Bad request 400).
## Tasks
- [x] Add graffiti update support to `PATCH lighthouse/validators/{validator_pubkey}`
- [x] Return error if user tries to update graffiti while the `--graffiti-flag` is set
- [x] Update Lighthouse book
## Issue Addressed
NA
## Proposed Changes
Adds the `--validator-registration-batch-size` flag to the VC to allow runtime configuration of the number of validators POSTed to the [`validator/register_validator`](https://ethereum.github.io/beacon-APIs/?urls.primaryName=dev#/Validator/registerValidator) endpoint.
There are builders (Agnostic and Eden) that are timing out with `regsiterValidator` requests with ~400 validators, even with a 9 second timeout. Exposing the batch size will help tune batch sizes to (hopefully) avoid this.
This PR should not change the behavior of Lighthouse when the new flag is not provided (i.e., the same default value is used).
## Additional Info
NA
## Issue Addressed
NA
## Proposed Changes
Downgrade a `CRIT` to an `ERRO` when there's an `Irrecoverable` error whilst publishing a blinded block.
It's quite common for builders successfully broadcast a block to the network whilst failing to respond to the BN when it publishes a signed, blinded block. The VC is currently raising a `CRIT` when this happens and I think that's excessive.
These changes have the same intent as #4073. In that PR I only managed to remove the `CRIT`s in the BN but missed this one in the VC.
I've also tidied the log messages to:
- Give them all the same title (*"Error whilst producing block"*) to help with grepping.
- Include the `block_slot` so it's easy to look up the slot in an explorer and see if it was actually skipped.
## Additional Info
This PR should not change any logic beyond logging.
This PR adds the ability to read the Lighthouse logs from the HTTP API for both the BN and the VC.
This is done in such a way to as minimize any kind of performance hit by adding this feature.
The current design creates a tokio broadcast channel and mixes is into a form of slog drain that combines with our main global logger drain, only if the http api is enabled.
The drain gets the logs, checks the log level and drops them if they are below INFO. If they are INFO or higher, it sends them via a broadcast channel only if there are users subscribed to the HTTP API channel. If not, it drops the logs.
If there are more than one subscriber, the channel clones the log records and converts them to json in their independent HTTP API tasks.
Co-authored-by: Michael Sproul <micsproul@gmail.com>
## Issue Addressed
https://github.com/sigp/lighthouse/pull/4309#issuecomment-1556052261
## Proposed Changes
Log the `Connected to beacon node` message only if the node was previously offline. This avoids a regression in logging after #4295, whereby the `Connected to beacon node` message would be logged every slot.
The new reduced logging is _slightly different_ from what we had prior to my changes in #4295. The main difference is that we used to log the `Connected` message whenever a node was online and subject to a health check (for being unhealthy in some other way). I think the new behaviour is reasonable, as the `Connected` message isn't particularly helpful if the BN is unhealthy, and the specific reason for unhealthiness will be logged by the warnings for `is_compatible`/`is_synced`.
## Issue Addressed
Closes https://github.com/sigp/lighthouse/issues/4291, part of #3613.
## Proposed Changes
- Implement the `el_offline` field on `/eth/v1/node/syncing`. We set `el_offline=true` if:
- The EL's internal status is `Offline` or `AuthFailed`, _or_
- The most recent call to `newPayload` resulted in an error (more on this in a moment).
- Use the `el_offline` field in the VC to mark nodes with offline ELs as _unsynced_. These nodes will still be used, but only after synced nodes.
- Overhaul the usage of `RequireSynced` so that `::No` is used almost everywhere. The `--allow-unsynced` flag was broken and had the opposite effect to intended, so it has been deprecated.
- Add tests for the EL being offline on the upcheck call, and being offline due to the newPayload check.
## Why track `newPayload` errors?
Tracking the EL's online/offline status is too coarse-grained to be useful in practice, because:
- If the EL is timing out to some calls, it's unlikely to timeout on the `upcheck` call, which is _just_ `eth_syncing`. Every failed call is followed by an upcheck [here](693886b941/beacon_node/execution_layer/src/engines.rs (L372-L380)), which would have the effect of masking the failure and keeping the status _online_.
- The `newPayload` call is the most likely to time out. It's the call in which ELs tend to do most of their work (often 1-2 seconds), with `forkchoiceUpdated` usually returning much faster (<50ms).
- If `newPayload` is failing consistently (e.g. timing out) then this is a good indication that either the node's EL is in trouble, or the network as a whole is. In the first case validator clients _should_ prefer other BNs if they have one available. In the second case, all of their BNs will likely report `el_offline` and they'll just have to proceed with trying to use them.
## Additional Changes
- Add utility method `ForkName::latest` which is quite convenient for test writing, but probably other things too.
- Delete some stale comments from when we used to support multiple execution nodes.
It is a well-known fact that IP addresses for beacon nodes used by specific validators can be de-anonymized. There is an assumed risk that a malicious user may attempt to DOS validators when producing blocks to prevent chain growth/liveness.
Although there are a number of ideas put forward to address this, there a few simple approaches we can take to mitigate this risk.
Currently, a Lighthouse user is able to set a number of beacon-nodes that their validator client can connect to. If one beacon node is taken offline, it can fallback to another. Different beacon nodes can use VPNs or rotate IPs in order to mask their IPs.
This PR provides an additional setup option which further mitigates attacks of this kind.
This PR introduces a CLI flag --proposer-only to the beacon node. Setting this flag will configure the beacon node to run with minimal peers and crucially will not subscribe to subnets or sync committees. Therefore nodes of this kind should not be identified as nodes connected to validators of any kind.
It also introduces a CLI flag --proposer-nodes to the validator client. Users can then provide a number of beacon nodes (which may or may not run the --proposer-only flag) that the Validator client will use for block production and propagation only. If these nodes fail, the validator client will fallback to the default list of beacon nodes.
Users are then able to set up a number of beacon nodes dedicated to block proposals (which are unlikely to be identified as validator nodes) and point their validator clients to produce blocks on these nodes and attest on other beacon nodes. An attack attempting to prevent liveness on the eth2 network would then need to preemptively find and attack the proposer nodes which is significantly more difficult than the default setup.
This is a follow on from: #3328
Co-authored-by: Michael Sproul <michael@sigmaprime.io>
Co-authored-by: Paul Hauner <paul@paulhauner.com>
## Issue Addressed
Addresses #4117
## Proposed Changes
See https://github.com/ethereum/keymanager-APIs/pull/58 for proposed API specification.
## TODO
- [x] ~~Add submission to BN~~
- removed, see discussion in [keymanager API](https://github.com/ethereum/keymanager-APIs/pull/58)
- [x] ~~Add flag to allow voluntary exit via the API~~
- no longer needed now the VC doesn't submit exit directly
- [x] ~~Additional verification / checks, e.g. if validator on same network as BN~~
- to be done on client side
- [x] ~~Potentially wait for the message to propagate and return some exit information in the response~~
- not required
- [x] Update http tests
- [x] ~~Update lighthouse book~~
- not required if this endpoint makes it to the standard keymanager API
Co-authored-by: Paul Hauner <paul@paulhauner.com>
Co-authored-by: Jimmy Chen <jimmy@sigmaprime.io>
## Title
Optimise `update_validators` by decrypting key cache only when necessary
## Issue Addressed
Resolves [#3968: Slow performance of validator client PATCH API with hundreds of keys](https://github.com/sigp/lighthouse/issues/3968)
## Proposed Changes
1. Add a check to determine if there is at least one local definition before decrypting the key cache.
2. Assign an empty `KeyCache` when all definitions are of the `Web3Signer` type.
3. Perform cache-related operations (e.g., saving the modified key cache) only if there are local definitions.
## Additional Info
This PR addresses the excessive CPU usage and slow performance experienced when using the `PATCH lighthouse/validators/{pubkey}` request with a large number of keys. The issue was caused by the key cache using cryptography to decipher and cipher the cache entities every time the request was made. This operation called `scrypt`, which was very slow and required a lot of memory when there were many concurrent requests.
These changes have no impact on the overall functionality but can lead to significant performance improvements when working with remote signers. Importantly, the key cache is never used when there are only `Web3Signer` definitions, avoiding the expensive operation of decrypting the key cache in such cases.
Co-authored-by: Maksim Shcherbo <max.shcherbo@consensys.net>
* rename 4844 to deneb
* rename 4844 to deneb
* move excess data gas field
* get EF tests working
* fix ef tests lint
* fix the blob identifier ef test
* fix accessed files ef test script
* get beacon chain tests passing
## Issue Addressed
NA
## Proposed Changes
In #4024 we added metrics to expose the latency measurements from a VC to each BN. Whilst playing with these new metrics on our infra I realised it would be great to have a single metric to make sure that the primary BN for each VC has a reasonable latency. With the current "metrics for all BNs" it's hard to tell which is the primary.
## Additional Info
NA
## Issue Addressed
NA
## Proposed Changes
- Adds a `WARN` statement for Capella, just like the previous forks.
- Adds a hint message to all those WARNs to suggest the user update the BN or VC.
## Additional Info
NA
## Issue Addressed
Closes#3963 (hopefully)
## Proposed Changes
Compute attestation selection proofs gradually each slot rather than in a single `join_all` at the start of each epoch. On a machine with 5k validators this replaces 5k tasks signing 5k proofs with 1 task that signs 5k/32 ~= 160 proofs each slot.
Based on testing with Goerli validators this seems to reduce the average time to produce a signature by preventing Tokio and the OS from falling over each other trying to run hundreds of threads. My testing so far has been with local keystores, which run on a dynamic pool of up to 512 OS threads because they use [`spawn_blocking`](https://docs.rs/tokio/1.11.0/tokio/task/fn.spawn_blocking.html) (and we haven't changed the default).
An earlier version of this PR hyper-optimised the time-per-signature metric to the detriment of the entire system's performance (see the reverted commits). The current PR is conservative in that it avoids touching the attestation service at all. I think there's more optimising to do here, but we can come back for that in a future PR rather than expanding the scope of this one.
The new algorithm for attestation selection proofs is:
- We sign a small batch of selection proofs each slot, for slots up to 8 slots in the future. On average we'll sign one slot's worth of proofs per slot, with an 8 slot lookahead.
- The batch is signed halfway through the slot when there is unlikely to be contention for signature production (blocks are <4s, attestations are ~4-6 seconds, aggregates are 8s+).
## Performance Data
_See first comment for updated graphs_.
Graph of median signing times before this PR:
Graph of update attesters metric (includes selection proof signing) before this PR:
Median signing time after this PR (prototype from 12:00, updated version from 13:30):
99th percentile on signing times (bounded attestation signing from 16:55, now removed):
Attester map update timing after this PR:
Selection proof signings per second change:
## Link to late blocks
I believe this is related to the slow block signings because logs from Stakely in #3963 show these two logs almost 5 seconds apart:
> Feb 23 18:56:23.978 INFO Received unsigned block, slot: 5862880, service: block, module: validator_client::block_service:393
> Feb 23 18:56:28.552 INFO Publishing signed block, slot: 5862880, service: block, module: validator_client::block_service:416
The only thing that happens between those two logs is the signing of the block:
0fb58a680d/validator_client/src/block_service.rs (L410-L414)
Helpfully, Stakely noticed this issue without any Lighthouse BNs in the mix, which pointed to a clear issue in the VC.
## TODO
- [x] Further testing on testnet infrastructure.
- [x] Make the attestation signing parallelism configurable.
## Issue Addressed
NA
## Proposed Changes
Adds a service which periodically polls (11s into each mainnet slot) the `node/version` endpoint on each BN and roughly measures the round-trip latency. The latency is exposed as a `DEBG` log and a Prometheus metric.
The `--latency-measurement-service` has been added to the VC, with the following options:
- `--latency-measurement-service true`: enable the service (default).
- `--latency-measurement-service`: (without a value) has the same effect.
- `--latency-measurement-service false`: disable the service.
## Additional Info
Whilst looking at our staking setup, I think the BN+VC latency is contributing to late blocks. Now that we have to wait for the builders to respond it's nice to try and do everything we can to reduce that latency. Having visibility is the first step.
## Issue Addressed
Cleans up all the remnants of 4844 in capella. This makes sure when 4844 is reviewed there is nothing we are missing because it got included here
## Proposed Changes
drop a bomb on every 4844 thing
## Additional Info
Merge process I did (locally) is as follows:
- squash merge to produce one commit
- in new branch off unstable with the squashed commit create a `git revert HEAD` commit
- merge that new branch onto 4844 with `--strategy ours`
- compare local 4844 to remote 4844 and make sure the diff is empty
- enjoy
Co-authored-by: Paul Hauner <paul@paulhauner.com>
This fixes issues with certain metrics scrapers, which might error if the content-type is not correctly set.
## Issue Addressed
Fixes https://github.com/sigp/lighthouse/issues/3437
## Proposed Changes
Simply set header: `Content-Type: text/plain` on metrics server response. Seems like the errored branch does this correctly already.
## Additional Info
This is needed also to enable influx-db metric scraping which work very nicely with Geth.
## Issue Addressed
Resolves#2521
## Proposed Changes
Add a metric that indicates the next attestation duty slot for all managed validators in the validator client.
## Issue Addressed
#3853
## Proposed Changes
Added `INFO` level logs for requesting and receiving the unsigned block.
## Additional Info
Logging for successfully publishing the signed block is already there. And seemingly there is a log for when "We realize we are going to produce a block" in the `start_update_service`: `info!(log, "Block production service started");
`. Is there anywhere else you'd like to see logging around this event?
Co-authored-by: GeemoCandama <104614073+GeemoCandama@users.noreply.github.com>
## Issue Addressed
#3780
## Proposed Changes
Add error reporting that notifies the node operator that the `voting_keystore_path` in their `validator_definitions.yml` file may be incorrect.
## Additional Info
There is more info in issue #3780
Co-authored-by: Paul Hauner <paul@paulhauner.com>
