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Add check for head/target consistency (#1702)

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## Issue Addressed

NA

## Proposed Changes

Addresses an interesting DoS vector raised by @protolambda by verifying that the head and target are consistent when processing aggregate attestations. This check prevents us from loading very old target blocks and doing lots of work to skip them to the current slot.

## Additional Info

NA
This commit is contained in:
Paul Hauner 2020-10-02 10:46:37 +00:00
parent 6af3bc9ce2
commit c4bd9c86e6
No known key found for this signature in database
GPG Key ID: 5E2CFF9B75FA63DF
2 changed files with 79 additions and 33 deletions
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97
beacon_node/beacon_chain/src/attestation_verification.rs
View File

@ -237,7 +237,7 @@ pub enum Error {
/// The peer has sent an invalid message.
InvalidTargetRoot {
attestation: Hash256,
expected: Hash256,
expected: Option<Hash256>,
},
/// There was an error whilst processing the attestation. It is not known if it is valid or invalid.
///
@ -349,7 +349,16 @@ impl<T: BeaconChainTypes> VerifiedAggregatedAttestation<T> {
//
// Attestations must be for a known block. If the block is unknown, we simply drop the
// attestation and do not delay consideration for later.
verify_head_block_is_known(chain, &attestation, None)?;
let head_block = verify_head_block_is_known(chain, &attestation, None)?;
// Check the attestation target root is consistent with the head root.
//
// This check is not in the specification, however we guard against it since it opens us up
// to weird edge cases during verification.
//
// Whilst this attestation *technically* could be used to add value to a block, it is
// invalid in the spirit of the protocol. Here we choose safety over profit.
verify_attestation_target_root::<T::EthSpec>(&head_block, &attestation)?;
// Ensure that the attestation has participants.
if attestation.aggregation_bits.is_zero() {
@ -475,37 +484,8 @@ impl<T: BeaconChainTypes> VerifiedUnaggregatedAttestation<T> {
let head_block =
verify_head_block_is_known(chain, &attestation, chain.config.import_max_skip_slots)?;
// Check the attestation target root.
let head_block_epoch = head_block.slot.epoch(T::EthSpec::slots_per_epoch());
if head_block_epoch > attestation_epoch {
// The attestation points to a head block from an epoch later than the attestation.
//
// Whilst this seems clearly invalid in the "spirit of the protocol", there is nothing
// in the specification to prevent these messages from propagating.
//
// Reference:
// https://github.com/ethereum/eth2.0-specs/pull/2001#issuecomment-699246659
} else {
let target_root = if head_block_epoch == attestation_epoch {
// If the block is in the same epoch as the attestation, then use the target root
// from the block.
head_block.target_root
} else {
// If the head block is from a previous epoch then skip slots will cause the head block
// root to become the target block root.
//
// We know the head block is from a previous epoch due to a previous check.
head_block.root
};
// Reject any attestation with an invalid target root.
if target_root != attestation.data.target.root {
return Err(Error::InvalidTargetRoot {
attestation: attestation.data.target.root,
expected: target_root,
});
}
}
// Check the attestation target root is consistent with the head root.
verify_attestation_target_root::<T::EthSpec>(&head_block, &attestation)?;
let (indexed_attestation, committees_per_slot) =
obtain_indexed_attestation_and_committees_per_slot(chain, &attestation)?;
@ -715,6 +695,57 @@ pub fn verify_attestation_signature<T: BeaconChainTypes>(
}
}
/// Verifies that the `attestation.data.target.root` is indeed the target root of the block at
/// `attestation.data.beacon_block_root`.
pub fn verify_attestation_target_root<T: EthSpec>(
head_block: &ProtoBlock,
attestation: &Attestation<T>,
) -> Result<(), Error> {
// Check the attestation target root.
let head_block_epoch = head_block.slot.epoch(T::slots_per_epoch());
let attestation_epoch = attestation.data.slot.epoch(T::slots_per_epoch());
if head_block_epoch > attestation_epoch {
// The epoch references an invalid head block from a future epoch.
//
// This check is not in the specification, however we guard against it since it opens us up
// to weird edge cases during verification.
//
// Whilst this attestation *technically* could be used to add value to a block, it is
// invalid in the spirit of the protocol. Here we choose safety over profit.
//
// Reference:
// https://github.com/ethereum/eth2.0-specs/pull/2001#issuecomment-699246659
return Err(Error::InvalidTargetRoot {
attestation: attestation.data.target.root,
// It is not clear what root we should expect in this case, since the attestation is
// fundamentally invalid.
expected: None,
});
} else {
let target_root = if head_block_epoch == attestation_epoch {
// If the block is in the same epoch as the attestation, then use the target root
// from the block.
head_block.target_root
} else {
// If the head block is from a previous epoch then skip slots will cause the head block
// root to become the target block root.
//
// We know the head block is from a previous epoch due to a previous check.
head_block.root
};
// Reject any attestation with an invalid target root.
if target_root != attestation.data.target.root {
return Err(Error::InvalidTargetRoot {
attestation: attestation.data.target.root,
expected: Some(target_root),
});
}
}
Ok(())
}
/// Verifies all the signatures in a `SignedAggregateAndProof` using BLS batch verification. This
/// includes three signatures:
///

15
beacon_node/beacon_chain/tests/attestation_verification.rs
View File

@ -278,6 +278,21 @@ fn aggregated_gossip_verification() {
&& earliest_permissible_slot == current_slot - E::slots_per_epoch() - 1
);
/*
* This is not in the specification for aggregate attestations (only unaggregates), but we
* check it anyway to avoid weird edge cases.
*/
let unknown_root = Hash256::from_low_u64_le(424242);
assert_invalid!(
"attestation with invalid target root",
{
let mut a = valid_aggregate.clone();
a.message.aggregate.data.target.root = unknown_root;
a
},
AttnError::InvalidTargetRoot { .. }
);
/*
* The following test ensures:
*